

CPM: The big picture and CPM design implications


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Figure 2.18 Estimated net revenue of hypothetical combined cycle unit



1. Revenue shortfalls for existing gas assets are staggering and expected to get worse
2. Greatest Irony: RPS brings much higher demands on flexibility and much lower market revenues

This is a “significant societal problem”!
(CAISO Governor Foster describing this revenue shortfall situation)

Study highlights several market impacts and directions for potential design reforms needed for 20% RPS (3)

- Effect of declining energy market revenues on capability of gas-fired generation to invest in additional operational flexibility
- Need to examine pricing and definition of wholesale market products and relationship of wholesale market revenues, CPUC LTPP, and RA program in supporting needed investments

- Centralized capacity market discussions have ended, at least for the time being
- CPUC policy effectively establishes RA price cap and floor
- Mandated planning reserve margins serve to reduce scarcity energy and ancillary service revenues
- Capped and mitigated [essentially] energy-only market with oversupply is unlikely to fill the revenue gap

- CPM is one, limited part of the design
 - CPM will not solve revenue adequacy problems, but could be a useful tool
 - CPM could be used to:
 - (1) discourage reliance on backstop mechanisms,
 - (2) encourage forward contracting, and
 - (3) create an investment signal
- CAISO CPM proposal expands (e.g., for NQC inadequacies, forestalling retirements, solving operational requirements) rather than discourages use without basis for need beyond 15% RA planning reserve margin
 - Poor pricing design will worsen compensation shortfall situation

- If this isn't the right place and time for the CAISO to provide market-based investment signals when is the right time?
 - Deferred to exceptional dispatch – new products
 - Deferred to renewable integration – new products
 - Deferred towhen?

Topics proposed for deferral to subsequent phases

- New ancillary service products and pricing
- Impact of changes in wholesale market revenues to generator types over next few years
- Intra-hour scheduling on inertias
- Changes to market timelines and intra-day settlements

- If we implement this CPM design proposed by the CAISO...
 - Will there be fewer market signals for the new services than are needed?
 - Will there will be increasing uplifts with essentially no ability for LSEs to hedge increased costs?
 - Will we have inefficient capital allocation?
 - Where will the incremental \$s come from for least-cost retooling of existing fleets?
 - Or will we require new higher-cost resources to take their place?

- What are the other long-term ramifications of paying a capacity price that is based only on going forward fixed cost and that provides no return on capital?

- Also, in terms of total compensation, California policies discriminate in pricing between “new” and “existing” generation with existing generation largely constrained to “going forward” costs
 - Is this policy sustainable and what inefficient outcomes might it lead to?

- FERC => adequacy of resources has significant effect on wholesale rates and services and therefore is subject to Commission jurisdiction
 - How will CAISO assure that CAISO FERC Tariff produces economically efficient investment in new and existing resources, an essential component of long term resource adequacy?