



Market Performance Report October 2018

December 3, 2018

ISO Market Quality and Renewable Integration

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Executive Summary¹

The market performance in October 2018 is summarized below.

CAISO area performance,

- Peak loads for ISO area continued to drop in October following the downward trend of temperatures.
- Across all market, such as the integrated forward market (IFM), the fifteen-minute market (FMM) and real-time market (RTD), the market observed price separation with higher prices observed in the PG&E area due to transmission congestion.
- Congestion rents for interties fell to \$5.88 million from \$6.66 million in September. Majority of the congestion rents in October accrued on Malin (43 percent) intertie and Palo Verde (49 percent) intertie.
- In the congestion revenue rights (CRR) market, revenue adequacy was 101.78 percent, flipping into a surplus from a revenue deficit of 99.37 percent observed in September. The nomogram 7750_D-ECASCO_OOS_CP6_NG contributed largely to a revenue surplus.
- The monthly average ancillary service cost to load inched up to \$0.54/MWh from \$0.47/MWh in September. There were five scarcity events in this month.
- The cleared virtual supply was well above the cleared demand in most days of this month. The profits from convergence bidding rose to \$5.16 million from \$3.67 million in September.
- The bid cost recovery decreased to \$7.90 million from \$8.43 million in September.
- The real-time energy offset decreased to -\$5.19 million from -\$4.55 million in September. The real-time congestion offset cost fell to \$12.33 million from \$13.92 million in September.
- The volume of exceptional dispatch rose to 105,347 MWh from 85,520 MWh in September. The main contributors to the increased monthly volume were load forecast uncertainty and planned transmission outage. The monthly average of total exceptional dispatch volume as a percentage of load percentage was 0.56 percent, edging up from 0.43 percent in September

¹ This report contains the highlights of the reporting period. For a more detailed explanation of the technical characteristics of the metrics included in this report please download the Market Performance Metric Catalog, which is available on the CAISO web site at <http://www.caiso.com/market/Pages/ReportsBulletins/Default.aspx>.

Energy Imbalance market (EIM) performance,

- In the FMM, the prices for AZPS, IPCO, NEVP, and PACE were elevated on October 1 and 2 driven by upward load adjustment, renewable deviation, import reduction, and generation outages. In RTD, the prices for AZPS, IPCO, NEVP, and PACE were elevated on October 2 due to upward load adjustment and renewable deviation.
- The monthly average prices in FMM for EIM entities (AZPS, BCHA, IPCO, NEVP, PACE, PACW, PGE and PSEI) observed very little price separation and were \$35.37, \$36.42, \$36.90, \$37.64, \$32.07, \$34.98, \$34.91 and \$37.01 respectively.
- The monthly average prices in RTD for EIM entities (AZPS, BCHA, IPCO, NEVP, PACE, PACW, PGE and PSEI) was \$29.82, \$33.71, \$34.39, \$31.35, \$29.83, \$33.65, \$33.13 and \$33.25 respectively.
- Bid cost recovery, real-time imbalance energy offset, and real-time congestion offset costs for EIM entities (AZPS, BCHA, IPCO, NEVP, PACE, PACW, PGE and PSEI) were \$0.36 million, \$1.98 million and -\$0.70 million respectively.

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
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Market Characteristics

Loads

Peak loads for ISO area continued to drop in October due to falling temperatures.

Figure 1: System Peak Load



Resource Adequacy Available Incentive Mechanism

Resource Adequacy Availability Incentive Mechanism (RAAIM) was activated on November 1, 2016 to track the performance of Resource Adequacy (RA) Resources. RAAIM is used to determine the availability of resources providing local and/or system Resource Adequacy Capacity and Flexible RA Capacity each month and then assess the resultant Availability Incentive Payments and Non-Availability Charges through the CAISO’s settlements process. Table 1 below shows the monthly average actual availability, total non-availability charge, and total availability incentive payment.² Starting from May 2018, the ISO reports the system RA average actual availability and flexible RA average actual availability separately.

