EIM Entities Presentation on Transmission Elements of EDAM Design
Feb 11-12, 2020
Preamble

- The EIM Entities are a diverse group differently situated based upon geography, resource portfolios, and jurisdictional status, among other potential differentiating factors.

- Some EIM Entities may not have yet formulated individual positions on specific market design issues. Therefore, while this presentation represents a consensus view, it may not necessarily represent the ultimate position of any individual EIM Entity.

- Some EIM Entities may choose to offer their own individual contributions where appropriate, either in comments or throughout the stakeholder process.
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Overview and Principles
### Overview of Presentation

**Design concepts presented**
- Informed by experience in the EIM
- Guided by EDAM principles document

**Design must be mindful of differences of Transmission Providers among the EIM entity community**
- System topology
- Transmission cost recovery
- Interactions with third-party transmission customers
- Modeling of Joint-owned transmission
- Jurisdiction
Key Principles

Planning and Operational Control Unchanged
- OATT Administration (modified to facilitate EDAM)
- Transmission and Balancing Authority Operations
- Transmission planning and siting remains with utilities and regulators

No Materially Significant Cost Shifts
- Balance cost and benefits of transmission including recovery of transmission costs and compensation for transmission utilization

Transmission Should Facilitate Market Activity
- Transmission charge/hurdle rate imposed should not impede EDAM efficiency

Reasonably Compatible with Existing Market Transactions
- Bi-lateral purchases and sales
- Reserve Sharing Groups
- Respect long-term transmission ownership/rights

Congestion Rent Revenue
- Transmission Customers contributing transmission should receive proportionate congestion rents
Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT) Environment
FERC’s Order No. 888 required all public utilities that own, operate or control interstate transmission facilities to:

- Offer network and point-to-point transmission service and ancillary service to eligible customers;
- Take transmission service for their own use under the same terms and conditions;
- Functionally separate transmission and power marketing functions;
- Adopt an electronic transmission system information network; and
- Have on file with FERC an Open Access Transmission Tariff

The FERC pro-forma tariff defines:

