

Figure 1 a




Figure 1 b




Figure 1 c




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


Figure 2 a




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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


Figure 4 a




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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


Figure 5 a

Percentage of Bid Insufficient Hours in Ancillary Services Markets
North of Path 15




Figure 5 b

Percentage of Bid Insufficient Hours in Ancillary Services Markets
South of Path 15




Figure 6 a




Figure 6 b




Figure 6 c




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


Figure 6 e




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


Figure 6 g




Figure 6 h




Figure 6 i




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


Figure 6 k




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


Figure 7 a




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


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


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


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


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


Figure 8 a




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


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


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


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


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


Figure 9 a




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


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


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


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


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


Figure 10 a




Figure 10 b




Figure 10 c




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


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


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


Figure 10 g




Figure 10 h




Figure 10 i




Figure 10 j




Figure 10 k




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


Figure 11 a

Percentage of Pivotal Hours in Ancillary Services Markets
Firm 1 : Full Market




Figure 11 b

Percentage of Pivotal Hours in Ancillary Services Markets
Firm 2 : Full Market




Table 1a : Ancillary Services Prices in \$ per MW for NP15

		NP15					
		Regulation	Spin	Non-Spin	Replacement	Real-time	PX
June	Mean	\$33.65	\$33.15	\$3.21	\$3.82	\$8.38	\$12.09
	Std Dev	\$78.35	\$70.20	\$2.11	\$2.17	\$10.94	\$9.36
July	Mean	\$15.26	\$15.32	\$16.38	\$15.22	\$27.73	\$32.41
	Std Dev	\$47.39	\$38.10	\$46.48	\$47.83	\$29.72	\$20.71
August	Mean	\$12.83	\$35.71	\$28.50	\$34.68	\$45.40	\$39.53
	Std Dev	\$51.53	\$74.94	\$71.97	\$78.91	\$49.57	\$29.10
September	Mean	\$0.40	\$19.67	\$14.31	\$11.64	\$40.77	\$34.01
	Std Dev	\$9.28	\$57.58	\$51.71	\$42.54	\$41.76	\$27.93
October	Mean	\$7.41	\$2.60	\$0.63	\$0.39	\$35.30	\$26.65
	Std Dev	\$41.45	\$12.93	\$0.29	\$0.63	\$10.45	\$7.08
November	Mean	-\$1.43	\$3.32	\$0.86	\$0.54	\$30.58	\$25.74
	Std Dev	\$18.99	\$11.65	\$0.99	\$1.12	\$6.67	\$6.93
December	Mean	\$23.71	\$11.92	\$3.22	\$2.10	\$29.59	\$29.13
	Std Dev	\$32.43	\$36.28	\$23.18	\$15.85	\$22.37	\$17.36

Table 1b : Ancillary Services Prices in \$ per MW for SP15

		SP15					
		Regulation	Spin	Non-Spin	Replacement	Real-time	PX
June	Mean	\$34.29	\$39.59	\$3.05	\$3.65	\$8.38	\$12.09
	Std Dev	\$79.12	\$77.68	\$2.11	\$2.19	\$10.94	\$9.36
July	Mean	\$48.45	\$76.95	\$14.78	\$22.63	\$27.62	\$32.41
	Std Dev	\$95.15	\$96.04	\$47.55	\$66.20	\$29.69	\$20.71
August	Mean	\$16.84	\$50.23	\$37.08	\$35.04	\$43.53	\$39.53
	Std Dev	\$59.15	\$88.61	\$81.01	\$79.36	\$50.43	\$29.10
September	Mean	\$0.77	\$23.50	\$15.64	\$11.87	\$35.13	\$34.01
	Std Dev	\$13.15	\$64.08	\$54.60	\$42.82	\$41.22	\$27.93
October	Mean	\$7.41	\$2.60	\$0.63	\$0.39	\$27.69	\$26.65
	Std Dev	\$41.45	\$12.93	\$0.29	\$0.63	\$13.87	\$7.08
November	Mean	-\$1.43	\$3.32	\$0.86	\$0.54	\$24.08	\$25.74
	Std Dev	\$18.99	\$11.65	\$0.99	\$1.12	\$10.89	\$6.93
December	Mean	\$27.32	\$17.87	\$5.01	\$2.10	\$26.13	\$29.13
	Std Dev	\$40.10	\$52.03	\$30.79	\$15.85	\$22.40	\$17.36

