August 16, 2022

The Honorable Kimberly D. Bose
Secretary
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
888 First Street, NE
Washington, DC 20426

Re: California Independent System Operator Corporation
Docket: ER15-2565-__
Independent Assessment by the Department of Market Monitoring
June 2022 Western Energy Imbalance Market Transition Period Report for Bonneville Power Administration

Dear Secretary Bose:

The Department of Market Monitoring (DMM) hereby submits its independent assessment on the transition period of Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) during its first six months of participation in the Western Energy Imbalance Market (WEIM) for June 2022, as BPA joined the WEIM on May 3, 2022.

Please contact the undersigned directly with any questions or concerns regarding the foregoing.

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Eric Hildebrandt

Eric Hildebrandt
Director of Market Monitoring
California Independent System Operator Corporation
250 Outcropping Way
Folsom, CA 95630
Tel: (916) 608-7123
Fax: (916) 608-7222
ehildebrandt@caiso.com
California ISO

Report on Western Energy Imbalance Market issues and performance:
Bonneville Power Administration for June 2022

August 16, 2022

Prepared by: Department of Market Monitoring
Executive summary

Pursuant to the Commission’s October 29, 2015 order on the California ISO’s Western Energy Imbalance Market (WEIM), the California ISO (CAISO) filed a report on August 4, 2022 covering the period from June 1 through June 30, 2022 (June report) for Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) in the Western Energy Imbalance Market.\(^1\) BPA joined the Western Energy Imbalance Market on May 3, 2022, and the transition period will apply to the BPA balancing authority area (BAA) until October 31, 2022.\(^2\)

This report provides a review by the Department of Market Monitoring (DMM) of Western Energy Imbalance Market performance for the BPA balancing authority area during the period covered in the CAISO’s June report. This is the second report for the transition period of the BPA balancing authority area. Key findings in this report include the following:

- Prices in the BPA area tracked similarly with prices in the North WEIM region, but well below prices at the Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) default aggregation point within the CAISO.

- The BPA balancing authority area failed the upward and downward sufficiency tests during 90 intervals and 7 intervals, respectively, as well as the upward capacity test during 3 intervals. BPA did not fail the downward bid range capacity test in June.

- There were no valid under-supply or over-supply infeasibilities in the 15-minute or 5-minute markets.

- Transition period pricing decreased BPA area prices in the 15-minute and 5-minute markets by $0.46/MWh and $1.05/MWh, respectively.

Section 1 of this report provides a description of prices and power balance constraint relaxations and Section 2 discusses the flexible ramping sufficiency and bid range capacity tests.

---


\(^2\) This follows from the application of CAISO Tariff section 27(b)(1), which refers to a number of months rather than a number of days.
1 Western Energy Imbalance Market prices

Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 show hourly average 15-minute and 5-minute prices during June for BPA compared with prices in the CAISO at the Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) default load aggregation point and the average North WEIM regional prices.\(^3\)

Average prices in the Bonneville Power Administration area tracked similarly to prices in the North WEIM region, but well below prices at the PG&E default aggregation point within the CAISO. Price separations between BPA and the North WEIM occurred throughout the day. For the month, BPA prices averaged $10.29/MWh in the 15-minute market and $1.96/MWh in the 5-minute market.

---

\(^3\) The North WEIM region includes PacifiCorp West, Portland General Electric, Puget Sound Energy, Seattle City Light, and Powerex. Bonneville Power Administration, Avista Utilities, and Tacoma Power are located in the North WEIM region but are not included in the regional average for this analysis.
All power balance constraint relaxations that occurred in June were subject to the six-month transition period pricing that expires on November 1, 2022. The transition period pricing mechanism sets prices at the highest cost supply bid dispatched to meet demand rather than at the $1,000/MWh penalty parameter while relaxing the constraint for shortages, or the -$155/MWh penalty parameter while relaxing the constraint for excess energy. Power balance constraint relaxations can be grouped in the following categories:

- **Valid under-supply infeasibility** (power balance constraint shortage). These occurred when the power balance constraint was relaxed because load exceeded available generation. The CAISO validated that their software was working appropriately during these instances.

- **Valid over-supply infeasibility** (power balance constraint excess). These occurred when the power balance constraint was relaxed because generation exceeded load. The CAISO validated that their software was working appropriately during these instances.

- **Load conformance limiter would have resolved infeasibility.** The load conformance limiter automatically reduces the size of an operator load adjustment and sets prices at the last economic

---

4 When transition period pricing provisions are triggered by relaxation of the power balance constraint, any shadow price associated with the flexible ramping product is set to $0/MWh to allow the market software to use the last economic bid dispatched.

5 The penalty parameter while relaxing the constraint for shortages may rise from $1,000/MWh to $2,000/MWh, depending on system conditions, per phase 2 implementation of FERC Order 831.
signal when the conditions for the limiter are met. During the transition period, the limiter does not change price outcomes because transition period pricing is applied during these intervals instead. However, in these cases, the load conformance limiter *would have resolved the infeasibility* had transition period pricing not been in effect.