- Process for requesting transmission service;
- Rates, terms, and conditions for service;
- Required ancillary services and rates for those services;
- Studies conducted to determine the availability of transmission and interconnection service;
- Priorities among competing transmission service requests, including rights of first refusal;
- Curtailment priorities; and
- Provisions dealing with billing and payment, creditworthiness, force majeure, liability, and indemnification
# OATT Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network Integration Transmission Service (NITS)</th>
<th>Point-To-Point Transmission Service (PTP)</th>
<th>Available Transfer Capability (ATC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Firm transmission utilized by a Designated Network Resource (DNR)</td>
<td>• Capacity based reservation from a specified point of receipt to a specified point of delivery on a transmission providers system</td>
<td>• ATC is the transfer capability remaining on a transmission provider’s transmission system that is available for further commercial activity over and above already committed uses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Transmission rate based on load ratio share</td>
<td>• Varies in length of service term (Long-Term or Short-Term) and firmness (Firm or non-firm)</td>
<td>• Firm – unreserved by a customer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Allows for secondary network (non-firm) utilization for non-DNR with priority over other non-firm service</td>
<td>• Transmission charged on reserved capacity</td>
<td>• Non-firm – reserved but not scheduled for that timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Methodology for calculating ATC typically found in OATT Attachment C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Comparison of OATT to CAISO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provisions</th>
<th>OATT</th>
<th>CAISO Tariff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Products</strong></td>
<td>Network and (Firm and Non-firm) Point-to-Point</td>
<td>Schedule delivery (economic, not firm physical, rights)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rate Structure</strong></td>
<td>Single provider - charges based on posted OATT rates and vary based on form of transmission services procured by Transmission Customer, often offered in hourly, daily, monthly and annual increments and firmness/quality</td>
<td>High voltage (200 kV and above) single-system (combined revenue requirements of all participating transmission owners); Low voltage zonal rates based on utility-specific costs Currently a volumetric rate ($/MWh); proposal to move to ½ volumetric and ½ demand CAISO loads are charged TAC Exports and MSS Loads are charged WAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Network – load ratio share</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Point-to-point based on capacity reservation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Firm Transmission Rights</strong></td>
<td>Network transmission service is firm when Network Load is supplied from Designated Network Resources (DNR)</td>
<td>Firm PTP rights only for “grandfathered” pre-existing transmission contracts on PTOs’ systems Priority to inject or withdrawal based on economic bids, system constraints and other factors (e.g., RMR for supply) Firmness of exports protected through “supporting resource” in CAISO (i.e., supply tied to export not already committed to an internal CAISO RA obligation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If there is ATC available, firm PTP transmission can be procured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Comparison of OATT to CAISO (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provision</th>
<th>OATT</th>
<th>CAISO Tariff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congestion Management</td>
<td>Expectation is that absent an outage or de-rate there will be sufficient transmission capacity to accommodate NITS and Firm PTP without any redispatch charge. Non-Firm PTP may be subject to curtailment, not redispatch with an associated congestion charge.</td>
<td>Collected through Locational Marginal Price (LMP) [LMP = \text{system marginal energy} + \text{marginal congestion} + \text{marginal loss}] Load can be hedged through Congestion Revenue Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmission Losses</td>
<td>Average system losses based on stated rate</td>
<td>Marginal losses charged through LMP [LMP = \text{system marginal energy} + \text{marginal congestion} + \text{marginal loss}]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curtailment Priority</td>
<td>Based on “firmness” of rights used by transmission customer</td>
<td>Based on economic bids/Self-Schedules based on priority assigned in Tariff (i.e., “penalty factors” – assigned numeric values to schedules. The higher the value, the firmer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheeling</td>
<td>If PTP wheeling moves through multiple balancing authorities/transmission service providers, rates are “pancaked” (i.e., cumulative). Dependent on PTP reservation not import/export of energy in the BA.</td>
<td>Single WAC for exports from anywhere within the CAISO (except EIM exports). Will see additional pancaked charge from an OATT transmission service provider beyond CAISO boundary.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Transmission Service Regulatory Diversity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investor Owned Utility</th>
<th>Municipal or Public Utility District</th>
<th>Power Marketing Administration</th>
<th>Provincial Utility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Provides transmission service under a FERC-approved OATT</td>
<td>• Various organic statutes that create/govern the utility</td>
<td>• Various organic statutes that create/govern the utility</td>
<td>• Organizational separation between operational and marketing functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rates and OATT changes approved by FERC in publicly notified dockets under the FPA</td>
<td>• Very limited FERC regulation and no FERC-approved OATT</td>
<td>• Various oversight by DOE and Congress</td>
<td>• Limited FERC regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Non-interstate business regulated by a state regulatory body</td>
<td>• Various mechanisms for memorializing terms and conditions of transmission service</td>
<td>• Limited FERC regulation</td>
<td>• Marketing organization is the EIM Entity and does not provide transmission service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Various local governance and regulatory schemes</td>
<td>• Maintain OATT but none are approved by FERC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Various rules for changing OATT terms and conditions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EIM Transmission
# EIM Transmission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of EIM Transmission</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interchange Rights Holder – previously reserved transmission donated by Transmission Customers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available Transfer Capacity – Unreserved or unscheduled transmission identified by the EIM Entity transmission provider</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Energy Transfer System Resources (ETSRs) are defined in each EIM BAA to anchor the Energy Transfer schedules from that BAA to other BAAs in the EIM Area for tracking, tagging, and settlement.

There is no charge for transmission usage in the EIM.
Sources of EDAM Transmission Capacity
Sources of EDAM Transmission

**Key Objectives** of EDAM Transmission

**Design:**

- Enable maximum transmission availability through a voluntary design framework
- Avoid material cost shifts (i.e., winners and losers)
- Respect OATT right holders
- Compatible with TSPs’ OATTs and practices
- Ensure appropriate transmission compensation framework
  - Sufficient revenue recovery for Transmission Service Provider
  - Consistent with FERC open access policies

**Key Principle:** Transmission supporting EDAM must be **reliable and “high quality”**

- EDAM Entities will be **relying** on EDAM transfers to avoid committing units and to serve load
- This transmission could be restricted to firm, although there may be potential for use of other transmission capacity that is typically only sold as non-firm (e.g. Capacity Benefit Margin, Transmission Reliability Margin, seasonal unused network capacity)
Sources of EDAM Transmission

**EDAM Resource Sufficiency (RS) Transmission**
- “Bucket 1”
- Transmission demonstrated to support RS prior to the EDAM run by a transmission customer to meet EDAM RS test(s).

**EDAM Interchange Rights Holder (“IRH”) Transmission**
- “Bucket 2”
- Transmission contributed prior to the EDAM run by an IRH transmission customer on a voluntary basis.

