

Market Performance Report March 2020

May 18, 2020

ISO Market Quality and Renewable Integration

CAISO 250 Outcropping Way Folsom, California 95630 (916) 351-4400

Executive Summary¹

The market performance for March 2020 is summarized below.

CAISO area performance,

- Peak loads for ISO area trended downward in the second half of March, driven by the COVID-19 pandemic and statewide stay-at-home orders.
- Across the integrated forward market (IFM), fifteen-minute market (FMM) and real-time market (RTD), VEA prices were depressed throughout this month due to transmission congestion.
- Congestion rents for interties fell to \$3.06 million from \$5.85 million in February. Majority of the congestion rents accrued on Palo Verde (46 percent) and Malin500 (32 percent) intertie.
- In the congestion revenue rights (CRR) market, the balancing account for March had a surplus of approximately \$7.20 million, which was allocated to measured demand.
- The monthly average ancillary service cost to load inched down to \$0.60/MWh from 0.80/MWh in February. There were three scarcity events this month.
- The cleared virtual supply was well above cleared demand in most days of March. The profits from convergence bidding slid to \$0.41 million from \$0.76 million in February.
- The bid cost recovery increased to \$6.08 million from \$3.92 million in February.
- The real-time energy offset cost decreased to -\$3.15 million from -\$2.21 million in February. The real-time congestion cost skidded to \$2.16 million from \$6.07 million in February.
- The volume of exceptional dispatch inched down to 46,493 MWh from 48,673 MWh in February. The top reasons to the monthly volume were planned transmission outage and reliability assessment. The monthly average of total exceptional dispatch volume as a percentage of load percentage was 0.28 percent in March, edging down from 0.30 percent in February.

¹ This report contains the highlights of the reporting period. For a more detailed explanation of the technical characteristics of the metrics included in this report please download the Market Performance Metric Catalog, which is available on the CAISO web site at http://www.caiso.com/market/Pages/ReportsBulletins/Default.aspx.

