25 INTERCONNECTION OF GENERATING UNITS AND GENERATING FACILITIES TO THE CAISO CONTROLLED GRID.

25.1 Applicability.

This Section 25 and Appendix U (the Standard Large Generator Interconnection Procedures (LGIP)), Appendix Y (the LGIP for Interconnection Requests in a Queue Cluster Window), Appendix S (the Small Generator Interconnection Procedures (SGIP)), or Appendix W, as applicable, shall apply to:

(a) each new Generating Unit that seeks to interconnect to the CAISO Controlled Grid;

(b) each existing Generating Unit connected to the CAISO Controlled Grid that will be modified with a resulting increase in the total capability of the power plant;

(c) each existing Generating Unit connected to the CAISO Controlled Grid that will be modified without increasing the total capability of the power plant but has changed the electrical characteristics of the power plant such that its re-energization may violate Applicable Reliability Criteria; and

(d) each existing Qualifying Facility Generating Unit connected to the CAISO Controlled Grid whose total Generation was previously sold to a Participating TO or on-site customer but whose Generation, or any portion thereof, will now be sold in the wholesale market, subject to Section 25.1.2.

25.1.1 The owner of a Generating Unit described in Section 25.1 (a), (b), or (c), or its designee, shall be an Interconnection Customer required to submit an Interconnection Request and comply with Appendix U (the LGIP), Appendix Y (the LGIP for Interconnection Requests in a Queue Cluster Window), Appendix S (the SGIP), or Appendix W, as applicable, which applicability shall be based on the maximum rated capacity of the new total capability of the power plant, including the capability of all of multiple energy production devices at a site, consistent with Section 4.10 of the SGIP.

25.1.2 If the owner of a Qualifying Facility described in Section 25.1(d), or its designee, represents that the total capability and electrical characteristics of the Qualifying Facility will be substantially unchanged, then that entity must submit an affidavit to the CAISO and the applicable Participating TO representing that the total capability and electrical characteristics of the Qualifying Facility will remain substantially unchanged. If there is any change to the total capability and electrical characteristics of the Qualifying Facility, however, the affidavit shall include supporting information describing any such changes. The CAISO and the applicable Participating TO shall have the right to verify whether or not the total capability or electrical characteristics of the Qualifying Facility have changed or will change.

25.1.2.1 If the CAISO and the applicable Participating TO confirm that the electrical characteristics are substantially unchanged, then that request will not be placed into the interconnection queue. However, the owner of the Qualifying Facility, or its designee, will be required to execute a Standard Large Generator Interconnection Agreement in accordance with Section 11 of Appendix U (the LGIP), a Large Generator Interconnection Agreement in accordance with Section 11 of Appendix Y (the LGIP for Interconnection Requests in a Queue Cluster Window), a Small Generator Interconnection Agreement in accordance with Section 3.3.4, 3.4.5, or 3.5.7 and Section 4.8 of the SGIP, or an interconnection agreement in accordance with Appendix W, as applicable.

25.1.2.2 If the CAISO and the applicable Participating TO cannot confirm that the total capability and electrical characteristics are and will be substantially unchanged, then the owner of the Qualifying Facility, or its designee, shall be an Interconnection Customer required to submit an Interconnection Request and comply with Appendix U (the LGIP), Appendix Y (the LGIP for Interconnection Requests in a Queue Cluster Window), Appendix S (the SGIP), or Appendix W, as applicable.

25.2 Interconnections to the Distribution System.

Any proposed interconnection by the owner of a planned Generating Unit, or its designee, to connect that Generating Unit to a Distribution System of a Participating TO will be processed, as applicable, pursuant to the Wholesale Distribution Access Tariff or CPUC Rule 21, or other Local Regulatory Authority requirements, if applicable, of the Participating TO; provided, however, that the owner of the planned Generating Unit, or its designee, shall be required to mitigate any adverse impact on reliability of the CAISO Controlled Grid consistent with Appendix U (the Standard Large Generator Interconnection Procedures) and Appendix Y (the LGIP for Interconnection Requests in a Queue Cluster Window). In addition, each Participating TO will provide to the CAISO a copy of the system impact study used to determine the impact of a planned Generating Unit on the Distribution System and the CAISO Controlled Grid pursuant to a request to interconnect under the applicable Wholesale Distribution Access Tariff or CPUC Rule 21, or other Local Regulatory Authority requirements, if applicable.

25.3 Maintenance of Encumbrances.

No new Generating Unit shall adversely affect the ability of the applicable Participating TO to honor its Encumbrances existing as of the time an Interconnection Customer submits its Interconnection Request to the CAISO. The applicable Participating TO, in consultation with the CAISO, shall identify any such adverse effect on its Encumbrances in the Interconnection System Impact Study performed under Section 7 of Appendix U (the LGIP), the Phase I Interconnection Study performed under Section 6 of Appendix Y (the LGIP for Interconnection Requests in a Queue Cluster Window), the system impact study performed under Section 3.4 of the SGIP, or the System Impact Study performed under Section 5.1 of Appendix W, as applicable. To the extent the applicable Participating TO determines that the connection of the new Generating Unit will have an adverse effect on Encumbrances, the Interconnection Customer shall mitigate such adverse effect.

