

Market Performance Report March 2018

May 23, 2018

ISO Market Quality and Renewable Integration

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Executive Summary¹

The market performance in March 2018 is summarized below.

CAISO area performance,

- Peak loads for ISO remained low in March driven by seasonal low temperatures.
- In the integrated forward market (IFM), SCE and SDG&E prices were elevated in a few days due to transmission congestion. In the fifteenminute market (FMM) and real-time market (RTD), SCE and SDG&E prices were elevated on March 5 due to transmission congestion.
- Congestion rents for interties decreased to \$6.76 million from \$8.35 million in February. Majority of the congestion rents in March accrued on MALIN (60 percent) intertie and NOB (32 percent) intertie.
- In the congestion revenue rights (CRR) market, revenue adequacy was 79.67 percent, improving from 71.71 percent in February. The transformer 24138_SERRANO _500_24137_SERRANO contributed largely to the revenue shortfall.
- The monthly average ancillary service cost to load rose to \$0.88/MWh in March from \$0.73/MWh in February. There were 21 scarcity events this month.
- The cleared virtual supply was well above the cleared demand in most days of March. The profits from convergence bidding inched down to \$0.57 million from \$0.86 million in February.
- The bid cost recovery skidded to \$5.86 million from \$10.06 million in February.
- The real-time energy offset fell to \$1.82 million from \$18.22 million in February. The real-time congestion offset cost increased to \$3.54 million from -\$6.18 million in February.
- The volume of exceptional dispatch dropped to 44,485 MWh from 78,846 MWh in February. The main contributor to this volume was planned transmission outage. The monthly average of total exceptional dispatch volume as a percentage of load percentage decreased to 0.28 percent from 0.50 percent in February.

¹ This report contains the highlights of the reporting period. For a more detailed explanation of the technical characteristics of the metrics included in this report please download the Market Performance Metric Catalog, which is available on the CAISO web site at <u>http://www.caiso.com/market/Pages/ReportsBulletins/Default.aspx</u>.

Energy Imbalance market (EIM) performance,

- In the FMM, the prices for AZPS and NEVP were elevated on March 18 due to tight supply. In the RTD, the prices for AZPS, NEVP and PACE were elevated on March 11 due to upward load adjustment and net import reduction.
- The monthly average prices in FMM for EIM entities (AZPS, NEVP, PACE, PACW, PGE and PSEI) were \$23.36, \$27.90, \$21.34, \$18.61, \$18.47 and \$18.43 respectively.
- The monthly average prices in RTD for EIM entities (AZPS, NEVP, PACE, PACW, PGE and PSEI) were \$27.22, \$28.72, \$24.56, \$18.34, \$18.22 and \$18.68 respectively.
- Bid cost recovery, real-time imbalance energy offset, and real-rime congestion offset costs for EIM entities (AZPS, NEVP, PACE, PACW, PGE and PSEI) were \$1.12 million, -\$0.40 million and -\$2.15 million respectively.


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Market Characteristics

Loads

Peak loads for ISO remained low in March driven by low temperatures. The daily peak loads were below 30,000 MW throughout this month.





Resource Adequacy Available Incentive Mechanism

Resource Adequacy Availability Incentive Mechanism (RAAIM) was activated on November 1, 2016 to track the performance of Resource Adequacy (RA) Resources. RAAIM is used to determine the availability of resources providing local and/or system Resource Adequacy Capacity and Flexible RA Capacity each month and then assess the resultant Availability Incentive Payments and Non-Availability Charges through the CAISO's settlements process. Table 1 below shows the monthly average actual availability, total non-availability charge, and total availability incentive payment.²

