



July 6, 2009

The Honorable Kimberly D. Bose  
Secretary  
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission  
888 First Street N.E.  
Washington, DC 20426

**Re: California Independent System Operator Corporation, ER02-1656**

Dear Secretary Bose:

The California Independent System Operator Corporation (“CAISO”) hereby respectfully submits for electronic filing a report on the Automated Mitigation Procedures (“AMP”) covering the first quarter of 2009. This report is being submitted in accordance with the directive in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (“Commission”) July 17, 2002 Order, *California Independent System Operator Corporation*, 100 FERC ¶ 61, 060 (2002) (the “Order”). This filing contains the last of the quarterly reports on AMP, as the July 17 Order specifying the reporting requirement was specific to the AMP mechanism used in the market at that time and the California ISO has implemented a new market that does not have an AMP feature implemented. The report will also be posted on the CAISO’s website at <http://www.caiso.com>.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Anthony J. Ivancovich  
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Report on Performance of the Automated Mitigation Procedure  
Covering 2009 Q1  
California ISO – July 3, 2009

As directed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“Commission”) in its July 17, 2002 Order,<sup>1</sup> the ISO has prepared this Report on the Performance of the Automated Mitigation Procedure (AMP), covering the first quarter of 2009. AMP, proposed by the ISO in its May 1, 2002 Market Redesign 2002 filing, was approved by the Commission with modifications in the July 17 Order. This report provides an accounting of AMP activity for the subject period.

### Description of AMP

AMP is an automated procedure designed as part of the ISO’s real-time market dispatch software. It was intended to limit the ability of suppliers of energy in the real-time market to exercise market power by offering energy at prices well in excess of production costs. In short, AMP is a three-step algorithm that runs approximately 53 minutes prior to each hour of operation of the real-time market:

1. **Price Screen:** AMP predicts prices for each 15-minute interval of the operating hour based upon submitted bids and predicted imbalance.<sup>2</sup> If any predicted interval price in any ISO congestion zone exceeds \$91.87/MWh, AMP applies the Conduct Test.
2. **Conduct Test:** AMP compares each resource’s bid to its *Reference Level*, a benchmark generally based upon the resource’s rolling average of bids from the previous 90 days. In the event that a bid exceeds its reference level by the lower of \$100 or twice the reference level, the resource is said to have failed the Conduct Test.
3. **Impact Test:** AMP substitutes reference levels for all resources that have failed the Conduct Test. AMP then re-calculates the predicted prices based upon this reconstructed supply curve. If the average predicted price over the four 15-minute intervals is \$50 above or twice the original predicted price, whichever is lower, the Impact Test is said to have been failed.

In the event that the Impact Test is failed, all resources whose bids failed the Conduct Test are mitigated. That is, their reference levels replace submitted bids for purposes of actual real-time dispatch and pricing.

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<sup>1</sup> *California Independent System Operator Corporation*, 100 FERC ¶ 61,060 (2002) (July 17 Order).

<sup>2</sup> AMP actually runs for four 15-minute predicted intervals in each hour, rather than for the 12 actual 5-minute market intervals each hour. This was a design tradeoff that could provide similar predictive value in a computer processing timeframe that was feasible for hourly operation.

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**Accounting of AMP Activity for 2009 Q1**

The following figures and discussion cover the three months, January through March 2009, with specific attention paid to instances where running AMP resulted in actual bid mitigation. Table 1 below shows some summary statistics for each of these months. Note that mitigation occurred in a total of 7 hours during this three month period.

**Table 1: Summary of Conduct and Impact Test Failures for January - March 2009**

<b>Month</b>	<b>Hours in the Month</b>	<b>Hours w/ <math>\geq 3</math> Intervals Priced <math>\geq \\$91.87</math></b>	<b>Hours with Conduct Test Failures</b>	<b>Impact Test Failures (Mitigation)</b>	<b>Avg. Hourly MCP with Mitigation</b>
Jan-09	744	27	25	2	\$14.73
Feb-09	672	20	13	1	\$14.05
Mar-09	743	26	29	4	\$28.29

The third column in Table 1 shows the number of hours in the month where at least three five-minute intervals were priced at or above \$91.87/MWh. This statistic is presented to indicate the number of hours where there was a significant number of intervals priced greater than the Price Screen threshold of \$91.87. Note that these prices are actual market outcomes and will be influenced by any mitigation that has occurred, however since mitigation took place in only seven hours during this period, we are able to glean from these figures in how many hours prices were significantly high that AMP may have been triggered by failure of the price screen.<sup>3</sup> Generally, the percent of hours in a month where there were three or more intervals priced over \$91.87 ranged from 3% to 4%.

The fourth column in Table 1 shows the number of hours where the Price Screen failed, triggered evaluation of the Conduct Test, and the Conduct Test was failed by one or more generators. In general, in all hours there are high priced energy bids submitted that are high enough that they would likely fail the Conduct Test. Given this, the frequency of hours with Conduct Test failures is also an indication of the frequency of hours where the Price Screen failed as well.

The last two columns in Table 1 show the number of hours in which bids were mitigated as a result of AMP and the average hourly price during those mitigated hours. Bid mitigation occurred in a total of seven hours during this period.

Table 2 shows summary statistics for the hours where mitigation did occur. Generally, the number of resources in an hour that failed the Conduct Test and had their bids mitigated when the Impact Test failed ranged from 16 to 35 resources. During this period, six out of seven hours where bids

<sup>3</sup> Since implementation of RTMA on October 1, 2004, the 15-minute interval prices generated by the price predictor and used in evaluating whether or not the Price Screen was failed are not readily available and can only be viewed by retrieving and reading from RTMA "Saved Cases". This is an extremely cumbersome process and was not undertaken for this summary.

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were mitigated occurred in the late evening when the different rates at which load and schedules ramp can force the imbalance market to move significantly further up the bid curve quickly to dispatch sufficient ramping energy to cover any disconnect between load and schedule ramps.

**Table 2: AMP Mitigation Detail for January - March 2009**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Hour</b>	<b>Number of Mitigated Units</b>	<b>Hourly Average Load (MW)</b>	<b>Hourly Average MCP (\$/MWh)</b>
18-Jan-09	18	35	25,900	\$12.53
20-Jan-09	9	23	26,923	\$16.93
28-Feb-09	23	30	22,700	\$14.05
01-Mar-09	21	29	26,336	\$21.18
03-Mar-09	21	18	28,534	\$14.57
10-Mar-09	20	16	28,567	\$62.54
10-Mar-09	23	28	25,130	\$14.87