



effective November 1, 2001, and that the other three proposals described above became effective February 26, 2002.

A number of parties have moved to intervene in the present proceeding. Some of the motions to intervene include limited protests and protests concerning Amendment No. 41.<sup>2</sup> Pursuant to Rule 213 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 C.F.R. § 385.213, the ISO now submits its Answer to the motions to intervene, limited protests, and protests submitted in the above-referenced docket.<sup>3</sup> The ISO does not oppose the intervention of parties that have sought leave to intervene in this proceeding. However, as explained below, the ISO believes that Amendment No. 41 should be accepted by the Commission in its entirety.

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<sup>2</sup> Motions to intervene, limited protests, and protests were submitted by Motion to Intervene, Limited Protests, and Protests filed by the following entities: the Attorney General of the State of California ("California Attorney General"); Cogeneration Association of California and The Energy Producers and Users Associations ("CAC/EPUC"); California Department of Water Resources ("CDWR"); California Electricity Oversight Board ("CEOB"); The Cities of Redding, Santa Clara and Palo Alto, California and The Metropolitan-S-R Public Power Agency ("Cities/M-S-R"); City of Vernon, California ("Vernon"); Constellation Power Source, Inc. ("CPS"); Duke Energy North American, LLC, and Duke Energy Trading and Marketing, LLC ("Duke Energy"); Dynegy Power Marketing, Inc. ("Dynegy"); Independent Energy Producers Association ("IEP"); Modesto Irrigation District ("MID"); Mirant Americas Energy Marketing, LP, Mirant California, LLC, Mirant Delta, LLC, and Mirant Potrero, LLC ("Mirant"); The Metropolitan Water District ("MWD"); The Northern California Power Agency ("NCPA"); Reliant Energy Power Generation, Inc. and Reliant Energy Services, Inc. ("Reliant"); Southern California Edison Company ("SCE"); The Sacramento Municipal Utility District ("SMUD"); Turlock Irrigation District ("TID"); Williams Energy Marketing & Trading Company ("Williams"); and Western Power Trading Forum ("WPTF"). A notice of intervention and limited protest was filed by The Public Utilities Commission of the State of California ("CPUC").

<sup>3</sup> Some of the parties that have submitted filings concerning Amendment No. 41 request affirmative relief in leading styles as protests. There is no prohibition on the ISO's responding to the assertions in these pleadings. *Florida Power & Light*, 67 FERC ¶ 61,315 (1994). Additionally, to the extent that this Answer is deemed an answer to protests, the ISO requests a waiver of Rule 213 (18 C.F.R. § 385.213) to permit it to make this Answer. Good cause for this waiver exists here given the nature and complexity of this proceeding and the usefulness of this Answer in ensuring the development of a complete record. See, e.g., *Enron Corp.*, 78 FERC ¶ 61,179, at 61,733, 61,741 (1997); *El Paso Electric Co.*, 68 FERC ¶ 61,181, at 61,899 & n.57 (1994).

## II. ANSWER

### A. The ISO's Proposal Concerning Interest on Defaulted Market Payments Is Reasonable

The CDWR argument that the ISO's proposed change to ISO Tariff Settlement and Billing Protocol ("SABP") Section 6.5.2 appears to represent a departure from within -month settlement and payment <sup>4</sup> is incorrect. In its November 21 filing to comply with the Commission's November 7, 2001 Order, the ISO proposed to modify the ISO's billing and settlement procedures so that payments made by CDWR would be applied to the month remitted. <sup>5</sup> Amendment No. 41 does not modify this proposal in any way. Rather, proposed SABP Section 6.5.2 concerns the application of default interest with the proposed change being that the ISO would apply the default interest amount to any unpaid creditor balances. This is a change from the current Tariff provision, which requires that all interest payments be deposited in the ISO Surplus Account. Funds in the ISO Surplus Account are refunded to Market Participants that paid the ISO Grid Management Charge. Under the change proposed in Amendment No. 41, interest payments still may be deposited in the ISO Surplus Account, but only after all ISO market creditors have been paid in full. The ISO notes that, from the viewpoint of any ISO market creditor, the proposed change is a significant improvement over the present Tariff provision.