Energy Imbalance market (EIM) performance,

- In the FMM, the ELAP prices were generally quiet. In the RTD, the ELAP prices for AZPS, NEVP and BANCSMUD spiked on March 12 due to renewable deviation and upward load adjustment.
- The monthly average prices in FMM for EIM entities (AZPS, BANCSMUD, BCHA, IPCO, NEVP, PACE, PACW, PGE and PSEI) were \$ \$20.71, \$26.99, \$20.72, \$20.87, \$20.16, \$19.68, \$20.98, \$21.53, and \$20.83 respectively.
- The monthly average prices in RTD for EIM entities (AZPS, BANCSMUD, BCHA, IPCO, NEVP, PACE, PACW, PGE and PSEI) were \$20.86, \$26.34, \$19.63, \$19.34, \$20.33, \$18.65, \$19.24, \$19.40, and \$19.44 respectively.
- Bid cost recovery, real-time imbalance energy offset, and real-rime congestion offset costs for EIM entities (AZPS, BANCSMUD, BCHA, IPCO, NEVP, PACE, PACW, PGE and PSEI) were \$0.27 million, -\$3.07 million and -\$1.34 million respectively.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Market Characteristics 5 Loads 5 Resource Adequacy Available Incentive Mechanism 6 Direct Market Performance Metrics 7 Energy 7 Day-Ahead Prices 7 Real-Time Prices 7 Congestion 11 Congestion Revenue Rights 12 Ancillary Services 15 IFM (Day-Ahead) Average Price 15 Ancillary Service Cost to Load 16 Scarcity Events 16 Convergence Bidding 17 Renewable Generation Curtailment 18 Flexible Ramping Product 19 Flexible Ramping Product Payment 20 Indirect Market Performance Metrics 21 Bid Cost Recovery 21 Bid Cost Recovery 21 Real-time Imbalance Offset Costs 31 Market Software Metrics 32 Market Disruption 32 Manual Market Adjustment 34 Energy Imbalance Market 34	Executive Summary	2
Resource Adequacy Available Incentive Mechanism.6Direct Market Performance Metrics.7Energy.7Day-Ahead Prices.7Real-Time Prices.7Congestion11Congestion Rents on Interties.11Congestion Revenue Rights.12Ancillary Services15IFM (Day-Ahead) Average Price.15Ancillary Service Cost to Load.16Scarcity Events16Convergence Bidding17Renewable Generation Curtailment18Flexible Ramping Product19Flexible Ramping Product Payment.20Indirect Market Performance Metrics21Bid Cost Recovery.21Real-time Imbalance Offset Costs31Market Software Metrics.32Manual Market Adjustment.34Exceptional Dispatch34	Market Characteristics	5
Direct Market Performance Metrics.7Energy.7Day-Ahead Prices.7Real-Time Prices.7Congestion11Congestion Rents on Interties.11Congestion Revenue Rights.12Ancillary Services15IFM (Day-Ahead) Average Price.15Ancillary Service Cost to Load.16Scarcity Events16Convergence Bidding.17Renewable Generation Curtailment18Flexible Ramping Product19Flexible Ramping Product Payment.20Indirect Market Performance Metrics21Bid Cost Recovery.21Real-time Imbalance Offset Costs31Market Software Metrics.32Manual Market Adjustment.34Exceptional Dispatch34	Loads	5
Energy7Day-Ahead Prices7Real-Time Prices7Congestion11Congestion Rents on Interties11Congestion Revenue Rights12Ancillary Services15IFM (Day-Ahead) Average Price15Ancillary Service Cost to Load16Scarcity Events16Convergence Bidding17Renewable Generation Curtailment18Flexible Ramping Product19Flexible Ramping Product Payment20Indirect Market Performance Metrics21Bid Cost Recovery21Real-time Imbalance Offset Costs31Market Software Metrics32Manual Market Adjustment34Exceptional Dispatch34	Resource Adequacy Available Incentive Mechanism	6
Day-Ahead Prices7Real-Time Prices7Congestion11Congestion Rents on Interties11Congestion Revenue Rights12Ancillary Services15IFM (Day-Ahead) Average Price15Ancillary Service Cost to Load16Scarcity Events16Convergence Bidding17Renewable Generation Curtailment18Flexible Ramping Product19Flexible Ramping Product Payment20Indirect Market Performance Metrics21Bid Cost Recovery21Real-time Imbalance Offset Costs31Market Software Metrics32Manual Market Adjustment34Exceptional Dispatch34	Direct Market Performance Metrics	7
Day-Ahead Prices7Real-Time Prices7Congestion11Congestion Rents on Interties11Congestion Revenue Rights12Ancillary Services15IFM (Day-Ahead) Average Price15Ancillary Service Cost to Load16Scarcity Events16Convergence Bidding17Renewable Generation Curtailment18Flexible Ramping Product19Flexible Ramping Product Payment20Indirect Market Performance Metrics21Bid Cost Recovery21Real-time Imbalance Offset Costs31Market Software Metrics32Manual Market Adjustment34Exceptional Dispatch34	Energy	7
Congestion11Congestion Rents on Interties.11Congestion Revenue Rights.12Ancillary Services15IFM (Day-Ahead) Average Price.15Ancillary Service Cost to Load16Scarcity Events16Convergence Bidding17Renewable Generation Curtailment18Flexible Ramping Product19Flexible Ramping Product Payment.20Indirect Market Performance Metrics21Bid Cost Recovery.21Real-time Imbalance Offset Costs31Market Software Metrics32Manual Market Adjustment34Exceptional Dispatch34		
Congestion Rents on Interties.11Congestion Revenue Rights.12Ancillary Services15IFM (Day-Ahead) Average Price.15Ancillary Service Cost to Load16Scarcity Events16Convergence Bidding17Renewable Generation Curtailment18Flexible Ramping Product19Flexible Ramping Product Payment.20Indirect Market Performance Metrics21Bid Cost Recovery.21Real-time Imbalance Offset Costs31Market Software Metrics32Market Disruption32Manual Market Adjustment34Exceptional Dispatch34	Real-Time Prices	7
Congestion Revenue Rights12Ancillary Services15IFM (Day-Ahead) Average Price15Ancillary Service Cost to Load16Scarcity Events16Convergence Bidding17Renewable Generation Curtailment18Flexible Ramping Product19Flexible Ramping Product Payment20Indirect Market Performance Metrics21Bid Cost Recovery21Real-time Imbalance Offset Costs31Market Software Metrics32Market Disruption32Manual Market Adjustment34Exceptional Dispatch34	Congestion	.11
Congestion Revenue Rights12Ancillary Services15IFM (Day-Ahead) Average Price15Ancillary Service Cost to Load16Scarcity Events16Convergence Bidding17Renewable Generation Curtailment18Flexible Ramping Product19Flexible Ramping Product Payment20Indirect Market Performance Metrics21Bid Cost Recovery21Real-time Imbalance Offset Costs31Market Software Metrics32Market Disruption32Manual Market Adjustment34Exceptional Dispatch34	Congestion Rents on Interties	.11
Ancillary Services15IFM (Day-Ahead) Average Price15Ancillary Service Cost to Load16Scarcity Events16Convergence Bidding17Renewable Generation Curtailment18Flexible Ramping Product19Flexible Ramping Product Payment20Indirect Market Performance Metrics21Bid Cost Recovery21Real-time Imbalance Offset Costs31Market Software Metrics32Market Disruption32Manual Market Adjustment34Exceptional Dispatch34		
IFM (Day-Ahead) Average Price.15Ancillary Service Cost to Load16Scarcity Events16Convergence Bidding17Renewable Generation Curtailment18Flexible Ramping Product19Flexible Ramping Product Payment20Indirect Market Performance Metrics21Bid Cost Recovery21Real-time Imbalance Offset Costs31Market Software Metrics32Market Disruption32Manual Market Adjustment34Exceptional Dispatch34		
Ancillary Service Cost to Load16Scarcity Events16Convergence Bidding17Renewable Generation Curtailment18Flexible Ramping Product19Flexible Ramping Product Payment20Indirect Market Performance Metrics21Bid Cost Recovery21Real-time Imbalance Offset Costs31Market Software Metrics32Manual Market Adjustment34Exceptional Dispatch34	IFM (Day-Ahead) Average Price	.15
Scarcity Events16Convergence Bidding17Renewable Generation Curtailment18Flexible Ramping Product19Flexible Ramping Product Payment20Indirect Market Performance Metrics21Bid Cost Recovery21Real-time Imbalance Offset Costs31Market Software Metrics32Market Disruption32Manual Market Adjustment34Exceptional Dispatch34		
Renewable Generation Curtailment18Flexible Ramping Product19Flexible Ramping Product Payment20Indirect Market Performance Metrics21Bid Cost Recovery21Real-time Imbalance Offset Costs31Market Software Metrics32Market Disruption32Manual Market Adjustment34Exceptional Dispatch34	•	
Renewable Generation Curtailment18Flexible Ramping Product19Flexible Ramping Product Payment20Indirect Market Performance Metrics21Bid Cost Recovery21Real-time Imbalance Offset Costs31Market Software Metrics32Market Disruption32Manual Market Adjustment34Exceptional Dispatch34	Convergence Bidding	.17
Flexible Ramping Product Payment.20Indirect Market Performance Metrics21Bid Cost Recovery.21Real-time Imbalance Offset Costs31Market Software Metrics32Market Disruption.32Manual Market Adjustment.34Exceptional Dispatch34		
Flexible Ramping Product Payment.20Indirect Market Performance Metrics21Bid Cost Recovery.21Real-time Imbalance Offset Costs31Market Software Metrics32Market Disruption.32Manual Market Adjustment.34Exceptional Dispatch34	Flexible Ramping Product	.19
Indirect Market Performance Metrics 21 Bid Cost Recovery 21 Real-time Imbalance Offset Costs 31 Market Software Metrics 32 Market Disruption 32 Manual Market Adjustment 34 Exceptional Dispatch 34		
Real-time Imbalance Offset Costs31Market Software Metrics32Market Disruption32Manual Market Adjustment34Exceptional Dispatch34		
Real-time Imbalance Offset Costs31Market Software Metrics32Market Disruption32Manual Market Adjustment34Exceptional Dispatch34	Bid Cost Recovery	.21
Market Disruption		
Market Disruption	Market Software Metrics	.32
Manual Market Adjustment		
Exceptional Dispatch		
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Market Characteristics

