	Criteria Grid reliability	Score Rationale  3 Better hedge achieved over multiple rounds allows generators to offer energy without the reservations about possible congestion impact on their bottom line
	Sha reliability	A. Better price discovery in multiple rounds as opposed to a single round.
Donfita	Improving overall market efficiency	10 B. The outcome of the previous round may help a MP in its bidding in the next rounds. Learning process from round to round for MPs.
Benfits		C. Risk mitigation for CAISO: if something goes wrong in one round, the potential damage is limited to that round.  From the 2013 Stakeholder Initiatives Catalog: "The ISO's January 29, 2007 compliance filing on long term CRRs noted that several parties wanted the ISO to implement an auction process for long term CRRs, which the
	Desired by stakeholdres	10 ISO agreed to consider for a future release. FERC's July 6, 2007 Order on CRRs encouraged the ISO to initiate a stakeholder process and file tariff language to implement an auction for residual long term CRRs in a future
		release of the new market."
Feasibility	Market Participant Implementation Impact (\$ and resources)	Very little impact impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in only the the first round (in this case it would be doing what it is doing today) or participate in any additional rounds with the same bids as in the first round to try and purchase the balance of what it needs
	ISO Implementation Impact (\$ and resources	7 Very few adjustments are required: just split the capacity between the rounds and keep track of what has been bought and sold
Initiative	7.4 Long Term CRR Auction Sub-initiative 2: rolling long-term auction	on where future periods such as future months, quarters, half-a-year strips, or years can be traded multiple times.
	Criteria	Score Rationale
Benfits	Grid reliability	3 Better hedge achieved over multiple rounds allows market participants to contract for longer term
		A. Better price discovery over longer time horizon and at multiple times.  B. The outcome of the previous sequence may help a MP in its bidding in the next sequences.
	Improving overall market efficiency	C. Allows to maintain a smooth rolling hedging position over a long-term
50		From the 2013 Stakeholder Initiatives Catalog: "The ISO's January 29, 2007 compliance filing on long term CRRs noted that several parties wanted the ISO to implement an auction process for long term CRRs, which the
	Desired by stakeholdres	10 ISO agreed to consider for a future release. FERC's July 6, 2007 Order on CRRs encouraged the ISO to initiate a stakeholder process and file tariff language to implement an auction for residual long term CRRs in a future
	•	
		release of the new market."
Feasibility	Market Participant Implementation Impact (\$ and resources)	7 Very little impact impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the auctions they see fit
Feasibility	Market Participant Implementation Impact (\$ and resources) ISO Implementation Impact (\$ and resources	
Feasibility		7 Very little impact impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the auctions they see fit
	ISO Implementation Impact (\$ and resources	7 Very little impact impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the auctions they see fit
Feasibility Initiative		7 Very little impact impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the auctions they see fit
	ISO Implementation Impact (\$ and resources  8.3 Implement Point-to-Point (PTP) Convergence Bids  Criteria	7 Very little impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the auctions they see fit 7 CAISO CRR group needs to think through the maintenance of inventory  Score Rationale
	ISO Implementation Impact (\$ and resources  8.3 Implement Point-to-Point (PTP) Convergence Bids	7 Very little impact impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the auctions they see fit 7 CAISO CRR group needs to think through the maintenance of inventory
	ISO Implementation Impact (\$ and resources  8.3 Implement Point-to-Point (PTP) Convergence Bids  Criteria	7 Very little impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the auctions they see fit 7 CAISO CRR group needs to think through the maintenance of inventory  Score Rationale
Initiative	8.3 Implement Point-to-Point (PTP) Convergence Bids Criteria Grid reliability	7 Very little impact impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the auctions they see fit 7 CAISO CRR group needs to think through the maintenance of inventory  Score Rationale 3 Better DAM results, converging DAM constraints to RTM constraints, thus better constraint management  A. Better convergence of DAM to RTM as it allows PTPs to be aligned with constraints and thus converge shadow price in DAM to shadow prices in RTM. Constraints are linear instruments and are better served with linear Convergence Bids (CBs), i.e. PTPs, as opposed to virtual transactions (VTs) that may achieve only point by point convergence but not constraint by constraint convergence.