Mirant and Reliant argue that the ISO does not specify how it proposes to allocate default interest to pay unpaid creditors. <sup>6</sup> The ISO will apply default

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<sup>4</sup> CDWR at 1 -3.

<sup>5</sup> ISO Compliance Filing, Docket Nos. ER01 -3013-001 and ER01 -889-009 (Nov. 21, 2001).

<sup>6</sup> Mirant at 12 -13; Reliant at 4-5.

interest first towards unpaid creditor balances for the trade month in which the default interest was assessed and second to any other unpaid creditor balances. Then, and only then, upon full payment to all unpaid creditor balances in the ISO markets will any excess funds pertaining to the default interest be credited to the Surplus Account. Section 6.5.3 of the SABP provides that funds in the Surplus Account in excess of an amount determined by the ISO Governing Board and noticed by the ISO to Market Participants will be distributed to Scheduling Coordinators using the same method of apportioning the refund as the method employed in apportioning the liability for the Grid Management Charge.

IEP's protest of the ISO's "proposal to apply interest on amounts past -due to supplier to pay down the [ISO's] GMC" is in apposite. <sup>7</sup>As noted *supra* in the Amendment No. 41 Transmittal Letter, SABP Section 6.5.3 already provides for the payment of excess funds in the Surplus Account to be returned to all Market Participants who paid the ISO Grid Management Charge. <sup>8</sup>Thus, IEP is in effect attempting to stage a collateral attack on a payment methodology that the Commission long ago approved. Moreover, under the ISO's proposed change to SABP 6.5.2, default interest would first be applied to pay off all unpaid creditor balances, and only if there were default interest amounts remaining after this was done would the remaining amounts be deposited in the ISO Surplus Account for refund to Market Participants that paid the Grid Management Charge. It appears that IEP fails to recognize that the ISO's proposed change is very much to the benefit of all unpaid creditors in ISO markets.

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<sup>7</sup> IEP at 3.

<sup>8</sup> Amendment No. 41 Transmittal Letter at 2.

**B. The ISO's Proposal Concerning ISO Release of Confidential Information Is Reasonable**

Parties are incorrect in arguing that proposed Section 20.3.4(b) represents a significant departure from the ISO's current practice.<sup>9</sup> The only change the ISO has proposed to that section is one that emphasizes the fact that it is the Market Participant that must take the lead in directing a challenge or defense against a disclosure requirement, after being notified of the disclosure requirement by the ISO. The provision in Section 20.3.4(b) stating that such a challenge is to be "at the sole discretion and down cost" (emphasis added) of the Market Participant has been left intact; the ISO's proposal to "provide such information and assistance as is necessary to enable" the Market Participant to conduct its own challenge or defense, rather than collaborate with the Market Participant in its challenge or defense, is in keeping with the focus of that unaltered provision. Moreover, the provision stating that the ISO will provide information and assistance is more specific than the existing language requiring the ISO to "cooperate" with the Market Participant.

SMU is incorrect in arguing that the proposed confidentiality provisions concerning the Commission and the CEOB should for the most parts simply follow the language of current Section 20.3.4(b).<sup>10</sup> The ISO's proposed changes in Sections 20.3.4(c) and 20.3.4(d) purposely are specific to the Commission and the CEOB and provide, beyond the detail in Section 20.3.4(b), further explanation with regard to the provision of confidential information to these two entities.

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<sup>9</sup> CAC/EPUC at 4; Duke Energy at 7 -8; Dynegy at 4; SMU at 3 -4; Williams at 4 -6; WPTF at 8 -9.

<sup>10</sup> SMU at 4 -8.

