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Scheduling quantities that a Scheduling Coordinator schedules as Regulatory Must-Take Generation for a CHP Resource shall be limited to the quantity necessary in any hour to meet the reasonably anticipated industrial host's thermal requirements and shall not exceed any established RMTMax values. The CHP Resource owner or operator shall provide its Scheduling Coordinator with the Regulatory Must-Take Generation values and is solely responsible for the accuracy of the information. The Scheduling Coordinator for the CHP Resource will schedule the quantities consistent with information provided subject to any contract rights between the CHP Resource Generating Unit owner or operator and its counter-party to any power purchase agreement regarding curtailment or dispatchability of the CHP Resource. If the CHP Resource Generating Unit has a power purchase agreement and its counter-party is not the Scheduling Coordinator for the resource, the parties to the agreement share the responsibility for ensuring that the Scheduling Coordinator schedules the resource consistent with contractual rights of the counter-parties. A Scheduling Coordinator for a Physical Scheduling Plant or a System Unit may include Generation Distribution Factors as part of its Supply Bid. If the Scheduling Coordinator has not submitted the Generation Distribution Factors applicable for the Bid, the CAISO will use default Generation Distribution Factors stored in the Master File. All Generation Distribution Factors used by the CAISO will be normalized based on Outage data that is available to the automated market systems. A Multi-Stage Generating Resource and its MSG Configurations are registered under a single Resource ID and Scheduling Coordinator for the Multi-Stage Generating Resource must submit all Bids for the resource's MSG Configurations under the same Resource ID. For a Multi-Stage Generating Resources Scheduling Coordinators may submit bid curves for up to ten individual MSG Configurations of their Multi-Stage Generating Resources into the Day-Ahead Market and up to three individual MSG Configurations into the Real-Time Market. Scheduling Coordinators for Multi-Stage Generating Resources must submit a single Operational Ramp Rate for each MSG Configuration for which it submits a supply Bid either in the Day-Ahead Market or Real-Time Market. For Multi-Stage Generating Resources the Scheduling Coordinator may submit the Transition Times, which cannot be greater than the maximum Transition Time registered in the Master File. To the extent the Scheduling Coordinator does not submit the Transition Time that is a registered feasible transition the CAISO will use the registered maximum Transition Time for that MSG Transition for the specific Multi-Stage Generating Resource.

Changes to Section 30.4.1 are currently pending with FERC in Docket No. ER19-951. Gray-shaded language will become effective April 1, 2019. Click [here](#) for additional information.

30.5.2.7.1 Regulation Up or Regulation Down Bid Information

In the case of Regulation Up or Regulation Down, the Ancillary Services Bid or submission to self-provide must also contain: (a) the upward and downward range of generating capacity over which the resource is willing to provide Regulation in ten (10) minutes; (b) the Bid price of the capacity reservation, stated separately for Regulation Up and Regulation Down (\$/MW); and (c) the Bid price (\$) of the Mileage stated separately for Regulation Up and Regulation Down. For submissions to self-provide Regulation Up or Regulation Down, the price for the capacity reservation shall be \$0/MWh and the price for Mileage shall be \$0. In the case of Regulation Up or Regulation Down from Dynamic System Resources, the Ancillary Services Bid must also contain the Contract Reference Number, if applicable. Scheduling Coordinators may include inter-temporal opportunity costs in their Regulation capacity bids, but these inter-temporal opportunity costs must be verifiable. Ancillary Services Bids submitted to the Day-Ahead or Real-Time Market for Regulation need not be accompanied by an Energy Supply Bid that covers the Ancillary Services capacity being offered. A Regulation Down Bid will be erased unless there is an Energy Supply Bid or Energy Self-Schedule at a level that would permit the resource to provide Regulation Down to its lower Regulation Limit. A submission to self-provide Regulation Down will be erased unless there is an Energy Self-Schedule at a level that would permit the resource to provide Regulation Down to its lower Regulation Limit. A Regulation Up Bid will be erased unless there is an Energy Supply Bid or Energy Self-Schedule at a level that would permit the resource to provide Regulation Up within its Regulation Limit. A submission to self-provide Regulation Up will be erased unless there is an Energy Self-Schedule at a level that would permit the resource to provide Regulation Up within its Regulation Limit.

30.5.2.7.2 Spinning Reserve Capacity Bid Information

In the case of Spinning Reserve capacity, the Ancillary Services Bid must also contain: (a) MW of additional capability synchronized to the system, immediately responsive to system frequency, and available within ten (10) minutes; (b) Bid price of capacity reservation, and (c) an indication whether the capacity reserved would be available to supply imbalance energy only in the event of the occurrence of an unplanned Outage, a Contingency or an imminent or actual System Emergency (Contingency Flag).

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In the case of Spinning Reserve capacity from System Resources, the Ancillary Services Bid must also contain: (a) Schedule ID (NERC ID number); and (b) a Contract Reference Number, if applicable.

Ancillary Services Bids and Submissions to Self-Provide an Ancillary Services submitted to the Real-Time Market for Spinning Reserves must also submit an Energy Bid that covers the Ancillary Services capacity being offered into the Real-Time Market.

30.5.2.7.3 Non-Spinning Reserve Capacity

In the case of Non-Spinning Reserve, the Ancillary Service Bid must also contain: (a) the MW capability available within ten (10) minutes; (b) the Bid price of the capacity reservation; (c) time of synchronization following notification (minutes); and (d) an indication whether the capacity reserved would be available to supply imbalance energy only in the event of the occurrence of an unplanned Outage, a Contingency or an imminent or actual System Emergency (Contingency Flag). In the case of Non-Spinning Reserve Capacity from System Resources, the Ancillary Services Bid must also contain: (a) Schedule ID (NERC ID number); and (b) a Contract Reference Number, if applicable. In the case of Non-Spinning Reserve Capacity from Participating Load within the CAISO Balancing Authority Area, the Ancillary Service Bid must also contain: (a) a Load identification name and Location Code; (b) Demand reduction available within ten (10) minutes; (c) time to interruption following notification (minutes); and (d) maximum allowable curtailment duration (hour). In the case of Aggregated Participating Load, and Proxy Demand Resources, Scheduling Coordinators must submit Bids using a Generating Unit, Physical Scheduling Plant Resource ID, or Resource ID for the Proxy Demand Resource for the Demand reduction capacity of the Aggregated Participating Load through a Bid to provide Non-Spinning Reserve or a Submission to Self-Provide an Ancillary Service for Non-Spinning Reserve. Ancillary Services Bids and Submissions to Self-Provide an Ancillary Services submitted to the Real-Time Market for Non-Spinning Reserves must also submit an Energy Bid that covers the Ancillary Services capacity being offered into the Real-Time Market.

30.5.2.7.4 Additional Rules for Self-Provided Ancillary Services

Scheduling Coordinators electing to self-provide Ancillary Services shall supply the information referred to in this Section 30.5 in relation to each Ancillary Service to be self-provided, excluding the capacity price information, but including the name of the trading Scheduling Coordinator in the case of Inter-Scheduling Coordinator Ancillary Service Trades. The portion of the Energy Bid that corresponds to the high end of

the resource's operating range, shall be allocated to any awarded or Self-Provided Ancillary Services in the following order from higher to lower capacity: (a) Regulation Up; (b) Spinning Reserve; and (c) Non-Spinning Reserve. For resources providing Regulation Up, the upper regulating limit shall be used if it is lower than the highest operating limit. The remaining portion of the Energy Bid (i.e. that portion not associated with capacity committed to provide Ancillary Services) shall constitute a Bid to provide Energy.