Initiative	ISO Implementation Impact (\$ and resources  8.3 Implement Point-to-Point (PTP) Convergence Bids  Criteria	7 Very little impact impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the auctions they see fit 7 CAISO CRR group needs to think through the maintenance of inventory  Score Rationale 3 Better DAM results, converging DAM constraints to RTM constraints, thus better constraint management  A. Better convergence of DAM to RTM as it allows PTPs to be aligned with constraints and thus converge shadow price in DAM to shadow prices in RTM. Constraints are linear instruments and are better served with linear Convergence Bids (CBs), i.e. PTPs, as opposed to virtual transactions (VTs) that may achieve only point by point convergence but not constraint by constraint convergence.  B. Better risk management for Market Participants (MPs) as they do not have to submit price taking pair of virtual supply (VS) and virtual demand (VD), when bidding on constraints, and thus unwillingly expose
Initiative	8.3 Implement Point-to-Point (PTP) Convergence Bids Criteria Grid reliability	7 Very little impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the auctions they see fit 7 CAISO CRR group needs to think through the maintenance of inventory  Score Rationale 3 Better DAM results, converging DAM constraints to RTM constraints, thus better constraint management  A. Better convergence of DAM to RTM as it allows PTPs to be aligned with constraints and thus converge shadow price in DAM to shadow prices in RTM. Constraints are linear instruments and are better served with linear Convergence Bids (CBs), i.e. PTPs, as opposed to virtual transactions (VTs) that may achieve only point by point convergence but not constraint by constraint convergence.  B. Better risk management for Market Participants (MPs) as they do not have to submit price taking pair of virtual supply (VS) and virtual demand (VD), when bidding on constraints, and thus unwillingly expose themselves to unrealistic levels of DAM shadow prices that are unlikely to materialize in RTM. There is also no risk of exposure to system energy price due to asymmetric clearing, which is always present when bidding a
Initiative	8.3 Implement Point-to-Point (PTP) Convergence Bids Criteria Grid reliability	7 Very little impact impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the auctions they see fit 7 CAISO CRR group needs to think through the maintenance of inventory  Score Rationale 3 Better DAM results, converging DAM constraints to RTM constraints, thus better constraint management  A. Better convergence of DAM to RTM as it allows PTPs to be aligned with constraints and thus converge shadow price in DAM to shadow prices in RTM. Constraints are linear instruments and are better served with linear Convergence Bids (CBs), i.e. PTPs, as opposed to virtual transactions (VTs) that may achieve only point by point convergence but not constraint by constraint convergence.  B. Better risk management for Market Participants (MPs) as they do not have to submit price taking pair of virtual supply (VS) and virtual demand (VD), when bidding on constraints, and thus unwillingly expose
Initiative Benfits	8.3 Implement Point-to-Point (PTP) Convergence Bids Criteria Grid reliability Improving overall market efficiency	7 Very little impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the auctions they see fit 7 CAISO CRR group needs to think through the maintenance of inventory  Score 8 Rationale 3 Better DAM results, converging DAM constraints to RTM constraints, thus better constraint management  A. Better convergence of DAM to RTM as it allows PTPs to be aligned with constraints and thus converge shadow price in DAM to shadow prices in RTM. Constraints are linear instruments and are better served with linear Convergence Bids (CBs), i.e. PTPs, as opposed to virtual transactions (VTs) that may achieve only point by point convergence but not constraint by constraint convergence. B. Better risk management for Market Participants (MPs) as they do not have to submit price taking pair of virtual supply (VS) and virtual demand (VD), when bidding on constraints, and thus unwillingly expose themselves to unrealistic levels of DAM shadow prices that are unlikely to materialize in RTM. There is also no risk of exposure to system energy price due to asymmetric clearing, which is always present when bidding a pair of VS and VD. In PTP CB its source and sink always clear together.  10 No reason to see, why such instrument with multiple upsides and no downside would not be welcome by MPs 10 Very little impact impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the PTP bidding as they see fit