	Average Actual Availability	Total Non- availability Charge	Total Availability Incentive Payment
Nov-16	92.23%	\$3,616,895	-\$1,678,657
Dec-16	96.25%	\$1,878,503	-\$1,878,503
Jan-17	26.30%	\$49,188,214	-\$5,670
Feb-17	92.31%	\$3,157,590	-\$1,867,721
Mar-17	91.92%	\$2,975,585	-\$1,550,365
Apr-17	89.46%	\$3,641,392	-\$1,483,548
May-17	96.44%	\$1,017,191	-\$1,017,191
Jun-17	94.24%	\$4,058,330	-\$1,502,850
Jul-17	96.11%	\$1,298,826	-\$1,298,826
Aug-17	64.11%	\$29,701,024	-\$19,051
Sep-17	96.52%	\$1,055,396	-\$1,055,396
Oct-17	97.42%	\$690,037	-\$690,037
Nov-17	96.15%	\$1,483,755	-\$1,483,755
Dec-17	96.87%	\$1,517,252	-\$1,517,252
Jan-18	97.59%	\$1,169,857	-\$893,352
Feb-18	96.00%	\$1,280,008	-\$1,280,008
Mar-18	93.60%	\$2,749,829	-\$1,537,297

Table 1: Resource Adequacy Availability and Payment

² On June 21, 2017, the ISO indicated in the market notice that it intended to file a petition with the FERC for a limited tariff waiver on section 40.9.6 to forego assessing any Resource Adequacy Availability Incentive Mechanism (RAAIM) charges for the period April 1, 2017 through December 31, 2017 due to identified implementation issues. This waiver includes April, 2017 and May 2017. The ISO is currently estimating the penalties reflected in the charge code 8830 to be zero pursuant to tariff section 11.29.10.5.

Direct Market Performance Metrics

Energy

Day-Ahead Prices

Figure 2 shows daily prices of four default load aggregate points (DLAPs). Table 2 below lists the binding constraints along with the associated DLAP locations and the occurrence dates when the binding constraints resulted in relatively high or low DLAP prices.




Figure 2: Day-Ahead Simple Average LAP Prices (All Hours)

Table 2: Day-Ahead	Transmission	Constraints
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DLAP	Date	Transmission Constraint
SCE, SDG&E	March 5-6, 13, 22	SERRANO-SERRANO-500 XFMR

Real-Time Prices

FMM daily prices of the four DLAPs are shown in Figure 3. Table 3 lists the binding constraints along with the associated DLAP locations and the occurrence dates when the binding constraints resulted in relatively high or low DLAP prices.




Figure 3: FMM Simple Average LAP Prices (All Hours)

Table 3: FMM Transmission Constraints

DLAP	AP Date Transmission Constraint	
SCE, SDG&E	March 5	SERRANO-SERRANO-500 XFMR

Figure 4 below shows the daily frequency of positive price spikes and negative prices by price range for the default LAPs in the FMM. The cumulative frequency of prices above \$250/MWh decreased to 0.22 percent in March from 0.65 percent in February. The cumulative frequency of negative prices increased to 4.21 percent in March from 1.81 percent in February.




Figure 4: Daily Frequency of FMM LAP Positive Price Spikes and Negative Prices

RTD daily prices of the four DLAPs are shown in Figure 5. Table 4 lists the binding constraints along with the associated DLAP locations and the occurrence dates when the binding constraints resulted in relatively high or low DLAP prices. March 7 saw relatively high prices for all four DLAPs due to renewable deviation. On March 11, all four DLAP prices were elevated due to upward load adjustment, renewable deviation, and reduction of net import.





Figure 5: RTD Simple Average LAP Prices (All Hours)

DLAP Date		Transmission Constraint		
SCE, SDG&E	March 5	SERRANO-SERRANO-500 XFMR		

Table 4: RTD	Transmission	Constraints
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Figure 6 below shows the daily frequency of positive price spikes and negative prices by price range for the default LAPs in RTD. The cumulative frequency of prices above \$250/MWh decreased to 1.02 percent in March from 1.26 percent in February. The cumulative frequency of negative prices increased to 8.97 percent in March from 3.28 percent in February.