Loads

Peak loads for ISO area trended downward in the second half of March, driven by the COVID-19 pandemic and statewide stay-at-home orders.²




Figure 1: System Peak Load

² The study of impact of COVID-19 on California ISO Load and markets is available on CAISO website at the link. <u>http://www.caiso.com/Documents/COVID-19-Impacts-ISOLoadForecast-Presentation.pdf#search=COVID%2D19</u>.

Resource Adequacy Available Incentive Mechanism

Resource Adequacy Availability Incentive Mechanism (RAAIM) was activated on November 1, 2016 to track the performance of Resource Adequacy (RA) Resources. RAAIM is used to determine the availability of resources providing local and/or system Resource Adequacy Capacity and Flexible RA Capacity each month and then assess the resultant Availability Incentive Payments and Non-Availability Charges through the CAISO's settlements process. Table 1 below shows total non-availability charge, total availability incentive payment, system RA average actual availability, and flexible RA average actual availability separately.

	Total Non- availability Charge	Total Availability Incentive Payment	Flexible Average Actual Availability	System Average Actual Availability
Jan19	\$1,381,334	-\$1,381,334	98.25%	96.69%
Feb19	\$1,858,922	-\$1,837,042	95.73%	97.27%
Mar19	\$1,454,246	-\$1,476,126	96.64%	97.19%
Apr19	\$3,792,889	-\$2,039,727	93.83%	93.72%
May19	\$2,809,132	-\$2,753,623	93.31%	97.51%
Jun19	\$3,331,178	-\$1,992,534	92.66%	96.62%
Jul19	\$1,648,195	-\$2,042,559	97.03%	97.01%
Aug19	\$2,231,077	-\$2,745,149	97.45%	95.93%
Sep19	\$3,162,035	-\$2,988,545	96.77%	94.98%
Oct19	\$1,094,547	-\$2,247,052	97.51%	97.52%
Nov19	\$1,818,975	-\$2,127,382	96.60%	95.59%
Dec19	\$3,040,198	-\$2,441,759	94.59%	95.48%
Jan20	\$1,510,951	-\$1,510,951	96.91%	97.32%
Feb20	\$2,549,784	-\$1,980,701	97.35%	94.39%
Mar20	\$2,020,680	-\$2,200,356	96.30%	96.43%