26 TRANSMISSION RATES AND CHARGES.

26.1 Access Charges.

All Market Participants withdrawing Energy from the CAISO Controlled Grid shall pay Access Charges in accordance with this Section 26.1 and Appendix F, Schedule 3, except as provided in Section 4.1 of Appendix I (Station Power Protocol). Prior to the TAC Transition Date determined under Section 4 of Schedule 3 of Appendix F, the Access Charge for each Participating TO shall be determined in accordance with the principles set forth in this Section 26.1 and in Section 5 of the TO Tariff. The Access Charge shall comprise two components, which together shall be designed to recover each Participating TO's Transmission Revenue Requirement. The first component shall be the annual authorized revenue requirement associated with the transmission facilities and Entitlements turned over to the Operational Control of the CAISO by a Participating TO approved by FERC. The second component shall be based on the Transmission Revenue Balancing Account (TRBA), which shall be designed to flow through the Participating TO's Transmission Revenue Credits calculated in accordance with Section 5 of the TO Tariff and other credits identified in Sections 6 and 8 of Schedule 3 of Appendix F of the CAISO Tariff.

Commencing on the TAC Transition Date determined under Section 4 of Schedule 3 of Appendix F, the Access Charges shall be paid by any UDC or MSS Operator that is serving Gross Load in a PTO Service Territory, and shall consist, where applicable, of a High Voltage Access Charge, a Transition Charge and a Low Voltage Access Charge. High Voltage Access Charges and Low Voltage Access Charges shall each comprise two components, which together shall be designed to recover each Participating TO's High Voltage Transmission Revenue Requirement and Low Voltage Transmission Revenue Requirement, as applicable. The first component shall be based on the annual authorized Transmission Revenue Requirement associated with the High Voltage Transmission Facilities or Low Voltage Transmission Facilities, as applicable, and Entitlements turned over to the CAISO Operational Control by a Participating TO. The second component shall be the Transmission Revenue Balancing Account (TRBA), which shall

be designed to flow through the Participating TO's Transmission Revenue Credits associated with the high voltage or low voltage, as applicable, transmission facilities and Entitlements and calculated in accordance with Section 5 of the TO Tariff and other credits identified in Sections 6, 8 and 13 of Schedule 3 of Appendix F of the CAISO Tariff. Each Participating TO shall provide in its TO Tariff filing with FERC an appendix to such filing that states the Participating TO's High Voltage Transmission Revenue Requirement, its Low Voltage Transmission Revenue Requirement (if applicable) and its Gross Load used in developing the rate. The allocation of each Participating TO's Transmission Revenue Requirement between the High Voltage Transmission Revenue Requirement and the Low Voltage Transmission Revenue Requirement shall be undertaken in accordance with Section 11 of Schedule 3 of Appendix F. To the extent necessary, each Participating TO shall make conforming changes to its TO Tariff.

The applicable High Voltage Access Charge and the Transition Charge shall be paid to the CAISO by each UDC and MSS Operator based on its Gross Load connected to a High Voltage Transmission Facility in a PTO Service Territory, either directly or through intervening distribution facilities, but not through a Low Voltage Transmission Facility. The applicable High Voltage Access Charge, the Transition Charge and the Low Voltage Access Charge for the applicable Participating TO shall be paid by each UDC and MSS Operator based on its Gross Load in the PTO Service Territory. The applicable High Voltage Access Charge and Transition Charge shall be assessed by the CAISO as a charge for transmission service under this CAISO Tariff, shall be determined in accordance with Schedule 3 of Appendix F, and shall include all applicable components of the High Voltage Access Charge and Transition Charge set forth therein.

The Low Voltage Access Charge for each Participating TO is set forth in that Participating TO's TO Tariff. Each Participating TO shall charge for and collect the Low Voltage Access Charge, as provided in its TO Tariff, except that the CAISO shall charge for and collect the Low Voltage Access Charge of each Non-Load-Serving Participating TO that qualifies under this Section 26.1 and Appendix F, Schedule 3, Section

13, unless otherwise agreed by the affected Participating TOs. If a Participating TO that is also a UDC, MSS Operator, or Scheduling Coordinator serving End-Use Customers is using the Low Voltage Transmission Facilities of another Participating TO, such Participating TO shall also be assessed the Low Voltage Access Charge of the other Participating TO by such other Participating TO, or by the CAISO pursuant to Section 13 of Schedule 3 of Appendix F. The CAISO shall provide to the applicable Participating TO a statement of the amount of Energy delivered to each UDC and MSS Operator serving Gross Load that utilizes the Low Voltage Transmission Facilities of that Participating TO on a monthly basis. If a UDC or MSS Operator that is serving Gross Load in a PTO Service Territory has Existing Rights to use another Participating TO's Low Voltage Transmission Facilities, such entity shall not be charged the Low Voltage Access Charge for delivery of Energy to Gross Load for deliveries using the Existing Rights. Each Participating TO shall recover Standby Transmission Revenues directly from the Standby Service Customers of that Participating TO through its applicable retail rates.

