

resources only include proxy demand response resources and are generally subject to the ISO's resource adequacy incentive mechanism (RAAIM).¹⁴

Supply plan demand response capacity averaged 333 MW in July and August 2023, a 20 percent reduction compared to summer 2022. Supply plan demand response capacity is contracted either through the CPUC's Demand Response Auction Mechanism (DRAM) or bilaterally between third party providers and load serving entities. Previously, most third party demand response was contracted through DRAM but increasingly, more capacity is being contracted bilaterally.

2.2 Availability of demand response resource adequacy capacity

On days when the ISO issued an Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) or a Restricted Maintenance Operations (RMO) notice, about 85 percent of resource adequacy demand response capacity was bid into the ISO market across peak net load hours. This is a substantial increase in the availability of resource adequacy demand response capacity compared to summer 2022.

In summer 2023, the bid-in capacity of utility demand response averaged about 81 percent of resource adequacy credits, compared to 67 percent last year. While supply bid in from reliability demand response met or exceeded resource adequacy capacity for reliability demand response, proxy demand response fell substantially short of resource adequacy credits.

In 2023, third party demand response was available up to 96 percent of their resource adequacy capacity in the day-ahead market and 69 percent in the real-time market. Greater availability of supply plan demand response, compared to utility proxy demand response, is likely due to supply plan resources being subject to penalties for failing to bid in up to their resource adequacy capacity, while utility demand response resources do not face the same penalties.

Utility demand response availability


Figure 2.1 shows the availability of CPUC-jurisdictional credited demand response capacity on high load days, compared to total resource adequacy credits in respective months. Figure 2.1 also shows the real-time schedules of ISO-integrated CPUC-jurisdictional utility demand response capacity (both proxy demand response and reliability demand response). Program availability is based on demand response resource bids into the ISO markets. On average, utility demand response resources bid in about 81 percent of the amount of demand response capacity used to meet resource adequacy requirements (after inclusion of the 9 percent planning reserve margin adder, and the transmission and distribution gross-ups).

This is a substantial increase in availability compared to 2021 and 2022, when utility demand response bids fell short of resource adequacy credits by 34 and 33 percent, respectively. The shortfall of bid-in capacity compared to resource adequacy credits was primarily associated with proxy demand response. Since credited demand response resources are not included in resource adequacy supply plans, there is

¹⁴ RAAIM is a financial incentive mechanism applied to resource adequacy capacity where suppliers could be penalized for not being available (bid) into the ISO market in Availability Assessment Hours which are currently peak net load hours (4:00 to 9:00 pm) on non-holiday weekdays. Resources with a Pmax less than 1 megawatt are exempt from RAAIM under the ISO Tariff, Section 40.9.2(a)(1). In July and August 2023, 18% of supply plan demand response capacity was associated with resources sized less than 1 megawatt and thus were exempt from RAAIM.

limited visibility into which resources were failing to bid in adequate capacity. However, availability was much lower for proxy demand response resources compared to reliability demand response resources.

Figure 2.1 CPUC-jurisdictional utility demand response availability and resource adequacy credits



The availability of credited utility demand response varied significantly between reliability demand response resources and proxy demand response resources. Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 show the bid-in capacity for reliability demand response resources and proxy demand response resources separately.¹⁵ As seen in Figure 2.2, bids from reliability demand response resources met or exceeded the CPUC-jurisdictional credited resource adequacy values for reliability demand response programs.

The percentage of credited utility proxy demand response that bid in during these tight system days was substantially lower, averaging 41 percent of resource adequacy values (including the PRM adder and T&D gross-ups). Because credited utility demand response is not shown on supply plans, utility proxy demand resources are not subject to RAIM if they fail to bid in their resource adequacy capacity. This may explain why such a large portion of this capacity was unavailable to the ISO during peak hours on high load days in summer 2023.

In addition, non-CPUC jurisdictional load serving entities claimed an average of 46 MW of demand response resource adequacy credits in July and August, which reduced system resource adequacy obligations for these entities. The ISO did not have insight into the availability of non-CPUC-jurisdictional utility demand response programs as this capacity is not integrated in the ISO market.

¹⁵ The aggregate resource adequacy values in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 vary slightly from Figure 2.1. This is due to Figure 2.1 using data from the CPUC’s CIRA Generic Obligations Report, which has total RA Obligations met by DR, while 2.2 and 2.3 use the individual LSE reports that breakdown DR capacity between PDR and RDRR. There are some slight data discrepancies between these two sources.