- **Correctable infeasibility.** These occurred when the CAISO software relaxed the power balance constraint concurrent with a software error or data error that resulted in a price correction or would have triggered a price correction if transition period pricing were not active.

Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4 show the weekly frequency of under-supply and over-supply infeasibilities, respectively, in the 15-minute and 5-minute markets. In June, BPA had no valid under-supply or over-supply infeasibilities in the 15-minute or 5-minute markets.

Additionally, there were no intervals during June when the load conformance limiter would have triggered in the 15-minute or 5-minute markets for the BPA balancing authority area, had transition period pricing not been in effect.

---

6 The CAISO implemented an enhancement to the load conformance limiter, effective February 27, 2019. With the enhancement, the load conformance limiter triggers by a measure based on the change in load adjustment from one interval to the next, rather than the total level of load adjustment.

7 Section 35 of the CAISO tariff provides the CAISO authority to correct prices if it detects an invalid market solution or issues due to a data input failure, occurrence of hardware or software failure, or a result that is inconsistent with the CAISO tariff. During erroneous intervals, the CAISO determined that prices resulting under transition period pricing were equivalent to prices that would result from a price correction, so no further price adjustment was appropriate. [http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Section35_MarketValidationAndPriceCorrection_May1_2014.pdf](http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Section35_MarketValidationAndPriceCorrection_May1_2014.pdf)
Figure 1.3  Frequency of under-supply power balance infeasibilities by week
Bonneville Power Administration

Figure 1.4  Frequency of over-supply power balance infeasibilities by week
Bonneville Power Administration
Figure 1.5 and 1.6 show the average weekly prices in the 15-minute and 5-minute markets with and without the special transition period pricing provisions applied to mitigate prices in the BPA area during the month. On average for June, transition period pricing decreased BPA area prices in the 15-minute and 5-minute markets by $0.46/MWh and $1.05/MWh, respectively.

---

8 A detailed description of the methodology used to calculate these counterfactual prices that would result without transition period pricing was provided on p. 7 of the January 2017 report for Arizona Public Service from DMM: [http://www.caiso.com/Documents/May1_2017_Department_MarketMonitoring_EIMTransitionPeriodReport_ArizonaPublicService_Jan2017_ER15-2565.pdf](http://www.caiso.com/Documents/May1_2017_Department_MarketMonitoring_EIMTransitionPeriodReport_ArizonaPublicService_Jan2017_ER15-2565.pdf)
Figure 1.5  Average prices by week – Bonneville Power Administration (BPA)  
(15-minute market)

![Graph showing average prices by week for Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) from 3-May to 28-Jun. The graph compares BPA price, BPA price without transition period pricing, and PG&E price.](image)

Figure 1.6  Average prices by week – Bonneville Power Administration (BPA)  
(5-minute market)

![Graph showing average prices by week for Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) from 3-May to 28-Jun. The graph compares BPA price, BPA price without transition period pricing, and PG&E price.](image)
2 Flexible ramping sufficiency and bid range capacity tests

As part of the Western Energy Imbalance Market, each area, including the California ISO, is subject to a resource sufficiency evaluation. The evaluation is performed prior to each hour to ensure that generation in each area is sufficient without relying on transfers from other balancing areas. The evaluation includes two tests:

- **The bid range capacity test (capacity test)** requires that each area provide incremental bid-in capacity to meet the imbalance between load, intertie, and generation base schedules.

- **The flexible ramping sufficiency test (sufficiency test)** requires that each balancing area has enough ramping flexibility over an hour to meet the forecasted change in demand as well as uncertainty.

If an area fails either the bid range capacity test or flexible ramping sufficiency test, energy imbalance market transfers into that area cannot be increased. If an area fails either test in the upward direction, net WEIM imports (negative) during the hour cannot exceed the lower of either the base transfer or optimal transfer from the last 15-minute interval prior to the hour. Failures of the capacity and sufficiency test are important because these outcomes limit transfer capability. Constraining transfer capability may affect the efficiency of the WEIM by limiting transfers into and out of a balancing area that could potentially provide benefits to other balancing areas. Reduced transfer capability also affects the ability for an area to balance load, since there is less availability to import-from or export-to neighboring areas. This can result in local prices being set at power balance constraint penalty parameters.

The BPA balancing authority area failed the upward and downward sufficiency tests during 90 intervals and 7 intervals, respectively, as well as the upward capacity test during 3 intervals. BPA did not fail the downward bid range capacity test in June.

---

9 If an area fails either test in the upward direction, net WEIM imports (negative) during the hour cannot exceed the lower of either the base transfer or optimal transfer from the last 15-minute interval prior to the hour.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I have served the foregoing document upon the parties listed on the official service list in the captioned proceedings, in accordance with the requirements of Rule 2010 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 C.F.R. § 385.2010).

Dated at Folsom, California, this 16th day of August, 2022.

/s/ Jennifer Shirk
Jennifer Shirk