As to proposed Section 20.3.4(c), the ISO notes that this section is closely modeled upon the disclosure provisions included in the New England Power Pool (“NEPOOL”) Information Policy, which have been approved by the Commission.<sup>11</sup> Thus, the Commission already has indicated that such provisions are just and reasonable. Further, the provisions of Section 20.3.4(c) largely parallel the provisions of Section 20.3.4(d), with the difference between the two sections mainly being that Section 20.3.4(c) provides for the ISO to request that information be withheld from public disclosure by the Commission or its staff pursuant to 18 C.F.R. §388.112, whereas Section 20.3.4(d) provides for the ISO to give confidential information to the CEO or its staff provided that adequate confidentiality arrangements (as explicitly defined in this section) are in place.

With regard to the provision of confidential information to the CEO, the ISO proposed Section 20.3.4(d) in order to allow for a more efficient method of providing information to the CEO than has been the case until now, while at the same time ensuring that confidential information will not be released unless adequate confidentiality arrangements are in place. As the CEO notes, the ISO has received numerous subpoenas from the CEO concerning the provision of confidential information to the CEO.<sup>12</sup> Each of these subpoenas has had to be addressed individually by the ISO. Each time a subpoena has been addressed,

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<sup>11</sup> See *New England Power Pool*, 95 FERC ¶61,105 (2001); *New England Power Pool*, 95 FERC ¶61,248 (2001).

<sup>12</sup> CEO at 3. Reliant characterizes the ISO as having received “a staggering number of subpoenas and data requests” over the past eighteen months. Reliant at 6. However, even while recognizing this enormous number of subpoenas and data requests, Reliant Companies argue that the ISO’s current procedures for responding to them should not only be maintained but “enhanced.” Reliant at 6. As explained below, the ISO believes that it is more practicable to adopt its proposed streamlined procedures, rather than to augment the current procedures thereby making them much slower and less workable.

the ISO has had to notify each Market Participant and work to resolve confidentiality concerns with the CEOB and the relevant Market Participant. The process of considering each subpoena on an individual basis entails significant ISO resources.<sup>13</sup>

Under the ISO's proposed Tariff change, the same information would be provided to the same entity, the CEOB, as is currently being provided through the subpoena process. The difference is that the ISO's proposed Tariff change would streamline that process. Moreover, the proposed Tariff change provides for similar protection of confidential information as Market Participants currently enjoy. The Tariff change prohibits confidential information from being provided unless and until there is a good reason for it to be provided, and unless adequate confidentiality arrangements are in place. Further, the Tariff change describes in detail the conditions that must exist in order for adequate confidentiality arrangements to be deemed to be in place.

Additionally, providing channels through which confidential information may be provided to the CEOB—in the appropriate circumstances—is consistent with the Commission's recognition that the Commission and state agencies should work in partnership to further their common goal, namely, the protection of consumer interests. For example, the Commission, in its order granting a petition for a declaratory order filed with the Commission by the CEOB, explained that “[w]e find that the Oversight Board's request for confirmation that the pending

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<sup>13</sup> See generally Memorandum from Elena Schmid, Vice President—Corporate and Strategic Development to the ISO Governing Board concerning the Information Policy Tariff Revision Filing (Nov. 2001). This memorandum was reviewed by the ISO Governing Board prior

legislation removes the [federal -state] jurisdictional conflict is appropriate and that it will help promote *a cooperative state/federal partnership that is consistent with our respective responsibilities to protect electric customers*.<sup>14</sup> Dynegy does not present a relevant argument by noting that at the Commission, in its December 19, 2001 Order, found that the CEOB has no authority to evaluate wholesale rates.<sup>15</sup> What Dynegy misses is the simple truth that the CEOB certainly has a vital role to play in the evaluation of *retail rates*; that this role clearly is within the jurisdiction of the CEOB; and that, indeed, the CEOB has a duty to protect the interests of retail customers. The only way in which the CEOB can evaluate retail rates is by having access to relevant, confidential priced data. The ISO's proposed Tariff change provides for such access in appropriate circumstances. The CEOB can, and does, acquire the same information now through subpoena. The changes proposed in Amendment No. 41 neither add to nor subtract from that existing subpoena authority, but rather provide for the CEOB to acquire the same information it would acquire under subpoena anyway in a more efficient and less burdensome way.