30.5.2.8 RUC Availability Bids

Scheduling Coordinators may submit RUC Availability Bids for specific Generating Units capacity that is not Resource Adequacy Capacity or CPM Capacity in the DAM. Scheduling Coordinators for Resource Adequacy Capacity or CPM Capacity must participate in RUC to the extent that such capacity is not reflected in an IFM Schedule but need not submit RUC Availability Bids. Resource Adequacy Capacity participating in RUC will be optimized using a zero dollar (\$0/MW-hour) RUC Availability Bid. For Multi-Stage Generating Resources, the RUC Availability Bids shall be submitted at the MSG Configuration. Capacity that does not have Bids for Supply of Energy in the IFM will not be eligible to participate in the RUC process. The RUC Availability Bid component is MW-quantity of non-Resource Adequacy Capacity in \$/MW per hour.

30.5.3 Demand Bids

Each Scheduling Coordinator representing Demand, including Non-Participating Load and Aggregated Participating Load, shall submit Bids indicating the hourly quantity of Energy in MWh that it intends to purchase in the IFM for each Trading Hour of the Trading Day. Scheduling Coordinators must submit Demand Bids, including Self Schedules, for CAISO Demand at Load Aggregation Points except as provided in Section 30.5.3.2.

30.5.3.1 Demand Bids Components

Demand Bids must have the following components: Scheduling Coordinator ID Code; a Demand Bid curve that is a monotonically decreasing staircase function of no more than ten (10) segments defined by eleven (11) ordered pairs of MW and \$/MWh; Location Code for the LAP, Custom LAP or PNode, as applicable; and hourly scheduled MWh within the range of the Bid curve, including any zero values, for each Settlement Period of the Trading Day.

30.5.3.2 Exceptions to Requirement for Submission of Demand Bids and Settlement at the LAP

The following are exceptions to the requirement that Demand Bids be submitted and settled at the LAP:

- (a) ETC or TOR Self-Schedules submitted consistent with the submitted TRTC Instructions;
- (b) Participating Load and Aggregated Participating Load Bids for Supply and Demand may be submitted and settled at a PNode or Custom LAP, as appropriate; and
- (c) Export Bids are submitted and settled at Scheduling Points, which do not constitute a LAP.

30.5.4 Wheeling Through Transactions

A Wheeling Through transaction consists of an Export Bid and an Import Bid with the same Wheeling reference (a unique identifier for each Wheeling Through transaction). If the Wheeling reference does not match at the time the relevant market closes, the Wheeling Through transaction will be erased; this includes any Economic Bid or Self-Schedule for the resource for that Trading Hour. Wheeling Through transactions with matching Wheeling references will be kept balanced in the IFM and RTM; that is, to the extent an Export Bid or Import Economic Bid or Self-Schedule specify different quantities, only that matching quantity will clear the CAISO Markets.

30.5.5 Scheduling Sourcing/Sinking in Same Balancing Authority Area

30.5.5.1 Prohibition

A Scheduling Coordinator is prohibited from submitting Bids that result in a Schedule(s) being awarded to that single Scheduling Coordinator that has an associated E-Tag reflecting a source and sink in the same Balancing Authority Area. A Schedule or Schedules resulting from Bids submitted in violation of this Section 30.5.5.1 will be settled according to Section 11.2.4.7 and Section 11.33.

30.5.5.2 Exceptions to Prohibition

Bids that otherwise would be prohibited under Section 30.5.5.1 are permitted, and the resulting Schedule(s) will not be settled according to Section 11.2.4.7 and Section 11.33, if any of the following four conditions cause the associated E-Tag to have a source and sink in the same Balancing Authority Area.

- (a) The Schedule(s) includes a transmission segment on a DC Intertie.
- (b) The Schedule(s) involves a Pseudo-Tie generating unit delivering energy from its Native

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Balancing Authority Area to an Attaining Balancing Authority Area.

- (c) The Schedule(s) are used either to: (i) serve Load that temporarily has become isolated from the CAISO Balancing Authority Area because of an Outage; or (ii) deliver Power from a Generating Unit that temporarily has become isolated from the CAISO Balancing Authority Area because of an Outage.
- (d) The Schedule(s) involve a Wheeling Through transaction that the Scheduling Coordinator can demonstrate was used to serve load located outside the transmission and Distribution System of a Participating TO.

Provided, however, that if the circumstances leading to one of the above four conditions being met were excluded from consideration and the resulting hypothetical Schedule(s) could have an associated E-Tag reflecting a source and sink in the same Balancing Authority Area, then the Schedule(s) will be settled according to Section 11.2.4.7 and Section 11.33.

30.5.6 Non-Generator Resource Bids

Scheduling Coordinators must ensure that Non-Generator Resource Bids or Bids from resources using Non-Generator Resource Generic Modeling functionality contain the Bid components specified in this Section 30.5 based on how the resource is then participating in the CAISO Markets, namely, whether it is providing Supply, Demand, and/or Ancillary Services Bids. In addition to the Bid components listed in this Section 30.5, Scheduling Coordinators representing Non-Generator Resources may submit Bids including the State of Charge for the Day-Ahead Market to indicate the forecasted starting physical position of the Non-Generator Resource. Scheduling Coordinators representing Non-Generator Resources using Regulation Energy Management must submit Bids compliant with the requirements of Section 8.4.1.2.

30.5.7 E-Tag Rules and Treatment of Intertie Schedules

In addition to complying with all generally applicable E-Tagging requirements, Scheduling Coordinators must submit their E-tags consistent with the requirements specified in this Section 30.6.2. If a Scheduling Coordinator receives an intra-hour Schedule change, then the Scheduling Coordinator must, by twenty minutes before the start of the FMM interval to which the Schedule change applies, ensure that an updated energy profile reflects the change. Absent extenuating circumstances, the CAISO automatically

updates Energy profiles on E-tags for Energy Schedules that change from HASP to the FMM within a Trading Hour. In performing this service for a Scheduling Coordinator, the CAISO does not assume any responsibility for compliance with any E-tag requirements or obligations to which the Scheduling Coordinator is subject. The changed energy profile will apply for the balance of the operating hour unless it is subsequently changed by a further updated energy profile.

30.5.7.1 Self-Schedule Hourly Blocks

By twenty minutes prior to the applicable Trading Hour, the Scheduling Coordinator must submit an E-Tag in support of Self-Scheduled Hourly Blocks. The transmission profile must be greater than or equal to the Energy profile, and the Energy profile must equal the Self-Scheduled Hourly Block. The CAISO may modify the Energy profile due to Reliability related curtailments.

30.5.7.2 Variable Energy Resource Self-Schedule

By twenty minutes prior to the applicable Trading Hour, the Scheduling Coordinator must submit an E-Tag in support of a Variable Energy Resource Self-Schedule. The transmission profile must be greater than or equal to the Energy profile, and the Energy profile must equal the Variable Energy Resource Self-Schedule. The CAISO may modify the Energy profile due to Reliability related curtailments.

30.5.7.3 Economic Hourly Bid

By twenty minutes prior to the applicable Trading Hour, the Scheduling Coordinator must submit an E-Tag in support of an Economic Hourly Block Bid. The transmission profile must be greater than or equal to the Energy profile, and the Energy profile must equal the Economic Hourly Block Bid as awarded through HASP. The CAISO may modify the Energy profile due to Reliability related curtailments.

30.5.7.4 Economic Hourly Block Bid with Intra-Hour Option

By twenty minutes prior to the applicable Trading Hour, the Scheduling Coordinator must submit an E-Tag in support of an Economic Hourly Block Bid. The transmission profile must be greater than or equal to the Energy profile, and the Energy profile must equal the Economic Hourly Block Bid as awarded through HASP. The CAISO may modify the Energy profile due to Reliability related curtailments. In the case of an intra-hour redispatch from the FMM, the CAISO may increment or decrement the Energy

profile to correspond to the intra-hour redispatch.

