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## THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

San Diego Gas & Electric Company, Complainant,	)	
v.	)	Docket No. EL00-95-045
Sellers of Energy and Ancillary Services Into Markets Operated by the California Independent System Operator and the California Power Exchange, Respondents.	) ) ) )	
Investigation of Practices of the California Independent System Operator and the California Power Exchange	) ) )	Docket No. EL00-98-042

## PREPARED SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECT TESTIMONY OF DR. ERIC HILDEBRANDT ON BEHALF OF THE CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR CORPORATION

PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME. 1 Q. 2 A. Dr. Eric Hildebrandt. 3 4 ARE YOU THE SAME DR. ERIC HILDEBRANDT WHO PREVIOUSLY Q. 5 FILED TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING ON BEHALF OF THE CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR ("ISO")? 6 7 Yes. On October 9, 2000, I submitted Prepared Direct Testimony ("initial Α. 8 testimony") explaining how the ISO arrived at the mitigated price to be 9 used in determining the amount of refunds due for transactions in the ISO 10 and California Power Exchange ("PX") markets during the period of

1		October 2, 2000 through June 20, 2001 (the "refund period") pursuant to
2		the methodology set forth in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's
3		("Commission" or "FERC") July 25, 2001 Order, 96 FERC ¶ 61,120 (2001)
4		("July 25 Order"). Those mitigated prices were attached to my initial
5		testimony as Exhibit Nos. ISO-3 and ISO-4.
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7	Q.	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS SUPPLEMENTAL TESTIMONY?
8	A.	The purpose of this supplemental direct testimony is to explain a
9		modification made by the ISO to the methodology for calculating the
10		mitigated prices during the refund period, as described in my previous
11		direct testimony, required by the Commission's December 19, 2001 Order,
12		97 FERC ¶ 61,275 (2001) ("December 19 Order"). Included with this
13		testimony as Exhibit Nos. ISO-17 and ISO-18 are the new mitigated prices
14		calculated by the ISO using this modified methodology.
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16	Q.	WHY DID THE METHODOLOGY DESCRIBED IN YOUR INITIAL
17		DIRECT TESTIMONY NEED TO BE MODIFIED AS A RESULT OF THE
18		DECEMBER 19 ORDER?
19	A.	The Commission, in the December 19 Order, granted a request for
20		rehearing made by the Indicated California Generators concerning the
21		method of determining the marginal unit dispatched in real time. As
22		explained by the Commission in the December 19 Order:
23 24		The [Indicated California Generators] assert that the Commission's approach mistakenly focuses on identifying the unit with the highest

heat rate and instead "should apply the 'North' gas cost index to the unit in the North with the highest heat rate, and apply the 'South' gas cost index to the unit in the South with the highest heat rate. Whichever unit has the highest total costs should serve as the system-wide marginal, market clearing unit." [December 19 Order, slip op. at 65]

The Commission, agreeing with the California Generators' proposal, directed the ISO to recalculate mitigated prices during the refund period, incorporating this modification into the methodology outlined in the July 25 Order:

We will grant Indicated California Generators' rehearing request. They correctly describe the appropriate method for determining the mitigated reserve deficiency MCP using separate gas cost indices for northern and southern California, which will lead to the best approximation of the marginal costs of the last unit dispatched. Therefore, we will direct the ISO to recalculate the mitigated reserve deficiency MCP for each hour of the refund period in the manner prescribed in our orders, as modified by the Indicated California Generators, and to provide the data to Judge Birchman for use in the refund hearing. [December 19 Order, slip op. at 67].

Α.

