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| Section | Proposed Changes | Reason for Change |
| 4.5.1.1.1  First sentence | To become a Scheduling Coordinator, a Scheduling Coordinator Applicant must submit a completed application, as set forth in the applicable Business Practice Manual, to the CAISO by mail, electronic submission, or in person. | Adding electronic submission option. |
| 4.5.1.1.8.2 | **[Not Used]** | Removing text here as it is duplicative and not as specific as the language provided in 4.5.1.1.6. |
| 4.5.1.1.10.1 (a) | The CAISO will not certify that a Scheduling Coordinator Applicant has become a Scheduling Coordinator until the Scheduling Coordinator Applicant has completed all of the following requirements:  (a) provided the technical/operational information required in Tariff Section 4.5 and as set forth in the applicable Business Practice Manual, and to comply with Section 10.3; | Clarifying tariff language by adding specific tariff reference for  Scheduling Coordinator requirements. |
| 4.5.1.1.10.1,  Last sentence | Additional instructions for completing the foregoing requirements will be set forth in a Business Practice Manual posted on the CAISO Website The Scheduling Coordinator is also responsible for ongoing compliance with all tariff requirements applicable to Scheduling Coordinators. | Clarifying tariff language to state that requirements to qualify as a scheduling coordinator are ongoing requirements. |
| 4.5.1.2.1.2 | The Scheduling Coordinator has an ongoing obligation to inform the CAISO within five (5) Business Days of any change to its credit ratings or any Material Change in Financial Condition. | Changing notification window from three (3) business days to five (5) business days to align with Section 12. |
| 4.10.1.1  First Sentence | To become a Candidate CRR Holder, a Candidate CRR Holder applicant must submit a completed written application, as provided in the applicable form posted on the CAISO Website, to the CAISO by mail, electronic submission, or in person. | Adding electronic submission option. |
| 4.10.1.5.1 | The Candidate CRR Holder applicant must complete all of the following requirements as part of the application process:  (a) the proposed date for commencement of the CRR Allocation, CRR Auction or Secondary Registration System in which the applicant intends to qualify to participate, which may not be less than sixty (60) days after the date the application was filed, unless waived by the CAISO;  (b) financial and credit information as set forth in Section 12;  (c) proof of completion of CRR training or expected completion of CRR training;  (d) the prescribed non-refundable application fee; and  (e) identity of the applicant’s Affiliates, as described in Section 39.9. | Revising language for clarity and for consistency of terms |
| 4.10.1.8.1 | If the CAISO accepts the application, the Candidate CRR Holder applicant must return an executed CRR Entity Agreement and any required financial and credit information pursuant to Section 12 of the CAISO tariff. | Updated reference to point to Section 12 |
| 4.14.1.1 | To become a Convergence Bidding Entity, a Convergence Bidding Entity applicant must submit a completed written application, as provided in the applicable form posted on the CAISO Website, to the CAISO by mail, electronic submission, or in person. | Adding electronic submission option. |
| 5.1, last 3 sentences |  | This amendment proposes to delete language. The CAISO develops its system restoration plan to comply with North American Electric Reliability Corporation Reliability Standard EOP-005-03 by consulting with Participating Transmission Owners and reviewing the system restoration plans those PTOs develop. Scheduling coordinators do not actually provide the CAISO with additional information about load restoration times. Instead, load restoration information is generally collected by utility distribution companies who are the entities responsible for restoration of distribution circuits. |
| 7.7.3(d), first and second sentences. | If a Load curtailment is required to manage System Emergencies, the CAISO will determine the amount and location of Load to be reduced. In those instances when the CAISO requires load-shedding assistance from the entire CAISO Balancing Authority Area to preserve or restore stable operation of the CAISO Controlled Grid and to the extent practicable, the CAISO will allocate a portion to each UDC or MSS Operator based on the ratio of its Demand (at the time of the Balancing Authority Area annual peak for the previous year) to total Balancing Authority Area annual peak Demand for the previous year taking into account system considerations and the UDC’s or MSS Operator’s curtailment rights under their tariffs. | The CAISO proposes to eliminate ambiguity in Section 7.7.3(d) by specifying that it will use this allocation only in those instances when the CAISO requires load-shedding assistance from the entire CAISO Balancing Authority Area to preserve or restore stable operation of the CAISO Controlled Grid. |
| 7.7.4(a) | **Periodic Tests Of Emergency Procedures.** The CAISO shall develop and administer periodic tests of System Emergency procedures designed to ensure that Participating Transmission Owners and Scheduling Coordinators received the information required to respond to operating conditions, including System Emergencies. | The CAISO proposes refer to Participating Transmission Owners and Scheduling Coordinators instead of the overbroad term “Market Participants.” |
| 9.4.3, header | **Uncomplicated Work** | The CAISO proposes to correct a typographical error in the header. |
| 9.4.3, first sentence | When line rearrangements and/or station equipment work is uncomplicated and easily understood, the CAISO may determine that the work can be accomplished using Outages approved in accordance with Section 9.3.6. | This amendment proposes to remove language because the term “CAISO Outage Coordination Office” was eliminated as a defined term in the NERC Outages Reliability Standards tariff amendment. *See* letter order issued March 28, 2017 in Docket No.17-879. The CAISO is proposing to align the tariff with that change. |
| 10.2.4.4, second paragraph | Subject to any exemption granted by the CAISO under the CAISO Tariff, the CAISO will not accept Revenue Quality Meter Data from a CAISO Metered Entity unless the Revenue Quality Meter Data is produced by Metering Entities that are certified in accordance with the CAISO Tariff and the CAISO Metered Entity has a current Certificate of Compliance. | The CAISO is proposing to relocate this language from Section 10.2.4.6 as it is more suitable to include this language with the contents of the Certificate of Compliance, as opposed to being counter-intuitively placed with the revocation of the Certificate of Compliance. |
| 10.2.4.6, last paragraph |  | The CAISO is proposing to relocate this language to Section 10.2.4.4 as it is more suitable to include this language with the contents of the Certificate of Compliance, as opposed to being counter-intuitively placed with the revocation of the Certificate of Compliance. |
| 10.2.7 | CAISO Metered Entities shall make available to the CAISO's RMDAPS Revenue Quality Meter Data meeting the format requirements of this Section 10 and in accordance with the Business Practice Manual standards and other information reasonably required by the CAISO. | This amendment proposes to provide clarity and transparency on enforced standards for the format of meter data. |
| 10.3.6.3(c), third sentence |  | The CAISO proposes to delete this sentence as it may set out an impossible requirement. For example, if the Scheduling Coordinator has until T+48B to make the required correction, then it would be assumed that the CAISO should implement measures to proactively identify and perform outreach to parties that have not replaced estimated data. |
| 10.3.6.4 | Scheduling Coordinators may submit Actual Settlement Quality Meter Data for the Scheduling Coordinator Metered Entities they represent to the CAISO for use in Recalculation Settlement Statement T+9M up to one-hundred and seventy-two Business Days after the Trading Day (T+172B). Scheduling Coordinators submitting Actual Settlement Quality Meter Data after forty-eight Business Days after the Trading Day (T+48B) but up to T+172B have failed to provide complete and accurate Settlement Quality Meter Data as required by Section 37.5.2.1 and will be subject to monetary penalty pursuant to Section 37.5.2.2. Any Actual Settlement Quality Meter Data that is submitted by a Scheduling Coordinator after T+172B, will be rejected by the CAISO and not used in settlement calculations. | This edit proposes to remove the five business day submission window for meter data to be included on the T+9M recalculation settlement statement. At one point system limitations may have made a defined submission window necessary but that is no longer the case. The CAISO is capable of accepting the data at any point between T+48B and T+172B. There is no business need for the CAISO to reject meter data that is submitted, for example, at T+150B. |
| 11.2.3.2.1  First sentence | The CAISO shall charge Scheduling Coordinators that submit Bids for MSS Operators that have selected net Energy Settlement an amount equal to the product of the net MSS Demand in the Day-Ahead Schedule and the IFM LAP Price. The net MSS Demand is the quantity of MSS Demand that exceeds MSS Generation for the applicable MSS. | The CAISO proposes to use the optimization engine pricing for Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points, which is also known as the Price Inconsistency Market Enhancements pricing methodology. (*See* <http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Feb19_2013TariffAmendment-EnhancePriceConsistency-DocketNoER13-957-000.pdf>)  Currently, the MSS LAP price is calculated using the weighted average price of the constituent Pnodes. This formulation results in inconsistency with settlement for CRRs under the CAISO’s CRR Track 1B initiative (*see Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.*165 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2018)) that either source or sink at Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points. |
| 11.5.1.1  Fourth Sentence | For MSS Operators that have elected net Settlement, the FMM IIE Settlement Amounts for Energy dispatched through the FMM optimization shall be calculated as the product of the FMM LAP Price and the sum of the following types of Energy: FMM Minimum Load Energy from System Units dispatched in FMM, FMM Derate Energy, and FMM Pumping Energy. | The CAISO proposes to use the optimization engine pricing for Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points, which is also known as the Price Inconsistency Market Enhancements pricing methodology. (*See* <http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Feb19_2013TariffAmendment-EnhancePriceConsistency-DocketNoER13-957-000.pdf>)  Currently, the MSS LAP price is calculated using the weighted average price of the constituent Pnodes. This formulation results in inconsistency with settlement for CRRs under the CAISO’s CRR Track 1B initiative (*see Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.*165 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2018)) that either source or sink at Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points. |
| 11.5.1.2  Fourth sentence | For MSS Operators that have elected net Settlement, the RTD IIE Settlement Amounts for Energy dispatched through the RTD optimization shall be calculated as the product of the RTD LAP Price and the sum of the following types of Energy: RTD Minimum Load Energy from System Units dispatched in Real-Time, Regulation Energy, Ramping Energy Deviation, RTD Derate Energy, MSS Load Following Energy, and RTD Pumping Energy. | The CAISO proposes to use the optimization engine pricing for Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points, which is also known as the Price Inconsistency Market Enhancements pricing methodology. (*See* <http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Feb19_2013TariffAmendment-EnhancePriceConsistency-DocketNoER13-957-000.pdf>)  Currently, the MSS LAP price is calculated using the weighted average price of the constituent Pnodes. This formulation results in inconsistency with settlement for CRRs under the CAISO’s CRR Track 1B initiative (*see Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.*165 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2018)) that either source or sink at Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points. |
| 11.5.2, Last Sentence | For MSS Operators that have elected net Settlement, the UIE Settlement Amount is calculated for each Settlement Interval as the product of its Uninstructed Imbalance Energy quantity and RTD LAP Price. | The CAISO proposes to use the optimization engine pricing for Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points, which is also known as the Price Inconsistency Market Enhancements pricing methodology. (*See* <http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Feb19_2013TariffAmendment-EnhancePriceConsistency-DocketNoER13-957-000.pdf>)  Currently, the MSS LAP price is calculated using the weighted average price of the constituent Pnodes. This formulation results in inconsistency with settlement for CRRs under the CAISO’s CRR Track 1B initiative (*see Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.*165 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2018)) that either source or sink at Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points. |