Table 1: Resource Adequacy Availability and Payment

	Total Non-availability Charge	Total Availability Incentive Payment	Average Actual Availability	Flexible Average Actual Availability	System Average Actual Availability
Jan17	\$2,265,805	-\$1,844,332	95.72%		
Feb17	\$3,157,590	-\$2,119,905	92.52%		
Mar17	\$2,975,585	-\$1,789,708	92.15%		
Apr17	\$3,641,392	-\$1,703,556	89.75%		
May17	\$1,017,191	-\$1,017,191	96.44%		
Jun17	\$4,058,330	-\$1,502,850	94.24%		
Jul17	\$3,277,858	-\$1,940,268	95.20%		
Aug17	\$3,691,798	-\$1,544,674	95.27%		
Sep17	\$934,468	-\$934,468	96.82%		
Oct17	\$620,818	-\$620,818	97.58%		
Nov17	\$1,483,755	-\$1,483,755	96.29%		
Dec17	\$1,502,939	-\$1,502,939	96.96%		
Jan18	\$921,031	-\$921,031	97.66%		
Feb18	\$2,480,894	-\$1,759,093	95.46%		
Mar18	\$3,552,921	-\$1,541,456	93.06%		
Apr18	\$2,917,993	-\$1,599,950	93.00%		
May18	\$6,004,496	-\$2,254,847		92.43%	91.22%
Jun18	\$5,182,422	-\$2,618,787		95.08%	92.09%
Jul18	\$2,085,852	-\$2,692,615		94.54%	95.18%
Sep18	\$1,288,104	-\$2,289,531		98.06%	96.96%
Oct18	\$2,431,149	-\$2,275,138		95.42%	96.31%

² On June 21, 2017, the ISO indicated in the market notice that it intended to file a petition with the FERC for a limited tariff waiver on section 40.9.6 to forego assessing any Resource Adequacy Availability Incentive Mechanism (RAAIM) charges for the period April 1, 2017 through December 31, 2017 due to identified implementation issues. This waiver includes April, 2017 and May 2017. The ISO is currently estimating the penalties reflected in the charge code 8830 to be zero pursuant to tariff section 11.29.10.5.

Direct Market Performance Metrics

Energy

Day-Ahead Prices

Figure 2 shows daily prices of four default load aggregate points (DLAPs). Table 2 below lists the binding constraints along with the associated DLAP locations and the occurrence dates when the binding constraints resulted in relatively high or low DLAP prices.

Figure 2: Day-Ahead Simple Average LAP Prices (All Hours)




Table 2: Day-Ahead Transmission Constraints

DLAP	Date	Transmission Constraint
PGAE	October 6-12, 16-24, 28-31	7750_D-ECASCO_OOS_CP6_NG, OMS_6451207_TRACY-LOSBANOS

Real-Time Prices

FMM daily prices of the four DLAPs are shown in Figure 3. Table 3 lists the binding constraints along with the associated DLAP locations and the occurrence dates when the binding constraints resulted in relatively high or low DLAP prices. The LMPs for all four DLAPs spiked on October 1 and 2 due to upward load adjustment, renewable deviation, import reduction, and generation outage.

Figure 3: FMM Simple Average LAP Prices (All Hours)





Table 3: FMM Transmission Constraints

DLAP	Date	Transmission Constraint
PGAE	October 3- 8, 10, 14-31	7750_D-ECASCO_OOS_CP6_NG, OMS_6451207_TRACY-LOSBANOS

Figure 4 below shows the daily frequency of positive price spikes and negative prices by price range for the default LAPs in the FMM. The cumulative frequency of prices above \$250/MWh increased to 0.35 percent in October from 0.13 percent in September. The cumulative frequency of negative prices rose to 2.40 percent in October from 0.02 percent in September.

