

### Decision on market enhancements for Summer 2021 readiness

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### Management proposes enhancements to address concerns arising from last summer's heatwave

- Strengthen import offer incentives for hourly imports during tight supply conditions
- Provide stronger prices signals for enhanced supply incentives during tight supply conditions
- Enhance dispatch of reliability demand response resources through the market to provide more accurate pricing
- Enhance interconnection process changes to expedite new supply interconnections to the grid

### Enhancements respond to ISO/CPUC/CEC Final Root Cause Analysis report and other analyses

- Proposed enhancements are limited to changes that can be implemented by this summer
  - Significant stakeholder input shaped proposals despite initiative's fast timeline
- Longer-term changes will be addressed in upcoming stakeholder initiatives
- Management is also finalizing proposal for additional summer 2021 enhancements addressing export and wheeling scheduling priorities



#### Management proposes an import bid price makewhole payment during tight system conditions to strengthen import supply incentives

- Hourly imports may have insufficient incentives to offer supply due to risk of being paid less than their offer price
- Real-time market clears hourly block economic import bids based on hour-ahead scheduling process prices but pays fifteen-minute market price
  - Risk is greater during tight system conditions because operator out-of-market actions can lower fifteen-minute prices relative to the hour-ahead scheduling process
  - Risk does not exist for fifteen-minute dispatchable imports



### Hourly import make-whole payment would only apply under limited tight supply conditions

- Fifteen-minute market design has important benefits under most conditions
- Tight system conditions defined as
  - Day-ahead alert notice anticipating operating reserve deficiency, or
  - Real-time warning notice indicating operating reserve deficiency or emergency stages 1-3
- Would apply to real-time market hourly block imports:
  - Real-time market imports incremental to day-ahead schedules
  - Day-ahead scheduled exports reduced in the real-time market
- Allocate uplift costs to load and exports



### Management proposes enhancement to improve price signals during very tight supply conditions

- New provision would apply when operators arm load to meet contingency reserve requirements
  - Arming load occurs when operators configure the system to be able to immediately perform controlled load shedding
  - Armed load can count for contingency reserves
  - Makes supply resources scheduled for contingency reserves available to serve load
- Current market rules can result in lower market prices when contingency reserves released to serve load
- Propose to price energy from resources released from contingency reserves to serve load at energy bid cap



### Current process for dispatching reliability demand response resources can mute price signals during tight supply conditions

- Reliability demand response resources are dispatched pursuant to a settlement agreement
  - Only dispatched upon issuance of system condition warning notice
  - Resources must bid at \$950/MWh or higher
- Reliability demand response resources seldom set price because operators typically manually dispatch them
- Dispatch of reliability demand response resources can suppress market prices if not incorporated into load forecast



### Management proposes to enhance reliability demand response resources dispatch to preserve price signals

- Provide ability to specify reliability demand response resources as hourly, fifteen-minute, or five-minute dispatchable
  - Fifteen- and five-minute dispatchable reliability demand response resource's ability to set fifteen-market prices will improve pricing
  - Use in the real-time pre-dispatch process of the real-time market will reduce manual dispatch
- Allow reliability demand response resources under "discrete dispatch" option to set market prices
- Automate reliability demand response resource dispatch into load forecast



# Management proposes targeted interconnection process changes to expedite connection of additional supply for summer 2021

- Remove 100MW or 125% cap on behind-the-meter expansion requests
  - Since inception, the ISO has not found the cap to be critical
  - Majority of expansions are battery additions to variable energy resources, which do not present interconnection issues and help meet peak demand
- Allow the ISO to award available deliverability temporarily to online projects until earlier-queued project comes online
  - Allows temporary use of transmission upgrades to expedite new supply capacity



### Stakeholders generally support management's proposals (slide 1 of 2)

- Stakeholder's generally support management's import make-whole payment proposal but IPC objected to allocating a portion of costs to EIM transfers
  - Management revised proposal remove transfers from allocation
- Most stakeholders support pricing energy at bid cap from contingency reserves released when arming load
  - CPUC and PG&E believe changes needs to be more comprehensively examined
  - SCE continues to advocate to couple scarcity pricing changes with implementing system market power mitigation
  - Management believes change accurately reflects system conditions and provides proper market incentives



### Stakeholders generally support management's proposals (slide 2 of 2)

- Stakeholder's generally support management's proposal to improve reliability demand response resource dispatch and better reflect it in ISO market pricing
  - CLECA is concerned dispatches may not reflect resource start-up times and use limitations
    - Management notes changes will result in market better respecting these constraints
  - Calpine believes hourly dispatchable reliability demand response resources should be able to set fifteen-minute market prices
    - Management believes that they should not because they cannot respond with fifteen-minute granularity
- Stakeholder's support management's proposals to enhance the ISO's interconnection process as a way to expedite more capacity for summer 2021

# Management requests the Board of Governors approve its market enhancements for summer 2021 proposals

- Strengthens incentives for suppliers to offer import supply
- Improves ISO market incentives under very tight supply conditions
- Better reflects using reliability demand response resources in ISO market pricing
- Expedites connecting additional supply for summer 2021

