

October 13, 2021

The Honorable Kimberly D. Bose  
Secretary  
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission  
888 First Street, NE  
Washington, DC 20426

**Re: California Independent System Operator Corporation  
Docket: ER15-2565-\_\_  
Independent Assessment by the Department of Market Monitoring  
August 2021 Energy Imbalance Market Transition Period Report for Balancing  
Authority of Northern California**

Dear Secretary Bose:

The Department of Market Monitoring (DMM) hereby submits its independent assessment on the transition period of Balancing Authority of Northern California (BANC) during its first six months of participation in the Energy Imbalance Market (EIM) for August 2021, as BANC joined the EIM on March 25, 2021.

Please contact the undersigned directly with any questions or concerns regarding the foregoing.

Respectfully submitted,

**By: /s/ Eric Hildebrandt**

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## California ISO

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# Report on energy imbalance market issues and performance: Balancing Authority of Northern California for August 2021

October 13, 2021

Prepared by: Department of Market Monitoring

## Executive summary

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Pursuant to the Commission’s October 29, 2015 Order on the ISO’s energy imbalance market (EIM), the ISO filed a report on September 23, 2021 covering the period from August 1 through August 31, 2021 (August report) for Balancing Authority of Northern California (BANC) in the energy imbalance market.<sup>1</sup> BANC joined the energy imbalance market on March 25, 2021, and the transition period will apply to the BANC balancing authority area (BAA) until August 31, 2021.<sup>2</sup>

This report provides a review by the Department of Market Monitoring (DMM) of energy imbalance market performance for the BANC balancing authority area during the period covered in the ISO’s August report. This is the fifth and final report for the transition period for the BANC balancing authority area. Key findings in this report include the following:

- Prices in the BANC area were similar to prices within the ISO. During this time period, prices in the BANC area averaged \$56.17/MWh in the 15-minute market and \$52.38/MWh in the 5-minute market.
- The BANC balancing authority area did not fail the upward or downward sufficiency or capacity tests in August.
- In August, there were no valid under-supply or over-supply infeasibilities in the 15-minute or 5-minute markets.
- Transition period pricing did not impact 15-minute or 5-minute market prices in the BANC area.

Section 1 of this report provides a description of prices and power balance constraint relaxations and section 2 discusses the flexible ramping sufficiency and bid range capacity tests.

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<sup>1</sup> The ISO’s August 2021 Report was filed at FERC and posted on the ISO website on September 23, 2021: <http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Sep23-2021-EIMTransitionPeriodReport-BalancingAuthority-NorthernCalifornia-Aug2021-ER15-2565.pdf>


<sup>2</sup> This follows from the application of CAISO Tariff section 27(b)(1), which refers to a number of months rather than a number of days.


## 1 Energy imbalance market prices

Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 show hourly average 15-minute and 5-minute prices during August for BANC compared with prices in the ISO at the Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) default load aggregation point.

Average prices in the Balancing Authority of Northern California area tracked similarly to prices at the Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) default aggregation point within the ISO. Price separations between these two areas occurred primarily during peak net load hours. In the BANC area during the month, prices averaged \$56.17/MWh in the 15-minute market and \$52.38/MWh in the 5-minute market.

**Figure 1.1 Average hourly 15-minute price (August 2021)**



**Figure 1.2 Average hourly 5-minute price (August 2021)**

All power balance constraint relaxations that occurred in August were subject to the six-month transition period pricing that expires on September 1, 2021.<sup>2</sup> The transition period pricing mechanism sets prices at the highest cost supply bid dispatched to meet demand rather than at the \$1,000/MWh penalty parameter while relaxing the constraint for shortages, or the -\$155/MWh penalty parameter while relaxing the constraint for excess energy.<sup>3 4</sup> Power balance constraint relaxations can be grouped in the following categories:

- **Valid under-supply infeasibility** (power balance constraint shortage). These occurred when the power balance constraint was relaxed because load exceeded available generation. The ISO validated that ISO software was working appropriately during these instances.
- **Valid over-supply infeasibility** (power balance constraint excess). These occurred when the power balance constraint was relaxed because generation exceeded load. The ISO validated that ISO software was working appropriately during these instances.
- **Load conformance limiter would have resolved infeasibility.** The load conformance limiter automatically reduces the size of an operator load adjustment and sets prices at the last economic

<sup>3</sup> When transition period pricing provisions are triggered by relaxation of the power balance constraint, any shadow price associated with the flexible ramping product is set to \$0/MWh to allow the market software to use the last economic bid dispatched.

<sup>4</sup> The penalty parameter while relaxing the constraint for shortages may rise from \$1,000/MWh to \$2,000/MWh, depending on system conditions, per phase 2 implementation of FERC Order 831.

signal when the conditions for the limiter are met.<sup>5</sup> During the transition period, the limiter does not change price outcomes because transition period pricing is applied during these intervals instead. However, in these cases, the load conformance limiter *would have resolved the infeasibility* had transition period pricing not been in effect.