Figure 2.2 Utility reliability demand response availability and resource adequacy credits





Figure 2.3 Utility proxy demand response availability and resource adequacy credits




Supply plan demand response availability

Supply plan demand response was largely offered up close to resource adequacy values in the day-ahead market, although a smaller percentage was available in real-time. The high availability of supply plan demand response resources in the day-ahead market is due in part to these resources being subjected to Resource Adequacy Availability Incentive Mechanism (RAAIM) penalties for failing to bid in resource adequacy values during net peak hours.

Figure 2.4 shows the availability of supply plan demand response capacity as reflected by day-ahead and real-time bids, where bids are capped at individual resource adequacy values. Bids from supply plan demand response resources averaged 96 percent of resource adequacy capacity during high load days in summer 2023. This is an increase from summer 2022, when bid-in capacity in the day-ahead market averaged 75 percent of resource adequacy values. The increase in availability is due in part to high load days not falling on weekends or holidays in summer 2023. In summer 2022, the availability of supply plan demand response averaged 90 percent on non-holiday weekdays but only 35 percent on holidays or weekends.

Figure 2.4 Day-ahead and real-time availability of supply plan demand response



While bid-in capacity from supply plan demand response averaged close to its resource adequacy value in the day-ahead market, only about 70 percent was bid in the real-time market. Limited availability of demand response capacity in real-time can primarily be attributed to demand response programs with start-up times more than 255 minutes, which qualify these resources as long-start. Long-start resources are not subject to RAAIM and therefore are not penalized for being unavailable in the real-time if they are not scheduled economically in the day-ahead market. In July and August of 2023, around 52 percent of supply plan demand resource adequacy capacity was associated with long-start resources.

2.3 Demand response bidding

Figure 2.5 shows day-ahead bid prices and day-ahead schedules across peak net load hours (hours ending 17 through 21) of proxy demand response resources (utility and third party) counted toward resource adequacy requirements.

Figure 2.5 Proxy demand response resource adequacy day-ahead bids





Figure 2.5 highlights the pattern of proxy demand response bids in the day-ahead market. Across high load days in summer 2023, around half of utility demand response bids and 80 percent of third party demand response bids exceeded \$500/MWh. These high bid prices led to a small percentage of demand response capacity being scheduled in the day-ahead market. Over this period, about 30 percent of the utility proxy demand response that bid into the day-ahead market was scheduled, while about 16 percent of bid-in third party demand response was scheduled.

Figure 2.6 shows real-time bids of proxy demand response (utility and third party) counted towards resource adequacy requirements across peak net load hours. Figure 2.6 highlights that proxy demand response capacity incremental to day-ahead awards was largely offered at or near the \$1,000/MWh soft bid cap. Under certain conditions, the bid cap can be increased from \$1,000/MWh to \$2,000/MWh; however, proxy demand response, as with all internal resources, must submit reference level change requests to bid over \$1,000/MWh. Although the hard bid cap of \$2,000/MWh was in effect during various hours on August 15 and 16, no proxy demand response resources submitted a reference level change request and thus were unable to bid over \$1,000/MWh.¹⁶

¹⁶ It is not clear to DMM if proxy demand response resources can submit reference level change requests and whether the ISO would be able to validate these requests. DMM has recommended the ISO open a policy initiative to consider improvements to the reference level change request process to ensure non-gas resources are able to submit requests to accurately reflect their costs. Comments on Policy Initiatives Catalog and Roadmap Process 2024, Department of Market Monitoring, Feb 29, 2024: <https://www.caiso.com/Documents/DMM-Comments-on-2024-Policy-Roadmap-Feb-29-2024.pdf>

Figure 2.6 Proxy demand response resource adequacy real-time bids



Beginning in 2024, resource adequacy proxy demand response resources will be subject to a bid cap of \$949/MWh. This change was implemented by the CPUC in order to ensure that proxy demand response resources are dispatched prior to reliability demand response resources, who are required to bid in at 95 percent of the current market bid cap. As a reference, in high load days in 2023, 41 percent of third party demand response and 31 percent of utility proxy demand response bid in at \$950 or above in the day-ahead market. In the real-time market these percentages are even higher, averaging 43 percent for utility demand response and 78 percent for third party demand response.