Initiative	8.3 Implement Point-to-Point (PTP) Convergence Bids Criteria Grid reliability Improving overall market efficiency Desired by stakeholdres	7 Very little impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the auctions they see fit 7 CAISO CRR group needs to think through the maintenance of inventory  Score  Rationale 3 Better DAM results, converging DAM constraints to RTM constraints, thus better constraint management  A. Better convergence of DAM to RTM as it allows PTPs to be aligned with constraints and thus converge shadow price in DAM to shadow prices in RTM. Constraints are linear instruments and are better served with linear Convergence Bids (CBs), i.e. PTPs, as opposed to virtual transactions (VTs) that may achieve only point by point convergence but not constraint convergence.  B. Better risk management for Market Participants (MPs) as they do not have to submit price taking pair of virtual supply (VS) and virtual demand (VD), when bidding on constraints, and thus unwillingly expose themselves to unrealistic levels of DAM shadow prices that are unlikely to materialize in RTM. There is also no risk of exposure to system energy price due to asymmetric clearing, which is always present when bidding a pair of VS and VD. In PTP CB its source and sink always clear together.  10 No reason to see, why such instrument with multiple upsides and no downside would not be welcome by MPs  10 Very little impact impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the PTP bidding as they see fit  7 Since CAISO already has wheeling transactions implemented in its clearing system, it seems to be a matter of extending those to include internal CB locations to enable PTP CBs to clear alongside VS and VD system-
Initiative Benfits	8.3 Implement Point-to-Point (PTP) Convergence Bids Criteria Grid reliability Improving overall market efficiency Desired by stakeholdres Market Participant Implementation Impact (\$ and resources)	7 Very little impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the auctions they see fit 7 CAISO CRR group needs to think through the maintenance of inventory  Score 8 Rationale 3 Better DAM results, converging DAM constraints to RTM constraints, thus better constraint management  A. Better convergence of DAM to RTM as it allows PTPs to be aligned with constraints and thus converge shadow price in DAM to shadow prices in RTM. Constraints are linear instruments and are better served with linear Convergence Bids (CBs), i.e. PTPs, as opposed to virtual transactions (VTs) that may achieve only point by point convergence but not constraint by constraint convergence. B. Better risk management for Market Participants (MPs) as they do not have to submit price taking pair of virtual supply (VS) and virtual demand (VD), when bidding on constraints, and thus unwillingly expose themselves to unrealistic levels of DAM shadow prices that are unlikely to materialize in RTM. There is also no risk of exposure to system energy price due to asymmetric clearing, which is always present when bidding a pair of VS and VD. In PTP CB its source and sink always clear together.  10 No reason to see, why such instrument with multiple upsides and no downside would not be welcome by MPs 10 Very little impact impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the PTP bidding as they see fit
Initiative  Benfits  Feasibility	8.3 Implement Point-to-Point (PTP) Convergence Bids  Criteria Grid reliability  Improving overall market efficiency  Desired by stakeholdres Market Participant Implementation Impact (\$ and resources)  ISO Implementation Impact (\$ and resources)	7 Very little impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the auctions they see fit 7 CAISO CRR group needs to think through the maintenance of inventory  Score  Rationale 3 Better DAM results, converging DAM constraints to RTM constraints, thus better constraint management  A. Better convergence of DAM to RTM as it allows PTPs to be aligned with constraints and thus converge shadow price in DAM to shadow prices in RTM. Constraints are linear instruments and are better served with linear Convergence Bids (CBs), i.e. PTPs, as opposed to virtual transactions (VTs) that may achieve only point by point convergence but not constraint convergence.  B. Better risk management for Market Participants (MPs) as they do not have to submit price taking pair of virtual supply (VS) and virtual demand (VD), when bidding on constraints, and thus unwillingly expose themselves to unrealistic levels of DAM shadow prices that are unlikely to materialize in RTM. There is also no risk of exposure to system energy price due to asymmetric clearing, which is always present when bidding a pair of VS and VD. In PTP CB its source and sink always clear together.  10 No reason to see, why such instrument with multiple upsides and no downside would not be welcome by MPs  10 Very little impact impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the PTP bidding as they see fit  7 Since CAISO already has wheeling transactions implemented in its clearing system, it seems to be a matter of extending those to include internal CB locations to enable PTP CBs to clear alongside VS and VD system-