| 11.5.5.2 | For Eligible Intermittent Resources, the Settlement Amount for any portion of the resource’s Residual Imbalance Energy that is greater than its forecasted output for a particular Settlement Interval will be the product of the MWh of Residual Imbalance Energy above the resource’s forecasted output for that Settlement Interval and the applicable RTD Locational Marginal Price or RTD LAP Price if the resource is MSS Net settled. | The CAISO proposes to use the optimization engine pricing for Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points, which is also known as the Price Inconsistency Market Enhancements pricing methodology. (*See* <http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Feb19_2013TariffAmendment-EnhancePriceConsistency-DocketNoER13-957-000.pdf>)  Currently, the MSS LAP price is calculated using the weighted average price of the constituent Pnodes. This formulation results in inconsistency with settlement for CRRs under the CAISO’s CRR Track 1B initiative (*see Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.*165 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2018)) that either source or sink at Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points. |
| 11.8.2.1.3 2nd sentence | The IFM Pump Shut-Down Cost for an IFM Shut-Down period shall be zero if: (1) it is followed by an IFM Self-Commitment Period or RTM Self-Commitment Period in generation mode; (2) the Shut-Down is due to an Outage reported through the CAISO’s outage management system as described in Section 9; or (3) the Shut-Down is delayed by the RTM past the Integrated Forward Market Shut-Down period in question or cancelled by the Real-Time Market before the Shut-Down process has started. | This amendment proposes to correct a typographical error by changing “RFM” to “RTM.” Additionally, the CAISO is proposing to spell out acronyms for readability of its tariff. |
| 11.8.2.3.2, Second Sentence | The IFM Bid Cost as described in Section 11.8.2.1 above and IFM Market Revenue as provided in Section 11.8.2.2 above, of each MSS will be, respectively, the total of the IFM Bid Costs and IFM Market Revenues over all BCR Eligible Resources within the MSS where each BCR Eligible Resource’s IFM Market Revenues for its Energy shall be calculated as described in Section 11.2.3.2 at the relevant IFM LAP price. | The CAISO proposes to use the optimization engine pricing for Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points, which is also known as the Price Inconsistency Market Enhancements pricing methodology. (*See* <http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Feb19_2013TariffAmendment-EnhancePriceConsistency-DocketNoER13-957-000.pdf>)  Currently, the MSS LAP price is calculated using the weighted average price of the constituent Pnodes. This formulation results in inconsistency with settlement for CRRs under the CAISO’s CRR Track 1B initiative (*see Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.*165 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2018)) that either source or sink at Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points. |
| 11.8.2.5.1(a) | For Generation Unit and Resource-Specific-System Resource scheduled by CAISO in the Day-Ahead Market | The CAISO proposes to correct punctuation as “Resource-SpecificSystem Resource” is a defined term in the CAISO’s tariff. |
| 11.8.4.3.2 | In calculating the Energy RTM Market Revenue for all the resources within the MSS as provided in Section 11.8.4.2, the CAISO will use the FMM LAP Price or the RTD LAP Price, as applicable. | The CAISO proposes to use the optimization engine pricing for Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points, which is also known as the Price Inconsistency Market Enhancements pricing methodology. (*See* <http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Feb19_2013TariffAmendment-EnhancePriceConsistency-DocketNoER13-957-000.pdf>)  Currently, the MSS LAP price is calculated using the weighted average price of the constituent Pnodes. This formulation results in inconsistency with settlement for CRRs under the CAISO’s CRR Track 1B initiative (*see Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.*165 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2018)) that either source or sink at Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points. |
| 11.23(h) | The Uninstructed Deviation Penalty will be calculated and assessed for each resource individually. | The CAISO proposes to remove language pertaining to Appendix R since the CAISO is also proposing, in this filing, to mark Appendix R as Not Used. |
| 11.29.10.5, first sentence | In the event of an emergency or a failure of any of the CAISO software or business systems, the CAISO may use estimated Settlement Statements and Invoices and Payment Advices and may implement any temporary variation of the timing requirements relating to the Settlement Statements and Invoices and Payment Advices. | The CAISO proposes to clarify the existing language to include the CAISO’s tariff authority regarding extensions for invoices as well as settlement statements. |
| 11.31(a), last sentence | The Decline Potential Charge will not apply if the decline is made after the applicable E-Tag deadline, as defined in Section 30.6.2. | This amendment proposes to capitalize the “t” in E-Tag in order to be consistent with the defined term throughout the CAISO tariff. |
| 11.31(b), second from last sentence | The Decline Potential Charge will not apply if the decline is made after the applicable E-Tag deadline, as defined in Section 30.6.2. | This amendment proposes to capitalize the “t” in E-Tag in order to be consistent with the defined term throughout the CAISO tariff. |
| 14.7.2.2 | The CAISO will notify the RC Customers(s) or Market Participant(s) it believes contributed to the Reliability Standards violation(s) during the CMEP proceeding or, if applicable, during the enforcement proceeding directly instituted by FERC. This notification shall be in writing and shall: (i) inform the RC Customer(s) or Market Participant(s) that the CAISO intends to invoke the direct allocation provisions of this Section; (ii) detail the underlying factual basis for the CAISO’s position; and (iii) inform the RC Customer(s) or Market Participant(s) that it may seek to participate in the CMEP proceeding or, if applicable, the enforcement proceeding directly instituted by FERC. | The proposed amendment proposes to correct an administrative error. This language should have been added via Docket No. ER18-2366 (*CAISO 165 FERC ¶ 61,116*). |
| 19.7(e)(3) | If payment is not received by 21 Business Days after an RC Services Invoice is issued, the RC Customer will be charged a $1,000 late payment fee on a supplemental RC Services Invoice and will be considered to be in default, understanding that the CAISO reserves the right to terminate, consistent with the terms of the RCSA, such RC Customer’s RC Services until such time as payment is received except as otherwise may be required to comply with Schedule 2 of the RCSA. | The CAISO proposes to align the late payment timeline with the payment timeline of 21 business days after an RC services invoice is issued.  With multiple holidays in January, it is possible that the last business day in January occurs prior to the expiration of 21 business days after the first business day in January. This could require the CAISO to issue a penalty prior to the actual payment due date. |
| 24.13, first sentence | Under the procedures set forth in Sections 24.3.3 and 24.4.3, the CAISO may consider potential interregional solutions to regional needs during Phase 2 of the Transmission Planning Process. | The CAISO proposes to correct a CAISO tariff cross-reference. |
| 25.5.2 | The Generating Unit owner will provide the CAISO a $50,000 deposit for repowering requests, or a $10,000 deposit for all other modification assessments at the time the request is submitted. Except as provided below, any modification assessment will be concluded, and a response provided to the Generating Unit owner in writing, within forty-five (45) calendar days from the date the CAISO receives all of the following: the Generating Unit owner’s written notice to modify the project, technical data required to assess the request, and payment of the applicable deposit. If the modification assessment cannot be completed within that time period, the CAISO will notify the Generating Unit owner and provide an estimated completion date and an explanation of the reasons why additional time is required. | Aligns the tariff revisions with the CAISO’s stated intent, which was to increase the required deposit for repowering requests only; not other modifications. |
| 27.1.1  Last two sentences |  | Moving to Section 27.1.1.4. |
| 27.1.1.4,  New Section | **Disconnected Pricing Node or Aggregated Pricing Node**  In the event that a Pricing Node or Aggregated Pricing Node becomes electrically disconnected from the market model during a CAISO Market run, the LMP, including the System Marginal Energy Cost, Marginal Cost of Congestion and Marginal Cost of Losses, at the closest electrically connected Pricing Node will be used as the LMP at the affected Location. The CAISO will include the impact of the disconnected Pricing Node on any modeled Remedial Action Scheme in determining the LMP. | Moved from Section 27.1.1 and updated to reference aggregated pricing nodes. |
| 27.2.2.1, 1st sentence | The IFM LAP Price for Settlement of Demand at any LAP for a given Trading Hour is the price as produced by the IFM optimization run based on the distribution of system Load at the constituent Pricing Nodes within the applicable LAP and is determined by the effectiveness of the Load within the LAP in relieving a Transmission Constraint within the effectiveness threshold as specified in Section 27.4.3.6. | The CAISO proposes to use the optimization engine pricing for Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points, which is also known as the Price Inconsistency Market Enhancements pricing methodology.  Currently, the MSS LAP price is calculated using the weighted average price of the constituent Pnodes. This formulation results in inconsistency with settlement for CRRs under the CAISO’s CRR Track 1B initiative (*see Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.*165 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2018)) that either source or sink at Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points. |
| 27.2.2.2 | The FMM LAP Price and RTD LAP Price for a fifteen-minute FMM interval and five minute Dispatch Interval is the price as produced by the FMM and RTD optimization runs, respectively, based on the distribution of system Load at the constituent Pricing Nodes within the applicable LAP and is determined by the effectiveness of the Load within the LAP in relieving a Transmission Constraint within the effectiveness threshold as specified in Section 27.4.3.6. The Hourly Real-Time LAP Price is then determined for Settlement purposes as further described in Section 11.5.2.2. | The CAISO proposes to use the optimization engine pricing for Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points, which is also known as the Price Inconsistency Market Enhancements pricing methodology. (*See* <http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Feb19_2013TariffAmendment-EnhancePriceConsistency-DocketNoER13-957-000.pdf>)  Currently, the MSS LAP price is calculated using the weighted average price of the constituent Pnodes. This formulation results in inconsistency with settlement for CRRs under the CAISO’s CRR Track 1B initiative (*see Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.*165 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2018)) that either source or sink at Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points. |
| 29.7(j)(2)(D) | in addition or as an alternative, use market results in the Real-Time Market in accordance with Section 7.7.9 or take any of the actions specified in Section 7.7.6 with respect to the Real-Time Market, except that if Section 7.7.6 calls for the use of Day-Ahead Market results, the CAISO will use: | The CAISO proposes to correct a CAISO tariff cross-reference. |
| 29.34(f)(3)(C) | include approved, pending, and adjusted E-Tags for imports and exports. | This amendment proposes to capitalize the “e” and “t” in E-Tag in order to be consistent with the defined term throughout the CAISO tariff. |
| 30.4.1.1.4,  1st paragraph, 2nd sentence | Scheduling Coordinators may propose adders for major maintenance expenses as a component of Proxy Start-Up Costs, Proxy Minimum Load Costs, or both. Such proposed adders must be based solely on resource-specific information derived from actual maintenance costs, when available, or estimated maintenance costs provided by the Scheduling Coordinators to the CAISO. | The CAISO is proposing to eliminate a long-expired reference to the use of an independent entity. |
| 30.4.1.1.4,  2nd paragraph, 2nd sentence | The CAISO will evaluate the information provided by Scheduling Coordinators, and may require Scheduling Coordinators to provide additional information, to enable the CAISO to determine reasonable adders for major maintenance expenses or to conduct audits of major maintenance expenses. | The CAISO is proposing to eliminate a long-expired reference to the use of an independent entity. |
| 30.4.1.1.4,  2nd paragraph, 3rd sentence | Within fifteen (15) days of receipt of the information or any requested additional information, the CAISO will notify the Scheduling Coordinator in writing whether it has sufficient and accurate information to determine reasonable major maintenance adders to be included in Start-Up or Minimum Load Cost calculations or both. | The CAISO is proposing to eliminate a long-expired reference to the use of an independent entity. |
| 30.4.1.1.4,  2nd paragraph, 4th sentence | Within ten (10) days after providing written notification to the Scheduling Coordinator that the information is sufficient and accurate, the CAISO will determine the reasonable adder for major maintenance expenses to be included in Start-Up or Minimum Load Costs or both and will so inform the Scheduling Coordinator in writing. | The CAISO is proposing to eliminate a long-expired reference to the use of an independent entity. |
| 30.4.1.1.4,  2nd paragraph, 5th sentence | In the event of a dispute regarding the sufficiency or accuracy of the information provided by the Scheduling Coordinator, the CAISO and the Scheduling Coordinator will enter a period of good faith negotiations that terminates sixty (60) days after the date the dispute began. | The CAISO is proposing to eliminate a long-expired reference to the use of an independent entity. |