Table 1: Resource Adequacy Availability and Payment

Direct Market Performance Metrics

Energy

Day-Ahead Prices

Figure 2 shows daily prices of four default load aggregate points (DLAPs). Table 2 below lists the binding constraints along with the associated DLAP locations and the dates when the binding constraints resulted in relatively high or low DLAP prices.





Figure 2: Day-Ahead Simple Average LAP Prices (All Hours)

Table 2: Day-Ahead T	ransmission Constraints
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DLAP	Date	Transmission Constraint		
VEA	March 1-31	ME-JF 138		

Real-Time Prices

FMM daily prices of the four DLAPs are shown in Figure 3. Table 3 lists the binding constraints along with the associated DLAP locations and the dates when the binding constraints resulted in relatively high or low DLAP prices.







DLAP	Date	Transmission Constraint
SDGE	March 16	DOUBLTTP-FRIARS-138 kV line
VEA	March 1-12, 14-31	ME-JF 138

Figure 4 below shows the daily frequency of positive price spikes and negative prices by price range for the default LAPs in the FMM. The cumulative frequency of prices above \$250/MWh stayed at 0 percent in March. The cumulative frequency of negative prices edged down to 9.46 percent in March from 9.66 percent in February.




Figure 4: Daily Frequency of FMM LAP Positive Price Spikes and Negative Prices

RTD daily prices of the four DLAPs are shown in Figure 5. Table 4 lists the binding constraints along with the associated DLAP locations and the dates when the binding constraints resulted in relatively high or low DLAP prices. On March 12, all four DLAP prices were elevated due to renewable deviation and upward load adjustment.




Figure 5: RTD Simple Average LAP Prices (All Hours)

Table 4: RTD Transmission Constraints

-PGAE -SCE -SDGE -VEA

DLAP	Date	Transmission Constraint
SDGE	March 27	SUNCREST-SUNCREST-230 XFMR
VEA	March 1-12, 14-31	ME-JF 138

Figure 6 below shows the daily frequency of positive price spikes and negative prices by price range for the default LAPs in RTD. The cumulative frequency of prices above \$250/MWh increased slightly to 0.48 percent in March from 0.38 percent in February. The cumulative frequency of negative prices edged up to 11.47 percent in March from 11.38 percent in February.





Figure 6: Daily Frequency of RTD LAP Positive Price Spikes and Negative Price

Congestion

Congestion Rents on Interties

Figure 7 below illustrates the daily integrated forward market congestion rents by interties. The cumulative total congestion rent for interties in March fell to \$3.06 million from \$5.85 million in February. Majority of the congestion rents in March accrued on Palo Verde (46 percent) and Malin500 (32 percent) intertie.

The congestion rent on Malin500 declined to \$0.98 million in March from \$3.76 million in February. The congestion rent on Palo Verde rose to \$1.41 million in March from \$0.12 million in February.






■ IPPUTAH_ITC ■ NOB_ITC ■ PALOVRDE_ITC ■ MALIN500_ISL ■ COTPISO_ITC ■ CASCADE_ITC ■ SUMMIT_ITC

Average Congestion Cost per Load Served

This metric quantifies the average congestion cost for serving one megawatt of load in the ISO system. Figure 8 shows the daily and monthly averages for the day-ahead and real-time markets respectively.





The average congestion cost per MWh of load served in the integrated forward market decreased to \$1.04/MWh in March from \$1.44/MWh in February. The average congestion cost per load served in the real-time market increased to -\$0.13/MWh in March from -\$0.39/MWh in February.

Congestion Revenue Rights

Congestion revenue rights auction efficiency 1B became in effect on January 1, 2019. It includes key changes related to the congestion revenue rights settlements process:

- Targeted reduction of congestion revenue rights payouts on a constraint by constraint basis.
- Distribute congestion revenues to the extent that CAISO collected the requisite revenue on the constraint over the month. That is, implement a pro-rata funding for CRRs.
- Allow surpluses on one constraint in one hour to offset deficits on the same constraint in another hour over the course of the month.
- Only distribute surpluses to congestion revenue rights if the surplus is collected on a constraint that the congestion revenue right accrued a deficit, and only up to the full target payment value of the congestion revenue right.
- Distribute remaining surplus revenue at the end of the month, which are associated with constraints that collect more surplus over the month than deficits, to measured demand.