Figure 4: Daily Frequency of FMM LAP Positive Price Spikes and Negative Prices



RTD daily prices of the four DLAPs are shown in Figure 5. Table 4 lists the binding constraints along with the associated DLAP locations and the occurrence dates when the binding constraints resulted in relatively high or low DLAP prices. On October 1 and 2, all four DLAP LMPs were elevated by upward load adjustment, renewable deviation, and import reduction.

Figure 5: RTD Simple Average LAP Prices (All Hours)





Table 4: RTD Transmission Constraints

DLAP	Date	Transmission Constraint
PGAE	October 3- 8, 10, 14-31	7750_D-ECASCO_OOS_CP6_NG, OMS_6451207_TRACY-LOSBANOS
SDG&E	October 25	OMS_6454908_TL23054_NG

Figure 6 below shows the daily frequency of positive price spikes and negative prices by price range for the default LAPs in RTD. The cumulative frequency of prices above \$250/MWh decreased to 0.40 percent in October from 0.80 percent in September. The cumulative frequency of negative prices increased to 4.86 percent in October from 0.31 percent in September.

Figure 6: Daily Frequency of RTD LAP Positive Price Spikes and Negative Price




Congestion

Congestion Rents on Interties

Figure 7 below illustrates the daily integrated forward market congestion rents by interties. The cumulative total congestion rent for interties in October fell to \$5.88 million from \$6.66 million in September. Majority of the congestion rents in October accrued on Malin (43 percent) intertie and Palo Verde (49 percent) intertie.

The congestion rent on Malin dropped to \$2.54 million in October from \$4.38 million in September. The congestion rent on Palo Verde increased to \$2.85 million in October from \$0.66 million in September.


Figure 7: IFM Congestion Rents by Interties (Import)



Average Congestion Cost per Load Served

This metric quantifies the average congestion cost for serving one megawatt of load in the ISO system. Figure 8 shows the daily and monthly averages for the day-ahead and real-time markets respectively.

Figure 8: Average Congestion Cost per Megawatt of Served Load




The average congestion cost per MWh of load served in the integrated forward market declined to \$1.19/MWh in October from \$2.00/MWh in September. The average congestion cost per load served in the real-time market edged up to -\$0.68/MWh in October from -\$0.71/MWh in September.

Congestion Revenue Rights

Figure 9 illustrates the daily revenue adequacy for congestion revenue rights (CRRs) broken out by transmission element. The average CRR revenue surplus in October was \$12,450 compared with the average revenue deficit of \$11,276 in September. Both months basically achieved revenue neutrality.

Figure 9: Daily Revenue Adequacy of Congestion Revenue Rights




Overall, October experienced a CRR revenue surplus. Revenue surplus was observed in 19 days this month. The main reasons are

- The nomogram 7750_D-ECASCO_OOS_CP6_NG was binding in 28 days this month, resulting in revenue surplus of \$3.82 million.
- The intertie PALOVRDE_ITC was binding in 12 days of this month, resulting in revenue surplus of \$0.79 million.
- The nomogram 7820_TL 230S_OVERLOAD_NG was binding in nine days of this month, resulting in revenue surplus of \$0.74 million.

The shares of the revenue surplus and deficit accruing on various congested transmission elements for the reporting period are shown in Figure 10 and the monthly summary for CRR revenue adequacy is provided in Table 5.

Figure 10: CRR Revenue Adequacy by Transmission Element



Overall, the total amount collected from the IFM was insufficient to cover the net payments to congestion revenue right holders and the cost of the exemption for existing rights. The revenue adequacy level was 101.78 percent in October. Out of the total congestion rents, 3.79 percent was used to cover the cost of existing right exemptions. Net total congestion revenues in October were in surplus by \$0.39 million, compared to the deficit of \$0.25 million in September. The auction revenues credited to the balancing account for October were \$6.27 million. As a result, the balancing account for October had a surplus of approximately \$6.84 million, which will be allocated to measured demand.

