


Bidding for Capacity Products in Spot Markets

Roger Avalos

Market Monitoring Analyst

Market Surveillance Committee Meeting

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Outline

- Introduction and Overview of Spot Market Capacity Products
- Types of cost: direct and opportunity
- ***Appropriateness of offer price for spot market capacity hinges on whether there are marginal costs for that capacity***
- Foregone energy sales *within* CAISO market are opportunity costs covered by the capacity price
- Foregone energy sales in other markets (outside, RT v. DA) are opportunity costs that can be captured with demand bids
- Including opportunity cost in bids can introduce market inefficiency compared to using other existing mechanisms
- Direct costs of providing spot market capacity are not clear

Overview of Spot Capacity Products

- Ability to change energy output within a specified time
- Can be procured
 - By committing generation resources
 - By moving an online generator (up or down) to an output level where they can provide more energy change within timeframe
 - Or from offline generators that can start up quickly enough
- CAISO is currently developing:
 - Flexible Ramping Product to procure 5-Minute Capacity in a period so it can be used to provide energy in a future period
 - Corrective Capacity to reduce flows across a transmission constraint post contingency within 30-Minutes
- CPUC and CAISO are also working together to develop forward procurement of flexible ramping capacity

Determining the Value of Capacity (1 of 2)

- Value of a MW of capacity is the amount energy production costs do not have to increase because that MW was able to help meet the capacity requirement
- Equivalent to the Shadow Value on the capacity constraint
 - The amount energy costs would decrease from a reduction in the capacity constraint.

G1 provides 50 MW of capacity and 50 MW of energy


Energy Bid = \$35

LMP = \$50

If G1 provides 1 MW less of capacity it can produce more energy at a cost (\$35) below market price (\$50)

- Net savings = \$50 - \$35 = \$15 = Capacity Price

Determining the Value of Capacity (2 of 2)



Opportunity Cost of Within Market Unsold Energy

- G1
 - MC = Energy Bid = \$35
 - LMP = \$50
 - Energy Profit = LMP - MC = \$50 - \$35 = **\$15**
- The \$15 that G1 could earn by selling energy is its opportunity cost of providing capacity
- G1 must receive \$15 from the capacity market in order to be willing to provide capacity

Accounting for Opportunity Cost of Another Market in Energy Bid

- Generation resource G2 has:
 - MC = \$35
 - Expected Price Other Market = \$38
 - Energy Bid = \$38
 - to account for expected opportunity cost of other market
- LMP = \$39
 - Energy Profit = LMP - MC = \$39 - \$35 = \$4
 - Capacity Profit = LMP - Energy Bid = \$39 - \$38 = \$1
- If procured for energy, opportunity cost of other market is covered
- If procured for capacity, loss of \$3 profit opportunity
 - Perceived low in-market opportunity cost because of higher energy bid price to account for opportunity cost of other market

Accounting for Opportunity Cost of Other Markets with Capacity Bid

- Generation resource G2 has:
 - MC = \$35
 - Expected Price Other Market = \$38
 - Energy Bid = \$38
 - Capacity Bid = \$3 (Opp. Costs of other market = \$38 - \$35)
- LMP = \$39
 - Profit if Energy = LMP - MC = \$39 - \$35 = \$4
 - Profit if Capacity = LMP - En Bid + Cap Bid = \$39 - \$38 + \$3 = \$4
- Can cover opportunity cost in both markets with capacity offer
- There are other existing market instruments for covering this opportunity cost

Using Export Bid to Represent Opportunity Cost of Outside Market

- G2 can submit an export bid of \$38 equal to the price of other market
- Consider the case without congestion:
 - Energy Bid = \$35 = MC
 - Export Bid = \$38 = P^{other}
- LMP = \$39
 - Profit if Energy = $LMP - MC = \$39 - \$35 = \$4$
 - Profit if Capacity = $LMP - \text{Energy Bid} = \$39 - \$35 = \4
 - Export Profit = \$0 - *export does not clear market*
- LMP = \$37
 - Profit if Energy = $LMP - MC = \$37 - \$35 = \$2$
 - Profit if Capacity = $LMP - \text{Energy Bid} = \$37 - \$35 = \2
 - Export Profit = $P^{\text{other}} - MP = \$38 - \$37 = \1
 - Total Profit = \$3 = same as selling energy in other market
- Can cover opportunity costs of both markets with export bid

Demand Bids vs. Capacity Bids

- Demand bid method (either export or virtual) has stronger incentive to only submit when resource believes the opportunity cost is real
 - If benefit from other market does not materialize, resource may lose money on export or virtual demand bid
- With demand bids generator does not risk CAISO market profits
- Demand bid *cannot* be used to exercise market power in capacity
 - Interties are considered competitive markets
- Capacity bid *can* be used to exercise market power in capacity
 - Local constraints
- Existing LMPM for energy can be altered to accommodate corrective constraints
- If separate capacity bids are used, new market power mitigation for capacity products would need to be developed

Direct Costs of Capacity

- Non-Energy costs to provide capacity may affect whether a capacity bid separate from energy bid is appropriate and what the range of expected competitive offer prices might be
- Direct costs may include:
 - Scheduling Costs (per-bid fee, GMC)
 - Staffing Costs (when no energy schedules)
 - Operations and Maintenance
 - Others?
- Not clear to what extent these costs exist, are marginal, and aren't presumed to be covered by forward capacity contracts or infra-marginal rents in the spot market

Thank you for your time