Figure 9 illustrates the CRR notional value in the corresponding month for the various transmission elements that experienced congestion during the month. CRR notional value is calculated as the product of CRR implied flow and constraint shadow price in each hour per constraint and CRR.




Figure 9: Daily CRR Notional Value by Transmission Element

Figure 10 illustrates the daily CRR offset value in the corresponding month for the transmission elements that experienced congestion during the month.




Figure 10: Daily CRR Offset Value by Transmission Element

CRR offset value is the difference between the revenue collected from the dayahead congestion and CRR notional value. It is also calculated in each hour per constraint and CRR. A positive CRR offset value represents surplus and a negative CRR offset value represents shortfall.

The shares of the CRR payment on various congested transmission elements for the reporting period are shown in Figure 11 and the monthly summary for CRR revenue adequacy is provided in Table 5.




Figure 11: CRR Payment by Transmission Element

Net monthly balancing surplus in March was \$2.06 million. The auction revenues credited to the balancing account for March was \$5.13 million. As a result, the balancing account for March had a surplus of approximately \$7.20 million, which was allocated to measured demand.

Row	Description	Formula	Amount
1	CRR Notional Value		\$25,164,873
2	CRR Deficit		-\$9,660,691
3	CRR Settlement Rule		-\$62,463
4	CRR Adjusted Payment		\$14,441,273
5	CRR Surplus		\$2,381,113
6	Monthly Auction Revenue		\$3,172,956
7	Annual Auction Revenue		\$1,961,900
8	CRR Daily Balancing Account		\$4,816,591
9	Net Monthly Balancing Surplus	row 5 + row 8 - (row 6 + row 7)	\$2,062,848
10	Allocation to Measured Demand	row 6 + row 7 + row9	\$7,197,704

Table 5: CRR Revenue Adequacy Statistics

Ancillary Services

IFM (Day-Ahead) Average Price

Table 6 shows the monthly IFM average ancillary service procurements and the monthly average prices. In March the monthly average procurement decreased for regulation down, spinning and non-spinning reserves.

Table 6: IFM (Day-Ahead) Monthly Average Ancillary Service Procurement

		Average Procurred				Ave	rage Price	l i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
	Reg Up	Reg Dn	Spinning	Non-Spinning	Reg Up	Reg Dn	Spinning	Non-Spinning
Mar-20	420	481	792	791	\$8.51	\$9.59	\$2.74	\$0.44
Feb-20	416	524	918	918	\$10.53	\$14.90	\$2.60	\$0.18
Percent Change	0.92%	-8.22%	-13.75%	-13.90%	-19.21%	-35.59%	5.23%	143.15%

The monthly average prices increased for spinning and non-spinning reserves in March. Figure 12 shows the daily IFM average ancillary service prices. The average price for regulation down was elevated on March 27 due to high opportunity cost of energy.




Figure 12: IFM (Day-Ahead) Ancillary Service Average Price

Ancillary Service Cost to Load

The monthly average cost to load inched down to \$0.60/MWh in March from 0.80/MWh in February.




Figure 13: System (Day-Ahead and Real-Time) Average Cost to Load


Scarcity Events

The ancillary services scarcity pricing mechanism is triggered when the ISO is not able to procure the target quantity of one or more ancillary services in the IFM and real-time market runs. The scarcity events in April are shown in the table below.

Date	Hour Ending	Interval	Ancillary Service	Region	Shortfall (MW)	Percentage of Requirement
March 10	6	1-3	Regulation Down	SP26_EXP	6.9	5.8 %

Convergence Bidding

Figure 14 below shows the daily average volume of cleared virtual bids in IFM for virtual supply and virtual demand. The cleared virtual supply was well above cleared demand in most days of March.





Convergence bidding tends to cause the day-ahead market and real-time market prices to move closer together, or "converge". Figure 15 shows the energy prices (namely the energy component of the LMP) in IFM, hour ahead scheduling process (HASP), FMM, and RTD.





Figure 15: IFM, HASP, FMM, and RTD Prices

Figure 16 shows the profits that convergence bidders receive from convergence bidding. The total profits from convergence bidding in March slid to \$0.41 million from \$0.76 million in February.





Renewable Generation Curtailment

Figure 17 below shows the monthly wind and solar VERs (variable energy resource) curtailment due to system wide condition or local congestion in RTD. Figure 18 shows the monthly wind and solar VERs (variable energy resource) curtailment by resource type in RTD. Economic curtailment is defined as the resource's dispatch upper limit minus its RTD schedule when the resource has an economic bid. Dispatch upper limit is the maximum level the resource can be dispatched to when various factors are take into account such as forecast, maximum economic bid, generation outage, and ramping capacity. Self-schedule curtailment is defined as the resource's self-schedule minus its RTD schedule when RTD schedule is lower than self-schedule. When a VER resource is exceptionally dispatched, then exceptional dispatch value.