**EDAM Balancing Authority (“BA”) Transmission (ATC)**
- “Bucket 3”
- Transmission contributed prior to the EDAM run by an EDAM BA/transmission provider based on its determination of ATC.
EDAM Resource Sufficiency (RS) Transmission (Bucket 1)

Transmission (acquired in advance at OATT rates) to meet EDAM RS test

- Examples include transmission to support
  - Resources external to the BA but are owned or contracted to serve load in the BA
  - Bilateral firm energy contracts
  - Bilateral “bid range” and/or capacity transactions

As transmission is already paid for:

- Re-optimization of RS transmission in EDAM should not require an incremental transmission rate because TSP has already received compensation
- Transmission rights holder should receive a fair allocation of congestion rents for voluntarily providing “optimizable” RS transmission
Optimizing RS Transmission: 3rd Party Customer Treatment

Transmission that is needed for third-party OATT customer resource sufficiency (Bucket 1) should be included as market inputs but do not necessarily get optimized in EDAM; they could be treated as a non-optimized self-schedule.

- Full optimization is worth considering because it would increase transmission used by the market;
- The benefit of treating the transmission as a self-schedule (non-optimized) is to minimize potential congestion costs - important that accommodation of third-party schedules not cause uplifts for other customers;
- This should be the customer’s option as there may be other non-EDAM uses for transmission or contractual restrictions on usage that aren’t compatible with EDAM optimization.
EDAM Interchange Rights Holder Transmission (Bucket 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transmission contributed on a voluntary basis by a transmission rights holder (similar to EIM Interchange Rights Holder approach)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly reliable (EIM Entities currently require Interchange Rights Holder transmission to be FIRM transmission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No incremental transmission charge (&quot;hurdle rate&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights holder receives fair allocation of congestion rent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EDAM ATC Transmission (Bucket 3)

- Unsold ATC made available by EDAM BA/TSP
  - Transmission not already purchased and paid for by an OATT customer

- Requires an incremental charge to contribute to TSP cost of service
  - Risk that the transmission provider (and other transmission customers paying the embedded cost of the transmission provider’s system) is not being compensated for this category of transmission unless a charge is designed and applied

- Must be generally unsold ATC (not unscheduled rights that may result in curtailments if later used by another rights holder)
  - Potential exceptions may be considered, such as:
    - Network service that BA has information will not be scheduled
    - Capacity Benefit Margin ("CBM") or Transmission Reserve Margin ("TRM")
Compensation for Bucket 3

Reason for Compensation

- Larger volume of transactions in day-ahead
- Unsold ATC not already acquired or paid for by a transmission customer is used
- Minimizes cost shifting including to customers paying embedded cost of transmission system

Potential approaches to EDAM BA Transmission Charge

- **Individual EIM Entity Rates and the CAISO wheeling access charge** - each BA/TP retains autonomy over its OATT rates: \( \text{EDAM BA Total Transmission Revenue Requirement / BA Load + exports (measured demand)} = \text{EDAM BA Transmission Charge} \)

- **Blended EDAM Rate**: Combined EDAM BA Total Transmission Revenue Requirement / Combined BA Load + exports (measured demand)

- **Nominal EDAM Rate (e.g., $X.XX MWhr)**: The nominal rate can be viewed as a voluntary discount off cost-based, approved rates.
  - Options for Nominal EDAM Rate should analyze whether the rate is applied at each EDAM Entity BA (i.e., hurdle rate) or on a postage stamp basis (i.e., flat fee)

- **A volumetric uplift charge** based on power flows
Determining Bucket 3 Rate

Balancing the need to meet revenue requirements with the desire to have a charge that does not prevent economic optimization.

- Whether to/how to de-pancake rates
- Whether to/how to develop cost based rates
- Complex regulatory, governance and stakeholder context
Optimizing Each Transmission Type

- **Bucket 1** and **Bucket 2** will be used to enable transfers first (at no hurdle)
- **Bucket 3** will only be used to the extent that a transaction can clear the transmission charge (e.g. hurdle rate, flat fee, other)
- Potential to leverage existing ETSR Transfer Cost mechanism to include incremental transmission rate in market optimization

Bucket 1 (No Hurdle) → Bucket 2 (No Hurdle) → $27 Load

Bucket 3 (e.g., $3 Hurdle): $2 locational spread

Bucket 3 transmission will not be scheduled unless value of transaction is > hurdle rate
Bucket 3 - EDAM BA Transmission

Hurdle rate model charged based on total Bucket 3 EDAM exports from a particular BAA

- Imports would not incur a charge (as load has generally already paid for transmission to meet RS requirements)
- Application to exports would also provide revenues to BAAs that are wheeled-through (e.g., BAA2)
Day-Ahead Timelines for Transmission