| 30.4.1.1.4,  2nd paragraph, 6th sentence | If the CAISO and the Scheduling Coordinator resolve the dispute during the 60-day negotiation period, within ten (10) days of such agreement, the CAISO will determine the reasonable adder for major maintenance expenses and will provide the adder to the Scheduling Coordinator in writing. | The CAISO is proposing to eliminate a long-expired reference to the use of an independent entity. |
| 30.4.1.1.4,  2nd paragraph, 7th sentence | If the CAISO and the Scheduling Coordinator fail to agree upon the sufficiency or accuracy of the information during the 60-day negotiation period, the Scheduling Coordinator has the right to petition FERC to resolve the dispute as to the sufficiency or accuracy of its information. | The CAISO is proposing to eliminate a long-expired reference to the use of an independent entity. |
| 30.4.1.1.4,  3rd paragraph, 1st sentence | In the event of a dispute regarding the CAISO’s determination of adders for major maintenance expenses, the CAISO and the Scheduling Coordinator will enter a period of good faith negotiations that terminates sixty (60) days after the date the dispute began. | The CAISO is proposing to eliminate a long-expired reference to the use of an independent entity. |
| 30.4.1.1.4,  3rd paragraph, 2nd sentence | If the CAISO and the Scheduling Coordinator resolve the dispute during the 60-day negotiation period, the agreed-upon values will be effective as of the first Business Day following the resolution date. | The CAISO is proposing to eliminate a long-expired reference to the use of an independent entity. |
| 30.4.1.1.4,  4th paragraph | If the CAISO and the Scheduling Coordinator fail to agree on the major maintenance values for either the Proxy Start-Up Costs or Proxy Minimum Load Costs following the 60-day negotiation period, the Scheduling Coordinator has the right to file proposed values and supporting information for major maintenance adders for the Proxy Start-Up Costs or Proxy Minimum Load Costs with FERC pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act. | The CAISO is proposing to eliminate a long-expired reference to the use of an independent entity. |
| 30.4.1.1.4,  5th paragraph, 1st sentence | In the event of a dispute regarding the reasonableness of the adder for major maintenance expenses determined by the CAISO, but not a dispute regarding the sufficiency or accuracy of the information provided by the Scheduling Coordinator, the CAISO will determine a reasonable interim adder for major maintenance expenses until the adder for major maintenance expenses is determined by agreement between the CAISO and the Scheduling Coordinator or by FERC. | The CAISO is proposing to eliminate a long-expired reference to the use of an independent entity. |
| 30.5.2.1, last sentence | Scheduling Coordinators submitting Bids for Scheduling Points must adhere to the E-Tagging requirements outlined in Section 30.5.7. | This amendment proposes to capitalize the “e” in E-Tagging in order to be consistent with the defined term throughout the CAISO tariff.  This amendment also proposes to correct a CAISO tariff cross-reference. Section 30.6.2 pertaining to E-Tagging was moved to Section 30.5.7 in Docket No. ER18-1787 (delegated letter order dated October 29, 2018). |
| 30.5.7, first sentence | In addition to complying with all generally applicable E-Tagging requirements, Scheduling Coordinators must submit their E-Tags consistent with the requirements specified in this Section 30.5.7. | This amendment proposes to capitalize the “t” in E-Tags in order to be consistent with the defined term throughout the CAISO tariff. |
| 30.5.7, third sentence | Absent extenuating circumstances, the CAISO automatically updates Energy profiles on E-Tags for Energy Schedules that change from HASP to the FMM within a Trading Hour. | This amendment proposes to capitalize the “t” in E-Tag in order to be consistent with the defined term throughout the CAISO tariff. |
| 30.5.7, fourth sentence | In performing this service for a Scheduling Coordinator, the CAISO does not assume any responsibility for compliance with any E-Tag requirements or obligations to which the Scheduling Coordinator is subject. | This amendment proposes to capitalize the “t” in E-Tag in order to be consistent with the defined term throughout the CAISO tariff. |
| 31.5.3.1.4 | Scheduling Coordinators for Eligible Intermittent Resources may submit Bids, including Self-Schedules, in the Day-Ahead Market and the quantity ultimately scheduled from Eligible Intermittent Resources may differ from the CAISO forecasted deliveries from the Eligible Intermittent Resources. The CAISO may adjust the forecasted Demand either up or down for such differences by RUC Zone in which the Eligible Intermittent Resource resides. If the EIR’s expected output participating in the Day-Ahead Market, as reflected in the EIR’s Bid, including a Self-Schedule, or lack thereof, is less than CAISO’s forecast of the EIR, the CAISO may make a Supply-side adjustment to the resource’s expected output by using the CAISO’s forecast of the EIR. If on the other hand, the EIR’s expected output participating in the Day-Ahead Market, as reflected in the EIR’s Bid, including a Self-Schedule, or lack thereof, is greater than the CAISO’s forecast of the EIR, the CAISO may make a Demand side adjustment to the RUC Zone Demand equal to the difference between the EIR’s Day-Ahead Schedule and the CAISO forecasted quantity. | This amendment proposes to clarify the CAISO tariff to provide more detail on how the supply- side adjustments for variable energy resources Forecasts in RUC are applied under this section of the tariff. |
| 34.3.1, 5th sentence | RTUC is run at the following time intervals: (1) at approximately 12 minutes prior to the first Trading Hour, to serve as the HASP run, for T-45 minutes to T+60 minutes; | This amendment proposes to reflect a more accurate approximate time for the start of the HASP run. |
| 34.13.1, last paragraph | In any event, the CAISO may issue an Operating Instruction if necessary to maintain system reliability consistent with Sections 7.6 or 7.7. Upon receiving such an Operating Instruction, an Eligible Intermittent Resource must not generate in excess of its Dispatch Operating Target until the Operating Instruction expires, except when physically impossible. When such an Operating Instruction is in effect, Eligible Intermittent Resources should follow a linear ramp between Dispatch Operating Targets, except when physically impossible. | This amendment proposes to align terms as they are used in the Section. |
| 37.1.5 | The CAISO shall administer the following Rules of Conduct specified herein: Section 37.4.2, Section 37.5.2, Section 37.6.1, Section 37.6.2, and Section 37.6.3. FERC shall administer the following Rules of Conduct specified herein: Section 37.2.1, Section 37.2.3, Section 37.2.4, and Section 37.3.1. | The CAISO is proposing to remove the contents of CAISO tariff section 37.4.1 and replacing it with “Not Used.” As such, the CAISO is proposing to remove any CAISO tariff section cross-references in order to provide clarity.  The CAISO is also proposing to remove cross-reference CAISO Tariff Section 37.4.3 as it is marked as “Not Used.” |
| 37.4.1 | **37.4.1 [Not Used]** | The CAISO is proposing to remove the content of CAISO tariff section 37.4.1 and replace it with “Not Used.” The existing sanctions process for late outage reporting does not create meaningful incentives for compliance. The first late report in a month is defined as not constituting a violation. The sanction for the first violation in a month (i.e., the second late outage in a month) is a warning letter. Financial sanctions do not apply until the third late outage in a given month and the process starts over at the start of the next month. The core obligation in section 9.3.10.3.1 to report forced outages within 60 minutes of discovery will remain in the tariff. The CAISO finds that it is more appropriate to treat a late-reported forced outage in violation of section 9.3.10.3.1 as a general tariff violation subject to FERC referral. |
| 37.4.4 | Except as otherwise specifically provided, penalty amounts shall be tripled for any violation of Section 37.4.2 that occurs during a CAISO System Emergency. | The CAISO is proposing to remove the content of CAISO tariff section 37.4.1 and replace it with “Not Used.” As such, the CAISO is proposing to remove any cross-reference to that CAISO Tariff Section. The CAISO is also removing reference to CAISO tariff section 37.4.3 as it is marked as “Not Used.”  The CAISO also proposes to remove language that is not applicable as the CAISO does not have authority to assess Uninstructed Deviation Penalties. |
| 37.8.4 | The CAISO shall provide notice of the investigation to the Scheduling Coordinator in sufficient detail to allow for a meaningful response | The tariff as written today suggests that the market participant, separately from the scheduling coordinator, is only contacted during the process when the CAISO can objectively determine the participant’s role in the violation.  It often can be difficult to make that determination before the full Rules of Conduct process plays out to its conclusion.  Further, in virtually all respects, the CAISO’s direct relationship is with the scheduling coordinator, who serves as the market participant’s agent.  For that reason, it is a more streamlined and administrable process for the CAISO to communicate directly with the scheduling coordinator.  The CAISO expects that the scheduling coordinator would inform an individual market participant of rules of conduct issues, as they become relevant to that specific market participant.  Where an individual market participant has information relevant to the investigation and enforcement process, that information can be provided to the CAISO through the scheduling coordinator. |
| 37.8.5 | The CAISO shall provide an opportunity to the Scheduling Coordinator to present any issues of fact or other information relevant to the potential Rules of Conduct violation being investigated. The CAISO shall consider all such information or data presented. | The tariff as written today suggests that the market participant, separately from the scheduling coordinator, is only contacted during the process when the CAISO can objectively determine the participant’s role in the violation.  It often can be difficult to make that determination before the full Rules of Conduct process plays out to its conclusion.  Further, in virtually all respects, the CAISO’s direct relationship is with the scheduling coordinator, who serves as the market participant’s agent.  For that reason, it is a more streamlined and administrable process for the CAISO to communicate directly with the scheduling coordinator.  The CAISO expects that the scheduling coordinator would inform an individual market participant of rules of conduct issues, as they become relevant to that specific market participant.  Where an individual market participant has information relevant to the investigation and enforcement process, that information can be provided to the CAISO through the scheduling coordinator. |
| 37.8.6 | The CAISO shall notify the Scheduling Coordinator of the results of the investigation. The Scheduling Coordinator shall have thirty (30) days to respond to the findings of the CAISO before the CAISO makes a determination of whether a Sanction is required by this CAISO Tariff. | The tariff as written today suggests that the market participant, separately from the scheduling coordinator, is only contacted during the process when the CAISO can objectively determine the participant’s role in the violation.  It often can be difficult to make that determination before the full Rules of Conduct process plays out to its conclusion.  Further, in virtually all respects, the CAISO’s direct relationship is with the scheduling coordinator, who serves as the market participant’s agent.  For that reason, it is a more streamlined and administrable process for the CAISO to communicate directly with the scheduling coordinator.  The CAISO expects that the scheduling coordinator would inform an individual market participant of rules of conduct issues, as they become relevant to that specific market participant.  Where an individual market participant has information relevant to the investigation and enforcement process, that information can be provided to the CAISO through the scheduling coordinator. |
| 37.8.7 | Where the investigation results in a Sanction, the CAISO shall provide a written statement of its findings, conclusions, and a description of the penalty to the Scheduling Coordinator. . | The edits consolidate the information the CAISO must provide upon determining that sanctions are warranted. |
| 37.8.8 | [Not Used] | The requirement to notify an officer-level employee upon determining a sanction will apply is not necessary.  The CAISO believes each scheduling coordinator can determine for itself how to communicate these issues internally.  Additionally, the existing tariff provision requires the CAISO to maintain a current list of officer-level employees for each scheduling coordinator.  There is no justification for maintaining this administrative burden. |
| 37.8.10, first sentence | A Scheduling Coordinator that receives a Sanction, or a Market Participant whose conduct gave rise to the Sanction, may obtain immediate review of the CAISO’s determination by directly appealing to FERC, in accordance with FERC’s rules and procedures. | The proposed amendment clarifies that the penalty has always been assessed against the scheduling coordinator so the general reference to a “Market Participant that receives a Sanction” has never been correct.  The edits also clarify that the CAISO is not presuming to dictate that the market participant is barred from making a filing at FERC if they, rather than the scheduling coordinator, choose to do so. |