Figure 6: Daily Frequency of RTD LAP Positive Price Spikes and Negative Price



■<=-\$250 ■\$(-100, -250] ■\$(-40, -100] ■\$(-20, -40] ■\$(0, -20] ■\$[250, 500) ■\$[500, 750) ■\$[750, 1000) ■>=\$1000

Congestion

Congestion Rents on Interties

Figure 7 below illustrates the daily integrated forward market congestion rents by interties. The cumulative total congestion rent for interties in March decreased to \$6.76 million from \$8.35 million in February. Majority of the congestion rents in March accrued on MALIN (60 percent) intertie and NOB (32 percent) intertie.

The congestion rent on NOB decreased to \$2.18 million in March from \$3.23 million in February. The congestion rent on MALIN fell to \$3.85 million in March from \$5.01 million in February.




Figure 7: IFM Congestion Rents by Interties (Import)

Average Congestion Cost per Load Served

This metric quantifies the average congestion cost for serving one megawatt of load in the ISO system. Figure 8 shows the daily and monthly averages for the day-ahead and real-time markets respectively.




Figure 8: Average Congestion Cost per Megawatt of Served Load

The average congestion cost per MWh of load served in the integrated forward market decreased to \$2.56/MWh in March from \$4.90/MWh in February. The average congestion cost per load served in the real-time market fell to -\$0.22/MWh in March from \$0.40/MWh in February.

Congestion Revenue Rights

Figure 9 illustrates the daily revenue adequacy for congestion revenue rights (CRRs) broken out by transmission element. The average CRR revenue deficit in March decreased to \$355,489 from the average revenue deficit of \$1,075,897 in February.




Figure 9: Daily Revenue Adequacy of Congestion Revenue Rights

Overall, March experienced a CRR revenue deficit. Revenue shortfalls were observed in more than twenty days of March. The main reasons are

- The transformer 24138_SERRANO _500_24137_SERRANO was binding in most days of this month, resulting in revenue shortfall of \$5.74 million. The congestion was driven by the Serrano bank outage.
- The line 24029_DELAMO _230_24021_CENTER was binding in ten days of this month, resulting in revenue shortfall of \$1.82 million.

The shares of the revenue surplus and deficit accruing on various congested transmission elements for the reporting period are shown in Figure 10 and the monthly summary for CRR revenue adequacy is provided in Table 5.




Figure 10: CRR Revenue Adequacy by Transmission Element

Overall, the total amount collected from the IFM was not sufficient to cover the net payments to congestion revenue right holders and the cost of the exemption for existing rights. The revenue adequacy level was 79.67 percent in March. Out of the total congestion rents, 0.76 percent was used to cover the cost of existing right exemptions. Net total congestion revenues in March were in deficit by \$11.02 million, compared to the deficit of \$30.13 million in February. The auction revenues credited to the balancing account for March were \$5.77 million. As a result, the balancing account for March had a deficit of approximately \$5.16 million, which will be allocated to measured demand.

IFM Congestion Rents	\$43,504,396.20
Existing Right Exemptions	-\$331,256.40
Available Congestion Revenues	\$43,173,139.80
CRR Payments	\$54,193,311.36
CRR Revenue Adequacy	-\$11,020,171.57
Revenue Adequacy Ratio	79.67%
Annual Auction Revenues	\$3,649,706.25
Monthly Auction Revenues	\$2,119,373.24
CRR Settlement Rule	\$88,634.98
Allocation to Measured Demand	-\$5,162,457.09

Table 5: CRR Revenue Adequacy Statistics

Ancillary Services

IFM (Day-Ahead) Average Price

Table 6 shows the monthly IFM average ancillary service procurements and the monthly average prices. In March the monthly average procurement increased for regulation down.