## Q. GENERALLY, HOW DOES THIS MODICATION COMPARE TO THE METHODOLOGY USED IN YOUR PREVOUS CALCAUTIONS?

As described in my initial testimony, the ISO identified the marginal unit in each 10-minute interval based on the incremental heat rates of units dispatched in the ISO's Real Time Market, Ex. No. ISO-1 at 33:6-33:30, and then calculated the mitigated price by multiplying this heat rate by the corresponding spot market gas price, adding \$6 for other variable operating costs, and, finally, adding a 10% credit risk premium for periods after January 6, 2001. Ex. No. ISO-1 at 53:8-55:7. In effect, the

calculating the marginal operating costs for each unit eligible to set the mitigated price by multiplying each unit's heat rate by the appropriate spot market gas cost (plus \$6 O&M and a 10% adder after January 5, 2001), and then selecting the marginal unit based on these marginal operating costs, rather than unit heat rates.

Α.

Q. HOW DID THE MODIFICATION REQUIRED BY THE DECEMBER 19
ORDER AFFECT THE ISO'S CALCULATION OF THE MARGINAL UNIT
DURING INTERVALS IN WHICH ONE OR MORE BIDS FOR
INCREMENTAL IMBALANCE ENERGY WERE ACCEPTED BY THE
ISO'S BALANCING ENERGY AND EX-POST PRICING ("BEEP")

**SOFTWARE?** 

As I explained in my initial testimony, during intervals in which one or more bids for incremental Imbalance Energy were accepted by the ISO's BEEP Software and the resulting dispatch instruction was "acknowledged" by the unit's operator, the ISO selected the marginal unit based on the unit with the *highest incremental heat rate* of all gas units with an acknowledged incremental dispatch instruction during that interval. Ex. No. ISO-1 at 33:15-34:15. Based on the modification required by the December 19 Order, in recalculating the mitigated prices for intervals in which one or more bids for incremental Imbalance Energy were accepted by the ISO's BEEP Software and "acknowledged," the ISO selected as the marginal

1		unit that unit with the highest marginal operating costs during a particular
2		interval, determined in the manner described above.
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4	Q.	IN RECALCULATING MITIGATED PRICES PURSUANT TO THE
5		DECEMBER 15 ORDER, HOW DID THE ISO SELECT THE MARGINAL
6		UNIT DURING INTERVALS IN WHICH THERE WAS NO
7		ACKNOWLEDGED INCREMENTAL DISPATCH INSTRUCTION, BUT IN
8		WHICH THERE WERE ONE OR MORE ACKNOWLEDGED
9		DECREMENTAL DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS?
10	A.	During intervals in which no gas unit had an acknowledged dispatch
11		instruction for incremental real time energy, but one or more gas units had
12		a decremental dispatch instruction (representing an instruction to
13		decrease output below a unit's final Hour Ahead schedule), the ISO
14		originally derived the marginal unit based on the lowest incremental heat
15		rate of the gas units with an acknowledged decremental dispatch
16		instruction during the interval. Ex. No. ISO-1 at 34:16-35:21. In
17		recalculating mitigated prices as required by the December 19 Order, the
18		ISO selected the marginal unit during these intervals by selecting from all
19		gas units with an acknowledged decremental dispatch instruction that unit
20		with the lowest marginal operating costs, determined as described above.
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23		

1	Q.	IN RECALCULATING MITIGATED PRICES PURSUANT TO THE
2		DECEMBER 15 ORDER, HOW DID THE ISO SELECT THE MARGINAL
3		UNIT DURING INTERVALS IN WHICH NO UNIT HAD EITHER AN
4		ACKNOWLEDGED INCREMENTAL OR DECREMENTAL DISPATCH
5		INSTRUCTION?
6	A.	In my initial testimony, I explained that during intervals in which no gas
7		unit had either an acknowledged incremental or an acknowledged
8		decremental dispatch instruction, the ISO determined the marginal unit by
9		selecting the unit with the lowest incremental heat rate from all units with
10		bids for incremental energy submitted to the ISO. Ex. No. ISO-1 at 35:23-
11		36:30. In recalculating the mitigated prices consistent with the
12		modification set forth in the December 19 Order, the ISO selected the
13		marginal unit during these intervals by choosing from those units that had
14		submitted bids for incremental real time energy to the ISO the unit with the
15		lowest marginal operating costs, calculated as described above.
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17	Q.	DURING INTERVALS IN WHICH THERE WERE NO ACKNOWLEDGED
18		INCREMENTAL DISPATCHES, WHY DID THE ISO, FOR PUPOSES OF
19		RECALCULATING MITIGATED PRICES PURSUANT TO THE
20		DECEMBER 19 ORDER, SELECT THE MARGINAL UNIT BASED ON
21		THE UNIT WITH THE LOWEST MARGINAL OPERATING COSTS?
22	A.	In recalculating mitigated prices in order to reflect the modification
23		required by the December 19 Order, the ISO selected the marginal unit