| 37.8.10, fifth sentence | The disposition by FERC of such appeal shall be final, and no separate dispute of such Sanction may be initiated under Section 13. | This amendment proposes to remove an invalid CAISO tariff section cross-reference. |
| 37.9.1 | Penalty amounts for violation of these Rules of Conduct shall be calculated as specified in Section 37.4.2.2, Section 37.4.4, Section 37.5.2.2, Section 37.6.1.2, Section 37.6.2.2, and Section 37.6.3.2. | The CAISO is proposing to remove the contents of CAISO tariff section 37.4.1 and replace it with “Not Used.” As such, the CAISO is proposing to remove any cross-reference to that Tariff Section in order to provide clarity.  The CAISO is also proposing to remove reference to CAISO tariff section 37.4.3.2 as it is marked as “Not Used.” |
| 37.9.3.1 | The CAISO will administer any penalties issued under this Section 37 through Recalculation Settlement Statements, as relevant, issued to the responsible Scheduling Coordinator. | The edits consolidate the information the CAISO must provide upon determining that sanctions are warranted. |
| 39.7.1, third sentence | The Scheduling Coordinator must provide the data necessary for determining the Variable Costs unless the Negotiated Rate Option precedes the Variable Cost Option in the rank order, in which case the Scheduling Coordinator must have a negotiated rate established with the CAISO. | The CAISO is proposing to eliminate a long-expired reference to the use of an independent entity. |
| 39.7.1.1.2,  Second sentence | Resource specific values may be negotiated with the CAISO charged with calculating the Default Energy Bid. | The CAISO is proposing to eliminate a long-expired reference to the use of an independent entity. |
| 39.7.1.3.1, 2nd sentence of the first paragraph | Within ten (10) Business Days of receipt, the CAISO will provide a written response. | The CAISO is proposing to eliminate a long-expired reference to the use of an independent entity. |
| 39.7.1.3.1, 3rd sentence of the first paragraph | If the CAISO accepts the proposed Default Energy Bid, it will generally become effective within eleven (11) Business Days from the date of acceptance by the CAISO and remain in effect until: (1) the Default Energy Bid is modified by FERC; (2) the Default Energy Bid is modified by mutual agreement of the CAISO and the Scheduling Coordinator; or (3) the Default Energy Bid expires, is terminated or is modified pursuant to any agreed upon term or condition or pertinent FERC order. | The CAISO is proposing to eliminate a long-expired reference to the use of an independent entity. |
| 39.7.1.3.1, 1st sentence of the second paragraph | If the CAISO does not accept the proposed Default Energy Bid, the CAISO and the Scheduling Coordinator shall enter a period of good faith negotiations that terminates sixty (60) days following the date of submission of a proposed Default Energy Bid by a Scheduling Coordinator. | The CAISO is proposing to eliminate a long-expired reference to the use of an independent entity. |
| 39.7.1.3.1, 2nd sentence of the second paragraph | If at any time during this period, the CAISO and the Scheduling Coordinator agree upon the Default Energy Bid, it will generally become effective within eleven (11) Business Days of the date of agreement and remain in effect until: (1) the Default Energy Bid is modified by FERC; (2) the Default Energy Bid is modified by mutual agreement of the CAISO and the Scheduling Coordinator; or (3) the Default Energy Bid expires, is terminated or is modified pursuant to any agreed upon term or condition or pertinent FERC order. | The CAISO is proposing to eliminate a long-expired reference to the use of an independent entity. |
| 39.7.1.3.1, 1st sentence third paragraph | If by the end of the sixty (60)-day period the CAISO and the Scheduling Coordinator fail to agree on the Default Energy Bid to be used under the Negotiated Rate Option, the Scheduling Coordinator has the right to file a proposed Default Energy Bid with FERC pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act. | The CAISO is proposing to eliminate a long-expired reference to the use of an independent entity. |
| 39.7.1.3.1, first sentence of the fourth paragraph | During the sixty (60)-day period following the submission of a proposed negotiated Default Energy Bid by a Scheduling Coordinator, and pending FERC’s acceptance in cases where the CAISO fails to agree on the Default Energy Bid for use under the Negotiated Rate Option and the Scheduling Coordinator filed a proposed Default Energy Bid with FERC pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, the Scheduling Coordinator has the option of electing to use any of the other options available pursuant to Section 39.7. | The CAISO is proposing to eliminate a long-expired reference to the use of an independent entity. |
| 39.7.1.7.2.2(b) | Be supported by (1) a written attestation by a representative who has the authority to bind the company stating that the value submitted to the CAISO as the maximum storage horizon is consistent with the requirements specified in Section 39.7.1.7.2.2(a); or (2) corroborating information submitted to the CAISO, which may include several years of historic reservoir levels for the specific hydroelectric resource and regulatory filings related to the operations of the hydroelectric resource. | This amendment proposes to correct a typographical error concerning a CAISO tariff cross-reference. |
| 39.8.3, first sentence | The value of the Bid Adder will be either: (i) a unit-specific value determined in consultation with the CAISO; or (ii) a default Bid Adder of $24/MWh. | The CAISO is proposing to eliminate a long-expired reference to the use of an independent entity. |
| 40.1 last sentence | For purposes of Section 40, a Load Serving Entity shall not include any entity satisfying the terms of California Public Utilities Code Section 380(k)(3). | This amendment correct a California Public Utilities Code Section cross-reference. |
| 40.2.1(a) | The Scheduling Coordinator for a CPUC Load Serving Entity must provide the CAISO with all information or data to be provided to the CAISO as required by the CPUC and pursuant to the schedule adopted by the CPUC, except that the monthly Resource Adequacy Plans or the same information as required to be included in the monthly Resource Adequacy Plans, plus any other information the CAISO requires as identified in the Business Practice Manual, shall be submitted to the CAISO no less than 45 days in advance of the first day of the month covered by the plan, as provided in Section 40.2.1(e). | This amendment correct a tariff cross-reference. |
| 40.2.1(b) | Where the information or data provided to the CAISO under Section 40.2.1(a) does not include Reserve Margin(s), then the provisions of Section 40.2.2.1(b) shall apply. | This amendment correct a tariff cross-reference. |
| 40.2.1(c) | Where the information or data provided to the CAISO under Section 40.2.1(a) does not include criteria for determining qualifying resource types and their Qualifying Capacity, then the provisions of Section 40.8 shall apply. | This amendment correct a tariff cross-reference. |
| 40.2.1(d) | Where the information or data provided to the CAISO under Section 40.2.1(a) does not include annual and monthly Demand Forecast requirements, then the provisions of Section 40.2.2.3 shall apply. | This amendment correct a tariff cross-reference. |
| 40.2.1(e) | Where the information or data provided to the CAISO under Section 40.2.1(a) does not include annual and monthly Resource Adequacy Plan requirements that include, at a minimum, identifying Local Capacity Area Resources and Listed Local RA Capacity, or where there is a requirement to submit monthly Resource Adequacy Plans but the submission date is less than 45 days in advance of the first day of the month covered by the plan, then Section 40.2.2.4 shall apply. | This amendment correct a tariff cross-reference. |
| 40.6.8.1.4, 2nd sentence of the first paragraph | Within ten (10) Business Days of receipt, the CAISO will provide a written response. | The CAISO is proposing to remove the defined term “Independent Entity.” An Independent Entity is a CAISO contractor carrying out tasks assigned by the CAISO. As such, the CAISO is proposing that there is no purpose in having the term Independent Entity distinguish between the CAISO and a CAISO contracted independent entity. |
| 40.6.8.1.4, 3rd sentence of the first paragraph | If the CAISO accepts the proposed Generated Bid, it will become effective within three (3) Business Days from the date of acceptance by the CAISO and remain in effect until: (1) the Generated Bid is modified by FERC; (2) the Generated Bid is modified by mutual agreement of the CAISO and the Scheduling Coordinator; or (3) the Generated Bid expires, is terminated or is modified pursuant to any agreed upon term or condition or pertinent FERC order. | The CAISO is proposing to remove the defined term “Independent Entity.” An Independent Entity is a CAISO contractor carrying out tasks assigned by the CAISO. As such, the CAISO is proposing that there is no purpose in having the term Independent Entity distinguish between the CAISO and a CAISO contracted independent entity. |
| 40.6.8.1.4, first sentence of the second paragraph | If the CAISO does not accept the proposed Generated Bid, the CAISO and the Scheduling Coordinator shall enter a period of good faith negotiations that terminates sixty (60) days following the date of submission of a proposed Generated Bid by a Scheduling Coordinator. | The CAISO is proposing to remove the defined term “Independent Entity.” An Independent Entity is a CAISO contractor carrying out tasks assigned by the CAISO. As such, the CAISO is proposing that there is no purpose in having the term Independent Entity distinguish between the CAISO and a CAISO contracted independent entity. |
| 40.6.8.1.4, second sentence of the second paragraph | If at any time during this period, the CAISO and the Scheduling Coordinator agree upon the Generated Bid, it will be become effective within three (3) Business Days of the date of agreement and remain in effect until: (1) the Generated Bid is modified by FERC; (2) the Generated Bid is modified by mutual agreement of the CAISO and the Scheduling Coordinator; or (3) the Generated Bid expires, is terminated or is modified pursuant to any agreed upon term or condition or pertinent FERC order. | The CAISO is proposing to remove the defined term “Independent Entity.” An Independent Entity is a CAISO contractor carrying out tasks assigned by the CAISO. As such, the CAISO is proposing that there is no purpose in having the term Independent Entity distinguish between the CAISO and a CAISO contracted independent entity. |
| 40.6.8.1.4, third paragraph | If by the end of the sixty (60) day period the CAISO and the Scheduling Coordinator fail to agree on the Generated Bid to be used under the negotiated price option, the Scheduling Coordinator has the right to file a proposed Generated Bid with FERC pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act | The CAISO is proposing to remove the defined term “Independent Entity.” An Independent Entity is a CAISO contractor carrying out tasks assigned by the CAISO. As such, the CAISO is proposing that there is no purpose in having the term Independent Entity distinguish between the CAISO and a CAISO contracted independent entity. |
| 40.6.8.1.4, fourth paragraph | During the sixty (60) day period following the submission of a proposed negotiated Generated Bid by a Scheduling Coordinator, and pending FERC’s acceptance in cases where the CAISO fails to agree on the Generated Bid for use under the negotiated price option and the Scheduling Coordinator filed a proposed Generated Bid with FERC pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, the Scheduling Coordinator has the option of electing to use any of the other options available pursuant to this Section. | The CAISO is proposing to remove the defined term “Independent Entity.” An Independent Entity is a CAISO contractor carrying out tasks assigned by the CAISO. As such, the CAISO is proposing that there is no purpose in having the term Independent Entity distinguish between the CAISO and a CAISO contracted independent entity. |
| Appendix A – CAISO Operating Cost Reserve | **CAISO Operating Cost Reserve**  The CAISO Operating Cost Reserve requirement is fifteen (15) percent of annual CAISO Operating Costs, unless otherwise specified by (1) the rate covenants of the official statements for each CAISO bond offering, (2) the CAISO Governing Board or (3) the FERC. The CAISO Operating Cost Reserve consists of the projected CAISO Operating Cost Reserve balance for December 31 of the prior year less the reserve requirement, as calculated according to the formula set forth in Appendix F, Schedule 1, Part C. If such amount is negative, the amount may be divided by two, so that the reserve is replenished within a two-year period. | The proposed amendment seeks to align language in the conformed tariff to the term as it is used throughout the tariff. The conformed tariff should define “CAISO Operating Cost Reserve” as the term is used throughout the CAISO tariff. “CAISO Operating Cost Revenue” is not used in the tariff. |
| Appendix A, - Day-Ahead Minimum Load Energy | **- Day-Ahead Minimum Load Energy**  Day-Ahead Scheduled Energy below the registered Minimum Load, or if applicable, as modified pursuant to Section 9.3.3, which applies to Generating Units with non-zero Minimum Load. Day-Ahead Minimum Load Energy is settled as provided in Section 11.2.1.1, and it is included in Bid Cost Recovery (BCR) at the relevant IFM Minimum Load Cost as described in Section 11.8.2.1.2. | This amendment proposes to align the tariff with changes the CAISO made in Docket No. ER16-1265 regarding PMin after re-rate (*see* Commission Letter Order issued in Docket No. ER16-1265, dated May 6, 2016). |