Table 2a : Ancillary Services Bid Price Inequalities

Violation of Bid Inequality	Group	IOU			NGO		
		Period	1	2	3	1	2
$P_{\text{reg}} \geq P_{\text{spin}} \geq P_{\text{nspin}} \geq P_{\text{repl}}$	Frequency	0.74414	0.91383	0.724	0.29312	0.3289	0.30096
$P_{\text{spin}} \geq P_{\text{nspin}} \geq P_{\text{repl}}$	Frequency	0.37618	0.40402	0.47533	0.27669	0.30383	0.29066
$P_{\text{spin}} \geq P_{\text{nspin}}$	Frequency	0.32585	0.16238	0.36077	0.1071	0.11623	0.10409
$P_{\text{nspin}} \geq P_{\text{repl}}$	Frequency	0.04875	0.22414	0.11484	0.23992	0.22488	0.23451

Table 2b : Ancillary Services Bid Quantity Inequalities

Violation of Bid Inequality	Group	IOU			NGO		
		Period	1	2	3	1	2
$Q_{\text{reg}} \leq Q_{\text{spin}} \leq Q_{\text{nspin}} \leq Q_{\text{repl}}$	Frequency	0.2129	0.24342	0.2817	0.26422	0.21226	0.09379
$Q_{\text{spin}} \leq Q_{\text{nspin}} \leq Q_{\text{repl}}$	Frequency	0.00431	0.0043	0.01965	0.15934	0.06215	0.0228
$Q_{\text{spin}} \leq Q_{\text{nspin}}$	Frequency	0.00272	0.00063	0.00821	0.09821	0.05667	0.01
$Q_{\text{nspin}} \leq Q_{\text{repl}}$	Frequency	0.00159	0.00367	0.01143	0.06326	0.00548	0.01584

Table 3a : Ancillary Services Price Inequalities for NP15

NP15							
Violates	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.,	Dec
$P_{reg} \geq P_{spin}$	0.54306	0.38306	0.81989	0.99167	0.95027	0.86111	0.13441
$P_{spin} \geq P_{nspin}$	0.07639	0.5578	0.16398	0.15278	0.02688	0.06667	0.00806
$P_{nspin} \geq P_{repl}$	0.55417	0.10887	0.23522	0.24583	0.20161	0.13889	0.33333
$P_{reg} \geq P_{nspin}$	0.39306	0.78898	0.79167	0.99167	0.94758	0.84306	0.02016
$P_{reg} \geq P_{repl}$	0.36528	0.70565	0.79167	0.89583	0.63306	0.73333	0.01478
$P_{spin} \geq P_{repl}$	0.08194	0.48387	0.15054	0.04028	0.00403	0.00278	0
$P_{px} \geq \max \{ P_{spin}, P_{nspin}, P_{repl} \}$	0.16111	0.0672	0.06586	0.025	0	0	0.00672
$P_{real} \geq \max \{ P_{spin}, P_{nspin}, P_{repl} \}$	0.45417	0.14113	0.06855	0.01389	0.00134	0	0.00538

Table 3b : Ancillary Services Price Inequalities for SP15

SP15							
Violates	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.,	Dec.
$P_{reg} \geq P_{spin}$	0.55	0.68548	0.80914	0.9875	0.95027	0.86111	0.14382
$P_{spin} \geq P_{nspin}$	0.07639	0.04973	0.09677	0.12361	0.02688	0.06667	0.00403
$P_{nspin} \geq P_{repl}$	0.5625	0.30376	0.24866	0.20139	0.20161	0.13889	0.33602
$P_{reg} \geq P_{nspin}$	0.39444	0.62769	0.77823	0.9875	0.94758	0.84306	0.02016
$P_{reg} \geq P_{repl}$	0.36667	0.56586	0.77151	0.89444	0.63306	0.73333	0.01075
$P_{spin} \geq P_{repl}$	0.08194	0.09543	0.10484	0.0375	0.00403	0.00278	0
$P_{px} \geq \max \{ P_{spin}, P_{nspin}, P_{repl} \}$	0.16111	0.02151	0.0672	0.025	0	0	0.00672
$P_{real} \geq \max \{ P_{spin}, P_{nspin}, P_{repl} \}$	0.4375	0.0457	0.06586	0.02778	0.00134	0.00139	0.00538