30.5.7.5 FMM Economic Bid

By twenty minutes prior to the applicable Trading Hour, the Scheduling Coordinator must submit an E-Tag in support of a FMM Economic Bid. The transmission profile must be greater than or equal to the maximum bid-in capacity for the Trading Hour, and the Energy profile must equal the MWs awarded for the first FMM interval of the Operating Hour. If the Scheduling Coordinator intends to limit its participation in the FMM to the quantity in the HASP advisory energy schedule (including zero), the Scheduling Coordinator may update its transmission profile to the maximum amount it wants to make available to the FMM prior to the start of the binding FMM optimization, which is no earlier than thirty-seven and a half minutes before the applicable Trading Hour. If the Scheduling Coordinator does not have a transmission profile greater than or equal to its advisory Energy schedule, then the CAISO will limit the schedule for Energy in the FMM so that it does not exceed amounts greater than what is listed in the transmission profile. Cleared FMM Economic Bids are eligible for Bid Cost Recovery as specified in Section 11.8.

30.6 Bidding and Scheduling of PDRs and RDRRs

30.6.1 Bidding and Scheduling of PDRs

Unless otherwise specified in the CAISO Tariff and applicable Business Practice Manuals, and subject to Section 30.6.3, the CAISO will treat Bids for Energy and Ancillary Services on behalf of Proxy Demand Resources like Bids for Energy and Ancillary Services on behalf of other types of supply resources. A Scheduling Coordinator for a Demand Response Provider representing a Proxy Demand Resource may submit (1) Energy Bids only in the Day-Ahead Market and in the Real-Time Market; (2) RUC Availability Bids; and (3) Ancillary Service Bids in the Day-Ahead Market and Real-Time Market for those Ancillary Services for which the Proxy Demand Resource is certified. A Scheduling Coordinator for a Demand Response Provider representing a Proxy Demand Resource may Self-Provide Ancillary Services for which it is certified. The Demand Response Provider's Demand Response Services for Proxy Demand Resources will be bid separately and independently from the LSE's underlying Demand Bid.

30.6.2 Bidding and Scheduling of RDRRs

Unless otherwise specified in the CAISO Tariff and applicable Business Practice Manuals, and subject to Section 30.6.3, the CAISO will treat Bids for Energy on behalf of Reliability Demand Response Resources

like Bids for Energy on behalf of other types of supply resources. A Scheduling Coordinator for a Demand Response Provider representing a Reliability Demand Response Resource may submit Energy Bids for the Reliability Demand Response Resource only in the Day-Ahead Market and in the Real-Time Market, but may not submit Energy Self-Schedules for the Reliability Demand Response Resource, may not Self-Provide Ancillary Services from the Reliability Demand Response Resource, and may not submit RUC Availability Bids or Ancillary Service Bids for the Reliability Demand Response Resource. The Demand Response Provider's Demand Response Services for Reliability Demand Response Resources will be bid separately and independently from the LSE's underlying Demand Bid.

30.6.2.1 Bidding and Scheduling of RDRRs in the Real-Time Market

30.6.2.1.1 Limitations on Obligation to Bid in the Real-Time Market

Within each Reliability Demand Response Services Term, any capacity of a Reliability Demand Response Resource that remains uncommitted after the Day-Ahead Market shall be bid in the Real-Time Market in order to be available to provide Demand Response Services in Real-Time until such time as the Reliability Demand Response Resource has reached the RDRR Availability Limit for the Reliability Demand Response Services Term. Within each Reliability Demand Response Services Term, any capacity of a Reliability Demand Response Resource that remains uncommitted after the Day-Ahead Market may be (but is not required to be) bid in the Real-Time Market in order to be available to provide Demand Response Services in Real-Time after the Reliability Demand Response Resource has reached the RDRR Availability Limit during the Reliability Demand Response Services Term.

30.6.2.1.2 Real-Time Dispatch Options

For purposes of bidding and scheduling in the Real-Time Market, each Scheduling Coordinator for a Demand Response Provider representing a Reliability Demand Response Resource shall select either the Marginal Real-Time Dispatch Option or the Discrete Real-Time Dispatch Option prior to the start of the initial Reliability Demand Response Services Term applicable to the Reliability Demand Response Resource. The selection for each Reliability Demand Response Resource shall remain in effect until such time as the Scheduling Coordinator for the Reliability Demand Response Resource chooses to change its selection from the Marginal Real-Time Dispatch Option to the Discrete Real-Time Dispatch Option or vice versa, in which case the change in selection shall go into effect at the start of the next

Reliability Demand Response Services Term applicable to the Reliability Demand Response Resource.

A Reliability Demand Response Resource that is subject to either the Marginal Real-Time Dispatch Option or the Discrete Real-Time Dispatch Option shall have Minimum Load Costs of zero (0) dollars registered in the Master File.

30.6.2.1.2.1 Marginal Real-Time Dispatch Option

A Reliability Demand Response Resource that is subject to the Marginal Real-Time Dispatch Option:

- (a) May submit either a single-segment Bid or a multi-segment Bid in the Real-Time Market that must be at least ninety-five (95) percent of the applicable maximum Bid price and can be no greater than one hundred (100) percent of the applicable maximum Bid price set forth in Section 39.6.1.1.
- (b) Shall be dispatched as a marginal resource if it is dispatched by the CAISO.

30.6.2.1.2.2 Discrete Real-Time Dispatch Option

A Reliability Demand Response Resource that is subject to the Discrete Real-Time Dispatch Option:

- (a) May submit only a single-segment Bid in the Real-Time Market that must be at least ninety-five (95) percent of the applicable maximum Bid price and can be no greater than one hundred (100) percent of the applicable maximum Bid price set forth in Section 39.6.1.1.
- (b) Shall be dispatched as a discrete (non-marginal) resource if it is dispatched by the CAISO.

30.6.3 Net Benefits Test for PDRs or PDRRs

In accordance with Section 11.5.2.4, the CAISO will apply a net benefits test to determine a threshold Market Clearing Price for Proxy Demand Resources settlement adjustments.

30.6.3.1 Supply Curve Used in Applying the Net Benefits Test

The CAISO will generate one (1) on-peak supply curve and one (1) off-peak supply curve for each month that depicts the system-wide aggregated power supplies at different offer prices in the CAISO Markets within that month. The CAISO will generate these two supply curves for each month, using the following sequential methodology:

- (i) The CAISO will collect supply curve data for the month that is twelve (12) months prior to

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the month for which the CAISO is generating the supply curves (the reference month), using all mitigated Bids in the Real-Time Market from any Generating Unit that is either committed or uncommitted and excluding Import Bids and Export Bids.

- (ii) The CAISO will adjust the supply curve data to reflect differences in resource availability and fuel prices between the target month and the reference month. Significant changes in resource availability will be determined using the averages of the hourly supply curves over the entire reference month, with the supply quantities being averaged for every price level. Significant changes in fuel prices will be determined using the simple average of the relevant fuel indices as specified in the Business Practice Manual. For every supply quantity, the corresponding price will be scaled using a scaling factor defined as the forward gas price for the Trading Month divided by the historical average gas price for the reference month. These adjustments will result in two representative supply curves for the target month, one (1) on-peak and one (1) off-peak.
- (iii) The CAISO will smooth the representative supply curves to twice differentiable using an exponential form function and applying a price window that is likely to contain the threshold Market Clearing Price. The price window may need to be adjusted in the process until the smoothed supply curves fit the representative supply curves closely.

Using the smoothed supply curves, the CAISO will determine a candidate threshold Market Clearing Price for the on-peak and a threshold Market Clearing Price for the off-peak corresponding to the point on each supply curve beyond which (i) the product of the amount of supplied Power (prior to the dispatch of Proxy Demand Resources) and the reduction in Market Clearing Price that results from the dispatch of Proxy Demand Resources exceeds (ii) the product of the Market Clearing Price (prior to the dispatch of Proxy Demand Resources) and the reduction in the amount of supplied Power that results from the dispatch of Proxy Demand Resources. If the candidate threshold Market Clearing Price is outside the corresponding price window being used, the price window needs to be adjusted and this process will be repeated until the price window contains the candidate threshold Market Clearing Price and thus makes it the final threshold Market Clearing Price. If multiple candidate threshold Market Clearing Prices exist, the candidate threshold Market Clearing Price that is concave on the supply curve (a supply function of price)

will be the final threshold Market Clearing Price.