| Appendix A,  FMM LAP Price | **- FMM LAP Price**  The marginal price for a particular LAP calculated pursuant to Section 27.2.2.2. | The CAISO proposes to use the optimization engine pricing for Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points, which is also known as the Price Inconsistency Market Enhancements pricing methodology.  Currently, the MSS LAP price is calculated using the weighted average price of the constituent Pnodes. This formulation results in inconsistency with settlement for CRRs under the CAISO’s CRR Track 1B initiative (*see Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.*165 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2018)) that either source or sink at Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points. This new definition clarifies the generic use of this term in light of this this change. |
| Appendix A  FMM MSS Price | **[Not Used]** | The CAISO proposes to use the optimization engine pricing for Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points, which is also known as the Price Inconsistency Market Enhancements pricing methodology. (*See* <http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Feb19_2013TariffAmendment-EnhancePriceConsistency-DocketNoER13-957-000.pdf>)  Currently, the MSS LAP price is calculated using the weighted average price of the constituent Pnodes. This formulation results in inconsistency with settlement for CRRs under the CAISO’s CRR Track 1B initiative (*see Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.*165 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2018)) that either source or sink at Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points. |
| Appendix A,  IFM Lap Price (new definition) | **- IFM Lap Price**  The marginal price for a particular LAP calculated pursuant to Section 27.2.2.1. | The CAISO proposes to use the optimization engine pricing for Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points, which is also known as the Price Inconsistency Market Enhancements pricing methodology. (*See* <http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Feb19_2013TariffAmendment-EnhancePriceConsistency-DocketNoER13-957-000.pdf>)  Currently, the MSS LAP price is calculated using the weighted average price of the constituent Pnodes. This formulation results in inconsistency with settlement for CRRs under the CAISO’s CRR Track 1B initiative (*see Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.*165 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2018)) that either source or sink at Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points. |
| Appendix A  IFM MSS Price | **[Not Used]** | The CAISO proposes to use the optimization engine pricing for Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points, which is also known as the Price Inconsistency Market Enhancements pricing methodology. (*See* <http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Feb19_2013TariffAmendment-EnhancePriceConsistency-DocketNoER13-957-000.pdf>)  Currently, the MSS LAP price is calculated using the weighted average price of the constituent Pnodes. This formulation results in inconsistency with settlement for CRRs under the CAISO’s CRR Track 1B initiative (*see Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.*165 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2018)) that either source or sink at Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points. |
| Appendix A  - Independent Entity | **- [Not Used]** | The tariff refers to actions being taken by the CAISO or Independent Entity.  Since the Independent Entity is really just a contractor carrying out tasks assigned by the CAISO, there is no purpose for having the tariff distinguish the two.  The change would be to have the tariff refer only to the CAISO and strike all of the references to the independent entity. As such, the CAISO proposes to have the definition of “Independent Entity” be marked as “Not Used.” |
| Appendix A Interconnection Facilities Study | A study conducted by the Participating TO(s), CAISO, or a third party consultant for the Interconnection Customer to determine a list of facilities (including the Participating TO’s Interconnection Facilities, Network Upgrades, and Distribution Upgrades), the cost of those facilities, and the time required to interconnect the Generating Facility with the CAISO Controlled Grid. The scope of the study is defined in Section 8 of the Standard Large Generator Interconnection Procedures (Appendix U), Section 6 and 7 of the Generator Interconnection Procedures (Appendix Y) and Section 4.4 of the Generator Interconnection and Deliverability Allocation Procedures (Appendix DD). | The CAISO is proposing to update definitions relating to the interconnection process that were not updated when the CAISO amended the tariff to add Appendices U, Y and DD. |
| Appendix A Interconnection Request | An Interconnection Customer's request, in the form of Appendix 1 to the Generator Interconnection Deliverability Allocation Procedure (Appendix DD), in accordance with Section 25.1. | The CAISO is proposing to update definitions relating to the interconnection process that were not updated when the CAISO amended the tariff to add Appendices U, Y and DD. |
| Appendix A Interconnection Study | Any of the following studies: the Interconnection Feasibility Study, the Interconnection System Impact Study, and the Interconnection Facilities Study described in the Standard Large Generator Interconnection Procedures set forth in Appendix U and the Phase I Interconnection Study and the Phase II Interconnection Study described in the LGIP set forth in Appendix Y and Appendix DD. | The CAISO is proposing to update definitions relating to the interconnection process that were not updated when the CAISO amended the tariff to add Appendices U, Y and DD. |
| Appendix A,  LAP Price | **- LAP Price**  The marginal price for a particular LAP FMM MSS Price and RTD MSS Price, calculated as specified in Section 27.2.2. | The CAISO proposes to use the optimization engine pricing for Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points, which is also known as the Price Inconsistency Market Enhancements pricing methodology. (*See* <http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Feb19_2013TariffAmendment-EnhancePriceConsistency-DocketNoER13-957-000.pdf>)  Currently, the MSS LAP price is calculated using the weighted average price of the constituent Pnodes. This formulation results in inconsistency with settlement for CRRs under the CAISO’s CRR Track 1B initiative (*see Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.*165 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2018)) that either source or sink at Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points. |
| Appendix A  Location | A reference to either a Pricing Node or an Aggregated Pricing Node. | Spelling out term. |
| Appendix A;  - Minimum Dispatchable Level | Either (1) for resources that are not Multi-Stage Generating Resources, the lower limit of the fastest segment of a Generating Unit’s Operational Ramp Rate, as adjusted for the Generating Unit’s Forbidden Operating Regions, if any, or (2) for Multi-Stage Generating Resources, the minimum MW level of the fastest operational ramp rate across all configurations. | These revisions update the tariff to (1) reflect that resources with Forbidding Operating Regions are modelled as MSG resources; and (2) the CAISO market uses the operational ramp rate and issues DPMIN EDs based on the operational ramp rate. |
| Appendix A  - Negotiated Rate Option | A method of calculating Default Energy Bids based on a negotiation with the CAISO. | This amendment proposes to remove reference to the term “Independent Entity.” Since an Independent Entity is a contractor carrying out tasks assigned by the CAISO, there is no purpose for having the tariff distinguish between the CAISO and an independent entity. |
| Appendix A - Planning Region | Means each of the following Order 1000 transmission planning regions insofar as they are within the Western Interconnection: CAISO, NorthernGrid, and WestConnect. | This amendment acknowledges that NTTG and ColumbiaGrid are merging into a new planning region, NorthernGrid, beginning January 1, 2020. At that point in time there will be three Order 1000 planning regions: NorthernGrid, WestConnect, and CAISO. This change does not impact the CAISO and Appendix A is the only place where the planning regions are specifically mentioned in the CAISO tariff. |
| Appendix A  - PMax | The maximum normal capability of the Generating Unit, as measured at the Point of Interconnection or Point of Delivery, as applicable. PMax may not exceed the Interconnection Service Capacity, as documented in the Interconnection Study or Generator Interconnection Agreement. . | The proposed change to the definition of “PMax” clarifies the current language in the CAISO Tariff. |
| Appendix A,  RTD LAP Price | **- RTD LAP Price**  The marginal price for a particular LAP calculated pursuant to Section 27.2.2.2. | The CAISO proposes to use the optimization engine pricing for Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points, which is also known as the Price Inconsistency Market Enhancements pricing methodology.  Currently, the MSS LAP price is calculated using the weighted average price of the constituent Pnodes. This formulation results in inconsistency with settlement for CRRs under the CAISO’s CRR Track 1B initiative (*see Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.*165 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2018)) that either source or sink at Metered Subsystem Load Aggregated Points. This new definition clarifies the generic use of this term in light of this this change. |
| Appendix A  - Scheduling Point | A Location in the Base Market Model at which Scheduling Coordinators may submit Intertie Bids in the CAISO Markets. | Location is a defined term and is capitalized. |
| Appendix B.3, Section 4.1.1 | **Identification of Net Scheduled Generating Unit.** The Participating Generator has identified the Net Scheduled Generating Unit that it owns, operates or has a contractual entitlement to, in Schedule 1, as required by Section 4.6.4 of the CAISO Tariff. | The CAISO proposes to correct a typographical error by deleting the repetitious “Net Scheduled.” |
| Appendix B.3, Section 4.5 | **Dispatch and Curtailment.** The CAISO shall only dispatch or curtail a Net Scheduled Generating Unit of the Participating Generator: (a) to the extent the Participating Generator bids Energy or Ancillary Services from the Net Scheduled Generating Unit into the CAISO’s markets or the Energy is otherwise available to the CAISO under Section 40 or 43A of the CAISO Tariff; or (b) if the CAISO must dispatch or curtail the Net Scheduled Generating Unit in order to respond to an existing or imminent System Emergency or condition that would compromise CAISO Balancing Authority Area integrity or reliability as provided in Sections 7 and 7.6.1 of the CAISO Tariff. | The CAISO is proposing to change the CAISO tariff cross-reference to Section 43A, as Section 43 was removed from the tariff in its entirety in Docket No. ER19-1837-000, letter order issued August 9, 2019. |
| Appendix B.3, Section 6.1 | The Participating Generator shall be responsible for all its costs incurred in connection with operating and maintaining the Net Scheduled Generating Unit identified in Schedule 1 for the purpose of meeting its obligations under this Agreement. | This amendment clarifies a defined term in the CAISO tariff. The defined term “Net Scheduled QF” was changed to “Net Scheduled Generating Unit” and the CAISO is aligning this pro forma with that change. |
| Appendix B.3, Section 8.2 | The Participating Generator represents that all necessary leases, approvals, permits, licenses, easements, rights of way or access to install, own and/or operate its Net Scheduled Generating Unit have been or will be obtained by the Participating Generator prior to the effective date of this Agreement. | This amendment clarifies a defined term in the CAISO tariff. The defined term “Net Scheduled QF” was changed to “Net Scheduled Generating Unit” and the CAISO is aligning this pro forma with that change. |
| Appendix B.3, Section 8.3 | The Participating Generator represents and warrants that: (1) the Net Scheduled Generating Unit listed in Schedule 1 is (a) a Qualifying Facility or is operated as an integral part of a Qualifying Facility, or (b) is a CHP Resource, and (2) (a) the Self-provided Load of the Participating Generator that is served by the Net Scheduled Generating Unit either has, and continues to have through the term of this Agreement, standby service from a UDC or MSS Operator under terms approved by the Local Regulatory Authority or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, as applicable, or (b) the Self-provided Load shall be curtailed concurrently with any Outage of the Generation serving that Self-provided Load in an amount sufficient to cover that Outage. | This amendment clarifies a defined term in the CAISO tariff. The defined term “Net Scheduled QF” was changed to “Net Scheduled Generating Unit” and the CAISO is aligning this *pro forma* with that change. |
| Appendix B.9, Section 7.2 | The Host Balancing Authority must support associated E-Tagging as described in the CAISO Dynamic Scheduling Protocol and deemed to be consistent with NERC and/or WECC requirements. | This amendment proposes to capitalize the “e” and “t” in E-Tagging in order to be consistent with the defined term throughout the CAISO tariff. |
| Appendix B.11  Whereas Clause | **B.** The CRR Entity has completed the Candidate CRR Holder application process and is eligible to participate in the CRR Allocation or CRR Auction or register as a CRR Holder through the Secondary Registration System. | This amendment proposes to correct a typographical error in the alpha-numeric numbering sequence. |
