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    • Energy Imbalance Market foundation
      The California ISO worked extensively with stakeholders to provide Energy Imbalance Market (EIM) services to other balancing authorities in the west.
    • Energy Imbalance Market governance development
      The implementation of EIM necessitates that all entities, whether inside or outside California, are given a voice in the decision-making process going forward. The EIM Transitional Committee is a stakeholder body tasked with developing a long-term governance structure and advising the Board on EIM. Through this initiative the EIM Transitional Committee will first evaluate the general relationship between the ISO and EIM Governing Body, and criteria for evaluating governance proposals. Then the committee will vet its proposal for long-term EIM governance with stakeholders.
    • Energy Imbalance Market year 1 enhancements phase 1
      The ISO is proposing a series of Energy Imbalance Market (EIM) enhancements for FERC compliance, to meet commitments made during the original stakeholder process and to resolve issues identified during implementation. Phase 1 will focus on improvements that will facilitate NV Energy’s October 2015 entry into the market, which includes creating a greenhouse gas flag, cost based bid adder, bidding rules on external EIM interties and clarifying administrative pricing rules.
    • Energy Imbalance Market year 1 enhancements phase 2
      The second phase of the Energy Imbalance Market (EIM) enhancements initiative will address the potential of an EIM-wide transmission rate, flow entitlements for base and day-ahead schedules, the treatment of transfer limit congestion, market power mitigation of transfer limits, and bidding rules on external interties. The initiative also includes items that were discovered during EIM implementation.
    • Energy Imbalance Market transition period
    • Energy storage interconnection
      This initiative will examine issues with connecting energy storage facilities to the ISO controlled grid under the existing rules, and will develop new policies as needed to clarify and facilitate interconnection of energy storage.
    • e-Tagging timing requirements
      e-Tag timing requirements have been highlighted as an issue in several stakeholder initiatives such as Convergence Bidding. The California ISO currently requires an e-tag no later than T-20 after adjustments in Hour-Ahead Scheduling Process (HASP). The large majority of market participants have voluntarily tagged Integrated Forward Market (IFM) awards prior to HASP. Several market participants have expressed concern that not requiring an e-tag for IFM awards prior to HASP can lead to implicit virtual bidding at interties and the feasibility of Day-Ahead schedules may be at risk.
    • Ex post price correction make whole payments
      Ex post price corrections have led to instances in which bids that were cleared in the market are no longer economical when evaluated against the corrected price. Currently, the ISO does not have a policy or mechanism for compensating market participants when this occurs. The absence of such a make-whole mechanism was based on the assumption that the need for market results would always be consistent with the cleared bids. In practice, this is generally the case. When market prices require corrections, however, settlement prices can differ from the value of the cleared bids. Through this initiative, the ISO will develop a make-whole payment mechanism to compensate market participants for adverse financial impacts in the case when prices are adjusted in a way that is not consistent with their accepted bids.
    • Exceptional dispatch
      Under MRTU, reliability requirements that cannot be resolved through the California ISO market software will be met by manually issued Exceptional Dispatches. Units receiving Exceptional Dispatches for energy will be paid the higher of their bid price or the Locational Marginal Price (LMP). The ISO expects that the frequency and duration of Exceptional Dispatches will be very limited under MRTU. However, the potential cost of such Exceptional Dispatches could be significant if generators receiving such dispatches are able to exercise local or temporary market power by submitting extremely high energy bids. Therefore, the ISO is considering modifications to the MRTU to mitigate the potential for market power by units receiving Exceptional Dispatches for energy.
    • Exceptional dispatch mitigation in real time
      The local market power mitigation phase 2 initiative, which is conducted in parallel with this initiative, will implement a dynamic competitive path assessment that flags paths as uncompetitive based on the amount of congestion present on the lines under review, and determines the triggers for exceptional dispatch mitigations. This initiative seeks to complement those changes by implementing a mechanism to identify and mitigate for exceptional dispatches that have local market power and create a set of default path designations to use should the dynamic assessment fail to produce a valid set of designations. The exceptional dispatch mitigation in real time tariff changes are being addressed in the local market power mitigation FERC filing
    • Expanding metering and telemetry options
      As requested by participants, the ISO is evaluating additional configuration options for metering and telemetry to reduce barriers for aggregated resource models. We will conduct pilot programs as needed to demonstrate that the alternatives meet ISO and participant needs, and review and modify ISO requirements if necessary. The initiative may produce Business Practice Manual for Telemetry and Metering updates and potential tariff changes.
    • Expedited GIDAP enhancements 2017
      The ISO has identified two interconnection issues that need expedited resolutions: 1) how long an interconnection customer may “park” for purposes of receiving a Transmission Plan Deliverability allocation; and 2) how long interconnection customers have to submit, correct, and re-submit new interconnection requests within the ISO validation timeframe. Through this initiative the ISO proposes to change the current parking and interconnection request window and validation processes in the Generator Interconnection and Deliverability Allocation Procedures (GIDAP).
    • Extended short term unit commitment
      This initiative will increase the time horizon used in the Short Term Unit Commitment (STUC) process for the real-time market. This will enable STUC to see system needs over a greater length of time and therefore more efficiently commit units as necessary.