

Stakeholder Comments Template

Transmission Access Charge Options

September 30, 2016 Second Revised Straw Proposal

Submitted by	Company	Date Submitted
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The ISO provides this template for submission of stakeholder comments on the September 30, 2016 second revised straw proposal. The second revised straw proposal, presentations and other information related to this initiative may be found at:

<http://www.caiso.com/informed/Pages/StakeholderProcesses/TransmissionAccessChargeOptions.aspx>

Upon completion of this template please submit it to initiativecomments@caiso.com. Submissions are requested by close of business on **October 28, 2016**.

Second Revised Straw Proposal

1. The ISO previously proposed to allow a new PTO that is embedded within or electrically integrated with an existing sub-region to have a one-time choice to join that sub-region or become a separate sub-region. The ISO now proposes that an embedded or electrically integrated new PTO will become part of the relevant sub-region and will not have the choice to become a separate sub-region. This means that the new embedded/integrated PTO's transmission revenue requirements will be combined with those of the rest of its sub-region and its internal load will pay the same sub-regional TAC rate as the rest of the sub-region. Please comment on this element of the proposal.

Seattle supports the creation of new sub-regions for potential Balancing Authority Areas (BAAs). However, Seattle believes a new Participating Transmission Owner that is either embedded or electrically integrated within a relevant sub-region should still have the one-time ability to form its own sub-region (principle from previous straw proposal). Eliminating this option in the current proposal could result in undue cost shifts that otherwise could be avoided.

2. An embedded PTO is defined as one that cannot import sufficient power into its service territory to meet its load without relying on the system of the existing sub-region.

Whether a new PTO is considered electrically integrated will be determined by a case-by-case basis, subject to Board approval, based on criteria specified in the tariff. Please comment on these provisions of the proposal.

No comment

3. The proposal defines “new facilities” as transmission projects planned and approved in an expanded TPP for the expanded ISO BAA. The integrated TPP will begin in the first full calendar year that the first new PTO is fully integrated into expanded ISO BAA. Projects that are under review as potential “inter-regional” projects prior to the new PTO joining may be considered as “new” if they meet needs identified in the integrated TPP. Please comment on these provisions.

No comment

4. The ISO previously defined “existing facilities” as transmission assets planned in each entity’s own planning process for its own service area or planning region, and that are in service, or have either begun construction or have committed funding to construct. The ISO is now simplifying the proposal to define “existing facilities” as all those placed under operation control of the expanded ISO that are not “new.” Please comment on the ISO’s proposed new definition of “existing facilities.”

No comment

5. Consistent with the previous revised straw proposal, the ISO proposes to recover the costs of existing facilities through sub-regional “license plate” TAC rates. The ISO has proposed that each sub-region’s existing facilities comprise “legacy” facilities for which subsequent new sub-regions have no cost responsibility. Please comment on this aspect of the proposal.

No comment

6. The ISO proposes to use the Transmission Economic Assessment Methodology (TEAM) to determine economic benefits of certain new facilities to the expanded ISO region as a whole and to each sub-region. Please comment on these uses of the TEAM.

CAISO’s Transmission Economic Assessment Methodology (TEAM) was created to evaluate the need for transmission upgrades that *California* customers may be asked to fund. In an expanded footprint, the methodologies used in assessing future transmission needs may have different variables than within California.

A framework that takes into account reliability and economic responsibility inside as well as outside of California is needed. TEAM’s five principles on its face may look to be an adequate tool, but a deeper dive into how those principles interact in an expanded footprint warrant an open and transparent collaboration with stakeholders to evaluate the appropriateness of utilizing the tool for purpose of determining economic benefits.

If it is determined that CAISO should use TEAM in an expanded footprint, a proposed project should only be approved if TEAM ensures that benefits to affected customers are equal to or greater than the costs to develop the project.

7. For a reliability project that is narrowly specified as the more efficient or cost-effective solution to a reliability need within a sub-region, and has not been expanded or enhanced in any way to achieve additional benefits, the ISO proposes to allocate the project cost entirely to the sub-region with the driving reliability need, regardless of any incidental benefits that may accrue to other sub-regions. Please comment on this provision.