As Figure 17 and Figure 18 below show, the renewable curtailment continue to increase in March. The majority of the curtailment was economic and local.





Figure 17: Renewable Curtailment by Reason





Flexible Ramping Product

On November 1, 2016 the ISO implemented two market products in the 15minute and 5-minute markets: Flexible Ramping Up and Flexible Ramping Down uncertainty awards. These products provide additional upward and downward flexible ramping capability to account for uncertainty due to demand and renewable forecasting errors. In addition, the existing flexible ramping sufficiency test was extended to ensure feasible ramping capacity for real-time interchange schedules.

Flexible Ramping Product Payment

Figure 19 shows the flexible ramping up and down uncertainty payments. Flexible ramping up uncertainty payment rose to \$63,736 in March from \$4,369 in February. Flexible ramping down uncertainty payment dropped to \$4,154 in March from \$22,071 in February.




Figure 19: Flexible Ramping Up/down Uncertainty Payment

Figure 20 shows the flexible ramping forecast payment. Flexible ramping forecast payment decreased to -\$840 this month from \$3,970 in February.




Figure 20: Flexible Ramping Forecast Payment

Indirect Market Performance Metrics

Bid Cost Recovery

Figure 21 shows the daily uplift costs due to exceptional dispatch payments. The monthly uplift costs in March decreased to \$34,953 from \$184,648 in February.




Figure 21: Exceptional Dispatch Uplift Costs

Figure 22 shows the allocation of bid cost recovery payment in the IFM, residual unit commitment (RUC) and RTM markets. The total bid cost recovery for March increased to \$6.08 million from \$3.92 million in February. Out of the total monthly bid cost recovery payment for the three markets in March, the IFM market contributed 40 percent, RTM contributed 43 percent, and RUC contributed 17 percent of the total bid cost recovery payment.




Figure 22: Bid Cost Recovery Allocation

Figure 23 and Figure 24 show the daily and monthly BCR cost by local capacity requirement area (LCR) respectively.




Figure 23: Bid Cost Recovery Allocation by LCR






Figure 25 and Figure 26 show the daily and monthly BCR cost by utility distribution company (UDC) respectively.




Figure 25: Bid Cost Recovery Allocation by UDC

Figure 26: Monthly Bid Cost Recovery Allocation by UDC




Figure 27: Cost in RUC




Figure 27 shows the cost related to BCR by cost type in RUC.




Figure 28 and Figure 29 show the daily and monthly cost related to BCR by type and LCR in RUC respectively.




Figure 28: Cost in RUC by LCR




Figure 29: Monthly Cost in RUC by LCR

Figure 30 and Figure 31 show the daily and monthly cost related to BCR by type and UDC in RUC respectively.




Figure 30: Cost in RUC by UDC




Figure 31: Monthly Cost in RUC by UDC

Figure 32 shows the cost related to BCR in real time by cost type. Minimum load cost contributed largely to the real time cost this month.




Figure 32: Cost in Real Time

Figure 33 and Figure 34 show the daily and monthly cost related to BCR by type and LCR in real time respectively.




Figure 33: Cost in Real Time by LCR






Figure 35 and Figure 36 show the daily and monthly cost related to BCR by type and UDC in Real Time respectively.





Figure 35: Cost in Real Time by UDC

Figure 36: Monthly Cost in Real Time by UDC






Figure 37 shows the cost related to BCR in IFM by cost type.



Figure 38 and Figure 39 show the daily and monthly cost related to BCR by type and location in IFM respectively.




Figure 38: Cost in IFM by LCR




Figure 39: Monthly Cost in IFM by LCR

Figure 40 and Figure 41 show the daily and monthly cost related to BCR by type and UDC in IFM respectively.




Figure 40: Cost in IFM by UDC




Figure 41: Monthly Cost in IFM by UDC

Real-time Imbalance Offset Costs

Figure 42 shows the daily real-time energy and congestion imbalance offset costs. Real-time energy offset cost decreased to -\$3.15 million in March from -\$2.21 million in February. Real-time congestion offset cost in March skidded to \$2.16 million from \$6.07 million in February.




Figure 42: Real-Time Energy and Congestion Imbalance Offset

Market Software Metrics

Market performance can be confounded by software issues, which vary in severity levels with the failure of a market run being the most severe.

Market Disruption

A market disruption is an action or event that causes a failure of an ISO market, related to system operation issues or system emergencies.³ Pursuant to section 7.7.15 of the ISO tariff, the ISO can take one or more of a number of specified actions to prevent a market disruption, or to minimize the extent of a market disruption.