30.6.3.2 Information Posted on CAISO Website

The net benefits test will be posted on the CAISO website, along with supporting documentation and the threshold Market Clearing Prices that were in effect in the previous twelve (12) months, and any updated supply curve analysis. The CAISO will post the threshold Market Clearing Prices determined for each month on the CAISO Website by the fifteenth (15th) day of the immediately preceding month.

30.7 Bid Validation

The CAISO shall validate submitted Bids pursuant to the procedures set forth in this Section 30.7 and the rules set forth in the Business Practice Manuals.

30.7.1 Scheduling Coordinator Access

Each Scheduling Coordinator will be provided access to the CAISO's secure communication system to submit, modify and cancel Bids prior to the close of both the DAM and RTM, as specified in Section 30.5.1. The CAISO shall provide information regarding submitted Bids including, but not be limited to, the following: (i) notification of acceptance; (ii) notification of validation; (iii) notification of rejection; (iv) notification of status; (v) notification of submission error(s); and (vi) default modification or generation of Bids as further provided below, if any, on behalf of Scheduling Coordinators.

30.7.2 Timing of CAISO Validation

Once a Bid is submitted to the CAISO Markets, the Bid is available for validation, which is conducted in multiple steps. Clean Bids will be generated after Market Close.

30.7.3 DAM Validation

30.7.3.1 Validation Prior to Market Close and Master File Update

The CAISO conducts Bid validation in three steps:

Step 1: The CAISO will validate all Bids after submission of the Bid for content validation which determines that the Bid adheres to the structural rules required of all Bids as further described in the Business Practices Manuals. If the Bid fails any of the content level rules the CAISO shall

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assign it a rejected status and the Scheduling Coordinator must correct and resubmit the Bid.

Step 2: After the Bids are successfully validated for content, but prior to the Market Close of the DAM, the Bids will continue through the second level of validation rules to verify that the Bid adheres to the applicable CAISO Market rules and if applicable, limits based on Master File data. If the Bid fails any level two validation rules, the CAISO shall assign the Bid as invalid and the Scheduling Coordinator must either correct or resubmit the Bid.

Step 3: If the Bid successfully passes validation in Step 2, it will continue through the third level of validation where the Bid will be analyzed based on its contents to identify any missing Bid components that must be present for the Bid to be valid consistent with the market rules contained in Article III of this CAISO Tariff and as reflected in the Business Practice Manuals. At this stage the Bid will either be automatically modified for correctness and assigned a status of conditionally modified or modified, or if it can be accepted as is, the Bid will be assigned a status of conditionally valid, or valid. A Bid will be automatically modified and assigned a status of modified or conditionally modified Bid, whenever the CAISO inserts or modifies a Bid component. The CAISO will insert or modify a Bid component whenever (1) a Self-Schedule quantity is less than the lowest quantity specified as an Economic Bid for either an Energy Bid or Demand Bid, in which case the CAISO extends the Self-Schedule to cover the gap; (2) for non-Resource Adequacy Resources, the CAISO will extend the Energy Bid Curve using Proxy Costs to cover any capacity in a RUC Bid component, if necessary; and (3) for a Resource Adequacy Resource that is not a Use-Limited Resource, the CAISO will extend the Energy Bid Curve using Proxy Costs to cover any capacity in a RUC Bid component and, if necessary, up to the full registered Resource Adequacy Capacity. The CAISO will generate a Proxy Bid or extend an Energy Bid or Self-Schedule to cover any RUC Award or Day-Ahead Schedule in the absence of any Self-Schedule or Economic Bid components, or to fill in any gaps between any Self-Schedule Bid and any Economic Bid components to cover a RUC Award or Day-Ahead Schedule. To the extent that an Energy Bid to the HASP/RTM is not accompanied by an Ancillary Services Bid, the CAISO will insert a Spinning Reserve and Non-Spinning Reserve Ancillary Services Bid at \$ 0/MW for any certified Operating Reserve capacity. The CAISO will also generate a Self-

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Schedule Bid for any Generating Unit that has a Day-Ahead Schedule but has not submitted Bids in HASP/RTM, up to the quantity in the Day-Ahead Schedule. Throughout the Bid evaluation process, the Scheduling Coordinator shall have the ability to view the Bid and may choose to cancel the Bid, modify and re-submit the Bid, or leave the modified, conditionally modified or valid, conditionally valid Bid as is to be processed in the designated CAISO Market. The CAISO will not insert or extend any Bid for a Resource Adequacy Resource that is a Use-Limited Resource.

30.7.3.2 Master File Data Update

Except as otherwise prescribed in this tariff, once a day the Master File data is updated with changes to the Master File that were submitted between at least five (5) and up to eleven (11) Business Days in advance, after which all conditional Bids must be re-validated prior to the trading period when the Bid will take effect. After this re-validation takes place, the status of all conditionally modified and conditionally valid Bids may be changed to modified or valid, if the Bid period is for the next relevant DAM.

30.7.3.3 Validation Prior to Market Close and After Master File Update

Prior to the Market Close of the DAM, after the Master File data has been updated, all Bids must be re-validated using the same process as described in Section 30.7.3.1 to produce either valid Bids or modified Bids. Throughout this process the Scheduling Coordinator shall have the ability to view the Bid and may choose to re-submit (at which point the Bid would undergo the Bid validation process described in this Section 30.7 again), cancel, or modify the Bid. Valid or modified Bids that are not re-submitted or cancelled become Clean Bids after the Market Close of the DAM. Modified Bids for Resource Adequacy Resources will reflect the full capability of the resource as defined in the Master File.

30.7.3.4 Validation After Market Close

To the extent that a Scheduling Coordinator fails to enter a Bid for a resource that is required to submit a Bid in the full range of available capacity consistent with the bidding provisions of Section 30 or the Resource Adequacy provisions of Section 40, the CAISO will create a Bid for the Scheduling Coordinator, which is referred to as the Generated Bid. This does not apply to Load-following MSSs. The Generated Bid will be created only after the Market Close for the DAM and will be based on data registered in the

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Master File, and, if applicable, published natural gas pricing data and published pricing data for greenhouse gas allowances. The Generated Bid components will be calculated as set forth in Sections 30 and 40.6.8. The Scheduling Coordinator may view Generated Bids, but may not modify such Bids. The CAISO will provide notice to the Scheduling Coordinator of the use of a Generated Bid prior to Market Clearing of the IFM. In addition, validation of export priority pursuant to Sections 31.4 and 34.10.1 and Wheeling Through transactions pursuant to Section 30.5.4 occur after the Market Close for the DAM.

30.7.3.5 Bid Validation Rules for Multi-Stage Generating Resources

If a Scheduling Coordinator does not submit a Bid in the Day-Ahead Market or Real-Time Market for a Multi-Stage Generating Resource with a Resource Adequacy must-offer obligation at a MSG Configuration that can meet the applicable Resource Adequacy must-offer obligation, the CAISO will create a Generated Bid for the default Resource Adequacy MSG Configuration. If the Multi-Stage Generating Resource is not capable of Start-Up in the default Resource Adequacy MSG Configuration, then the ISO will, based on feasibility of transitions, create a Generated Bid for every MSG Configuration that has a minimum output below the MW level of the Resource Adequacy must-offer obligation, which will cover the operating range from its minimum output to the minimum of its maximum output and the MW level of the Resource Adequacy must-offer obligation. In the event that the Scheduling Coordinator does not submit a Bid in compliance with section 30.5.1(p), the CAISO will create a Generated Bid for all of the capacity not bid into the CAISO Market between the maximum bid-in Energy MW and the higher of Self-Scheduled Energy MW and the Multi-Stage Generating Resource plant-level PMin. If the Scheduling Coordinator submits a Bid for the Multi-Stage Generating Resource, the CAISO will create this Generated Bid for the registered MSG Configurations before the Market Close, and if it does not submit such a Bid the CAISO will create this Generated Bid after the Market Close. Any Generated Bid created by the CAISO for the default Resource Adequacy MSG Configuration will be in addition to the MSG Configurations bid into the Real-Time Market by the responsible Scheduling Coordinator. If the Scheduling Coordinator submits a Bid in the Day-Ahead Market or Real-Time Market for a MSG Configuration that is not the default Resource Adequacy MSG Configuration and that does not cover the full amount of the resource's Resource Adequacy requirements, the CAISO will create a Generated Bid for the full Resource Adequacy Capacity. Before the market closes, if a Scheduling Coordinator submits