Table 5: CRR Revenue Adequacy Statistics

IFM Congestion Rents	\$22,944,875.50
Existing Right Exemptions	-\$870,628.12
Available Congestion Revenues	\$22,074,247.38
CRR Payments	\$21,688,290.08
CRR Revenue Adequacy	\$385,957.29
Revenue Adequacy Ratio	101.78%
Annual Auction Revenues	\$4,173,258.76
Monthly Auction Revenues	\$2,096,422.91
CRR Settlement Rule	\$180,362.93
Allocation to Measured Demand	\$6,836,001.90

Ancillary Services

IFM (Day-Ahead) Average Price


Table 6 shows the monthly IFM average ancillary service procurements and the monthly average prices. In October the monthly average procurement decreased for all four types of ancillary services.

Table 6: IFM (Day-Ahead) Monthly Average Ancillary Service Procurement

	Average Procured				Average Price			
	Reg Up	Reg Dn	Spinning	Non-Spinning	Reg Up	Reg Dn	Spinning	Non-Spinning
Oct-18	313	385	790	791	\$11.29	\$7.56	\$5.23	\$0.60
Sep-18	337	395	931	932	\$9.70	\$8.96	\$4.71	\$0.35
Percent Change	-7.14%	-2.50%	-15.13%	-15.05%	16.42%	-15.55%	10.91%	74.88%

The monthly average prices increased for regulation up, spinning and non-spinning reserves in October. Figure 11 shows the daily IFM average ancillary service prices. The average prices in October were generally quiet.


Figure 11: IFM (Day-Ahead) Ancillary Service Average Price



Ancillary Service Cost to Load

The monthly average cost to load inched up to \$0.54/MWh in October from \$0.47/MWh in September. October 2 saw elevated average cost due to high spinning and non-spinning prices in real-time market, which was driven by high opportunity cost of energy and the increase in spinning and non-spinning requirements. On October 2, solar resources ramped off during the evening hours and other resources had to be re-dispatched for these ramping needs, resulting in high energy prices.

On Figure 12: System (Day-Ahead and Real-Time) Average Cost to Load



Scarcity Events


The ancillary services scarcity pricing mechanism is triggered when the ISO is not able to procure the target quantity of one or more ancillary services in the IFM and real-time market runs. The scarcity events in October are shown in the table below.

Date	Hour Ending	Interval	Ancillary Service	Region	Shortfall (MW)	Percentage of Requirement
October 2	20	3	Non-Spin	CAISO_EXP	30.6	2.3%
October 17	12	4	Regulation Up	SP26_EXP	0.71	0.7%
October 27	11	4	Regulation Up	SP26_EXP	10.88	10.4%
October 27	14	1	Regulation Up	SP26_EXP	6.38	5.7%
October 29	4	1	Regulation Up	CAISO_EXP	0.01	0.003%

Convergence Bidding

Figure 13 below shows the daily average volume of cleared virtual bids in IFM for virtual supply and virtual demand. The cleared virtual supply was well above the cleared demand in most days of this month.

Figure 13: Cleared Virtual Bids



Convergence bidding tends to cause the day-ahead market and real-time market prices to move closer together, or “converge”. Figure 14 shows the energy prices (namely the energy component of the LMP) in IFM, hour ahead scheduling process (HASP), FMM, and RTD.

Figure 14: IFM, HASP, FMM, and RTD Prices





Figure 15 shows the profits that convergence bidders receive from convergence bidding. The total profits from convergence bidding rose to \$5.16 million in October from \$3.67 million in September.

Figure 15: Convergence Bidding Profits



Renewable Generation Curtailment

Figure 16 below shows the monthly wind and solar VERs (variable energy resource) curtailment due to system wide condition or local congestion in RTD. Figure 17 shows the monthly wind and solar VERs (variable energy resource) curtailment by resource type in RTD. Economic curtailment is defined as the resource’s dispatch upper limit minus its RTD schedule when the resource has an economic bid. Dispatch upper limit is the maximum level the resource can be dispatched to when various factors are take into account such as forecast, maximum economic bid, generation outage, and ramping capacity. Self-schedule curtailment is defined as the resource’s self-schedule minus its RTD schedule when RTD schedule is lower than self-schedule. When a VER resource is exceptionally dispatched, then exceptional dispatch curtailment is defined as the dispatch upper limit minus the exceptional dispatch value.