| Appendix B.13  Section 4.3.3 | **4.3.3 Use of CAISO Forecast.**  For purposes of participating in the CAISO Markets, the System Resource Owner has the option of using a forecast of their output provided by CAISO, provided that: (1) they agree to provide the CAISO with the meteorological data specified in Appendix Q; and (2) they are certified to do so by the CAISO pursuant to the rules specified in the Business Practice Manuals. Once the election to use the output forecast provided by the CAISO is complete, the CAISO will specify the election status in the Master File. Any changes to this election will be subject to the timeline and rule changes that apply to the Master File as specified in Section 30.7.3.2. | The CAISO proposes to amend the *pro forma* Resources-Specific System Resource Agreement to extend to such units the option of using the CAISO forecast for scheduling purposes. |
| Appendix B.14  Section 4.3.2, first sentence | The Demand Response Provider shall notify the CAISO of any proposed change(s) to the registration of technical information. | This amendment proposes to correct a typographical error. |
| Appendix B.17, EIM Entity Agreement, Section 3.2.2  3rd sentence | The filing of the notice of termination by the CAISO with FERC will be considered timely if (1) the request to file a notice of termination is made after the preconditions for termination have been met, and the CAISO files the notice of termination within thirty (30) days of receipt of such request; or (2) the CAISO files the notice of termination in accordance with the requirements of FERC Order No. 2001. | This provision includes a typographical error. Thirty days, not 120 days, is the correct timeframe for the CAISO to file a notice of termination after all preconditions for termination have been met. |
| Appendix B.19, Section 3.2.2, first sentence | In the event that the EIM Participating Resource no longer wishes to submit Bids and transmit Energy over the CAISO Controlled Grid, it may terminate this Agreement, on giving the CAISO not less than ninety (90) days written notice, provided, however, that in accordance with Section 2.2.2, the EIM Participating Resource may modify Schedule 1 to remove EIM Resources which it no longer owns or no longer has contractual entitlement to and such modification shall be effective upon receipt by the CAISO. | This amendment proposes to correct a cross-reference to the EIM Participating Resource Agreement. The correct reference is Section 2.2.2. |
| Appendix C, Section I.1.2, middle of second paragraph | In addition, the Scheduling Coordinator must certify that the Schedules are subject to: (a) charges for losses by the Western Area Power Administration for the use of transmission facilities owned by the Western Area Power Administration within the SMUD/TID IBAA; or (b) Transmission Agency of Northern California for the use of the California-Oregon Transmission Project. Schedules and Dispatches settled under such Resource IDs shall be subject to an LMP which has accounted for the Marginal Cost of Losses as if there were an actual physical generation facility at the Tracy Scheduling Point or at the applicable Scheduling Point that connects the CAISO Balancing Authority Area and the Western Area Power Administration system as opposed to the Marginal Cost of Losses under the IBAA LMPs specified in Section I.1.1 of this Appendix. | This amendment proposes to correct a cross-reference within Appendix C to the CAISO tariff. |
| Appendix C, Section I.1.2, first sentence of the 4th paragraph | Schedules and Dispatches settled under such Resource IDs shall be subject to an LMP which has accounted for the Marginal Cost of Losses as if there were an actual physical generation facility at the Tracy Scheduling Point or at the applicable Scheduling Point that connects the CAISO Balancing Authority Area and the Western Area Power Administration system as opposed to the Marginal Cost of Losses under the IBAA LMPs specified in Section I.1.1 of this Appendix. | This amendment proposes to correct a cross-reference within Appendix C to the CAISO tariff. |
| Appendix L, Section L.2, last sentence | Actual ATC mathematical algorithms and other ATC calculation information are located in the CAISO’s ATC Implementation Document (ATCID) posted to the CAISO Website. | Appendix L to the CAISO tariff includes a footnote specifying that the CAISO’s Available Transfer Capability Implementation Document (ATCID) is available on the CAISO’s OASIS and the footnote provided a hyperlink to the document. Operations Engineer Services discovered that the link was not working for an undetermined time period. Though temporarily not available through the broken hyperlink, the CAISO’s ATCID was always available on the public caiso.com website. Due to challenges with maintaining links on OASIS, the CAISO plans to amend Appendix L to refer to the CAISO’s public website. |
| Appendix N, Section 1.2.1.6 | All Energy transfers associated with a Pseudo-Tie Generating Unit must be electronically tagged (E-Tagged). | This amendment proposes to capitalize the “t” in E-Tagging in order to be consistent with the defined term throughout the CAISO tariff. |
| Appendix N, Section 2.2.1.4 | All Energy transfers associated with a Pseudo-Tie generating unit must be electronically tagged (E-Tagged). | This amendment proposes to capitalize the “e” and “t” in E-Tagging in order to be consistent with the defined term throughout the CAISO tariff. |
| Appendix Q, Section 2.2.5 (in its entirety) | **2.2.5 [Not Used]** | This section is part of implementing a fee that was applied only to resources receiving participating intermittent resource program (PIRP) protective measures. PIRP Protective measures have expired. The defined term “Participating Intermittent Resource Export Fee” was deleted in Docket No. ER19-1837-000 (letter order issued October 10, 2019). Accordingly, these provisions need to be updated to reflect that the participating intermittent resource export fee no longer exists. |
| Appendix Q Section 2.4.4 | **Continuing Obligation**  A Participating Intermittent Resource or Eligible Intermittent Resource must meet all applicable obligations established for Participating Intermittent Resources or Eligible Intermittent Resources under the CAISO Tariff and this EIRP, and must fully cooperate in providing all data, other information, and authorizations the CAISO reasonably requests to fulfill its obligation to validate forecast models and explain deviations. | The defined term “Participating Intermittent Resource Export Fee” was deleted in Docket No. ER19-1837-000 (letter order issued October 10, 2019). |
| Appendix R | **Appendix R**  **[Not Used]** | The CAISO is proposing to delete all contents of this Appendix R and notate it as “Not Used,” as it contains outdated tariff language. |
| Appendix S, Section 1.3.1.4 | Infrastructure security of electric system equipment and operations and control hardware and software is essential to ensure day-to-day reliability and operational security. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission expects all transmission providers, market participants, and Interconnection Customers interconnected with electric systems to comply with Applicable Reliability Criteria. All public utilities are expected to meet basic standards for electric system infrastructure and operational security, including physical, operational, and cyber-security practices. | The CAISO is proposing this change because the President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board requirements have been superseded by the Applicable Reliability Criteria which, as defined by the CAISO tariff, include NERC and WECC Reliability Standards as well as Local Reliability Criteria. |
| Appendix T, Article 12.9 | Infrastructure security of electric system equipment and operations and control hardware and software is essential to ensure day-to-day reliability and operational security. FERC expects all transmission providers, market participants, and interconnection customers interconnected to electric systems to comply with Applicable Reliability Criteria . All public utilities are expected to meet basic standards for system infrastructure and operational security, including physical, operational, and cyber-security practices. | The CAISO is proposing this change because the President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board requirements have been superseded by the Applicable Reliability Criteria which, as defined by the CAISO tariff, include NERC and WECC Reliability Standards as well as Local Reliability Criteria. |
| Appendix U, Section 3.9.1, first sentence | If the actual MW capacity of its Generating Facility is reduced by no more than the greater of five percent (5%) of its MW capacity or 10 MW, but by no more than twenty-five percent (25%) of the MW capacity of the Generating Facility, such a one-time reduction shall not constitute a breach of the Interconnection Customer’s obligations under the CAISO Tariff or its Generator Interconnection Agreement. | The CAISO is proposing to remove this language as it is confusing and at tension with the broader language, as well as with the CAISO’s intent, in the rest of the provision. |
| Appendix U Section 4.4.6,  Last paragraph | The CAISO will publish cost data regarding modification assessments in accordance with the terms set forth in a Business Practice Manual.  Notwithstanding any other provision, all refunds pursuant to this Appendix U will be processed in accordance with the CAISO’s generally accepted accounting practices, including monthly batched deposit refund disbursements. Any CAISO deadline will be tolled to the extent the Interconnection Customer has not provided the CAISO with the appropriate documents to facilitate the Interconnection Customer’s refund, or if the Interconnection Customer has any outstanding invoice balance due to the CAISO on another project owned by the same Interconnection Customer. | By adding this provision at the end of the section, the CAISO proposes to clarify that CAISO refund deadlines will be tolled to the extent the Interconnection Customer fails to provide accounting information to facilitate the refund, or where generally accepted accounting practices (such as monthly batch disbursements) require *de minimis* tolling. |
| Appendix U, Section 4.4.7, first sentence | The CAISO’s agreement to modifications requested pursuant to Section 4.4.3 for an Interconnection Customer that has exceeded or will exceed ten (10) years from the date the Interconnection Request is received by the CAISO with retention of Deliverability will be predicated upon the Interconnection Customer’s ability to meet and maintain the following commercial viability criteria: | This amendment proposes to correct an omission, the word “agreement” should be included, consistent with CAISO Tariff Appendix DD, Section 6.7.4 |
| Appendix U, Section 4.4.7, 2nd to last paragraph | If an Interconnection Customer satisfies all the commercial viability criteria except criterion (b), the CAISO will postpone converting the Generating Facility to Energy-Only Deliverability Status for one year from the day the Interconnection Customer submits the modification request, or eleven years after the CAISO received the Interconnection Request, whichever occurs later. Interconnection Customers exercising this provision must continue to meet all other commercial viability criteria | This amendment proposes to clarify the logic of the time frame in the beginning of the section. |
| Appendix U, Section 4.4.7.1, first sentence | For Interconnection Customers extending their Commercial Operation Date beyond the ten-year threshold and retaining Deliverability pursuant to Section 4.4.7, the CAISO will perform an annual review of commercial viability. | This amendment proposes to clarify the logic of the time frame in the beginning of the section. |
| Appendix U Section 6.4 | The Participating TO(s) will invoice the CAISO for any assessment work within seventy-five (75) calendar days of completion of the assessment, and, within thirty (30) days thereafter, the CAISO will issue an invoice or refund to the Interconnection Customer, as applicable, based upon such submitted Participating TO invoices and the CAISO’s own costs for the assessment. If the actual costs of the re-study are greater than the deposit provided by the Interconnection Customer, the Interconnection Customer will pay the balance within thirty (30) days of being invoiced.  Notwithstanding any other provision, all refunds pursuant to this Appendix U will be processed in accordance with the CAISO’s generally accepted accounting practices, including monthly batched deposit refund disbursements. Any CAISO deadline will be tolled to the extent the Interconnection Customer has not provided the CAISO with the appropriate documents to facilitate the Interconnection Customer’s refund, or if the Interconnection Customer has any outstanding invoice balance due to the CAISO on another project owned by the same Interconnection Customer. | By adding this provision at the end of the section, the CAISO proposes to clarify that CAISO refund deadlines will be tolled to the extent the Interconnection Customer fails to provide accounting information to facilitate the refund, or where generally accepted accounting practices (such as monthly batch disbursements) require *de minimis* tolling. |
| Appendix U Section 7.6 | The Participating TO(s) will invoice the CAISO for any assessment work within seventy-five (75) calendar days of completion of the assessment, and, within thirty (30) days thereafter, the CAISO will issue an invoice or refund to the Interconnection Customer, as applicable, based upon such submitted Participating TO invoices and the CAISO’s own costs for the assessment. If the actual costs of the re-study are greater than the deposit provided by the Interconnection Customer, the Interconnection Customer will pay the balance within thirty (30) days of being invoiced.  Notwithstanding any other provision, all refunds pursuant to this Appendix U will be processed in accordance with the CAISO’s generally accepted accounting practices, including monthly batched deposit refund disbursements. Any CAISO deadline will be tolled to the extent the Interconnection Customer has not provided the CAISO with the appropriate documents to facilitate the Interconnection Customer’s refund, or if the Interconnection Customer has any outstanding invoice balance due to the CAISO on another project owned by the same Interconnection Customer. | By adding this provision at the end of the section, the CAISO proposes to clarify that CAISO refund deadlines will be tolled to the extent the Interconnection Customer fails to provide accounting information to facilitate the refund, or where generally accepted accounting practices (such as monthly batch disbursements) require *de minimis* tolling. |