Table 6: IFM (Day-Ahead) Monthly Average Ancillary Service Procurement

	Average Procurred				Ave	rage Price		
	Reg Up	Reg Dn	Spinning	Non-Spinning	Reg Up	Reg Dn	Spinning	Non-Spinning
Mar-18	324	417	992	992	\$12.31	\$13.75	\$7.41	\$0.50
Feb-18	329	408	1091	1094	\$8.80	\$12.58	\$4.73	\$0.33
Percent Change	-1.61%	2.06%	-9.15%	-9.33%	39.91%	9.27%	56.60%	54.00%

The monthly average prices increased for all four types of ancillary services in March. Figure 11 shows the daily IFM average ancillary service prices. The average price for regulation up, regulation down and spinning reserve were elevated on March 25 due to high opportunity cost of energy.




Figure 11: IFM (Day-Ahead) Ancillary Service Average Price

Ancillary Service Cost to Load

The monthly average cost to load rose to \$0.88/MWh in March from \$0.73/MWh in February. March 25 saw high average cost due to high regulation up, regulation down and spinning prices in day-ahead market driven by high opportunity cost of energy.




Figure 12: System (Day-Ahead and Real-Time) Average Cost to Load

Scarcity Events

The ancillary services scarcity pricing mechanism is triggered when the ISO is not able to procure the target quantity of one or more ancillary services in the IFM and real-time market runs. The scarcity events in March are shown in the table below.

Date	Hour Ending	Interval	Ancillary Service	Region	Shortfall (MW)	Percentage of Requirement
9-Mar	4	2	Regulation Up	CAISO_EXP	1.06	0.40%
9-Mar	4	4	Regulation Up	CAISO_EXP	10.3	3.40%
10-Mar	16	1	Regulation Down	SP26_EXP	2.66	2.50%
11-Mar	5	4	Regulation Down	SP26_EXP	2.89	2.80%
11-Mar	14	3	Regulation Down	CAISO_EXP	5.36	1.30%
11-Mar	14	4	Regulation Down	CAISO_EXP	5.36	1.30%
15-Mar	23	4	Regulation Down	SP26_EXP	1.49	1.40%
16-Mar	5	2	Regulation Down	SP26_EXP	12.71	12.10%
16-Mar	14	2	Regulation Down	SP26_EXP	0.22	0.20%
16-Mar	17	4	Regulation Down	SP26_EXP	12.09	11.50%
18-Mar	9	2	Regulation Down	CAISO_EXP	4.04	0.80%
19-Mar	2	1	Regulation Down	CAISO_EXP	19.52	5.60%
23-Mar	14	4	Regulation Down	NP26_EXP	8	7.60%

23-Mar	15	2	Regulation Up	NP26_EXP	20.1	19.10%
23-Mar	15	3	Regulation Up	NP26_EXP	6.1	5.80%
23-Mar	15	4	Regulation Up	NP26_EXP	6.1	5.80%
23-Mar	16	2	Regulation Up	NP26_EXP	20.1	19.10%
23-Mar	16	3	Regulation Up	NP26_EXP	20.1	19.10%
29-Mar	6	2	Regulation Down	CAISO_EXP	11.8	2.60%
29-Mar	10	2	Regulation Down	CAISO_EXP	3.8	0.70%
29-Mar	10	3	Regulation Down	CAISO_EXP	1.8	0.30%

Convergence Bidding

Figure 13 below shows the daily average volume of cleared virtual bids in IFM for virtual supply and virtual demand. The cleared virtual supply was well above the cleared demand in most days of March.




Figure 13: Cleared Virtual Bids

Convergence bidding tends to cause the day-ahead market and real-time market prices to move closer together, or "converge". Figure 14 shows the energy prices (namely the energy component of the LMP) in IFM, hour ahead scheduling process (HASP), FMM, and RTD.




Figure 14: IFM, HASP, FMM, and RTD Prices

Figure 15 shows the profits that convergence bidders receive from convergence bidding. The total profits from convergence bidding inched down to \$0.57 million in March from \$0.86 million in February.