As Figure 16 and Figure 17 below show, the renewable curtailment rose in October. The majority of the curtailments was economic and was mainly due to congestion management and not for oversupply conditions.

Figure 16: Renewable Curtailment by Reason





Figure 17: Renewable Curtailment by Resource Type



Flexible Ramping Product

On November 1, 2016 the ISO implemented two market products in the 15-minute and 5-minute markets: Flexible Ramping Up and Flexible Ramping Down uncertainty awards. These products provide additional upward and downward flexible ramping capability to account for uncertainty due to demand and renewable forecasting errors. In addition, the existing flexible ramping sufficiency test was extended to ensure feasible ramping capacity for real-time interchange schedules.

Flexible Ramping Product Payment

Figure 18 shows the flexible ramping up and down uncertainty payments. Flexible ramping up uncertainty payment increased to \$0.29 million in October from \$0.08 million in September. Flexible ramping down uncertainty payment decreased to -\$5,482 in October from -\$211 in September.

Figure 18: Flexible Ramping Up/down Uncertainty Payment





Figure 19 shows the flexible ramping forecast payment. Flexible ramping forecast payment dropped to -\$0.05 million this month from -\$0.02 million observed in September.

Figure 19: Flexible Ramping Forecast Payment



Indirect Market Performance Metrics

Bid Cost Recovery

Figure 20 shows the daily uplift costs due to exceptional dispatch payments. The monthly uplift costs in October fell to \$0.83 million from \$1.91 million in September.

Figure 20: Exceptional Dispatch Uplift Costs




Figure 21 shows the allocation of bid cost recovery payment in the IFM, residual unit commitment (RUC) and RTM markets. The total bid cost recovery for October decreased to \$7.90 million from \$8.43 million in September. Out of the total monthly bid cost recovery payment for the three markets in October, the IFM market contributed 27 percent, RTM contributed 66 percent, and RUC contributed 7 percent of the total bid cost recovery payment.

Figure 21: Bid Cost Recovery Allocation




Figure 22 and Figure 23 show the daily and monthly BCR cost by local capacity requirement area (LCR) respectively.

Figure 22: Bid Cost Recovery Allocation by LCR




Figure 23: Monthly Bid Cost Recovery Allocation by LCR




Figure 24 and Figure 25 show the daily and monthly BCR cost by utility distribution company (UDC) respectively.

Figure 24: Bid Cost Recovery Allocation by UDC




Figure 25: Monthly Bid Cost Recovery Allocation by UDC




Figure 26 shows the cost related to BCR by cost type in RUC.

Figure 26: Cost in RUC




Figure 27 and Figure 28 show the daily and monthly cost related to BCR by type and LCR in RUC respectively.

Figure 27: Cost in RUC by LCR




Figure 28: Monthly Cost in RUC by LCR




Figure 29 and Figure 30 show the daily and monthly cost related to BCR by type and UDC in RUC respectively.

Figure 29: Cost in RUC by UDC




Figure 30: Monthly Cost in RUC by UDC




Figure 31 shows the cost related to BCR in real time by cost type. Minimum load cost contributed largely to the real time cost this month.

Figure 31: Cost in Real Time




Figure 32 and Figure 33 show the daily and monthly cost related to BCR by type and LCR in real time respectively.

Figure 32: Cost in Real Time by LCR




Figure 33: Monthly Cost in Real Time by LCR




Figure 34 and Figure 35 show the daily and monthly cost related to BCR by type and UDC in Real Time respectively.