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a Bid in the Day-Ahead Market or Real-Time Market for the default Resource Adequacy MSG Configuration of a Multi-Stage Generating Resource that only meets part of the resource's Resource Adequacy must-offer obligation, the CAISO will extend the last segment of the Energy Bid curve in the submitted Bid for the Multi-Stage Generating Resource up to the Multi-Stage Generating Resource's Resource Adequacy must-offer obligation. After the market closes, to the extent that no Bid is submitted into the Real-Time Market for a Multi-Stage Generating Resource scheduled in the Integrated Forward Market as required in Section 30.5 the CAISO will create a Self-Schedule for MSG Configuration equal to the Day-Ahead Schedule for that resource for the MSG Configuration scheduled in the IFM. To the extent a Multi-Stage Generating Resource is awarded Operating Reserves in the Day-Ahead Market and no Economic Energy Bids is submitted for that resource in the Real-Time Market, the CAISO will insert Proxy Energy Bid in the MSG Configuration that was awarded in the Day-Ahead Market to cover the awarded Operating Reserves. To the extent that a Multi-Stage Generating Resources RUC Schedule is greater than its Day-Ahead Schedule, if the Scheduling Coordinator does not submit an Energy Bid in the RTM to cover the difference, then the CAISO will either create a Bid in the MSG Configuration awarded in RUC, or extend the Bid submitted by the Scheduling Coordinator before the Market Close. After the Market Close, the CAISO will create a Generated Bid if there is no Bid submitted for the resource for this difference. The CAISO will validate that the combination of the Day-Ahead Ancillary Services Awards and Submissions to Self-Provide Ancillary Services are feasible with respect to the physical operating characteristics of the applicable MSG Configuration. The CAISO will reject Ancillary Services Bids or Submissions to Self-Provide Ancillary Services for MSG Configurations that are not certified Ancillary Services. For any given Multi-Stage Generating Resource, for any given CAISO Market and Trading Hour if one MSG Configuration's Bid fails the bid validation process, all other Bids for all other MSG Configurations are also invalidated.

30.7.3.6 Additional Bid Validation Rules for Virtual Bids

In addition to the validation rules described in Section 30.7.3.1, Virtual Bids will be subject to the following additional validation rules.

30.7.3.6.1 Scheduling Coordinator Validation

The CAISO will validate that the SCID associated with a Virtual Bid is submitted from a Scheduling

Coordinator authorized to submit Virtual Bids and that the Virtual Bid is submitted at an Eligible PNode or Eligible Aggregated PNode. The CAISO will reject Virtual Bids that do not satisfy these requirements.

30.7.3.6.2 Credit Requirement

Virtual Bids must satisfy the credit requirements of Section 12.8. The Scheduling Coordinator will be notified if Virtual Bids fail to satisfy the credit requirements. If the Scheduling Coordinator fails to resubmit Virtual Bids that satisfy the credit requirements or to provide adequate additional Financial Security, the CAISO will reject the Scheduling Coordinator's Virtual Bids on a last-in, first-out basis.

30.7.3.6.3 Position Limits

For each Convergence Bidding Entity, the CAISO will reject all Virtual Bids submitted by its Scheduling Coordinator at any Eligible PNode or Eligible Aggregated PNode (other than a Default LAP or Trading Hub) that exceed the position limits specified in this Section 30.7.3.6.3. If the Scheduling Coordinator uses multiple SCIDs on behalf of a Convergence Bidding Entity, the position limits will apply to the sum of those Virtual Bids submitted at the Eligible PNode or Eligible Aggregated PNode (other than a Default LAP or Trading Hub). The CAISO will perform all position limit calculations based on the highest Virtual Bid segment MW point submitted in the Virtual Bid Curve. The CAISO will not net Virtual Supply Bids and Virtual Demand Bids in performing the position limit calculations. The affected Scheduling Coordinator will be provided notice that position limits have been violated. If the Scheduling Coordinator does not resubmit Virtual Bids within the position limits, the CAISO will reject Virtual Bids for all hours at each Eligible PNode and Eligible Aggregated PNode (other than a Default LAP or Trading Hub) where the position limits are violated. Position limits only apply to Eligible PNodes or Eligible Aggregated PNodes (other than Default LAPs or Trading Hubs).

30.7.3.6.3.1 Position Limits at Eligible PNodes and Eligible Aggregated PNodes

For an Eligible PNode associated with a single physical supply resource, the CAISO will publish a locational limit that will be equal to the PMax of the physical supply resource. For an Eligible PNode or Eligible Aggregated PNode (other than a Default LAP or Trading Hub) associated with more than one physical supply resource, the CAISO will publish a locational limit that will be equal to the sum of the PMaxes of the physical supply resources. For an Eligible PNode associated with a single physical

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demand resource, the CAISO will publish a locational limit that will be equal to the forecast of the maximum MW consumption of the physical demand resource. For an Eligible PNode or Eligible Aggregated PNode (other than a Default LAP or Trading Hub) associated with more than one physical demand resource, the CAISO will publish a locational limit that will be equal to the forecast of the maximum MW consumption of the physical demand resources. The percentages used to calculate the position limits for each Convergence Bidding Entity at Eligible PNodes and Eligible Aggregated PNodes (other than Default LAPs or Trading Hubs) will be the following percentages of the published locational limits:

- (a) Position limits of ten (10) percent will apply during the time period beginning as of the effective date of this tariff provision through the last day of the eighth month following the effective date of this tariff provision.
- (b) Position limits of fifty (50) percent will apply during the time period beginning as of the first day of the ninth month following the effective date of this tariff provision through the last day of the twelfth month following the effective date of this tariff provision.
- (c) Position limits will cease to apply beginning on the first day of the month as of the first anniversary of the effective date of this tariff provision.

The CAISO will enforce the position limits for Eligible PNodes and Eligible Aggregated PNodes (other than Default LAPs or Trading Hubs) at the time of Virtual Bid submission. It is possible for the enforcement of position limits on a later-submitted Virtual Bid to cause a previously approved Virtual Bid to be rejected, if both of those Virtual Bids are submitted by a Scheduling Coordinator on behalf of the same Convergence Bidding Entity at the same Eligible PNode or Eligible Aggregated PNode (other than a Default LAP or Trading Hub). The CAISO will timely publish the locational limits for Eligible PNodes and Eligible Aggregated PNodes (other than Default LAPs or Trading Hubs).

30.7.3.6.3.2 [Not Used]

30.7.4 RTM Validation

RTM Bids will include the same validation process implemented in the DAM except that the CAISO will not validate the Bid before and again after the Master File Data update. RTM Bids are only validated based on the current Master File Data on the relevant Trading Day.

Changes to Section 30.4.1 are currently pending with FERC in Docket No. ER19-951. Gray-shaded language will become effective April 1, 2019. Click [here](#) for additional information.

30.7.5 Validation of ETC Self-Schedules

ETC Self-Schedules shall be validated pursuant to the procedures set forth in Section 16.6.