Table 7 lists the number of market disruptions and the number of times that the ISO removed bids (including self-schedules) in any of the following markets in this month. The ISO markets include IFM, RUC, FMM and RTD processes

Type of CAISO Market	Market Disruption or Reportable	Removal of Bids (including Self-Schedules)
Day-Ahead		
IFM	0	0
RUC	0	0
Real-Time		
FMM Interval 1	5	0
FMM Interval 2	0	0
FMM Interval 3	0	0
FMM Interval 4	1	0
Real-Time Dispatch	26	0

Table 7: Summary of Market Disruption

Figure 43 shows the frequency of IFM, HASP (FMM interval 2), FMM (intervals 1, 3 and 4), and RTD failures. There were a total of 32 market disruptions this month. On March 23, there were one FMM and four RTD disruptions due to application problem.

³ These system operation issues or system emergencies are referred to in Sections 7.6 and 7.7, respectively, of the ISO tariff.




Figure 43: Frequency of Market Disruption

Manual Market Adjustment

Exceptional Dispatch

Figure 44 shows the daily volume of exceptional dispatches, broken out by market type: real-time incremental dispatch and real-time decremental dispatch. The real-time exceptional dispatches are among one of the following types: a unit commitment at physical minimum; an incremental dispatch above the day-ahead schedule and a decremental dispatch below the day-ahead schedule.

The total volume of exceptional dispatch in March inched down to 46,493 MWh from 48,673 MWh in February.




Figure 44: Total Exceptional Dispatch Volume (MWh) by Market Type

Figure 45 shows the volume of the exceptional dispatch broken out by reason.⁴ The majority of the exceptional dispatch volumes in March were driven by planned transmission outage (47 percent) and reliability assessment (28 percent).

⁴ For details regarding the reasons for exceptional dispatch please read the white paper at this link: <u>http://www.caiso.com/1c89/1c89d76950e00.html</u>.




Figure 45: Total Exceptional Dispatch Volume (MWh) by Reason

Figure 46 shows the total exceptional dispatch volume as a percent of load, along with the monthly average. The monthly average percentage was 0.28 percent in March, edging down from 0.30 percent in February.




Figure 46: Total Exceptional Dispatch as Percent of Load

Energy Imbalance Market

On November 1, 2014, the California Independent System Operator Corporation (ISO) and Portland-based PacifiCorp fully activated the Energy Imbalance Market (EIM). This real-time market is the first of its kind in the West. EIM covers six western states: California, Oregon, Washington, Utah, Idaho and Wyoming.

On December 1, 2015, NV Energy, the Nevada-based utility successfully began participating in the western Energy Imbalance Market (EIM). On October 1, 2016, Phoenix-based Arizona Public Service (AZPS) and Puget Sound Energy (PSEI) of Washington State successfully began full participation in the western Energy Imbalance Market.

On October 1, 2017, Portland General Electric Company (PGE) became the fifth western utility to successfully begin full participation in the western Energy Imbalance Market (EIM). PGE joins Arizona Public Service, Puget Sound Energy, NV Energy, PacifiCorp and the ISO, together serving over 38 million consumers in eight states: California, Arizona, Oregon, Washington, Utah, Idaho, Wyoming and Nevada.

On April 4, 2018, Boise-based Idaho Power and Powerex of Vancouver, British Columbia successfully entered the western Energy Imbalance Market (EIM) today, allowing the ISO's real-time power market to serve energy imbalances occurring within about 55 percent of the electric load in the Western Interconnection. The eight western EIM participants serve more than 42 million consumers in the power grid stretching from the border with Canada south to Arizona, and eastward to Wyoming.

On April 3, 2019, Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD), part of the Balancing Authority of Northern California (BANC), successfully began full participation in the Western EIM, becoming the first publicly owned agency to be an EIM entity in the Western EIM.

Figure 47 shows daily simple average ELAP prices for PacifiCorp east (PACE), PacifiCorp West (PACW), NV Energy (NEVP), Arizona Public Service (AZPS), Puget Sound Energy (PSEI), Portland General Electric Company (PGE), Idaho Power (IPCO), Powerex (BCHA), and Sacramento Municipal Utility District (BANCSMUD), for all hours in FMM. The average prices were generally quiet this month.




Figure 47: EIM Simple Average LAP Prices (All Hours) in FMM

Figure 48 shows daily simple average ELAP prices for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, PGE, IPCO, BCHA, and BANCSMUD for all hours in RTD. March saw relatively quiet average ELAP prices. The price for AZPS, NEVP and BANCSMUD spiked on March 12 due to renewable deviation and upward load adjustment.

Figure 48: EIM Simple Average LAP Prices (All Hours) in RTD




Figure 49 shows the daily price frequency for prices above \$250/MWh and negative prices in FMM for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, PGE, IPCO, BCHA, and BANCSMUD. The cumulative frequency of prices above \$250/MWh fell to 0.05 percent in March from 0.11 percent in February. The cumulative frequency of negative prices decreased to 1.01 percent in March from 2.11 percent in February.




