Decision on FERC Order No. 831 - import bidding and market parameters proposal

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General Session
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FERC Order No. 831 required ISO/RTOs make compliance filing to raise energy offer caps to $2,000/MWh

- Verify generator costs for bids above $1,000/MWh before the market run to be eligible to set energy prices
  - Did not require verification rules for import or virtual bids above $1,000/MWh

- ISO requested FERC defer implementation of 831 compliance filing until completion of this initiative and implementation of the resulting enhancements
This initiative addresses two topics related to the ISO’s compliance with FERC Order No. 831

1. Adjusting market constraint relaxation parameter prices to align with the increased energy bid cap

2. Price screening methodology for import bids greater than $1,000/MWh
Proposal defines specific conditions for setting power balance relaxation parameter prices

- Parameter prices remain unchanged unless verified bid costs are above $1,000/MWh

- If the ISO verifies bid costs above $1,000/MWh, then
  - If shortfall ≤ threshold, prices set based on the highest-priced cleared bid
  - Else, if shortfall > threshold, prices set based on $2,000/MWh power balance constraint

- Threshold for each balancing authority area set at NERC area control error limits
  - Annual calculation based on NERC requirements
Power balance constraint threshold values scaled to the size of each balancing authority area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Balancing Authority Area</th>
<th>Threshold Values (MW)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AZPS</td>
<td>67.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BANC – total</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCHA</td>
<td>77.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>233.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPCO</td>
<td>25.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEVP</td>
<td>43.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACE</td>
<td>61.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACW</td>
<td>31.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>PGE</td>
<td>27.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSEI</td>
<td>24.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCL</td>
<td>26.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRP</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Proposal provides additional protections for import and virtual bids greater than $1,000/MWh by using a maximum import bid price index

- Maximum import bid price index estimates energy prices outside of the ISO and EIM
  - Index calculated using the maximum of Palo Verde and Mid-Columbia bilateral on-peak hub prices
  - 16-hour hub prices shaped into hourly prices using ISO market prices from nearest high priced day

- Maximum import bid price index used with highest resource verified cost to evaluate import and virtual bids
Maximum import bid price index used to: 1) screen imports and virtual bids above $1,000/MWh and 2) limit resource adequacy import bids above $1,000/MWh

• Non-resource adequacy imports and virtual supplier bids greater than $1,000/MWh are allowed only under the following conditions:
  – The maximum allowable import bid index is greater than $1,000/MWh, or
  – The ISO has verified a specific resource’s cost to be greater than $1,000

• Resource adequacy import bids above $1,000/MWh reduced to greater of:
  – highest resource specific verified cost
  – maximum allowable import bid index, or
  – $1,000/MWh
Stakeholders generally support proposals related to the ISO’s compliance with FERC Order No. 831

- California IOUs, EIM Entities, DMM, and MSC generally support pricing proposal

- Suppliers and WPTF do not support pricing threshold and believe power balance constraint should be $2,000/MWh all of the time under FERC Order 831 implementation

- CPUC believes the ISO should cost verify all import bids

- Some market participants have requested that the ISO take on a scarcity pricing initiative
Management requests the Board approve the FERC Order No. 831 proposal

- Provides for appropriate shortage pricing levels under the FERC mandated $2,000/MWh bid cap

- Provides additional protections for import and virtual bids above $1,000/MWh
  - Ensures accepted import bids are aligned with bilateral market conditions
  - Does not discourage imports from bidding into the ISO market during tight supply conditions