30.7.6 Validation and Treatment of Ancillary Services Bids

30.7.6.1 Validation of Ancillary Services Bids

Throughout the validation process described in Section 30.7, the CAISO will verify that each Ancillary Services Bid conforms to the content, format and syntax specified for the relevant Ancillary Service. If the Ancillary Services Bid does not so conform, the CAISO will send a notification to the Scheduling Coordinator notifying the Scheduling Coordinator of the errors in the Bids as described in Section 30.7. When the Bids are submitted, a technical validation will be performed to verify that the bid quantity of Regulation, Spinning Reserve, or Non-Spinning Reserve does not exceed the certified Ancillary Services capacity for Regulation, or Operating Reserves on the Generating Units, System Units, Participating Loads, Proxy Demand Resources, and external imports/exports bid. The Scheduling Coordinator will be notified within a reasonable time of any validation errors. For each error detected, an error message will be generated by the CAISO in the Scheduling Coordinator's notification screen, which will specify the nature of the error. The Scheduling Coordinator can then look at the notification messages to review the detailed list of errors, make changes, and resubmit if it is still within the CAISO's timing requirements. The Scheduling Coordinator is also notified of successful validation. If a resource is awarded or has qualified Self-Provided Ancillary Services in the Day-Ahead Market, the following rules will apply: (1) if no Energy Self-Schedule is submitted to support a Submission to Self-Provide an Ancillary Service for Regulation, the Submission to Self-Provide an Ancillary Service will be invalidated: (2) if no Energy Supply Bid is submitted to cover the awarded or Self- Provided Ancillary Services for Spinning Reserve or Non-Spinning Reserve by the Market Close of the RTM, the CAISO will generate or extend an Energy Supply Bid as necessary to cover the awarded or Self-Provided Ancillary Services capacity using the registered values in the Master File and relevant fuel prices as described in the Business Practice Manuals for use in the RTM and IFM. If an AS Bid or Submission to Self-Provide an AS is submitted in the Real-Time Market for Spinning Reserve or Non-Spinning Reserve without an accompanying Energy Supply Bid at all, the AS Bid or Submission to Self-Provide an Ancillary Service will be erased. If an AS Bid is submitted in the Real-Time Market for Spinning Reserve and Non-Spinning Reserve with only a partial Energy

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Supply Bid for the AS capacity, the CAISO will generate an Energy Supply Bid for the uncovered portions. If a Submission to Self-Provide an Ancillary Service is submitted in the Real-Time Market for Spinning Reserve and Non-Spinning Reserve with only a partial Energy Supply Bid for the AS capacity bid in, the CAISO will not generate or extend an Energy Supply Bid for the uncovered portions. For Generating Units with certified Regulation capacity, if there no Bid for Regulation in the Real-Time Market, but there is a Day-Ahead award for Regulation Up or Regulation Down or a submission to self-provide Regulation Up or Regulation Down, respectively, the CAISO will generate a Regulation Up or Regulation Down Bid at the default Ancillary Service Bid price of \$0 up to the certified Regulation capacity for the Generating Unit minus any Regulation awarded or self-provided in the Day- Ahead. If there is a Bid for Regulation Up or Regulation Down in the Real-Time Market, the CAISO will increase the respective Bid up to the certified Regulation capacity for the Generating Unit minus any Regulation awarded or self-provided in the Day-Ahead. If a Self-Schedule amount is greater than the Regulation Limit for Regulation Up, the Regulation Up Bid will be erased.

Notwithstanding any of the provisions of Section 30.7.6.1 set forth above, the CAISO will not insert or extend any Bid for Regulation Up or Regulation Down for a Use-Limited Resource of a Load Following MSS Operator. The CAISO will not insert a Spinning Reserve and Non-Spinning Reserve Ancillary Service Bid at \$0 in the Real-Time Market for any certified Operating Reserve capacity of a resource unless that resource submits an Energy Supply Bid but fails to submit an Ancillary Service Bid in the Real-Time Market.

30.7.6.2 Treatment of Ancillary Services Bids

When Scheduling Coordinators bid into the Regulation Up, Regulation Down, Spinning Reserve, and Non-Spinning Reserve markets, they may submit Bids for the same capacity into as many of these markets as desired at the same time by providing the appropriate Bid information to the CAISO. The CAISO optimization will evaluate AS Bids simultaneously with Energy Bids. A Scheduling Coordinator may specify that its Bid applies only in the markets it desires. A Scheduling Coordinator shall also have

Changes to Section 30.4.1 are currently pending with FERC in Docket No. ER19-951. Gray-shaded language will become effective April 1, 2019. Click [here](#) for additional information.

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the ability to specify different capacity prices for the Spinning Reserve, Non-Spinning Reserve, and Regulation markets. A Scheduling Coordinator providing one or more Regulation Up, Regulation Down, Spinning Reserve or Non-Spinning Reserve services may not change the identification of the Generating Units or Proxy Demand Resources offered in the Day-Ahead Market or in the Real-Time Market for such services unless specifically approved by the CAISO (except with respect to System Units, if any, in which case Scheduling Coordinators are required to identify and disclose the resource specific information for all Generating Units, Participating Loads, and Proxy Demand Resources constituting the System Unit for which Bids and Submissions to Self-Provide Ancillary Services are submitted into the CAISO's Day-Ahead Market and Real-Time Market).

The following principles will apply in the treatment of Ancillary Services Bids in the CAISO Markets:

- (a) not differentiate between bidders for Ancillary Services and Energy other than through cost, price, effectiveness, and capability to provide the Ancillary Service or Energy, and the required locational mix of Ancillary Services;
- (b) select the bidders with most cost effective Bids for Ancillary Service capacity which meet its technical requirements, including location and operating capability to minimize the costs to users of the CAISO Controlled Grid;
- (c) evaluate the Day-Ahead Bids over the twenty-four (24) Settlement Periods of the following Trading Day along with Energy, taking into account Transmission Constraints and AS Regional Limits;
- (d) evaluate Import Bids along with Bids from internal resources (which includes Pseudo-Ties of Generating Units to the CAISO Balancing Authority Area);
- (e) establish Real-Time Ancillary Service Awards through the FMM from imports and resources internal to the CAISO Balancing Authority Area (which includes Pseudo-Ties of Generating Units to the CAISO Balancing Authority Area) at fifteen (15) minutes intervals to the hour of operation; and
- (f) procure sufficient Ancillary Services in the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets to meet its forecasted requirements.

30.7.7 Format and Validation of Operational Ramp Rates

The submitted Operational Ramp Rate expressed in megawatts per minute (MW/min) as a function of the operating level, expressed in megawatts (MW), must be a staircase function with up to four segments.

There is no monotonicity requirement for the Operational Ramp Rate. The submitted Operational Ramp Rate shall be validated as follows:

- (a) The range of the submitted Operational Ramp Rate must cover the entire capacity of the resource, from the minimum to the maximum operating capacity, as registered in the Master File for the relevant resource.
- (b) The operating level entries must match exactly (in number, sequence, and value) the corresponding minimum and maximum Operational Ramp Rate breakpoints, as registered in the Master File for the relevant resource.
- (c) If a Scheduling Coordinator does not submit an Operational Ramp Rate for a generating unit for a day, the CAISO shall use the maximum Ramp Rate for each operating range set forth in the Master File as the Ramp Rate for that unit for that same operating range for the Trading Day.
- (d) The last Ramp Rate entry shall be equal to the previous Ramp Rate entry and represent the maximum operating capacity of the resource as registered in the Master File. The resulting Operational Ramp Rate segments must lie between the minimum and maximum Operational Ramp Rates, as registered in the Master File.
- (e) The submitted Operational Ramp Rate must be the same for each hour of the Trading Day, i.e., the Operational Ramp Rate submitted for a given Trading Hour must be the same with the one(s) submitted earlier for previous Trading Hours in the same Trading Day.
- (f) Outages that affect the submitted Operational Ramp Rate must be due to physical constraints, reported in the CAISO's outage management system pursuant to Section 9 and are subject to CAISO approval. All approved changes to the submitted Operational Ramp Rate will be used in determination of Dispatch Instructions for the shorter period of the balance of the Trading Day or duration of reported Outage.