Figure 49: Daily Frequency of EIM LAP Positive Price Spikes and Negative Prices in FMM

Figure 50 shows the daily price frequency for prices above \$250/MWh and negative prices in RTD for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, PGE, IPCO, BCHA, and BANCSMUD. The cumulative frequency of prices above \$250/MWh declined to 0.18 percent in March from 0.26 from in February. The cumulative frequency of negative prices decreased to 3.12 percent in March from 3.83 percent in February.

Figure 50: Daily Frequency of EIM LAP Positive Price Spikes and Negative Prices in RTD




Figure 51 shows daily real-time imbalance energy offset cost (RTIEO) for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, PGE, IPCO, BCHA, and BANCSMUD respectively. Total RTIEO increased to -\$3.07 million in March from -\$4.90 million in February.




Figure 51: EIM Real-Time Imbalance Energy Offset by Area

Figure 52 shows daily real-time congestion offset cost (RTCO) for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, PGE, IPCO, BCHA, and BANCSMUD respectively. Total RTCO increased to -\$1.34 million in March from -\$1.55 million in February.




Figure 52: EIM Real-Time Congestion Imbalance Offset by Area

Figure 53 shows daily bid cost recovery for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, PGE, IPCO, BCHA, and BANCSMUD respectively. Total BCR slid to \$0.27 million in March from \$0.41 million in February.




Figure 53: EIM Bid Cost Recovery by Area

Figure 54 shows the flexible ramping up uncertainty payment for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, PGE, IPCO, BCHA, and BANCSMUD respectively. Total flexible ramping up uncertainty payment in March increased to \$48,355 from \$19,990 in February.




Figure 54: Flexible Ramping Up Uncertainty Payment

Figure 55 shows the flexible ramping down uncertainty payment for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, PGE, IPCO, BCHA, and BANCSMUD respectively. Total flexible ramping down uncertainty payment in March decreased to -\$7,086 from \$2,287 in February.




Figure 55: Flexible Ramping Down Uncertainty Payment

Figure 56 shows the flexible ramping forecast payment for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, PGE, IPCO, BCHA, and BANCSMUD respectively. Total forecast payment in March dropped to -\$22,287 from \$58,617 in February.




Figure 56: Flexible Ramping Forecast Payment

The ISO's Energy Imbalance Market Business Practice Manual⁵ describes the methodology for determining whether an EIM participating resource is dispatched to support transfers to serve California load. The methodology ensures that the dispatch considers the combined energy and associated marginal greenhouse gas (GHG) compliance cost based on submitted bids⁶.

The EIM dispatches to support transfers into the ISO were documented in Figure 57 and Table 8 below.




Figure 57: Percentage of EIM Transfer into ISO by Fuel Type

⁵ See the Energy Imbalance Market Business Practice Manual for a description of the methodology for making this determination, which begins on page 42 -- http://bpmcm.caiso.com/Pages/BPMDetails.aspx?BPM=Energy Imbalance Market.

⁶ A submitted bid may reflect that a resource is not available to support EIM transfers to California.

Month	Coal (%)	Gas (%)	Non-Emitting (%)	Total
Jan-18	0.00%	9.12%	90.88%	100%
Feb-18	0.00%	15.20%	84.80%	100%
Mar-18	0.16%	25.00%	74.84%	100%
Apr-18	0.00%	0.14%	99.86%	100%
May-18	0.00%	1.09%	98.91%	100%
Jun-18	0.00%	2.89%	97.11%	100%
Jul-18	0.00%	26.21%	73.79%	100%
Aug-18	0.00%	35.87%	64.13%	100%
Sep-18	0.00%	35.50%	64.50%	100%
Oct-18	0.00%	24.62%	75.38%	100%
Nov-18	1.16%	53.81%	45.03%	100%
Dec-18	2.00%	57.77%	40.23%	100%
Jan-19	0.45%	53.44%	46.11%	100%
Feb-19	5.60%	58.13%	36.28%	100%
Mar-19	1.07%	55.40%	43.52%	100%
Apr-19	1.13%	43.63%	55.25%	100%
May-19	2.22%	34.75%	63.03%	100%
Jun-19	3.47%	35.32%	61.21%	100%
Jul-19	0.50%	47.65%	51.85%	100%
Aug-19	0.56%	48.55%	50.89%	100%
Sep-19	1.77%	50.01%	48.22%	100%
Oct-19	0.68%	52.10%	47.22%	100%
Nov-19	1.39%	47.69%	50.92%	100%
Dec-19	0.54%	43.68%	55.78%	100%
Jan-20	0.17%	27.05%	72.79%	100%
Feb-20	0.37%	33.11%	66.52%	100%
Mar-20	4.42%	26.49%	69.09%	100%

Table 8: EIM Transfer into ISO by Fuel Type