Initiative Benfits	8.3 Implement Point-to-Point (PTP) Convergence Bids Criteria Grid reliability Improving overall market efficiency Desired by stakeholdres Market Participant Implementation Impact (\$ and resources)	7 Very little impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the auctions they see fit 7 CAISO CRR group needs to think through the maintenance of inventory  Score  Rationale 3 Better DAM results, converging DAM constraints to RTM constraints, thus better constraint management  A. Better convergence of DAM to RTM as it allows PTPs to be aligned with constraints and thus converge shadow price in DAM to shadow prices in RTM. Constraints are linear instruments and are better served with linear Convergence Bids (CBs), i.e. PTPs, as opposed to virtual transactions (VTs) that may achieve only point by point convergence but not constraint convergence.  B. Better risk management for Market Participants (MPs) as they do not have to submit price taking pair of virtual supply (VS) and virtual demand (VD), when bidding on constraints, and thus unwillingly expose themselves to unrealistic levels of DAM shadow prices that are unlikely to materialize in RTM. There is also no risk of exposure to system energy price due to asymmetric clearing, which is always present when bidding a pair of VS and VD. In PTP CB its source and sink always clear together.  10 No reason to see, why such instrument with multiple upsides and no downside would not be welcome by MPs  10 Very little impact impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the PTP bidding as they see fit  7 Since CAISO already has wheeling transactions implemented in its clearing system, it seems to be a matter of extending those to include internal CB locations to enable PTP CBs to clear alongside VS and VD system-
Initiative  Benfits  Feasibility	8.3 Implement Point-to-Point (PTP) Convergence Bids  Criteria Grid reliability  Improving overall market efficiency  Desired by stakeholdres Market Participant Implementation Impact (\$ and resources)  ISO Implementation Impact (\$ and resources)	7 Very little impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the auctions they see fit 7 CAISO CRR group needs to think through the maintenance of inventory  Score  Rationale 3 Better DAM results, converging DAM constraints to RTM constraints, thus better constraint management  A. Better convergence of DAM to RTM as it allows PTPs to be aligned with constraints and thus converge shadow price in DAM to shadow prices in RTM. Constraints are linear instruments and are better served with linear Convergence Bids (CBs), i.e. PTPs, as opposed to virtual transactions (VTs) that may achieve only point by point convergence but not constraint convergence.  B. Better risk management for Market Participants (MPs) as they do not have to submit price taking pair of virtual supply (VS) and virtual demand (VD), when bidding on constraints, and thus unwillingly expose themselves to unrealistic levels of DAM shadow prices that are unlikely to materialize in RTM. There is also no risk of exposure to system energy price due to asymmetric clearing, which is always present when bidding a pair of VS and VD. In PTP CB its source and sink always clear together.  10 No reason to see, why such instrument with multiple upsides and no downside would not be welcome by MPs  10 Very little impact impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the PTP bidding as they see fit  7 Since CAISO already has wheeling transactions implemented in its clearing system, it seems to be a matter of extending those to include internal CB locations to enable PTP CBs to clear alongside VS and VD system-