Figure 34: Cost in Real Time by UDC




Figure 35: Monthly Cost in Real Time by UDC




Figure 36 shows the cost related to BCR in IFM by cost type.

Figure 36: Cost in IFM




Figure 37 and Figure 38 show the daily and monthly cost related to BCR by type and location in IFM respectively.

Figure 37: Cost in IFM by LCR




Figure 38: Monthly Cost in IFM by LCR




Figure 39 and Figure 40 show the daily and monthly cost related to BCR by type and UDC in IFM respectively.

Figure 39: Cost in IFM by UDC






Figure 40: Monthly Cost in IFM by UDC



Real-time Imbalance Offset Costs

Figure 41 shows the daily real-time energy and congestion imbalance offset costs. Real-time energy offset cost decreased to -\$5.19 million in October from -\$4.55 million in September. Real-time congestion offset cost decreased to \$12.33 million in October from \$13.92 million in September.

Figure 41: Real-Time Energy and Congestion Imbalance Offset



Market Software Metrics

Market performance can be confounded by software issues, which vary in severity levels with the failure of a market run being the most severe.

Market Disruption

A market disruption is an action or event that causes a failure of an ISO market, related to system operation issues or system emergencies.³ Pursuant to section 7.7.15 of the ISO tariff, the ISO can take one or more of a number of specified actions to prevent a market disruption, or to minimize the extent of a market disruption.

There were a total of 26 market disruptions this month. Table 7 lists the number of market disruptions and the number of times that the ISO removed bids (including self-schedules) in any of the following markets in this month. The ISO markets include IFM, RUC, FMM and RTD processes.


Table 7: Summary of Market Disruption

Type of CAISO Market	Market Disruption or Reportable	Removal of Bids (including Self-Schedules)
Day-Ahead		
IFM	0	0
RUC	0	0
Real-Time		
FMM Interval 1	3	0
FMM Interval 2	1	0
FMM Interval 3	0	0
FMM Interval 4	5	0
Real-Time Dispatch	17	0

Figure 42 shows the frequency of IFM, HASP (FMM interval 2), FMM (intervals 1, 3 and 4), and RTD failures. On October 24, one HASP, two FMM and four RTD disruptions occurred due to application not being running.

³ These system operation issues or system emergencies are referred to in Sections 7.6 and 7.7, respectively, of the ISO tariff.

Figure 42: Frequency of Market Disruption



Manual Market Adjustment

Exceptional Dispatch

Figure 43 shows the daily volume of exceptional dispatches, broken out by market type: real-time incremental dispatch and real-time decremental dispatch. The real-time exceptional dispatches are among one of the following types: a unit commitment at physical minimum; an incremental dispatch above the day-ahead schedule and a decremental dispatch below the day-ahead schedule.

The total volume of exceptional dispatch in October increased to 105,347 MWh from 85,520 MWh in September.

Figure 43: Total Exceptional Dispatch Volume (MWh) by Market Type




Figure 44 shows the volume of the exceptional dispatch broken out by reason.⁴ The majority of the exceptional dispatch volumes in October were driven by load forecast uncertainty (33 percent), planned transmission outage (23 percent), voltage support (14 percent) and operating procedure number and constraint (14 percent).

⁴ For details regarding the reasons for exceptional dispatch please read the white paper at this link: <http://www.caiso.com/1c89/1c89d76950e00.html>.

Figure 44: Total Exceptional Dispatch Volume (MWh) by Reason





Figure 45 shows the total exceptional dispatch volume as a percent of load, along with the monthly average. The monthly average percentage was 0.56 percent in October, edging up from 0.43 percent in September. Exception dispatch volume escalated on October 2, largely driven by the outage of Vaca-Tesla 500 kV line which resulted in derate on Malin500 inertia.

Figure 45: Total Exceptional Dispatch as Percent of Load



Energy Imbalance Market

On November 1, 2014, the California Independent System Operator Corporation (ISO) and Portland-based PacifiCorp fully activated the Energy Imbalance Market (EIM). This real-time market is the first of its kind in the West. EIM covers six western states: California, Oregon, Washington, Utah, Idaho and Wyoming.