Figure 2.7 shows day-ahead and real-time bids for reliability demand response counted towards resource adequacy requirements. Reliability demand response resources may bid economically in the day-ahead market; however, incremental reliability demand response capacity offered into real-time must submit bids at or above 95 percent of the ISO’s current energy bid cap and can only be dispatched under an Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) Watch or greater. This is a change from previous years where reliability demand response could only be dispatched in the real-time if the ISO was in an EEA 2 or greater. In July 2023, the CPUC clarified reliability demand response should be available prior to an emergency, and instructed the ISO to allow operators to dispatch RDRR in an EEA Watch.¹⁷

Figure 2.7 also shows that reliability demand response resources were scheduled on four days in summer 2023. On August 16, 17, and 29, reliability demand response resources were scheduled economically in the day-ahead market. On July 20, the reliability demand response was dispatched in real-time. These resources were forced into the market by operators, therefore their bids were unable to set market prices.

¹⁷ Following this CPUC decision, the ISO updated their operating procedures: <https://www.caiso.com/Documents/4420.pdf>

Bids from reliability demand response resources must be at least 95 percent of the bid cap in the real-time market. Under normal conditions, the bid cap is \$1,000/MWh. Under stressed system conditions, the bid cap is raised to \$2,000/MWh.¹⁸ During several peak hours on August 15 and 16, the bid cap in the market was \$2,000/MWh and thus reliability demand response resources were required to bid in at least \$1,900/MWh.

Figure 2.7 Reliability demand response resource adequacy bids



2.4 Demand response performance

This section details the self-reported performance of both utility demand response and supply plan demand response resources on high load days in the summer. The aggregate performance of utility demand response, both proxy demand response and reliability demand response, averaged about 89 percent of their scheduled load curtailment during high load days, similar to summer 2022. The performance of third party demand response averaged substantially lower at 46 percent of their scheduled curtailments, similar to the previous summers.¹⁹

Utility demand response performance

Figure 2.8 shows real-time dispatches and self-reported response of CPUC-jurisdictional utility demand response capacity on high load days. Figure 2.8 reflects both proxy demand response and reliability demand response capacity scheduled by CPUC-jurisdictional investor-owned utilities. Non-CPUC-

¹⁸ FERC Order 831. See additional information on conditions in DMM’s 2021 Q1 Market Issues and Performance Report, pp 93-96: <http://www.caiso.com/Documents/2021-First-Quarter-Report-on-Market-Issues-and-Performance-Jun-9-2021.pdf>

¹⁹ Performance here refers to uncapped performance where responses are not capped at each resource’s scheduled load curtailment.

jurisdictional demand response programs are not currently tied to specific resources in the ISO market and thus are not included in Figure 2.8.

Figure 2.8 depicts self-reported response capped at individual resources’ dispatch instructions (green bar), and self-reported response in excess of individual resource dispatches (yellow bar). These metrics indicate that some individual resources under-performed while other resources reported to curtail load in excess of dispatch instructions. The performance of CPUC-jurisdictional demand response resources, capped at individual resource schedules, averaged 75 percent of their real-time schedules during high load days this summer. In aggregate, the total CPUC-jurisdictional utility demand response fleet, including excess curtailed load, averaged 89 percent of their real-time schedules. Overall, this is very similar to performance during high load days in summer 2022.

The largest amount of utility demand response was dispatched on August 16, with about 400 MW scheduled during hours-ending 19 and 20. Resources reported to curtail about 343 MW in hour-ending 19 and 260 MW in hour-ending 20. These reported curtailments include load curtailment in excess of individual resource dispatches and suggest a performance of 84 percent and 66 percent in hours-ending 19 and 20, respectively.

Figure 2.8 CPUC-jurisdictional utility demand response performance




Figure 2.9 and Figure 2.10 show CPUC-jurisdictional demand response performance, split between proxy and reliability demand response capacity. Including curtailments above individual resources’ schedules, the performance of proxy demand resources averaged 97 percent of their scheduled curtailments and reliability demand response resources averaged 71 percent during the high load days of this summer. Compared to summer 2022, proxy demand response resources performed better while reliability demand response resources performed worse on average during high load days in summer 2023.