Figure 15: Convergence Bidding Profits

Renewable Generation Curtailment

Figure 16 below shows the monthly wind and solar VERs (variable energy resource) curtailment due to system wide condition or local congestion in RTD. Figure 17 shows the monthly wind and solar VERs (variable energy resource) curtailment by resource type in RTD. Economic curtailment is defined as the resource's dispatch upper limit minus its RTD schedule when the resource has an economic bid. Dispatch upper limit is the maximum level the resource can be dispatched to when various factors are take into account such as forecast, maximum economic bid, generation outage, and ramping capacity. Self-schedule curtailment is defined as the resource's self-schedule minus its RTD schedule when RTD schedule is lower than self-schedule. When a VER resource is exceptionally dispatched, then exceptional dispatch curtailment is defined as the dispatch upper limit minus the exceptional dispatch value.

As Figure 16 and Figure 17 below indicate, the renewable curtailment rose in March. The majority of the curtailments was economic.





Figure 16: Renewable Curtailment by Reason





Flexible Ramping Product

On November 1, 2016 the ISO implemented two market products in the 15minute and 5-minute markets: Flexible Ramping Up and Flexible Ramping Down uncertainty awards. These products provide additional upward and downward flexible ramping capability to account for uncertainty due to demand and renewable forecasting errors. In addition, the existing flexible ramping sufficiency test was extended to ensure feasible ramping capacity for real-time interchange schedules.

Flexible Ramping Product Payment

Figure 18 shows the flexible ramping up and down uncertainty payments. Flexible ramping up uncertainty payment increased to \$0.34 million in March from \$0.27 million in February. Flexible ramping down uncertainty payment rose to \$61,135 in March from \$31,841 in February.






Figure 19 shows the flexible ramping forecast payment. Flexible ramping forecast payment dropped to -\$196,128 this month from -\$42,812 observed in February.




Figure 19: Flexible Ramping Forecast Payment

Flexible Ramping Forecast Payment

Indirect Market Performance Metrics

Bid Cost Recovery

Figure 20 shows the daily uplift costs due to exceptional dispatch payments. The monthly uplift costs in March inched up to \$0.41 million from \$0.28 million in February.






Figure 21 shows the allocation of bid cost recovery payment in the IFM, residual unit commitment (RUC) and RTM markets. The total bid cost recovery for March skidded to \$5.86 million from \$10.06 million in February. Out of the total monthly bid cost recovery payment for the three markets in March, the IFM market contributed 15 percent, RTM contributed 66 percent, and RUC contributed 19 percent of the total bid cost recovery payment.




Figure 21: Bid Cost Recovery Allocation

Figure 22 and Figure 23 show the daily and monthly BCR cost by local capacity requirement area (LCR) respectively.




Figure 22: Bid Cost Recovery Allocation by LCR




Figure 23: Monthly Bid Cost Recovery Allocation by LCR

Figure 24 and Figure 25 show the daily and monthly BCR cost by utility distribution company (UDC) respectively.




Figure 24: Bid Cost Recovery Allocation by UDC




Figure 25: Monthly Bid Cost Recovery Allocation by UDC

Figure 26 shows the cost related to BCR by cost type in RUC.

Figure 26: Cost in RUC




Figure 27 and Figure 28 show the daily and monthly cost related to BCR by type and LCR in RUC respectively.




Figure 27: Cost in RUC by LCR

Figure 28: Monthly Cost in RUC by LCR




Figure 29 and Figure 30 show the daily and monthly cost related to BCR by type and UDC in RUC respectively.




Figure 29: Cost in RUC by UDC

Figure 30: Monthly Cost in RUC by UDC




Figure 31 shows the cost related to BCR in real time by cost type. Minimum load cost contributed largely to the real time cost this month.




Figure 31: Cost in Real Time

Figure 32 and Figure 33 show the daily and monthly cost related to BCR by type and LCR in real time respectively.




Figure 32: Cost in Real Time by LCR




Figure 33: Monthly Cost in Real Time by LCR

Figure 34 and Figure 35 show the daily and monthly cost related to BCR by type and UDC in Real Time respectively.