On December 1, 2015, NV Energy, the Nevada-based utility successfully began participating in the western Energy Imbalance Market (EIM). On October 1, 2016, Phoenix-based Arizona Public Service (AZPS) and Puget Sound Energy (PSEI) of Washington State successfully began full participation in the western Energy Imbalance Market.

On October 1, 2017, Portland General Electric Company (PGE) became the fifth western utility to successfully begin full participation in the western Energy Imbalance Market (EIM). PGE joins Arizona Public Service, Puget Sound Energy, NV Energy, PacifiCorp and the ISO, together serving over 38 million consumers in eight states: California, Arizona, Oregon, Washington, Utah, Idaho, Wyoming and Nevada.

On April 4, 2018, Boise-based Idaho Power and Powerex of Vancouver, British Columbia successfully entered the western Energy Imbalance Market (EIM) today, allowing the ISO's real-time power market to serve energy imbalances occurring within about 55 percent of the electric load in the Western Interconnection. The eight western EIM participants serve more than 42 million consumers in the power grid stretching from the border with Canada south to Arizona, and eastward to Wyoming.

Figure 46 shows daily simple average ELAP prices for PacifiCorp east (PACE), PacifiCorp West (PACW), NV Energy (NEVP), Arizona Public Service (AZPS), Puget Sound Energy (PSEI), Portland General Electric Company (PGE), Idaho Power (IPCO), and Powerex (BCHA) for all hours in FMM. The prices for AZPS, IPCO, NEVP, and PACE were elevated on October 1 and 2 driven by upward load adjustment, renewable deviation, import reduction, and generation outage. The prices for NEVP spiked on October 20 and 21 due to capped EIM transfer, reduced ramping capacity, and upward load adjustment.

Figure 46: EIM Simple Average LAP Prices (All Hours) in FMM




Figure 47 shows daily simple average ELAP prices for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, PGE, IPCO, and BCHA for all hours in RTD. The prices for AZPS, IPCO, NEVP, and PACE were elevated on October 2 due to upward load adjustment and renewable deviation.

Figure 47: EIM Simple Average LAP Prices (All Hours) in RTD




Figure 48 shows the daily price frequency for prices above \$250/MWh and negative prices in FMM for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, PGE, IPCO, and BCHA. The cumulative frequency of prices above \$250/MWh increased to 0.35 percent in October from 0.18 percent in September. The cumulative frequency of negative prices rose to 0.53 percent in October from 0.05 percent in September.

Figure 48: Daily Frequency of EIM LAP Positive Price Spikes and Negative Prices in FMM




Figure 49 shows the daily price frequency for prices above \$250/MWh and negative prices in RTD for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, PGE, IPCO, and BCHA. The cumulative frequency of prices above \$250/MWh inched down to 0.30 percent in October from 0.49 percent in September. The cumulative frequency of negative prices increased to 1.07 percent in October from 0.21 percent in September.

Figure 49: Daily Frequency of EIM LAP Positive Price Spikes and Negative Prices in RTD




Figure 50 shows daily real-time imbalance energy offset cost (RTIEO) for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, PGE, IPCO, and BCHA respectively. Total RTIEO increased to \$1.98 million in October from -\$0.28 million in September.

Figure 50: EIM Real-Time Imbalance Energy Offset by Area




Figure 51 shows daily real-time congestion offset cost (RTCO) for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, PGE, IPCO, and BCHA respectively. Total RTCO declined to -\$0.70 million in October from -\$0.32 million in September.

Figure 51: EIM Real-Time Congestion Imbalance Offset by Area




Figure 52 shows daily bid cost recovery for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, PGE, IPCO, and BCHA respectively. Total BCR reduced to \$0.36 million in October from \$0.83 million in September.