| Appendix U Section 10.1 | The Participating TO(s) will invoice the CAISO for any assessment work within seventy-five (75) calendar days of completion of the assessment, and, within thirty (30) days thereafter, the CAISO will issue an invoice or refund to the Interconnection Customer, as applicable, based upon such submitted Participating TO invoices and the CAISO’s own costs for the assessment. If the actual costs of the study are greater than the deposit provided by the Interconnection Customer, the Interconnection Customer will pay the balance within thirty (30) days of being invoiced.  Notwithstanding any other provision, all refunds pursuant to this Appendix U will be processed in accordance with the CAISO’s generally accepted accounting practices, including monthly batched deposit refund disbursements. Any CAISO deadline will be tolled to the extent the Interconnection Customer has not provided the CAISO with the appropriate documents to facilitate the Interconnection Customer’s refund, or if the Interconnection Customer has any outstanding invoice balance due to the CAISO on another project owned by the same Interconnection Customer. | By adding this provision at the end of the section, the CAISO proposes to clarify that CAISO refund deadlines will be tolled to the extent the Interconnection Customer fails to provide accounting information to facilitate the refund, or where generally accepted accounting practices (such as monthly batch disbursements) require *de minimis* tolling. |
| Appendix V, Appendix D | Infrastructure security of CAISO Controlled Grid equipment and operations and control hardware and software is essential to ensure day-to-day CAISO Controlled Grid reliability and operational security. FERC will expect the CAISO, all Participating TOs, market participants, and Interconnection Customers interconnected to the CAISO Controlled Grid to comply with Applicable Reliability Criteria. All public utilities will be expected to meet basic standards for system infrastructure and operational security, including physical, operational, and cyber-security practices. | The CAISO is proposing this change because the President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board requirements have been superseded by the Applicable Reliability Criteria which, as defined by the CAISO tariff, include NERC and WECC Reliability Standards as well as Local Reliability Criteria. |
| Appendix X, Appendix C first paragraph | Infrastructure security of CAISO Controlled Grid equipment and operations and control hardware and software is essential to ensure day-to-day CAISO Controlled Grid reliability and operational security. FERC will expect the CAISO, and Approved Project Sponsor interconnected to the CAISO Controlled Grid to comply with Applicable Reliability Criteria. All public utilities will be expected to meet basic standards for system infrastructure and operational security, including physical, operational, and cyber-security practices. | The CAISO is proposing this change because the President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board requirements have been superseded by the Applicable Reliability Criteria which, as defined by the CAISO tariff, include NERC and WECC Reliability Standards as well as Local Reliability Criteria. |
| Appendix Y, Section 3.10.1, first sentence | If the actual MW capacity of its Generating Facility is reduced by no more than the greater of five percent (5%) of its MW capacity or 10 MW, but by no more than twenty-five percent (25%) of the MW capacity of the Generating Facility, such a one-time reduction shall not constitute a breach of the Interconnection Customer’s obligations under the CAISO Tariff or its Generator Interconnection Agreement | The CAISO is proposing to remove this language as it is confusing and at tension with the broader language, as well as with the CAISO’s intent, in the rest of the provision. |
| Appendix Y Sections 6.9.2.3 | The CAISO will publish cost data regarding modification assessments in accordance with the terms set forth in a Business Practice Manual.  Notwithstanding any other provision, all refunds pursuant to this Appendix Y will be processed in accordance with the CAISO’s generally accepted accounting practices, including monthly batched deposit refund disbursements. Any CAISO deadline will be tolled to the extent the Interconnection Customer has not provided the CAISO with the appropriate documents to facilitate the Interconnection Customer’s refund, or if the Interconnection Customer has any outstanding invoice balance due to the CAISO on another project owned by the same Interconnection Customer. | By adding this provision at the end of the section, the CAISO proposes to clarify that CAISO refund deadlines will be tolled to the extent the Interconnection Customer fails to provide accounting information to facilitate the refund, or where generally accepted accounting practices (such as monthly batch disbursements) require *de minimis* tolling. |
| Appendix Z, Table of Contents | 3.4 Relationship Between this LGIA and the Net Scheduled PGA | “QF PGA” is no longer a defined term and has been replaced with “Net Scheduled PGA” as a defined term in the Regulatory Must-Take Generation tariff amendment. The CAISO is proposing to align the tariff with that change. |
| Appendix Z, Article 1, Definition of QF PGA | **Net Scheduled PGA** shall mean a Net Scheduled Participating Generator Agreement specifying the special provisions for the operating relationship between a Net Scheduled Generating Unit and the CAISO, a pro forma version of which is set forth in Appendix B.3 of the CAISO Tariff. | “QF PGA” is no longer a defined term and has been replaced with “Net Scheduled PGA” as a defined term in the Regulatory Must-Take Generation tariff amendment. The CAISO is proposing to align the tariff with that change. |
| Appendix Z, Section 3.4 | **3.4 Relationship Between this LGIA and the Net Scheduled PGA.** With regard to the rights and obligations of a Net Scheduled Generating Unit that has entered into a Net Scheduled PGA with the CAISO and has entered into this LGIA, if and to the extent a matter is specifically addressed by a provision of the Net Scheduled PGA that is inconsistent with this LGIA, the terms of the Net Scheduled PGA shall govern. | “QF PGA” is no longer a defined term and has been replaced with “Net Scheduled PGA” as a defined term in the Regulatory Must-Take Generation tariff amendment. The CAISO is proposing to align the tariff with that change. |
| Appendix Z, Appendix D | Infrastructure security of CAISO Controlled Grid equipment and operations and control hardware and software is essential to ensure day-to-day CAISO Controlled Grid reliability and operational security. FERC will expect the CAISO, all Participating TOs, market participants, and Interconnection Customers interconnected to the CAISO Controlled Grid to comply with Applicable Reliability Criteria. All public utilities will be expected to meet basic standards for system infrastructure and operational security, including physical, operational, and cyber-security practices. | The CAISO is proposing this change because the President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board requirements have been superseded by the Applicable Reliability Criteria which, as defined by the CAISO tariff, include NERC and WECC Reliability Standards as well as Local Reliability Criteria. |
| Appendix BB, Appendix D | Infrastructure security of CAISO Controlled Grid equipment and operations and control hardware and software is essential to ensure day-to-day CAISO Controlled Grid reliability and operational security. FERC will expect the CAISO, all Participating TOs, market participants, and Interconnection Customers interconnected to the CAISO Controlled Grid to comply with Applicable Reliability Criteria. All public utilities will be expected to meet basic standards for system infrastructure and operational security, including physical, operational, and cyber-security practices. | The CAISO is proposing this change because the President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board requirements have been superseded by the Applicable Reliability Criteria which, as defined by the CAISO tariff, include NERC and WECC Reliability Standards as well as Local Reliability Criteria. |
| Appendix CC, Appendix D | Infrastructure security of CAISO Controlled Grid equipment and operations and control hardware and software is essential to ensure day-to-day CAISO Controlled Grid reliability and operational security. FERC will expect the CAISO, all Participating TOs, market participants, and Interconnection Customers interconnected to the CAISO Controlled Grid to comply with Applicable Reliability Criteria. All public utilities will be expected to meet basic standards for system infrastructure and operational security, including physical, operational, and cyber-security practices. | The CAISO is proposing this change because the President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board requirements have been superseded by the Applicable Reliability Criteria which, as defined by the CAISO tariff, include NERC and WECC Reliability Standards as well as Local Reliability Criteria. |
| Appendix DD, Section 3.5.1.1 | All non-refundable portions of the Interconnection Study Deposit that exceed the costs the CAISO, Participating TOs, or third parties have incurred on the Interconnection Customer’s behalf, and any non-refundable interconnection study deposit funds that are received by the CAISO from a Participating TO, pursuant to a requirement in the Participating TO’s wholesale distribution tariff for such funds to be distributed by the CAISO, shall be treated in accordance with Section 7.6.  Notwithstanding any other provision, all refunds pursuant to this Appendix DD will be processed in accordance with the CAISO’s generally accepted accounting practices, including monthly batched deposit refund disbursements. Any CAISO deadline will be tolled to the extent the Interconnection Customer has not provided the CAISO with the appropriate documents to facilitate the Interconnection Customer’s refund, or if the Interconnection Customer has any outstanding invoice balance due to the CAISO on another project owned by the same Interconnection Customer. | By adding this provision at the end of the section, the CAISO proposes to clarify that CAISO refund deadlines will be tolled to the extent the Interconnection Customer fails to provide accounting information to facilitate the refund, or where generally accepted accounting practices (such as monthly batch disbursements) require *de minimis* tolling. |
| Appendix DD 3.5.1.1 (b) | Should an Interconnection Request made under Section 3.5.1 be withdrawn by the Interconnection Customer or be deemed withdrawn by the CAISO by written notice under Section 3.8 more than thirty (30) calendar days after the Scoping Meeting, but on or before thirty (30) calendar days following the Results Meeting (or the latest date permitted under this GIDAP for a Results Meeting if a customer elects not to have a Results Meeting) for the Phase I Interconnection Study or the system impact and facilities study for Generating Facilities processed under the Independent Study Process, the CAISO shall refund to the Interconnection Customer the difference between (i) the Interconnection Customer’s Interconnection Study Deposit and (ii) the greater of the costs the CAISO and Participating TOs have incurred on the Interconnection Customer’s behalf or one-half of the original Interconnection Study Deposit up to a maximum of $75,000, including interest earned at the rate provided for in the interest-bearing account from the date of deposit to the date of withdrawal. | The CAISO proposes the amendment because when the CAISO changed the deposit to $150,000, the maximum the Interconnection Customer can forfeit is $75,000. (*See* Docket No. ER16-693, *Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.* 154 FERC ¶ 61,169). |
| Appendix DD, Section 3.8, 2nd sentence | In addition, after confirmation by the CAISO of a valid Interconnection Request under Section 3.5.2, if the Interconnection Customer fails to adhere to all requirements of this GIDAP, except as provided in Section 15.5 (Disputes), the CAISO shall deem the Interconnection Request to be withdrawn and shall provide written notice to the Interconnection Customer within five (5) Business Days of the deemed withdrawal and an explanation of the reasons for such deemed withdrawal. | This amendment proposes to correct a CAISO tariff cross-reference. |
| Appendix DD, Section 4.2, 1st sentence second paragraph | Otherwise, an Interconnection Request submitted under the Independent Study Process must pass all of the tests for determining electrical independence set forth in this Section 4.2 in order to qualify for the Independent Study Process. | This change clarifies the language to remove a typographical error. |
| Appendix DD, Section 4.2.1, title | **4.2.1 Flow Impact Test** | The CAISO proposes to remove this portion of the title as it is no longer applicable to Appendix DD to the CAISO tariff. |
| Appendix DD, Section 4.5 | **4.5 Intentionally left blank.** | This amendment proposes to add a Section 4.5 to Appendix DD as a means to keep consecutive numbering in the Generator Interconnection and Deliverability Allocation Procedures (Appendix DD to the CAISO Tariff). |
