November 8, 2023

The Honorable Kimberly D. Bose
Secretary
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
888 First Street, NE
Washington, DC 20426

Re: California Independent System Operator Corporation
Docket: ER15-2565-__
Independent Assessment by the Department of Market Monitoring
Errata Correcting May 2023 Western Energy Imbalance Market Transition Period Report for Avangrid Renewables

Dear Secretary Bose:

On July 10, 2023, the Department of Market Monitoring (DMM) filed its independent assessment on the transition period of Avangrid Renewables (AVRN) during its first six months of participation in the Western Energy Imbalance Market (WEIM) for May 2023, as AVRN joined the WEIM on April 5, 2023. The July 10 filing incorrectly characterized all power balance constraint relaxations as invalid. As a result, this also incorrectly showed that the impact on prices without transition period pricing was zero. This filing contains the corrected figures, which supersede and replace the corresponding report contained in the July 10 filing.

Attachment A     Clean version of the May 2023 WEIM Transition Period Report for Avangrid Renewables as revised by the corrected attachment.

DMM requests that the Commission disregard the July 10 filing, and reference the corrected filing included herewith.
Please contact the undersigned directly with any questions or concerns regarding the foregoing.

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Eric Hildebrandt

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Report on Western Energy Imbalance Market issues and performance: Avangrid Renewables for May 2023

Revised: November 8, 2023

Prepared by: Department of Market Monitoring
Attachment A – Errata Filing of Independent Assessment
by the Department of Market Monitoring

May 2023 Western Energy Imbalance Market Transition Period Report
for
Avangrid Renewables

November 8, 2023
Executive summary

Pursuant to the Commission’s October 29, 2015 Order on the CAISO’s Western Energy Imbalance Market (WEIM), the California ISO (CAISO) filed a report on June 26, 2023 covering the period from May 1 through May 31, 2023 (May report) for Avangrid Renewables (AVRN) in the Western Energy Imbalance Market. AVRN joined the WEIM on April 5, 2023, and the transition period will apply to the AVRN balancing authority area (BAA) until September 30, 2023.

This report provides a review by the Department of Market Monitoring (DMM) of Western Energy Imbalance Market performance for the AVRN balancing authority area during the period covered in the CAISO’s May report. This is the second report for the transition period of the AVRN balancing authority area. Key findings in this report include the following:

- Prices in the AVRN area tracked similarly to prices in the Pacific Northwest WEIM region and below morning and evening peak prices at the Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) default aggregation point within the CAISO.

- The AVRN balancing authority area failed the upward flexible ramping sufficiency test 22 times in May.

- There were 25 valid under-supply infeasibilities in the 5-minute market and 2 in the 15-minute market.

- Transition period pricing decreased AVRN area prices by $0.70/MWh and $2.92/MWh in the 15-minute and 5-minute markets, respectively.

Section 1 of this report provides a description of prices and power balance constraint relaxations, and Section 2 discusses the flexible ramping sufficiency and bid range capacity tests.

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2 This follows from the application of CAISO Tariff section 27(b)(1), which refers to a number of months rather than a number of days.
1 Western Energy Imbalance Market prices

Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 show hourly average 15-minute and 5-minute prices during May for AVRN compared with prices in the CAISO at the Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) default load aggregation point and the average Pacific Northwest WEIM regional prices.³

Average prices in the Avangrid Renewables area tracked similarly to prices in the Pacific Northwest WEIM region, and below morning and evening peak prices at the Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) default aggregation point within the CAISO. For the month, AVRN prices averaged $6.61/MWh in the 15-minute market and $6.07/MWh in the 5-minute market.

³ The Pacific Northwest WEIM region includes PacifiCorp West, Portland General Electric, Puget Sound Energy, Seattle City Light, Powerex, Bonneville Power Administration, and Tacoma Power.
All power balance constraint relaxations that occurred in May were subject to the six-month transition period pricing that expires on October 1, 2023. The transition period pricing mechanism sets prices at the highest cost supply bid dispatched to meet demand, rather than at the $1,000/MWh penalty parameter while relaxing the constraint for shortages, or the -$155/MWh penalty parameter while relaxing the constraint for excess energy. Power balance constraint relaxations can be grouped in the following categories:

- **Valid under-supply infeasibility** (power balance constraint shortage). These occurred when the power balance constraint was relaxed because load exceeded available generation. The CAISO validated that CAISO software was working appropriately during these instances.

- **Valid over-supply infeasibility** (power balance constraint excess). These occurred when the power balance constraint was relaxed because generation exceeded load. The CAISO validated that CAISO software was working appropriately during these instances.

- **Load conformance limiter would have resolved infeasibility**. The load conformance limiter automatically reduces the size of an operator load adjustment and sets prices at the last economic bid dispatched.