Initiative  Benfits  Feasibility	8.3 Implement Point-to-Point (PTP) Convergence Bids Criteria Grid reliability Improving overall market efficiency Desired by stakeholdres Market Participant Implementation Impact (\$ and resources) ISO Implementation Impact (\$ and resources) 8.1 Allowing Convergence Bidding at CRR Sub-LAPs	Score Rationale  3 Better DAM results, converging DAM constraints to RTM constraints, thus better constraint management  A. Better convergence of DAM to RTM as it allows PTPs to be aligned with constraints and thus converge shadow price in DAM to shadow prices in RTM. Constraints are linear instruments and are better served with linear Convergence Bids (CBS), i.e. PTPs, as opposed to virtual transactions (VTs) that may achieve only point by point convergence but not constraint by constraint convergence.  10 B. Better risk management for Market Participants (MPs) as they do not have to submit price taking pair of virtual supply (VS) and virtual demand (VD), when bidding on constraints, and thus unwillingly expose themselves to unrealistic levels of DAM shadow prices that are unlikely to materialize in RTM. There is also no risk of exposure to system energy price due to asymmetric clearing, which is always present when bidding a pair of VS and VD. In PTP CB its source and sink always clear together.  10 No reason to see, why such instrument with multiple upsides and no downside would not be welcome by MPs  10 Very little impact impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the PTP bidding as they see fit  7 Since CAISO already has wheeling transactions implemented in its clearing system, it seems to be a matter of extending those to include internal CB locations to enable PTP CBs to clear alongside VS and VD system-wide. Other markets, such as PJM and ERCOT, have successfully implemented PTP bids (aka "Up-to-congestion bids") and MISO is implementing such PTP bids.
Initiative  Benfits  Feasibility	8.3 Implement Point-to-Point (PTP) Convergence Bids  Criteria Grid reliability  Improving overall market efficiency  Desired by stakeholdres Market Participant Implementation Impact (\$ and resources)  ISO Implementation Impact (\$ and resources)  8.1 Allowing Convergence Bidding at CRR Sub-LAPs  Criteria	7 Very little impact impact a given market participant may choose to participate in the auctions they see fit 7 CAISO CRR group needs to think through the maintenance of inventory  Score  Rationale 3 Better DAM results, converging DAM constraints to RTM constraints, thus better constraint management  A. Better convergence of DAM to RTM as it allows PTPs to be aligned with constraints and thus converge shadow price in DAM to shadow prices in RTM. Constraints are linear instruments and are better served with linear Convergence Bids (CBs), i.e. PTPs, as opposed to virtual transactions (VTs) that may achieve only point to proint convergence but not constraint by constraint convergence.  B. Better risk management for Market Participants (MFs) as they do not have to submit price taking pair of virtual supply (VS) and virtual demand (VD), when bidding on constraints, and thus unwillingly expose themselves to unrealistic levels of DAM shadow prices that are unlikely to materialize in RTM. There is also no risk of exposure to system energy price due to asymmetric clearing, which is always present when bidding a pair of VS and VD. In PTP C Bit source and sink always clear together.  10 No reason to see, why such instrument with multiple upsides and no downside would not be welcome by MPs  10 Very little impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the PTP bidding as they see fit wide. Other markets, such as PJM and ERCOT, have successfully implemented PTP bids (aka "Up-to-congestion bids") and MISO is implementing such PTP bids.  Score  Rationale 3 Better convergence of DAM and RTM on a sub-LAP level
Initiative  Benfits  Feasibility  Initiative	8.3 Implement Point-to-Point (PTP) Convergence Bids Criteria Grid reliability Improving overall market efficiency Desired by stakeholdres Market Participant Implementation Impact (\$ and resources) ISO Implementation Impact (\$ and resources  8.1 Allowing Convergence Bidding at CRR Sub-LAPs Criteria Grid reliability	7 Very little impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the auctions they see fit 7 CAISO CRR group needs to think through the maintenance of inventory  Score 8 Rationale 9 Better DAM results, converging DAM constraints to RTM constraints, thus better constraint management A. Better convergence of DAM to RTM as it allows PTPs to be aligned with constraints and thus converge shadow price in DAM to shadow prices in RTM. Constraints are linear instruments and are better served with linear Convergence Bids (CBs), i.e. PTPs, as opposed to virtual transactions (VTS) that may achieve only point to point convergence but not constraint by constraint convergence.  