- **Correctable infeasibility.** These occurred when the ISO software relaxed the power balance constraint concurrent with a software error or data error that resulted in a price correction or would have triggered a price correction if transition period pricing were not active.<sup>6</sup>

Figure 1.3 show the monthly frequency of under-supply infeasibilities, in the 15-minute and 5-minute markets. As shown in the figures below, there were no valid under-supply or over-supply infeasibilities in the 15-minute or the 5-minute markets.

There were no intervals in August when the load conformance limiter would have triggered in the 15-minute or 5-minute markets for the BANC balancing authority area had transition period pricing not been in effect.

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<sup>5</sup> The ISO implemented an enhancement to the load conformance limiter, effective February 27, 2019. With the enhancement, the load conformance limiter triggers by a measure based on the change in load adjustment from one interval to the next, rather than the total level of load adjustment.

<sup>6</sup> Section 35 of the ISO tariff provides the ISO authority to correct prices if it detects an invalid market solution or issues due to a data input failure, occurrence of hardware or software failure, or a result that is inconsistent with the ISO tariff. During erroneous intervals, the ISO determined that prices resulting under transition period pricing were equivalent to prices that would result from a price correction, so no further price adjustment was appropriate.  
[http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Section35\\_MarketValidationAndPriceCorrection\\_May1\\_2014.pdf](http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Section35_MarketValidationAndPriceCorrection_May1_2014.pdf).

**Figure 1.3 Frequency of under-supply power balance infeasibilities by month  
Balancing Authority of Northern California**






Figure 1.4 and Figure 1.5 show the average monthly prices in the 15-minute and 5-minute markets *with* and *without* the special transition period pricing provisions applied to mitigate prices in the BANC area during August.<sup>7</sup> On average for the month, transition period pricing did not impact 15-minute or 5-minute market prices in the BANC area.

<sup>7</sup> A detailed description of the methodology used to calculate these counterfactual prices that would result without transition period pricing was provided on p. 7 of the January 2017 report for Arizona Public Service from DMM: [http://www.caiso.com/Documents/May1\\_2017\\_Department\\_MarketMonitoring\\_EIMTransitionPeriodReport\\_ArizonaPublicService\\_Jan2017\\_ER15-2565.pdf](http://www.caiso.com/Documents/May1_2017_Department_MarketMonitoring_EIMTransitionPeriodReport_ArizonaPublicService_Jan2017_ER15-2565.pdf)

**Figure 1.4 Average prices by month – Balancing Authority of Northern California (BANC) (15-minute market)**



**Figure 1.5 Average prices by month – Balancing Authority of Northern California (BANC) (5-minute market)**





## 2 Flexible ramping sufficiency and bid range capacity tests

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As part of the energy imbalance market, each area including the California ISO is subject to a resource sufficiency evaluation. The evaluation is performed prior to each hour to ensure that generation in each area is sufficient without relying on transfers from other balancing areas. The evaluation includes two tests:

- **The bid range capacity test (capacity test)** requires that each area provide incremental bid-in capacity to meet the imbalance between load, inertia, and generation base schedules.
- **The flexible ramping sufficiency test (sufficiency test)** requires that each balancing area has enough ramping flexibility over an hour to meet the forecasted change in demand as well as uncertainty.

If an area fails either the bid range capacity test or flexible ramping sufficiency test, energy imbalance market transfers into that area cannot be increased.<sup>8</sup> Failures of the capacity and sufficiency test are important because these outcomes limit transfer capability. Constraining transfer capability may affect the efficiency of the EIM by limiting transfers into and out of a balancing area that could potentially provide benefits to other balancing areas. Reduced transfer capability also affects the ability for an area to balance load, since there is less availability to import-from or export-to neighboring areas. This can result in local prices being set at power balance constraint penalty parameters.


Figure 2.1 show the monthly frequency of upward and downward flexible ramping sufficiency test failures, while Figure 2.2 shows the number of bid range capacity test failures by month.<sup>9</sup> The BANC balancing authority area did not fail the upward or downward sufficiency or capacity tests in August.

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
<sup>8</sup> If an area fails either test in the upward direction, net EIM imports (negative) during the hour cannot exceed the lower of either the base transfer or optimal transfer from the last 15-minute interval prior to the hour.

<sup>9</sup> Through recent revisions and enhancements, some test failures that were reported in prior months have been determined to be invalid and were removed from the charts accordingly. Therefore, previously published charts may no longer be accurate.

**Figure 2.1 Frequency of upward and downward sufficiency test failures by month  
Balancing Authority of Northern California (BANC)**



**Figure 2.2 Number of upward and downward capacity test failures by month  
Balancing Authority of Northern California (BANC)**



**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I certify that I have served the foregoing document upon the parties listed on the official service list in the captioned proceedings, in accordance with the requirements of Rule 2010 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 C.F.R. § 385.2010).

Dated at Folsom, California, this 13<sup>th</sup> day of October, 2021.

*/s/ Jennifer Shirk*

Jennifer Shirk