

# Resource adequacy modeling and program design working group discussion

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Market Surveillance Committee Meeting General Session February 23, 2024

#### Context

The resource adequacy modeling and program design (RAMPD) working group has provided significant feedback around the need to reform the following issues as well as the inter-related nature of:

- Resource counting
  - An interest in revisiting unforced capacity (UCAP) in light of the CPUC's scoping of UCAP into their proceeding
  - Questions on what it means to move to UCAP as local regulatory authority (LRA) establish resource counting
- Availability and performance incentives
  - Debate on if resource adequacy availability incentive mechanism (RAAIM) could be entirely or partially removed if there was a UCAP approach to resource counting
- Outage and substitution rules



#### Problem statement 2 Requirements for RA capacity and program tools

The ISO's current requirements and tools (e.g., outage, must-offer, bid-insertion, and resource performance and availability rules) have not been updated recently in light of evolving market and regulatory structures, and could result in:

- RA supply not available when and where needed;
- Inefficient procurement and investment (e.g. maintenance and capital upgrade) decisions; and
- Implementation challenges for the ISO and market participants

Sub-issues:

- Current requirements for RA capacity
- RAAIM
- Lack of a tool to incentivize performance
- Rules for substitution and planned outages
- The need for a comprehensive review of the CPUC's Slice-of-Day reform and the translatability and transactability of western resource adequacy program (WRAP)




#### Problem statement 3 LRA RA responsibility & cost allocation

Market participants are concerned about inequitable costs and cost allocation. Stakeholders have expressed a need for a transparent and common framework for evaluating reserve margins and counting rules, and understanding of an LRA RA program's contribution to overall system reliability

#### Sub-issues:


- **Definitions and requirements:** The ISO lacks a common definition, method of measurement, or standard to ensure that various LRAs bring a portfolio of resources that are accessible in the right place, available at right time, and provide the right attributes needed to evaluate if LRA programs are reliable
- EDAM resource sufficiency evaluation (RSE) cost causation: Aligning cost and benefit allocation with causation associated with the extended day-ahead market (EDAM) RSE, as a result of a deficiency or procurement of cure capacity







#### **ISO RA processes**



Key ISO Process:


- 1. Capacity procurement mechanism (CPM) allows the ISO to backstop for LRA deficiencies and significant events
- 2. Planned outage substitution obligation requires resources on planned outage to substitute resources to maintain reliability margins
- 3. Resource Adequacy Availability Incentive Mechanism (RAAIM) incentivizes resources to be available to the ISO market
- 4. Must offer obligation (MOO) places bid/offer requirements on RA resources



## **OUTAGE DATA**




#### System RA outages for summer months for 2021 - 2023



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
#### Analysis done during the September 5 – 8, 2022 Outages for **shown** RA resources



Key takeaway: Outages during extreme events exceed planned assumptions.




# Outage rates as a percent of RA showing of each type of resources





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
# RA outages due to ambient derates and comparing against peak load



Key takeaway: Data suggests a correlation between peak load and ambient derates. A ~50,000 MW peak load has a ~4% ambient derate, whereas a ~20,000 MW peak load has a ~2% ambient derate.



# Ambient derates for thermal resources as compared to total thermal RA outages




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### INCENTIVIZING AVAILABILITY AND PERFORMANCE



Prices at major hubs external to the ISO increased after 2020. Implied capacity prices are significantly above the CPM soft offer cap of \$6.31/kW-month





#### RAAIM incentive and penalty




If the average falls below 94.5% the resource is subject to a \$3.79/kW-month penalty. If the average is above 98.5% it is eligible for a payment from the pool of penalties assessed



#### **RAAIM** impact:

 The RA non-availability charge for September 2022 amounted to \$3.5 M



#### Other RAAIM Considerations

- RAAIM may not be sending the signal needed to incent generation to make capacity available. The following aspects of the RAAIM design may warrant revisiting to improve RAAIM's effectiveness:
  - The current deadband (i.e. 94.5-98.5%)
  - The monthly netting process
  - The carry-forward provisions
  - Resources excluded from RAAIM



### PLANNING RESERVE MARGIN



#### Planning reserve margin (PRM)

- Each LRA sets their own PRM and counting rules
- If an LRA does not provide a PRM or counting rule methodology, the ISO's default tariff rules apply
  - The ISO default PRM (15%) was set in 2006
  - There is an interplay between the PRM and counting rules
- Most LRAs set a PRM at 15% above forecasted monthly peak demand while some LRAs have set lower planning reserve margins

# LRAs	2023 PRM
6	≤7%
20	15%
1	16%

Key takeaway: The ISO's default PRM warrants revisiting in light of changes in the RA landscape



### RESOURCE COUNTING: UCAP



#### The ISO's prior UCAP design

#### Attributes:

- Resource specific: Base methodology for thermal and storage, alternative methods for other resources
- Accounted for non-availability by looking at resource availability during the top 20% of RA supply cushion hours on a weighted (last three years) and seasonal basis looking at peak/non-peak hours
- Recognized the need to eliminate RAAIM once an alternative solution was in place
- Recognized the PRM could be adjusted to only need to cover operating reserves and forecast error to the extent that resource counting sufficiently accounted for forced outages



#### Past ISO proposal – past rationale for UCAP

- Can promote the procurement of the most dependable and reliable resources up front by accounting for historical unavailability in their capacity value
  - Current PRM, forced outage substitution rules, and RAAIM have proven inadequate to replace capacity on forced outage
- Dynamically changes with the fleet's forced outage rate
  - Relying solely on the PRM, which has been a static value, may lead to over/under procurement if future outage rates change
  - The PRM would now only need to cover operating reserves and forecast error to the extent that resource counting sufficiently accounts for forced outages



#### **ISO-NE** capacity reforms

- Considering prompt year auction
- Capacity accreditation
  - Considering marginal effective load carrying capacity (ELCC) accreditation approach
  - Will address use limitations
  - Correlation of outages due to fuel
  - Seasonal values
- Currently using installed capacity (ICAP) for thermals, with seasonal values addressing different ambient derates



#### PJM capacity reforms

- Wanted capacity program modeling, program design and incentives to address the risks leading to outages
  - Including correlations between outage types and outages with weather
- Adopted marginal ELCC counting based on historical events, performance and scenarios
- PJM current testing Binding test for summer season (June-August)
  - FERC accepted additional test in both summer and winter addressing operational factors
  - Ambient derates also captured in ELCC modeling

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#### ISO-NE and PJM pay for performance

- High performance payment rate paid by resources
  underperforming to resources over performing
  - Higher rates in ISO-NE than PJM
- Triggered by insufficient reserves reserve/energy based on penalty factors
- Example: If a resource has 1% position of total RA, ISO measures if providing 1% of the need
- Transfer among capacity providers, including resources that do not have capacity obligation
- Few exemptions
- Stop loss provision capped losses on a percent basis