during intervals in which there were no acknowledged incremental dispatch instructions in the manner I described in the previous two responses for the same reasons that I gave in my initial testimony for why the ISO selected the marginal unit during these intervals based on the unit with the lowest incremental heat rate. See Ex. No. ISO-1 at 37:1-39:14. The same operational and economic rationales for using the lowest incremental heat rate to identify the marginal unit during intervals in which the there was no acknowledged dispatch instruction for incremental energy also support selecting as the marginal unit that unit with the lowest marginal operating costs during these intervals.

Α.

# Q. HOW DOES THE MODICATION REQUIRED BY THE DECEMBER 19 ORDER AFFECT THE RESULTS OF THE ISO'S MITIGATED PRICE CALCULATION?

Due to differences in spot market gas prices for units in northern and southern California, this modification results in a higher mitigated price during some intervals when the ISO was dispatching gas-fired units for incremental energy. This occurs in instances when the unit with the highest heat rate has a lower overall fuel cost (heat rate multiplied by spot market gas price) than another unit which may have a lower heat rate but is located in a different gas region with higher spot market gas prices. However, during intervals when no gas-fired units were dispatched to provide real time energy, this modification sometimes results in a lower

mitigated price. During intervals when gas fired units only received decremental dispatch instructions, this occurs when the unit with the lowest incremental heat rate that received a decremental dispatch has a higher overall fuel cost than some other unit with a higher incremental heat rate that also received a decremental dispatch instruction during that interval. Similarly, during intervals when no gas fired units received incremental or decremental dispatch instructions, this occurs when the unit with the lowest incremental heat rate that had an incremental energy bid submitted in the Real Time Market has a higher overall fuel cost than some other unit with a higher incremental heat rate that also had an incremental energy bid that hour.

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13 Q. DOES THE DECEMBER 19 ORDER INCLUDE ANY CLARIFICATIONS 14 OR GRANT ANY OTHER REQUESTS FOR REHEARNG THAT 15 REQUIRE MODIFICATION OF YOUR INTIAL TESTIMONY, IN ANY 16 WAY OTHER THAN THAT DESCRIBED ABOVE, CONCERNING THE 17 METHODOLOGY FOR CALCULATING MITIGATED PRICES? 18 As I noted above, the Commission, in the December 19 Order, Α. No. 19 explicitly required the ISO to recalculate mitigated prices for the refund 20 period in the manner prescribed in the Commission's previous orders, but 21 taking into account the single modification proposed by the California 22 Generators. Moreover, the Commission, in addressing ongoing hearing 23 procedures in this proceeding, noted that it "[did] not anticipate that

1		significant changes to the formula(e) previously used by the ISO" to
2		calculate the mitigated prices would be necessary. December 15 Order,
3		slip op. at 174.
4		
5	Q.	HAVE YOU RECALCALCULATED THE MITIGATED PRICES WITH THE
6		ONE MODIFICATION IDENTIFED IN THE DECEMBER 19 ORDER?
7	A.	Yes. Revised calculations of the mitigated prices are included in Exhibit
8		Nos. ISO-17 (interval mitigated prices) and ISO-18 (average hourly
9		mitigated prices).
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11	Q.	DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR SUPPLEMENTAL TESTIMONY?
12	A.	Yes, it does.
13		