| Appendix DD, Section 6.7.2.3 | The Participating TO(s) shall invoice the CAISO for any assessment work within seventy-five (75) calendar days of completion of the assessment, and, within thirty (30) days thereafter, the CAISO shall issue an invoice or refund to the Interconnection Customer, as applicable, based upon such submitted Participating TO invoices and the CAISO’s own costs for the assessment.  The CAISO will publish cost data regarding modification assessments in accordance with the terms set forth in a Business Practice Manual.  Notwithstanding any other provision, all refunds pursuant to this Appendix DD will be processed in accordance with the CAISO’s generally accepted accounting practices, including monthly batched deposit refund disbursements. Any CAISO deadline will be tolled to the extent the Interconnection Customer has not provided the CAISO with the appropriate documents to facilitate the Interconnection Customer’s refund, or if the Interconnection Customer has any outstanding invoice balance due to the CAISO on another project owned by the same Interconnection Customer. | By adding this provision at the end of the section, the CAISO proposes to clarify that CAISO refund deadlines will be tolled to the extent the Interconnection Customer fails to provide accounting information to facilitate the refund, or where generally accepted accounting practices (such as monthly batch disbursements) require *de minimis* tolling. |
| Appendix DD Section 6.8.3, first paragraph, second sentence. | Once the initial and second Interconnection Financial Security posting due dates as described in this section have passed, the error or omission provisions described in this Section 6.8 no longer apply. | This amendment proposes to correct a cross-reference. |
| Appendix DD  7.5.1  Second paragraph, second sentence | Specifically, beginning on the date of the opening of the annual Generator Downsizing Request Window, all proposed reductions of Interconnection Service Capacity by Interconnection Customers shall, regardless of the dates of the Interconnection Customer’s Interconnection Request(s), be subject to the requirements and procedures of the Generator Downsizing Process set forth in Section 7.5, except for MW capacity reductions made pursuant to the following: (1) the provisions of the CAISO’s interconnection procedures that permit Interconnection Customers to reduce the size of their Generating Facilities between the Phase I and Phase II Interconnection Studies, as set forth in Section 6.7.2; (2) specific non-conforming provisions of an Interconnection Customer’s Generator Interconnection Agreement that provide the Interconnection Customer with an explicit right to reduce the capacity of its Generating Facility through a partial termination of its Generator Interconnection Agreement; (3) the de minimis threshold set forth in Section 7.5.13.1; (4) the parking options set forth in Sections 8.9.4, 8.9.5, and 8.9.6; (5) modifications made pursuant to Section 6.7.2 to reduce Generating Facility Capacity without decreasing Interconnection Service Capacity where the Generating Facility Capacity still exceeds the Interconnection Service Capacity; and (6) where the CAISO and Participating TO determine no study is required. | The CAISO proposes to clarify that where no study is required, the downsizing request is not subject to the requirements and procedures of Section 7.5. |
| Appendix DD, Section 7.5.13.1, first sentence | If the actual MW capacity of its Generating Facility is reduced by no more than the greater of five percent (5%) of its MW capacity or 10 MW, but not by more than twenty-five percent (25%) of the MW capacity of the Generating Facility, such a one-time reduction shall not constitute a breach of the Interconnection Customer’s obligations under the CAISO Tariff or its Generator Interconnection Agreement. | The CAISO proposes to remove this language as it is confusing and at tension with the broader language, as well as with the CAISO’s intent, in the rest of the provision. |
| Appendix DD, Section 8.9.2(3) | To Interconnection Customers in the current Queue Cluster with a completed Phase II Interconnection Study that have not parked, which are subject to Section 8.9.2.2 and elect to proceed without a power purchase agreement, or that parked before November 27, 2018 and attested to balance-sheet financing upon the end of their parking period. | This amendment proposes to correct a cross-reference. |
| Appendix DD, Section 8.9.2 | All power purchase agreements in this Section 8.9 must require Deliverability for the Interconnection Customer to represent that it has, is negotiating, or is shortlisted for a power purchase agreement. For all TP Deliverability allocations based upon having, negotiating, or being shortlisted for power purchase agreements, the CAISO will allocate TP Deliverability up to the amount of deliverable MW capacity procured by the power purchase agreement. All Load Serving Entities building Generating Facilities to serve their own Load must be doing so to fulfill a regulatory requirement that warrants Deliverability. Load Serving Entities acting as Interconnection Customers are otherwise eligible for all other attestations.  Notwithstanding any other provision, all refunds pursuant to this Appendix DD will be processed in accordance with the CAISO’s generally accepted accounting practices, including monthly batched deposit refund disbursements. Any CAISO deadline will be tolled to the extent the Interconnection Customer has not provided the CAISO with the appropriate documents to facilitate the Interconnection Customer’s refund, or if the Interconnection Customer has any outstanding invoice balance due to the CAISO on another project owned by the same Interconnection Customer. | By adding this provision at the end of the section, the CAISO proposes to clarify that CAISO refund deadlines will be tolled to the extent the Interconnection Customer fails to provide accounting information to facilitate the refund, or where generally accepted accounting practices (such as monthly batch disbursements) require *de minimis* tolling. |
| Appendix DD Section 8.9.2.1  Second to last paragraph, second sentence | In a situation where the available amount of TP Deliverability can accommodate all Interconnection Customers with equal scores, the CAISO will allocate the TP Deliverability to the Interconnection Customers with the lowest LDNU cost estimates. | The CAISO proposes to correct a typographical error. |
| Appendix DD, Section 8.9.3(5) | The Interconnection Customer must maintain its Commercial Operation Date set forth in the GIA unless an extension results in no Material Modification or delay in the construction schedule for Network Upgrades common to multiple Generating Facilities; or unless the extension is occasioned by a material delay in the Participating TO’s construction of any Network Upgrades or Participating TO’s Interconnection Facilities | This amendment proposes to remove this language as this particular detail in the TP Deliverability retention criteria is now superfluous with the implementation of commercial viability criteria. |
| Appendix DD, Section 8.9.9, first paragraph, third sentence | Deliverability may not be assigned or otherwise transferred except as expressly provided by the CAISO Tariff. An Interconnection Customer may reallocate its Generating Facility’s Deliverability among its own Generating Units or Resource IDs at the Generating Facility. The Generating Units must be located at the same Point of Interconnection. | The CAISO is proposing to remove language from this Section because requiring the same GIA is overly restrictive. Generating units can elect to have separate GIAs, which should not prevent deliverability transfers among them. |
| Appendix DD, Section 14.2.4.2 | The Participating TO(s) will invoice the CAISO for any limited operation study work within seventy-five (75) calendar days of completion of the study, and, within thirty (30) days of payment of the Participating TO(s) invoice, the CAISO will issue an invoice or refund to the Generating Unit owner, as applicable, based upon such submitted Participating TO invoices and the CAISO’s costs for the assessment.  Notwithstanding any other provision, all refunds pursuant to this Appendix DD will be processed in accordance with the CAISO’s generally accepted accounting practices, including monthly batched deposit refund disbursements. Any CAISO deadline will be tolled to the extent the Interconnection Customer has not provided the CAISO with the appropriate documents to facilitate the Interconnection Customer’s refund, or if the Interconnection Customer has any outstanding invoice balance due to the CAISO on another project owned by the same Interconnection Customer. | By adding this provision at the end of the section, the CAISO proposes to clarify that CAISO refund deadlines will be tolled to the extent the Interconnection Customer fails to provide accounting information to facilitate the refund, or where generally accepted accounting practices (such as monthly batch disbursements) require *de minimis* tolling. |
| Appendix DD, Appendix 3, Section 13.10 | **[Not Used]** | CAISO proposes to remove language in the generator interconnection study process agreement to clarify that GISPAs will only be executed by the interconnection customer upon submission to the CAISO, consistent with the CAISO’s filing in Docket No. ER18-2498-000 (*Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 166 FERC P 61,113 (2019)*) |
| Appendix DD, Appendix 3,  Last Paragraph | IN WITNESS THEREOF, the Party has caused this Agreement to be duly executed by its duly authorized officers or agents on the day and year first above written. | CAISO proposes to remove the CAISO signature line in the generator interconnection study process agreement to clarify that GISPAs will only be executed by the interconnection customer upon submission to the CAISO, consistent with the CAISO’s filing in Docket No. ER18-2498-000 (*Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 166 FERC P 61,113 (2019)*). |
| Appendix DD, Appendix 4, Section 3.4.1, 1st sentence | For any tasks specifically assigned to the PTO pursuant to Attachment A or otherwise mutually agreed upon by the CAISO and the PTO, the CAISO reserves the right, on a case-by-case basis, to perform or reassign to a mutually agreed upon and pre-qualified contractor such task only where: (a) the quality and accuracy of prior PTO Interconnection Study work product resulting from assigned tasks has been deemed deficient by the CAISO, the CAISO has notified the PTO pursuant to the notice provision of Section 4.15 of this Agreement in writing of the deficiency, and the deficiency has not been cured pursuant to Section 3.4.2 of this Agreement; | This amendment proposes to correct a cross-reference to the appropriate section in Appendix 4 to Appendix DD to the CAISO tariff. |
| Appendix EE, Table of Contents | ARTICLE 5. INTERCONNECTION FACILITIES ENGINEERING, PROCUREMENT, AND CONSTRUCTION  5.1 Options  5.1.1 Standard Option  5.1.2 Alternate Option  5.1.3 Option to Build  5.1.4 Negotiated Option  5.1.5 Merchant Option | This amendment corrects the table of contents to be consistent with the tariff record. |
| Appendix EE, Appendix D, First Paragraph | Infrastructure security of CAISO Controlled Grid equipment and operations and control hardware and software is essential to ensure day-to-day CAISO Controlled Grid reliability and operational security. FERC will expect the CAISO, all Participating TOs, market participants, and Interconnection Customers interconnected to the CAISO Controlled Grid to comply with Applicable Reliability Criteria. All public utilities will be expected to meet basic standards for system infrastructure and operational security, including physical, operational, and cyber-security practices. | The CAISO is proposing this change because the President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board requirements have been superseded by the Applicable Reliability Criteria which, as defined by the CAISO tariff, include NERC and WECC Reliability Standards as well as Local Reliability Criteria. |
| Appendix EE, Appendix H, Section A.vi(4) | Status of plant controller | The CAISO proposes to correct a typographical error. |
| Appendix FF, Article 3.4.5, last paragraph | Notwithstanding Section 7.5 of Appendix DD, at any time after achieving its Commercial Operation Date, the Interconnection Customer may reduce the megawatt generating capacities of its Generating Facilities, subject to Section 25.1(c) of the CAISO Tariff. Section 7.5.11 of Appendix DD will still apply to such requests to reduce capacity. | This amendment proposes to correct a typographical error to a cross-reference in Appendix DD to the CAISO tariff. |
| Appendix FF, Article 6.4.1, first sentence | The Interconnection Customer is obligated to provide all necessary Interconnection Financial Security required under Section 11 of the GIDAP in a manner acceptable under Section 11 of the GIDAP. | This amendment proposes to correct a CAISO tariff cross-reference. |
| Appendix FF, Article 12.9 | Infrastructure security of electric system equipment and operations and control hardware and software is essential to ensure day-to-day reliability and operational security. FERC expects all transmission providers, market participants, and interconnection customers interconnected to electric systems to comply with Applicable Reliability Criteria. All public utilities are expected to meet basic standards for system infrastructure and operational security, including physical, operational, and cyber-security practices. | The CAISO is proposing this change because the President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board requirements have been superseded by the Applicable Reliability Criteria which, as defined by the CAISO tariff, include NERC and WECC Reliability Standards as well as Local Reliability Criteria. |
| Appendix GG | **Appendix GG**  **[Not Used]** | This CAISO is proposing to delete the contents of this Appendix GG and notate it as “Not Used” as it consists of outdated tariff language. |