Figure 34: Cost in Real Time by UDC




Figure 35: Monthly Cost in Real Time by UDC

Figure 36 shows the cost related to BCR in IFM by cost type. Minimum Load cost and energy cost contributed largely to the cost in IFM this month.




Figure 36: Cost in IFM

Figure 37 and Figure 38 show the daily and monthly cost related to BCR by type and location in IFM respectively.




Figure 37: Cost in IFM by LCR

Figure 38: Monthly Cost in IFM by LCR




Figure 39 and Figure 40 show the daily and monthly cost related to BCR by type and UDC in IFM respectively.






Figure 39: Cost in IFM by UDC

Figure 40: Monthly Cost in IFM by UDC



Real-time Imbalance Offset Costs

Figure 41 shows the daily real-time energy and congestion imbalance offset costs. Real-time energy offset cost skidded to \$1.82 million in March from \$18.22 million in February. Real-time congestion offset cost increased to \$3.54 million in March from -\$6.18 million in February.





Market Software Metrics

Market performance can be confounded by software issues, which vary in severity levels with the failure of a market run being the most severe.

Market Disruption

A market disruption is an action or event that causes a failure of an ISO market, related to system operation issues or system emergencies.³ Pursuant to section 7.7.15 of the ISO tariff, the ISO can take one or more of a number of specified actions to prevent a market disruption, or to minimize the extent of a market disruption.

There were a total of 24 market disruptions this month. Table 7 lists the number of market disruptions and the number of times that the ISO removed bids (including self-schedules) in any of the following markets in this month. The ISO markets include IFM, RUC, FMM and RTD processes.

Type of CAISO Market	Market Disruption or Reportable	Removal of Bids (including Self-Schedules)
Day-Ahead		
IFM	0	0
RUC	0	0
Real-Time		
FMM Interval 1	1	0
FMM Interval 2	2	0
FMM Interval 3	4	0
FMM Interval 4	3	0
Real-Time Dispatch	14	0

Figure 42 shows the frequency of IFM, HASP (FMM interval 2), FMM (intervals 1, 3 and 4), and RTD failures. On March 13, one HASP, three FMM and five RTD disruptions occurred due to application problem.

³ These system operation issues or system emergencies are referred to in Sections 7.6 and 7.7, respectively, of the ISO tariff.




Figure 42: Frequency of Market Disruption

Manual Market Adjustment

Exceptional Dispatch

Figure 43 shows the daily volume of exceptional dispatches, broken out by market type: real-time incremental dispatch and real-time decremental dispatch. The real-time exceptional dispatches are among one of the following types: a unit commitment at physical minimum; an incremental dispatch above the day-ahead schedule and a decremental dispatch below the day-ahead schedule.

The total volume of exceptional dispatch in March dropped to 44,485 MWh from 78,846 MWh in February.




Figure 43: Total Exceptional Dispatch Volume (MWh) by Market Type

Figure 44 shows the volume of the exceptional dispatch broken out by reason.⁴ The majority of the exceptional dispatch volumes in March were driven by planned transmission outage (44 percent), operating procedure number and constraint (19 percent), Unplanned Outage (15 percent) and load forecast uncertainty (12 percent).

⁴ For details regarding the reasons for exceptional dispatch please read the white paper at this link: <u>http://www.caiso.com/1c89/1c89d76950e00.html</u>.




Figure 44: Total Exceptional Dispatch Volume (MWh) by Reason

Figure 45 shows the total exceptional dispatch volume as a percent of load, along with the monthly average. The monthly average percentage decreased to 0.28 percent in March from 0.50 percent in February.




Figure 45: Total Exceptional Dispatch as Percent of Load

Energy Imbalance Market

On November 1, 2014, the California Independent System Operator Corporation (ISO) and Portland-based PacifiCorp fully activated the Energy Imbalance Market (EIM). This real-time market is the first of its kind in the West. EIM covers six western states: California, Oregon, Washington, Utah, Idaho and Wyoming.