Figure 2.9 CPUC-jurisdictional utility proxy demand response performance





Figure 2.10 CPUC-jurisdictional utility reliability demand response performance




Supply plan demand response performance

Figure 2.11 shows the self-reported response of third party demand response resources shown on resource adequacy supply plans. Figure 2.11 depicts both self-reported response capped at individual resources' schedules (green bar) and self-reported response in excess of resource schedules (yellow bar). Overall on high load days in summer 2023, supply plan demand response resources underperformed compared to dispatch instructions. Performance capped at individual resource schedules averaged 37 percent on high load days in summer 2023. When considering load curtailments in excess of individual resource schedules, performance of supply plan demand response resources averaged 46 percent. These average performances are very similar to high load days in summer 2022.

The largest quantity of third party demand response was dispatched on August 15 and 16 during hours-ending 19 and 20. On average during these hours, roughly 260 MW were dispatched, while reported uncapped performance averaged 86 MW. This implies an average performance of 33 percent. While supply plan demand response tends to bid in close to their resource adequacy values, their performance compared to their schedules suggests this available capacity may be inaccurate during high load days. As mentioned previously, supply plan demand response resources face consequences for not bidding their resource adequacy capacity in peak hours and thus may have the incentive to submit bids above their actual curtailment capabilities. Utility proxy demand response resources do not have the same bidding incentives, and their bid-in capacity averaged only 41 percent of their resource adequacy capacity. Therefore, it is possible that third party and utility proxy demand resources have similar curtailment ability compared to their resource adequacy capacity, but third party resources may bid more capacity even when this curtailment amount may not be feasible.

Figure 2.11 Supply plan demand response performance



2.5 Demand response aggregate summary of availability, dispatch, and performance

Figure 2.12 shows the availability, dispatch, and self-reported response of *all* demand response capacity (credited utility and supply plan demand response) counted toward resource adequacy obligations on high load days across the summer. Figure 2.12 includes both credited utility and supply plan demand response capacity.

Figure 2.12 Aggregate demand response resource adequacy




Figure 2.12 shows that demand response availability, as reflected through market bids, averaged about 85 percent of resource adequacy values. This is substantially higher than 2021 and 2022 when availability of resource adequacy demand response averaged about 65 percent during high load days in the summer. Availability was higher for both utility and supply plan demand response, in part due to high load days in summer 2023 not falling on holidays or weekends, when availability tends to be lower.

Figure 2.12 also depicts the real-time schedule of demand response resource adequacy (red line), along with their reported performance capped at individual resources’ schedules (dashed green line) and reported performance in excess of schedules (solid green line). Including load curtailment in excess of individual resources’ schedules, total demand response performance averaged 76 percent of real-time dispatches across peak net load hours on high load days. This is an increase from 67 percent in the summer of 2022.

3 Special Issues

This section discusses a variety of issues related to demand response participation in the California ISO market.

3.1 Baseline adjustment factors

Demand response baseline calculations generally rely on historical like-day metered load to establish the day-of counterfactual load baselines from which demand response performance is measured.²⁰ The ISO allows for baseline calculations to be adjusted upward and downward to capture intra-day load deviations from historical levels. However, the ISO has developed tariff-defined caps on the amount that intra-day baselines can be adjusted, based on different baseline methodologies.²¹

In 2020, based on supplier-submitted baseline and meter data and historic load trends, there was evidence that baseline adjustments could have been limited in the upward direction by tariff-defined baseline adjustment caps. Based on self-reported meter data and system load trends, certain customer loads on high load days may have deviated from load on previous days by factors greater than the ISO's baseline adjustments allowed. This could have resulted in self-reported performance values that were lower than actual load reduction, if baselines could not be adjusted sufficiently upward.

Given concerns that demand response performance could be under-represented due to the capped baseline adjustment factor, the ISO began to allow demand response providers to apply adjustment factors to baselines in excess of tariff-defined caps for certain baseline methodologies in summer months (May to October), should event day load exceed historic load by more than the ISO's capped ratios.²² In the summer of 2023, 62 percent of all demand response capacity used alternative adjustment factors in summer months, the same percentage as the previous year. A combination of proxy demand response and reliability demand response resources using day-matching baseline types were eligible to use alternate adjustment factors.