As to arguments that it is premature to propose a definition of the CEOB that anticipates a successor in interest to the CEOB,<sup>16</sup> because it is unclear what such a successor (or successors) might be, the ISO believes that its definition is

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to the November 29, 2001 meeting in which the Board approved modifications to Section 20.3.4, and is available on the ISO Home Page at <<http://www.caiso.com/pubinfo/BOG/>>.

<sup>14</sup> *California Electricity Oversight Board*, 88 FERC ¶61,172, at 61,577 -78 (1999) (emphasis added).

<sup>15</sup> Dynegy at 3 (citing *San Diego Gas & Electric Company, et al.*, 97 FERC ¶61,275 (2001)). Similarly, Williams and WPTF are incorrect in asserting that the ISO's proposal represents an effort to make an end-run around the December 19, 2001 Order. Williams at 9 WPTF at 6. -10;

<sup>16</sup> IEP at 7.



sufficiently specific without being too narrow. The definition applies to the CEOB or “any successor in interest to the responsibilities of such agency.” Thus, even if the responsibilities of the CEOB were to be split among one or more successors in interest, the ISO’s definition of CEOB would apply to each of those successors in interest.

**C. The ISO’s Proposal Concerning the Price Limitation During Non-System Emergency Periods Is Reasonable**

Contrary to the assertion of Reliant,<sup>17</sup> the ISO’s proposal to establish a lower limit on the Non-Emergency Clearing Price Limit (“NECPL”) is not in any way “arbitrary.” The lower limit is proposed to be completely symmetrical with the upper limit on the NECPL. As the ISO explained in the Amendment No. 41 Transmittal Letter, this symmetry is consistent with the manner in which the ISO has implemented previous price caps.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, the lower limit on the NECPL recognizes that, just as positive-priced bids can be unreasonable, the same is equally true of negative-priced bids. Therefore, the ISO’s proposal is entirely just and reasonable.

Mirant argues that the proposed symmetrical lower limit on the NECPL is inappropriate because it fails to reflect the Commission’s December 19, 2001 order<sup>19</sup> directing the ISO to determine a “winter season” mitigated price for use through April 30, 2002 and the fact that all price mitigation measures in the ISO

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<sup>17</sup> Reliant at 13.  
<sup>18</sup> Amendment No. 41 Transmittal Letter at 3.  
<sup>19</sup> 95 FERC ¶ 61,294 (2001).

market terminate on September 30, 2002. <sup>20</sup>The filing for a symmetrical lower limit on the NECPL is appropriate because the NECPL will be used again, beginning on May 1, 2002. Given the need for a lower limit, it is appropriate to have such a provision already in the ISO Tariff prior to resumption of use of NECPL as the mechanism to calculate the mitigated price. Moreover, the ISO submitted a compliance filing on January 25, 2002, reflecting the implementation of the winter -season mitigated price calculation for the period of December 20, 2001 through April 30, 2002, and proposing a new Tariff section specifically providing for the termination of all price mitigation measures on September 30, 2002. Thus Mirant's concerns are without foundation.

### **III. CONCLUSION**

For the foregoing reasons, the ISO respectfully requests that the Commission accept Amendment No. 41 as filed.

Respectfully submitted,

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Dated: February 4, 2002

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<sup>20</sup> Mirant at 13 -15.



February 4, 2002

The Honorable Magalie Roman Salas  
Secretary  
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission  
888 First Street, N.E.  
Washington, D.C. 20426

**Re: California Independent System Operator Corporation )**      **Docket No. ER02 -651-000**

Dear Secretary Salas:

Enclosed for electronic filing please find the Answer of The California Independent System Operator Corporation to Motions to Intervene, Limited Protests, and Protests to Amendment No. 41 to The California Independent System Operator Corporation Tariff, filed on December 28, 2001 in the above-referenced docket.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Respectfully submitted,

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## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have this day served the Answer of The California Independent System Operator Corporation to Motions to Intervene, Limited Protests, and Protests upon each person designated on the official service list compiled by the Secretary in the above captioned docket. -

Dated at Folsom, California, on this 4<sup>th</sup> day of February, 2002.

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