On December 1, 2015, NV Energy, the Nevada-based utility successfully began participating in the western Energy Imbalance Market (EIM). On October 1, 2016, Phoenix-based Arizona Public Service (AZPS) and Puget Sound Energy (PSEI) of Washington State successfully began full participation in the western Energy Imbalance Market.

On October 1, 2017, Portland General Electric Company (PGE) became the fifth western utility to successfully begin full participation in the western Energy Imbalance Market (EIM). PGE joins Arizona Public Service, Puget Sound Energy, NV Energy, PacifiCorp and the ISO, together serving over 38 million consumers in eight states: California, Arizona, Oregon, Washington, Utah, Idaho, Wyoming and Nevada.

Figure 46 shows daily simple average ELAP prices for PacifiCorp east (PACE), PacifiCorp West (PACW), NV Energy (NEVP), Arizona Public Service (AZPS), Puget Sound Energy (PSEI), and Portland General Electric Company (PGE) for all hours in FMM. The prices for AZPS and NEVP were elevated on March 18 due to tight supply.




Figure 46: EIM Simple Average LAP Prices (All Hours) in FMM

Figure 47 shows daily simple average ELAP prices for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, and PGE for all hours in RTD. The prices for AZPS, NEVP and PACE were elevated on March 11 due to upward load adjustment and net import reduction.




Figure 47: EIM Simple Average LAP Prices (All Hours) in RTD

Figure 48 shows the daily price frequency for prices above \$250/MWh and negative prices in FMM for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, and PGE. The cumulative frequency of prices above \$250/MWh inched down to 0.16 percent in March from 0.21 percent in February. The cumulative frequency of negative prices rose to 2.46 percent in March from 1.99 percent in February.

PACE — PACW — NEVP — AZPS — PGE — PSEI

Figure 48: Daily Frequency of EIM LAP Positive Price Spikes and Negative Prices in FMM





Figure 49 shows the daily price frequency for prices above \$250/MWh and negative prices in RTD for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, and PGE. The cumulative frequency of prices above \$250/MWh increased to 0.52 percent in

March from 0.46 percent in February. The cumulative frequency of negative prices increased to 5.94 percent in March from 2.78 percent in February.






Figure 50 shows the daily volume of EIM transfer for CAISO in FMM. "Import" represents the total EIM transfer from other balancing areas (BAs) into CAISO. "Export" represents the total EIM transfer out of CAISO to other BAs in FMM.




Figure 50: EIM Transfer for CAISO in FMM

Figure 51 shows the daily volume of EIM transfer for PACE in FMM. Figure 52 shows the daily volume of EIM transfer for PACW in FMM.





Figure 51: EIM Transfer for PACE in FMM








Figure 53 shows the daily volume of EIM transfer for NEVP in FMM.

Figure 53: EIM Transfer for NEVP in FMM

Figure 54 shows the daily volume of EIM transfer for AZPS in FMM.




Figure 54: EIM Transfer for AZPS in FMM




Figure 55 shows the daily volume of EIM transfer for PSEI in FMM.

Figure 55: EIM Transfer for PSEI in FMM

Figure 56 shows the daily volume of EIM transfer for PGE in FMM.




Figure 56: EIM Transfer for PGE in FMM




Figure 57 shows the daily volume of EIM for ISO in RTD.

Figure 57: EIM Transfer for CAISO in RTD

Figure 58 shows the daily volume of EIM transfer for PACE in RTD. Figure 59 shows the daily EIM transfer volume for PACW in RTD.




Figure 58: EIM Transfer for PACE in RTD




Figure 59: EIM Transfer for PACW in RTD

Figure 60 shows the daily EIM transfer volume for NEVP in RTD.




Figure 60: EIM Transfer for NEVP in RTD





Figure 61 shows the daily volume EIM transfer for AZPS in RTD.

Figure 61: EIM Transfer for AZPS in RTD






Figure 62: EIM Transfer for PSEI in RTD




Figure 63 shows the daily volume EIM transfer for PGE in RTD.