No comment

8. For a policy-driven project that is connected entirely within the same sub-region in which the policy driver originated, the ISO proposes to allocate the project cost entirely to the sub-region with the driving policy need, regardless of any incidental benefits that may accrue to other sub-regions. Please comment on this provision

No comment

9. For a purely economic project with benefit-cost ratio (BCR) > 1, cost shares will be allocated to sub-regions in proportion to their benefits, and because BCR > 1 this completely covers the costs. A purely economic project is one that is selected on the basis of the TPP economic studies following the selection of reliability and policy projects, and is a distinct new project, not an enhancement of a previously selected reliability or policy project.

No comment

10. For an economic project that results from modifying a reliability or policy-driven project to obtain economic benefits greater than incremental project cost, the ISO proposes to first, allocate avoided cost of original reliability or policy-driven project to the relevant sub-region, then allocate incremental project cost to sub-regions in proportion to their economic benefits determined by TEAM. This is called the “driver first” approach to cost allocation. The proposal also illustrated an alternative “total benefits” approach. Please comment on your preferences for either of these approaches.

No comment

11. The proposal outlined two scenarios for policy-driven projects involving more than one sub-region. In scenario 1, where a project built within one sub-region meets the policy needs of another sub-region, costs would be allocated to sub-regions up to the amount of their economic benefits (per TEAM) and the remaining costs would be allocated to the sub-region that was the policy-driver. Please comment on this cost allocation approach for scenario 1.

Seattle agrees with this methodology as a means for allocating costs based on economic benefits. The Western States Committee proposal framework in the most recent Governance Proposal should be used in determining allocation share for multi sub-region benefits with the caveat that voting should be based on a one state, one vote (not load weighted) share amongst the participating states.

12. In scenario 2, where a policy project meets the policy needs of more than one sub-region, costs would be allocated to sub-regions up to the amount of their economic benefits (per TEAM) and the remaining costs would be allocated to the relevant sub-regions in proportion to their internal load for project in-service year. Please comment on this cost allocation approach for scenario 2.

See comment associated with question 11 above.

13. Competitive solicitation to select the entity to build and own a new transmission project would apply to all new transmission projects rated 200 kV or greater, of any category, regardless of whether their costs are allocated to only one or more than one sub-region, with exceptions only for upgrades to existing facilities as stated in ISO tariff section 24.5.1. Please comment on this proposal.

No comment

14. The ISO proposes to drop the earlier proposal to recalculate benefit and cost shares for sub-regions and the proposal to allocate cost shares to a new PTO for a new facility that was planned and approved through the integrated TPP but before that new PTO joined the expanded ISO. Please comment on the elimination of these proposal elements.

No comment

15. The ISO proposes to establish a single region-wide export rate (“export access charge” or EAC) for the expanded region, defined as the load-weighted average of the sub-regional TAC rates. Please comment on this proposal.

No comment

16. Under the EAC proposal, non-PTO entities within a sub-region would pay the same sub-regional TAC rate paid by other loads in the same sub-region, rather than the wheeling access charge (WAC) they pay today. Please comment on this proposal.

No comment

17. The ISO proposes to allocate EAC revenues to each sub-region in proportion to their transmission revenue requirements. In the August 11 working group meeting the ISO presented the idea of allocating EAC revenues to each sub-region in proportion to its quantity of exports times its sub-regional TAC rate. Please comment on these two approaches for EAC revenue allocation, and suggest other approaches you think would be better and explain why.

No comment

18. Please provide any additional comments on topics that were not covered in the questions above.

Since the Transmission Access Charge and the most recent Governance Draft Proposal are closely linked in terms of cost allocation decisions in new policy driven transmission projects, Seattle agrees that the Western States Committee (WSC) should have primary approval authority in allocation decisions. Seattle prefaces this comment on the principle of one state, one vote (not load weighted) in the expanded ISO. In other words, as long as California, or any other state for that matter, is only allocated one vote in the WSC framework and the WSC is the source of cost allocation decisions in new transmission projects, Seattle agrees with this proposal.