Figure 52: EIM Bid Cost Recovery by Area




Figure 53 shows the flexible ramping up uncertainty payment for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, PGE, IPCO, and BCHA respectively. Total flexible ramping up uncertainty payment in October rose to \$0.45 million from \$0.14 million in September.

Figure 53: Flexible Ramping Up Uncertainty Payment




Figure 54 shows the flexible ramping down uncertainty payment for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, PGE, IPCO, and BCHA respectively. Total flexible ramping down uncertainty payment in October fell to -\$11,455 from \$754 in September.

Figure 54: Flexible Ramping Down Uncertainty Payment





Figure 55 shows the flexible ramping forecast payment for PACE, PACW, NEVP, AZPS, PSEI, PGE, IPCO, and BCHA respectively. Total forecast payment in October dropped to -\$0.16 million from \$0.09 million in September.


Figure 55: Flexible Ramping Forecast Payment



The ISO’s Energy Imbalance Market Business Practice Manual⁵ describes the methodology for determining whether an EIM participating resource is dispatched to support transfers to serve California load. The methodology ensures that the dispatch considers the combined energy and associated marginal greenhouse gas (GHG) compliance cost based on submitted bids⁶.

The EIM dispatches to support transfers into the ISO were documented in Figure 56 and Table 8 below.

Figure 56: Percentage of EIM Transfer into ISO by Fuel Type



⁵ See the Energy Imbalance Market Business Practice Manual for a description of the methodology for making this determination, which begins on page 42 -- [http://bpmcm.caiso.com/Pages/BPMDetails.aspx?BPM=Energy Imbalance Market](http://bpmcm.caiso.com/Pages/BPMDetails.aspx?BPM=Energy%20Imbalance%20Market).

⁶ A submitted bid may reflect that a resource is not available to support EIM transfers to California.

Table 8: EIM Transfer into ISO by Fuel Type

Month	Coal (%)	Gas (%)	Non-Emitting (%)	Total
Jan-16	0.00%	28.96%	71.04%	100%
Feb-16	0.00%	22.21%	77.79%	100%
Mar-16	0.00%	12.72%	87.28%	100%
Apr-16	0.00%	46.26%	53.74%	100%
May-16	0.00%	51.63%	48.37%	100%
Jun-16	0.00%	67.89%	32.11%	100%
Jul-16	0.00%	82.42%	17.58%	100%
Aug-16	0.00%	87.59%	12.41%	100%
Sep-16	1.98%	87.68%	10.34%	100%
Oct-16	0.00%	43.82%	56.18%	100%
Nov-16	0.00%	30.74%	69.26%	100%
Dec-16	0.00%	53.77%	46.23%	100%
Jan-17	0.00%	69.88%	30.12%	100%
Feb-17	0.00%	36.42%	63.58%	100%
Mar-17	0.00%	13.37%	86.63%	100%
Apr-17	0.00%	15.47%	84.53%	100%
May-17	0.00%	18.47%	81.53%	100%
Jun-17	0.00%	21.42%	78.58%	100%
Jul-17	0.00%	36.08%	63.92%	100%
Aug-17	0.00%	59.20%	40.80%	100%
Sep-17	0.00%	45.94%	54.06%	100%
Oct-17	0.00%	24.85%	75.15%	100%
Nov-17	0.00%	11.57%	88.43%	100%
Dec-17	0.00%	15.36%	84.64%	100%
Jan-18	0.00%	9.12%	90.88%	100%
Feb-18	0.00%	15.20%	84.80%	100%
Mar-18	0.16%	25.00%	74.84%	100%
Apr-18	0.00%	0.14%	99.86%	100%
May-18	0.00%	1.09%	98.91%	100%
Jun-18	0.00%	2.89%	97.11%	100%
Jul-18	0.00%	25.04%	74.96%	100%
Aug-18	0.00%	35.87%	64.13%	100%
Sep-18	0.00%	35.50%	64.50%	100%
Oct-18	0.00%	24.51%	75.49%	100%