- Entities communicate total transmission available for market use
  - Potential “processing hold” period could limit further OATT sales of transmission identified as Bucket 3 while EDAM optimization identifies the amount used by the market
  - Lock-out period would end at ~1 PM when market results are finalized
  - OATT transmission requests can continue to be queued on OASIS but not processed until the end of the optimization period
  - Does not limit use of previously-reserved transmission
Joint Owner, Seams, and Third-party Transmission Customer Issues
Joint Owner Operation & Seams Issues

Transmission and Balancing Authority Areas in WECC have many different relationships and seams, often without clear boundaries

- Joint ownership of transmission facilities where one entity acts as the path operator
- Load Serving Entities that serve load in multiple BAAs
- BAA’s reliance on 3rd-party transmission providers (who may or may not be in EIM or EDAM) to deliver remote resources that they own and operate
- Shared ownership of generators that may reside in multiple BAAs

Solutions to EDAM transmission should be developed with due consideration to the limitations and opportunities related to this complexity. These and other issues should be addressed as part of a complete market design.
Issues related to 3rd party customers

Change in the OATT timeline – Day ahead plan for RS will need to be submitted early. For example, load serving entities in EDAM BA will need to communicate how they plan to serve their load by deadline for the RS test and not by current OATT tagging deadlines.

Financially binding day-ahead schedule – In the EIM, a base schedule submitted by the EIM Entity before the EIM market run is the fixed point of settlement for the market. In EDAM, day ahead market results become the “base” from which changes are settled financially.

Consistency between resources that qualify as DNRs and resources that meet the EDAM resource sufficiency test

3rd party customers must be permitted to self-schedule their loads and resources – maintain existing transmission reservation priorities

Need to identify any new settlement charges and just and reasonable allocations
Other Considerations
Losses

ALL OATT Transmission Providers

- Use average system loss rates

EIM Entities

- Use average system for balanced base schedules
- Most use marginal losses as part of EIM LMP imbalance settlement

EDAM Entities (Proposal)

- Continue to charge based on average system loss factors
- Harmonize seams across EDAM footprint with respect to different loss settlements
Transmission Design – BA to BA vs TSP

Current EIM implementation of BA to BA settlement transactions does not work with Joint Owned Transmission

- BA may be reflecting wheel through schedules today on its system that is not using transmission provided under that EIM Entity’s OATT.
- BA responsibilities and TSP do not always align with joint owned transmission.

Need a design that ensures the market is appropriately allocating payments to the party that offers its transmission for EDAM use

- Compensate the Transmission Service Provider (TSP) via a transmission charge and/or congestion rent for transmission offered as Bucket 3
- Compensate the Transmission Customer (TC) via congestion rent for transmission offered as buckets 1 and 2
Operational and Commercial Seams

ETSRs represent boundaries between BAAs and are used for energy and market accounting. They may or may not represent physical transmission elements that can cause congestion. This differentiation may have impacts on market modeling and distribution of congestion rents.
Tariff Structure and Rate Change Rights

The proper balance of tariff structure and rate change rights between the CAISO Tariff and OATTs of Entities

More simply stated: **what goes where and who has the right to change it**

Need to develop a consistent and durable approach to this critical component of the market
Appendix
The table adjacent gives a rough idea of what sort of rate would be needed given a range of lost revenue and a range of potential transfers.

The table presumes a per MWh charge for EDAM Transfers as a rate design and is only meant to be informational.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual Revenue</th>
<th>Bucket 3 Transmission Rate Level to Remain Revenue Neutral ($/MWh)</th>
<th>Incremental Transmission Revenue</th>
<th>Annual Bucket 3 Transfers (GWh)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$5,000,000</td>
<td>$10.00 $5.00 $3.33 $2.50 $2.00 $1.67 $1.43 $1.25 $0.50</td>
<td></td>
<td>$500 $1,000 $1,500 $2,000 $2,500 $3,000 $3,500 $4,000 $10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10,000,000</td>
<td>$20.00 $10.00 $6.67 $5.00 $4.00 $3.33 $2.86 $2.50 $1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$17,500,000</td>
<td>$35.00 $17.50 $11.67 $8.75 $7.00 $5.83 $5.00 $4.38 $1.75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$25,000,000</td>
<td>$50.00 $25.00 $16.67 $12.50 $10.00 $8.33 $7.14 $6.25 $2.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$27,500,000</td>
<td>$55.00 $27.50 $18.33 $13.75 $11.00 $9.17 $7.86 $6.88 $2.75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30,000,000</td>
<td>$60.00 $30.00 $20.00 $15.00 $12.00 $10.00 $8.57 $7.50 $3.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$35,000,000</td>
<td>$70.00 $35.00 $23.33 $17.50 $14.00 $11.67 $10.00 $8.75 $3.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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