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- (g) Operational Ramp Rate derates in the CAISO's outage management system pursuant to Section 9 may be declared for any operational segment established in the Master File. Ramping capability through Forbidden Operating Regions are not affected by derates entered in the CAISO's outage management system pursuant to Section 9.
- (h) The amount of change in Ramp Rates from one operating range to a subsequent operating range must not exceed a 10 to 1 ratio, and any Ramp Rate change in excess will be adjusted to achieve the 10 to 1 ratio. This adjustment will also include the implicit ramp rate in the Forbidden Operating Region.
- (i) For all CAISO Dispatch Instructions of Reliability Must-Run Units the Operational Ramp Rate will be the Ramp Rate declared in the Reliability Must Run Contract Schedule A.

30.7.8 Format and Validation of Start-Up and Shut-Down Times

For a Generating Unit or a Resource-Specific System Resource, the submitted Start-Up Time expressed in minutes (min) as a function of down time expressed in minutes (min) must be a staircase function with up to three (3) segments defined by a set of 1 to 4 down time and Start-Up Time pairs. The Start-Up Time is the time required to start the resource if it is offline longer than the corresponding down time. The CAISO shall model Start-Up Times for Multi-Stage Generating Resource at the MSG Configuration level and Transition Times are validated based on the Transition Matrix submitted as provided in Section 27.8. The last segment will represent the time to start the unit from a cold start and will extend to infinity. The submitted Start-Up Time function shall be validated as follows:

- (a) The first down time must be zero (0) min.
- (b) The down time entries must match exactly (in number, sequence, and value) the corresponding down time breakpoints of the maximum Start-Up Time function, as registered in the Master File for the relevant resource.
- (c) The Start-Up Time for each segment must not exceed the Start-Up Time of the corresponding segment of the maximum Start-Up Time function, as registered in the Master File for the relevant resource.
- (d) The Start-Up Time function must be strictly monotonically increasing, i.e., the Start-Up Time must increase as down time increases.

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For Participating Load and for a Proxy Demand Resource or Reliability Demand Response Resource, a single Shut-Down time in minutes is the time required for the resource to Shut-Down after receiving a Dispatch Instruction. For Multi-Stage Generating Resources, the Scheduling Coordinator must provide Start-Up Costs for each MSG Configuration into which the resource can be started.

30.7.9 Format and Validation of Start-Up Costs and Shut-Down Costs

For a Generating Unit or a Resource-Specific System Resource, the submitted Start-Up Cost expressed in dollars (\$) as a function of down time expressed in minutes must be a staircase function with up to three (3) segments defined by a set of 1 to 4 down time and Start-Up Cost pairs. The Start-Up Cost is the cost incurred to start the resource if it is offline longer than the corresponding down time. The last segment will represent the cost to start the resource from cold Start-Up and will extend to infinity. The submitted Start-Up Cost function shall be validated as follows:

- (a) The first down time must be zero (0) min.
- (b) The down time entries must match exactly (in number, sequence, and value) the corresponding down time breakpoints of the Start-Up Cost function, as registered in the Master File for the relevant resource as either the Proxy Cost or Registered Cost.
- (c) The Start-Up Cost for each segment must not be negative and must be equal to the Start-Up Cost of the corresponding segment of the Start-Up Cost function, as registered in the Master File for the relevant resource. In addition, if the Proxy Cost methodology pursuant to Section 30.4 applies to the resource, the Scheduling Coordinator for that resource may submit a daily Bid for the Start-Up Cost that must not be negative but may be less than or equal to one hundred twenty-five (125) percent of the Proxy Cost, and if the resource is a Multi-Stage Generating Resource, the Scheduling Coordinator may submit a daily Bid for each MSG Configuration of the resource that must not be negative but may be less than or equal to one hundred twenty-five (125) percent of the Start-Up Cost for the MSG Configuration. For a resource that is eligible and has elected to use the Registered Cost methodology pursuant to Section 30.4, if a value is submitted in a Bid for the Start-Up Cost, it will be overwritten by the Registered Cost reflected in the Master File. If no value for Start-Up Cost is submitted in a Bid, the CAISO will insert the

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Master File value, as either the Proxy Cost or Registered Cost based on the methodology elected pursuant to Section 30.4.

- (d) The Start-Up Cost function must be strictly monotonically increasing, i.e., the Start-Up Cost must increase as down time increases.

The Start-Up cost for a Reliability Demand Response Resource shall be zero (0). For Participating Loads and Proxy Demand Resources, a single Shut-Down Cost in dollars (\$) is the cost incurred to Shut-Down the resource after receiving a Dispatch Instruction. The submitted Shut-Down Cost must not be negative. For Multi-Stage Generating Resources, the Scheduling Coordinator must provide Start-Up Costs for each MSG Configuration into which the resource can be started.

30.7.10 Format and Validation of Minimum Load Costs

30.7.10.1 In General

For a Generating Unit or a Resource-Specific System Resource, the submitted Minimum Load Cost expressed in dollars per hour (\$/hr) is the cost incurred for operating the unit at Minimum Load as registered in the Master File. The submitted Minimum Load Cost must not be negative. In addition, if the Proxy Cost methodology pursuant to Section 30.4 applies to the resource, the Scheduling Coordinator for that resource may submit a daily Bid for the Minimum Load Cost that must not be negative but may be less than or equal to one hundred twenty-five (125) percent of the Proxy Cost value. For a resource that is eligible and has elected to use the Registered Cost methodology pursuant to Section 30.4, any submitted Minimum Load Cost must be equal to the Minimum Load Cost as registered in the Master File.

30.7.10.2 Adjustments to Minimum Load Costs Due to Increases in Minimum Load

For Generating Units or Resource-Specific System Resources for which the responsible Scheduling Coordinator has temporarily increased their Minimum Load through the CAISO's outage management system as specified in Section 9.3.3, regardless of the election made pursuant to Section 30.4, the CAISO will add to the Minimum Load Costs submitted by the Scheduling Coordinator the cost of the incremental Minimum Load determined as the product of the resource's applicable Default Energy Bid and the corresponding MWs between the resource's original Minimum Load as registered in the Master File and the Minimum Load increased pursuant to Section 9.3.3. The CAISO will use the adjusted Minimum Load Cost in the clearing of the applicable CAISO Markets as well as for Settlement purposes

as described in Section 11. For Multi-Stage Generating Resources, the adjustments to Minimum Load Cost will be made at the MSG Configuration level.

30.7.10.3 Participating Loads

For Participating Loads, the submitted Minimum Load Cost (\$/hr) is the cost incurred while operating the resource at reduced consumption after receiving a Dispatch Instruction. The submitted Minimum Load Cost must not be negative.

30.8 Bids on Out-of-Service Paths at Scheduling Points Prohibited

Scheduling Coordinators shall not submit any Bids or ETC Self-Schedules at Scheduling Points using a transmission path for any Settlement Period for which the Total Transfer Capability for that path is zero (0) MW. The CAISO shall reject Bids or ETC Self-Schedules submitted at Scheduling Points where the Total Transfer Capability on the transmission path is zero (0) MW. If the Total Transfer Capability of a transmission path at the relevant Scheduling Point is reduced to zero (0) after Day-Ahead Schedules have been issued, then, if time permits, the CAISO shall direct the responsible Scheduling Coordinators to reduce all MWh associated with the Bids on such zero-rated transmission paths to zero (0) in the RTM. As necessary to comply with Applicable Reliability Criteria, the CAISO shall reduce any non-zero (0) RTM Bids across zero-rated transmission paths to zero after the Market Close for the RTM.

30.9 Virtual Bids

Virtual Bids are Energy Bids that may be submitted only in the Day-Ahead Market, at Eligible PNodes or Eligible Aggregated PNodes where virtual bidding is permitted, by Scheduling Coordinators representing Convergence Bidding Entities. Virtual Bids are either Virtual Supply Bids or Virtual Demand Bids. A Virtual Bid submitted in the Day-Ahead Market and cleared in the IFM represents a commitment to liquidate a Day-Ahead award in the Real-Time Market at the price determined for the applicable Eligible PNode or Eligible Aggregated PNode as set forth in Section 11.3. For each SCID associated with a Convergence Bidding Entity, there may be only one Virtual Supply Bid and one Virtual Demand Bid per each Eligible PNode or Eligible Aggregated PNode in the Day-Ahead Market. The minimum size of a segment of a Virtual Bid is one (1) MW.