Figure 3.1 shows the performance of demand response (DR) resources using alternate adjustment factors (AAF) compared to all demand response resources. Overall performance is very similar for resources who utilize the alternative adjustment factors compared to the entire demand response fleet. Average performance on high load days for resources using the alternative adjustment factors averaged 67 percent while resources without averaged 56 percent. This indicates that the uncapped adjustment factors may help demand response resource achieve slightly higher performance values.

²⁰ These baseline methodologies include the ISO's Day Matching baseline methodologies, which are currently the most commonly used baseline methodologies for demand response resources.

²¹ ISO Tariff Section 4.13.4

²² <http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Presentation-DemandResponseCustomerPartnershipGroup-Apr22-2021.pdf>

Figure 3.1 Performance of demand response resources with alternative adjustment factors



3.2 Resource adequacy demand response compensation

This section examines the revenue streams for demand response providing resource adequacy. Capacity payments (or value of avoided capacity procurement for utilities) for demand response resources can be much higher than potential net market revenues earned in the energy market. High capacity payments relative to potential market revenues can limit the incentive for demand response resources to participate in the energy market and earn additional market rents on a regular basis. Additionally, while the ISO’s resource adequacy availability mechanism (RAAIM) provides some incentives for supply plan demand response resources to remain available, RAAIM does not provide incentives for resources to actually deliver scheduled load curtailment.

Demand response market revenues

Table 3.1 shows net market revenues (market revenues, less bid costs, plus bid cost recovery) of demand response resources counted toward resourced adequacy requirements, by resource type. Net market revenues are reflected in dollars per megawatt-hour of energy delivered.

Net market revenue per megawatt-hour of energy delivered varies significantly among demand response resource types. In 2023, utility proxy demand response (PDR) resources earned about \$117/MWh while third party demand response resources earned about \$303/MWh of energy delivered. Third party demand response was scheduled less frequently than utility proxy demand response, and was primarily scheduled when prices were very high. Reliability demand response resources (RDRR) earned the highest value of about \$512/MWh, due to these resources only being scheduled during emergency events or very tight conditions when prices are highest.

Table 3.1 Demand response resource adequacy net market revenues - 2023

Demand response type	MWh scheduled	Energy delivered (MWh)	Energy market revenues (\$/MWh delivered)	Bid costs (\$/MWh delivered)	Bid cost recovery (\$/MWh delivered)	Net energy market revenues (\$/MWh delivered)
Utility PDR	28,949	23,152	\$184	\$67	\$0	\$117
Utility RDRR	1,496	1,200	\$751	\$266	\$27	\$512
3 rd party PDR	7,356	5,148	\$504	\$205	\$5	\$303

Demand response net market revenues and capacity value

Table 3.2 shows net market revenues accrued by demand response resources counted towards meeting resource adequacy requirements, compared to potential capacity values for demand response resources in 2022 and 2023.

The capacity values shown in Table 3.2 are based on the 85th percentile of resource adequacy prices, as reported in the CPUC's 2021 Resource Adequacy report.²³ Annualized capacity prices are based on the 2022 and 2023 budgets for the CPUC's Demand Response Auction Mechanism (DRAM) and DRAM capacity shown on resource adequacy supply plans.

Table 3.2 Demand response resource adequacy net market revenues and capacity costs (2022-2023)

Year	Demand response type	Net energy market revenues (\$/kW-year)	Capacity price - system RA 85 th percentile (\$/kW-year)	Capacity price - DRAM auction (\$/kW-year)
2022	Utility PDR	\$26.97	\$96	\$120
	Utility RDRR	\$3.42	\$96	\$120
	3 rd party PDR	\$15.18	\$96	\$120
2023	Utility PDR	\$8.22	\$96	\$157
	Utility RDRR	\$0.75	\$96	\$157
	3 rd party PDR	\$7.30	\$96	\$157

²³ 2021 Resource Adequacy Report, CPUC Energy Division, April 2023, p 24:

<https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/documents/resource-adequacy-homepage/2021-ra-report---update-011624.pdf>

Table 3.2 shows that in 2023, the primary revenue stream for demand response resource adequacy resources continue to be the capacity payments they receive. Net energy market revenues for all three types of demand response decreased compared to 2022, and remains much lower than the estimated capacity prices for resource adequacy. This does not provide a strong incentive for resources to deliver load curtailments. To strengthen incentives to be available and perform, DMM has recommended the ISO consider developing a performance penalty or incentive structure for resource adequacy resources, particularly for demand response resources.