Figure 63: EIM Transfer for PGE in RTD

Figure 64 shows daily real-time imbalance energy offset cost (RTIEO) for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, and PGE respectively. Total RTIEO was -\$0.40 million in March, increasing from -\$1.72 million in February.




Figure 64: EIM Real-Time Imbalance Energy Offset by Area

Figure 65 shows daily real-time congestion offset cost (RTCO) for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, and PGE respectively. Total RTCO dropped to -\$2.15 million in March from \$0.79 million in February.




Figure 65: EIM Real-Time Congestion Imbalance Offset by Area

Figure 66 shows daily bid cost recovery for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, and PGE respectively. Total BCR decreased to \$1.12 million in March from \$1.93 million in February.




Figure 66: EIM Bid Cost Recovery by Area

Figure 67 shows the flexible ramping up uncertainty payment for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, and PGE respectively. Total flexible ramping up uncertainty payment in March increased to \$0.45 million from \$0.27 million in February.




Figure 67: Flexible Ramping Up Uncertainty Payment

Figure 68 shows the flexible ramping down uncertainty payment for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, and PGE respectively. Total flexible ramping down uncertainty payment in March increased to \$97,619 from \$13,298 million in February.




Figure 68: Flexible Ramping Down Uncertainty Payment

Figure 69 shows the flexible ramping forecast payment for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, and PGE respectively. Total forecast payment in March slid to \$0.01 million from \$0.21 million in February.




Figure 69: Flexible Ramping Forecast Payment

The ISO's Energy Imbalance Market Business Practice Manual⁵ describes the methodology for determining whether an EIM participating resource is dispatched to support transfers to serve California load. The methodology ensures that the dispatch considers the combined energy and associated marginal greenhouse gas (GHG) compliance cost based on submitted bids⁶.

The EIM dispatches to support transfers into the ISO were documented in Figure 70 and Table 8 below.




Figure 70: Percentage of EIM Transfer into ISO by Fuel Type

⁵ See the Energy Imbalance Market Business Practice Manual for a description of the methodology for making this determination, which begins on page 42 -- http://bpmcm.caiso.com/Pages/BPMDetails.aspx?BPM=Energy Imbalance Market.

⁶ A submitted bid may reflect that a resource is not available to support EIM transfers to California.

Month	Coal (%)	Gas (%)	Non-Emitting (%)	Total
Jan-16	0.00%	28.96%	71.04%	100%
Feb-16	0.00%	22.21%	77.79%	100%
Mar-16	0.00%	12.72%	87.28%	100%
Apr-16	0.00%	46.26%	53.74%	100%
May-16	0.00%	51.63%	48.37%	100%
Jun-16	0.00%	67.89%	32.11%	100%
Jul-16	0.00%	82.42%	17.58%	100%
Aug-16	0.00%	87.59%	12.41%	100%
Sep-16	1.98%	87.68%	10.34%	100%
Oct-16	0.00%	43.82%	56.18%	100%
Nov-16	0.00%	30.74%	69.26%	100%
Dec-16	0.00%	53.77%	46.23%	100%
Jan-17	0.00%	69.88%	30.12%	100%
Feb-17	0.00%	36.42%	63.58%	100%
Mar-17	0.00%	13.37%	86.63%	100%
Apr-17	0.00%	15.47%	84.53%	100%
May-17	0.00%	18.47%	81.53%	100%
Jun-17	0.00%	21.42%	78.58%	100%
Jul-17	0.00%	36.08%	63.92%	100%
Aug-17	0.00%	59.20%	40.80%	100%
Sep-17	0.00%	45.94%	54.06%	100%
Oct-17	0.00%	24.85%	75.15%	100%
Nov-17	0.00%	11.57%	88.43%	100%
Dec-17	0.00%	15.36%	84.64%	100%
Jan-18	0.00%	9.12%	90.88%	100%
Feb-18	0.00%	15.20%	84.80%	100%
Mar-18	0.16%	25.00%	74.84%	100%

Table 8: EIM Transfer into ISO by Fuel Type