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4 When transition period pricing provisions are triggered by relaxation of the power balance constraint, any shadow price associated with the flexible ramping product is set to $0/MWh to allow the market software to use the last economic bid dispatched.

5 The penalty parameter while relaxing the constraint for shortages may rise from $1,000/MWh to $2,000/MWh, depending on system conditions, per phase 2 implementation of FERC Order 831.
signal when the conditions for the limiter are met. During the transition period, the limiter does not change price outcomes because transition period pricing is applied during these intervals instead. However, in these cases, the load conformance limiter would have resolved the infeasibility had transition period pricing not been in effect.

- **Correctable infeasibility.** These occurred when the CAISO software relaxed the power balance constraint concurrent with a software error or data error that resulted in a price correction, or would have triggered a price correction if transition period pricing were not active.

Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4 show the weekly frequency of under-supply and over-supply infeasibilities in the 15-minute and 5-minute markets, respectively. In May, there were 25 valid under-supply infeasibilities in the 5-minute market and 2 in the 15-minute market. There were no valid over-supply infeasibilities in the 15-minute or 5-minute markets.

Additionally, there were 2 intervals during May when the load conformance limiter would have triggered in the 5-minute market for the AVRN balancing authority area had transition period pricing not been in effect.

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6 The CAISO implemented an enhancement to the load conformance limiter, effective February 27, 2019. With the enhancement, the load conformance limiter triggers by a measure based on the change in load adjustment from one interval to the next, rather than the total level of load adjustment.

7 Section 35 of the CAISO tariff provides the CAISO authority to correct prices if it detects an invalid market solution or issues due to a data input failure, occurrence of hardware or software failure, or a result that is inconsistent with the CAISO tariff. During erroneous intervals, the CAISO determined that prices resulting under transition period pricing were equivalent to prices that would result from a price correction, so no further price adjustment was appropriate. For more information: http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Section35_MarketValidationAndPriceCorrection_May1_2014.pdf
Figure 1.3  Frequency of under-supply power balance infeasibilities by week
Avangrid Renewables

Figure 1.4  Frequency of over-supply power balance infeasibilities by week
Avangrid Renewables
Figure 1.5 and Figure 1.6 show the average weekly prices in the 15-minute and 5-minute markets with and without the special transition period pricing provisions applied to mitigate prices in the AVRN area during the month. On average for May, transition period pricing decreased AVRN area prices by $0.70/MWh and $2.92/MWh in the 15-minute and 5-minute markets, respectively.

Figure 1.5 Average prices by week – Avangrid Renewables (AVRN)
(15-minute market)

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8 A detailed description of the methodology used to calculate these counterfactual prices that would result without transition period pricing was provided on p. 7 of the January 2017 report for Arizona Public Service from DMM:
Figure 1.6  Average prices by week – Avangrid Renewables (AVRN) (5-minute market)
2 Flexible ramping sufficiency and bid range capacity tests

As part of the WEIM, each area including the California ISO is subject to a resource sufficiency evaluation. The evaluation is performed prior to each hour to ensure that generation in each area is sufficient without relying on transfers from other balancing areas. The evaluation includes two tests:

- **The bid range capacity test (capacity test)** requires that each area provide incremental bid-in capacity to meet the imbalance between load, intertie, and generation base schedules.

- **The flexible ramping sufficiency test (sufficiency test)** requires that each balancing area has enough ramping flexibility over an hour to meet the forecasted change in demand as well as uncertainty.

If an area fails either the bid range capacity test or flexible ramping sufficiency test, energy imbalance market transfers into that area cannot be increased.\(^9\) Failures of the capacity and sufficiency tests are important because these outcomes limit transfer capability. Constraining transfer capability may affect the efficiency of the WEIM by limiting transfers into and out of a balancing area that could potentially provide benefits to other balancing areas. Reduced transfer capability also affects the ability for an area to balance load, since there is less availability to import-from or export-to neighboring areas. This can result in local prices being set at power balance constraint penalty parameters.

The AVRN balancing authority area failed the upward flexible ramping sufficiency test 22 times in May. AVRN did not fail the downward sufficiency test or either bid range capacity test during the month.

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\(^9\) If an area fails either test in the upward direction, net WEIM imports (negative) during the hour cannot exceed the lower of either the base transfer or optimal transfer from the last 15-minute interval prior to the hour.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I have served the foregoing document upon the parties listed on the official service list in the captioned proceedings, in accordance with the requirements of Rule 2010 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 C.F.R. § 385.2010).

Dated at Folsom, California, this 8th day of November, 2023.

/s/ Aprille Girardot

Aprille Girardot