10 B, Better risk management for Market Participants (MPS) as they do not have to submit price taking pair of virtual supply (VS) and virtual demand (VD), when bidding on constraints, and thus unwillingly expose themselves to unrealistic levels of DAM shadow prices that are unlikely to materialize in RTM. There is also nor risk of exposure to system energy price due to asymmetric clearing, which is always present when bidding a pair of VS and VD. In PTP CB its source and sink always clear together.  10 No reason to see, why such instrument with multiple upsides and no downside would not be welcome by MPs  10 Very little impact impact, a given market participant may choose to participate in the PTP bidding as they see fit 7 Since CAISO already has wheeling transactions implemented in its clearing system, it seems to be a matter of extending those to include internal CB locations to enable PTP CBs to clear alongside VS and VD system-wide. Other markets, such as PIM and ERCOT, have successfully implemented PTP bids (aka "Up-to-congestion bids") and MISO is implementing such PTP bids.  Score 8 Rationale 10 Sometimes CBs can cause divergence, especially If put on locations with small MWs. Sub-LAP bidding will alleviate those instances when sub-LAP would be a good proxy for bidding a cluster of nodes. 10 No reason to see, why such instrument wit
Initiative  Benfits  Feasibility  Initiative	8.3 Implement Point-to-Point (PTP) Convergence Bids Criteria Grid reliability Improving overall market efficiency Desired by stakeholdres Market Participant Implementation Impact (\$ and resources) ISO Implementation Impact (\$ and resources)  8.1 Allowing Convergence Bidding at CRR Sub-LAPs Criteria Grid reliability Improving overall market efficiency	Score Rationale  3 Better convergence of DAM to RTM as it allows PTPs to be aligned with constraints and thus converge shadow price in DAM to shadow prices in RTM. Constraints are linear instruments and are better served with linear Convergence of DAM to RTM as it allows PTPs to be aligned with constraints and thus converge shadow price in DAM to shadow prices in RTM. Constraints are linear instruments and are better served with linear Convergence Bids (CBs), i.e. PTPs, as opposed to virtual transactions (VTs) that may achieve only point by point to movergence but not constraint by constraint to onvergence.  B. Better risk management for Market Participants (MPs) as they do not have to submit price taking pair of virtual supply (VS) and virtual demand (VD), when bidding on constraints, and thus unwillingly expose themselves to unrealistic levels of DAM shadow prices that are unlikely to materialize in RTM. There is also no risk of exposure to system energy price due to asymmetric clearing, which is always present when bidding a pair of VS and VI. In PTP CB its source and sink always clear together.  10 No reason to see, why such instrument with multiple upsides and no downside would not be welcome by MPs  10 Very little impact impact: a given market participant may choose to participate in the PTP bidding as they see fit  7 Since CAISO already has wheeling it armasctions implemented in its clearing system, it seems to be a matter of extending those to include internal CB locations to enable PTP CBs to clear alongside VS and VD system-wide. Other markets, such as PJM and ERCOT, have successfully implemented PTP bids (aka "Up-to-congestion bids") and MISO is implementing such PTP bids.  Score Rationale  3 Better convergence of DAM and RTM on a sub-LAP level  10 Sometimes CBs can cause divergence, especially if put on locations with small MWs. Sub-LAP bidding will alleviate those instances when sub-LAP would be a good proxy for bidding a cluster of nodes.

Initiative 7.4 Long Term CRR Auction Sub-initiative 1: multiple rounds for a given annual auction

## Initiative 7.6 Outage Notification Requirements

Criteria Grid reliability

Benfits Improving overall market efficiency

Desired by stakeholdres

Feasibility Market Participant Implementation Impact (\$ and resources)

ISO Implementation Impact (\$ and resources)

## Score Rationale

0

- 10 Will allow market participants to plan accordingly for the future
- 10 No reason to see, why such information with multiple upsides and no downside would not be welcome by MPs
- 10 No impact on Market Participants, just more outage information available
- 7 Since CAISO already has already implemented some outage data release, it seems to be a matter of extending that information to include events beyond the current reporting horizon