30.9.1 Virtual Bid Components

Each Virtual Bid must have the following components: an indicator that identifies the Virtual Bid as a

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Virtual Supply Bid or a Virtual Demand Bid; Scheduling Coordinator ID Code; Eligible PNode or Eligible Aggregated PNode as applicable; Virtual Bid Curve; and the Trading Hour or Trading Day to which the Virtual Bid applies. Virtual Bids do not include Start-Up Costs or Minimum Load Costs.

30.10 Use of AC Solution and Nodal MW Constraints

The CAISO will achieve an alternating current (AC) solution in the Day-Ahead Market to the extent practicable. If and when it is impracticable to achieve an AC power flow solution without the initial enforcement of nodal MW limit constraints, the CAISO will apply nodal MW constraints to Eligible PNodes (except for Eligible PNodes established for Interties, which are addressed through the process described in Section 31.8). The CAISO will determine whether to apply such nodal MW constraints as follows:

- (i) The CAISO will calculate a MW limit for each Eligible PNode other than an Eligible PNode established for an Intertie. For an Eligible PNode associated with physical supply resource, the MW limit will be equal to a factor multiplied by the PMax of the physical supply resource. For an Eligible PNode associated with a physical demand resource, the MW limit will be equal to a factor multiplied by the nodal load forecast of the Eligible PNode calculated as the MW portion of the System Demand Forecast that is distributed to the Eligible PNode according to the corresponding system Load Distribution Factor associated with the Eligible PNode. The factors used in these calculations will be determined in accordance with a process set forth in the Business Practice Manuals.
- (ii) For each of the Eligible PNodes or group of Eligible PNodes, the CAISO will calculate the percentage by which the sum of the MW amounts of all Energy Supply Bids, Demand Bids, and Virtual Bids exceeds the MW limit calculated pursuant to Section 30.10(i).
- (iii) Starting with the Eligible PNodes or group of Eligible PNodes at which the MW limits would be exceeded by the largest percentages, and working in descending order of the Eligible PNodes or group of Eligible PNodes that would exceed their MW limits ranked by the extent to which the corresponding MW limits would be exceeded, the CAISO will apply the MW limits to all Energy Supply Bids, Demand Bids, and Virtual Bids at the applicable Eligible PNodes or group of Eligible PNodes and run iterations of the IFM until

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the CAISO Markets can achieve an AC solution. The application of the MW limit will be enforced by means of a MW limit constraint on the sum of the nodal Energy Supply Bids, Demand Bids, and Virtual Bids as well as the portions of the aggregate Energy Supply Bids, Demand Bids, and Virtual Bids that are applicable to the Eligible PNodes or group of Eligible PNodes. The MW limit constraints will be enforced in the IFM optimization engine to curtail the Bids at the Eligible PNodes or group of Eligible PNodes that have been identified as candidates for causing AC convergence issues. The IFM optimization engine will use the economic criteria based on Bid prices and effectiveness of Bids to mitigate the violation of the MW limit at the Eligible PNode or group of Eligible PNodes.

30.11 Filings to Recover Commitment-Related Fuel Costs

If a Scheduling Coordinator incurs but cannot recover through the Bid Cost Recovery process any actual marginal fuel procurement costs that exceed (i) the limit on Bids for Start-Up Costs set forth in Section 30.7.9, (ii) the limit on Bids for Minimum Load Costs set forth in Section 30.7.10, or (iii) the limit on Bids for Transition Costs set forth in Section 30.4.1.1.5, the Scheduling Coordinator for the resource may seek to recover those costs through a FERC filing made pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act. The Scheduling Coordinator must notify the CAISO within thirty (30) Business Days after the Operating Day on which the resource incurred the unrecovered costs, and must submit the filing to FERC within ninety (90) Business Days after that Trading Day. Within sixty (60) Business Days after the Trading Day for which the Scheduling Coordinator provides notice to the CAISO per this Section, the CAISO will provide the Scheduling Coordinator with a written explanation of any effect that events or circumstances in the CAISO Markets and fuel market conditions may have had on the resource's inability to recover the costs on the Trading Day.

Each filing the Scheduling Coordinator submits to FERC must include:

- (1) Data supporting the Scheduling Coordinator's claim to the unrecovered costs it seeks, including Invoices for the unrecovered costs;
- (2) A description of the resource's participation in any gas pooling arrangements;
- (3) An explanation of why recovery of the costs is justified; and
- (4) A copy of the written explanation from the CAISO to the Scheduling Coordinator

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described above in this Section.

To the extent that FERC authorizes the Scheduling Coordinator to recover any costs pursuant to the Scheduling Coordinator's filing, the CAISO will pay the Scheduling Coordinator any amounts the Commission deems recoverable and will allocate such amounts pursuant to Section 11.14.

30.12 Eligibility to Submit Filings to Recover Marginal Fuel-Related Costs

30.12.1 Applicability

A Scheduling Coordinator or EIM Participating Resource Scheduling Coordinator may seek to recover through a FERC filing pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act any actual margin fuel procurement costs that cannot be recovered through CAISO market revenues under the following conditions:

- (i) A Scheduling Coordinator or EIM Participating Resource Scheduling Coordinator is mitigated to its Default Energy Bid that is calculated pursuant to any of the options set forth in Section 39.7.1, or the competitive LMP through the Local Market Power Mitigation as specified in Sections 31.2 and 34.1.5;
- (ii) A Scheduling Coordinator whose Exceptional Dispatch is mitigated pursuant to Section 39.10 for any of the options set forth in Section 39.7.1, or submits no Bid, and the Exceptional Dispatch is settled at the greater of the applicable Default Energy Bid or resource-specific LMP;
- (iii) A Scheduling Coordinator or EIM Participating Resource Scheduling Coordinator that is required by FERC order to submit Bids no greater than its Default Energy Bid calculated pursuant to any of the options set forth in Section 39.7.1, and submit Bids at the Default Energy Bid; or
- (iv) A Scheduling Coordinator that is subject to a Generated Bid as set forth in Sections 30.7.3.4, 39.7.1.1.1, and 40.6.8.

30.12.2 Notice and Process

The Scheduling Coordinator or EIM Participating Resource Scheduling Coordinator must notify the CAISO within thirty (30) Business Days after the Operating Day on which the resource incurred the unrecovered costs, and must submit the filing to FERC within ninety (90) Business Days after that

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Operating Day. Within sixty (60) Business Days after the Operating Day for which the Scheduling Coordinator or EIM Participating Resource Scheduling Coordinator provides notice to the CAISO per this Section, the CAISO will provide the Scheduling Coordinator or EIM Participating Resource Scheduling Coordinator with a written explanation of any effect that events or circumstances in the CAISO Markets and fuel market conditions may have had on the resource's inability to recover the costs on the Trading Day.

30.12.3 Documentation Required for FERC Filing

Each filing the Scheduling Coordinator or EIM Participating Resource Scheduling Coordinator submits to FERC must include:

- (1) Data supporting the Scheduling Coordinator's or EIM Participating Resource Scheduling Coordinator claim to the unrecovered costs it seeks, including invoices related to the unrecovered costs;
- (2) A description of the resource's participation in any gas pooling arrangements;
- (3) An explanation of why recovery of the costs is justified; and
- (4) A copy of the written explanation from the CAISO to the Scheduling Coordinator or EIM Participating Resource Scheduling Coordinator described above in this Section.

30.12.4 Payment and Allocation Costs Recovered Per FERC Order

To the extent that FERC authorizes the Scheduling Coordinator or EIM Participating Resource Scheduling Coordinator to recover any costs pursuant to the Scheduling Coordinator's or EIM Participating Resource Scheduling Coordinator's filing, the CAISO will pay the Scheduling Coordinator or EIM Participating Resource Scheduling Coordinator any amounts the Commission deems recoverable and will allocate such amounts pursuant to Section 11.14.