Where a Non-Load-Serving Participating TO has Low Voltage Transmission Facilities, the CAISO shall assess the Low Voltage Access Charge for each project of that Non-Load-Serving Participating TO to the UDC or MSS Operator of each Participating TO that is directly connected to one or more Low Voltage Transmission Facilities of that project, unless otherwise agreed by the affected Participating TOs. The Non-Load-Serving Participating TO shall calculate separately its Low Voltage Transmission Revenue Requirement for each individual transmission project that includes one or more Low Voltage Transmission Facilities. If the Non-Load-Serving Participating TO's Low Voltage Transmission Facilities projects are directly connected to the facilities of the same Participating TO(s), the Low Voltage Access Charge shall be calculated for the group of Low Voltage Transmission Facilities. A separate Low Voltage Access Charge shall apply based on the Low Voltage Transmission Revenue Requirement for the relevant project or projects of such Non-Load-Serving Participating TO divided by the Gross Load of all UDCs or MSS Operators of a Participating TO that are directly connected to the relevant Low Voltage Transmission Facility or group of facilities.

A Non-Load-Serving Participating TO must include any over- or under-recovery of its annual Low Voltage Transmission Revenue Requirement for the relevant project or group of projects in its low voltage TRBA adjustment for its Low Voltage Access Charge for the relevant project or group of projects pursuant to Section 13.1 of Schedule 3 of Appendix F.

A Participating TO that is a UDC or MSS Operator to whom the Low Voltage Access Charge of a Non-Load-Serving Participating TO is assessed shall include these billed Low Voltage Access Charge amounts in its low voltage TRBA adjustment for its Low Voltage Access Charge, together with all other applicable low voltage TRBA adjustments.

26.1.1 Publicly Owned Electric Utilities Access Charge.

Local Publicly Owned Electric Utilities whose transmission facilities are under CAISO Operational Control shall file with the FERC their proposed High Voltage Transmission Revenue Requirements, and any proposed changes thereto, under procedures determined by the FERC to be applicable to such filings and shall give notice to the CAISO and to all Scheduling Coordinators of any such filing. A prospective New Participating TO that is a Local Publicly Owned Electric Utility shall submit its first proposed High Voltage Transmission Revenue Requirement to the FERC and the CAISO at the time the Local Publicly Owned Electric Utility submits its application to become a New Participating TO in accordance with the Transmission Control Agreement. Federal power marketing agencies whose transmission facilities are under CAISO Operational Control shall develop their High Voltage Transmission Revenue Requirement pursuant to applicable federal laws and regulations.

The procedures for public participation in a federal power marketing agency's ratemaking process are posted on the federal power marketing agency's website. Each federal power marketing agency shall also post on its website the Federal Register notices and FERC orders for rate making processes that impact the federal power marketing agency's High Voltage Transmission Revenue Requirement. At the time the federal power marketing agency submits its application to become a New Participating TO in accordance with the Transmission Control Agreement, it shall submit its first proposed High Voltage Transmission Revenue Requirement to the FERC and the CAISO.

26.1.2 High Voltage Access Charge and Transition Charge Settlement.

UDCs and MSS Operators serving Gross Load in a PTO Service Territory shall be charged on a monthly basis, in arrears, the applicable High Voltage Access Charge and Transition Charge. The High Voltage Access Charge and Transition Charge for a billing period is calculated by the CAISO as the product of the applicable High Voltage Access Charge or Transition Charge, as applicable, and Gross Load connected to the facilities of the UDC and MSS Operator in the PTO Service Territory. The High Voltage Access Charge and Transition Charge are determined in accordance with Schedule 3 of Appendix F. These rates may be adjusted from time to time in accordance with Schedule 3 of Appendix F. During the 10-year TAC Transition Period described in Section 4 of Schedule 3 of Appendix F, a UDC or MSS Operator that is also a Participating TO shall pay, or receive payment of, if applicable, the difference between (i) the High Voltage Access Charge and the Transition Charge applicable to its transactions as a UDC or MSS Operator; and (ii) the disbursement of High Voltage Access Charge revenues to which it is entitled pursuant to Section 26.1.3.

26.1.3 Disbursement of High Voltage Access Charge and Transition Charge Revenues.

The CAISO shall collect and pay, on a monthly basis, to Participating TOs all High Voltage Access Charge and Transition Charge revenues at the same time as other CAISO charges and payments are settled. High Voltage Access Charge revenues received with respect to the High Voltage Access Charge and the Transition Charge shall be distributed to Participating TOs in accordance with Appendix F, Schedule 3, Section 10.

26.1.4 Wheeling.

Any Scheduling Coordinator or other such entity submitting a Bid or Self-Schedule for a Wheeling transaction shall pay to the CAISO the product of (i) the applicable Wheeling Access Charge, and (ii) the total hourly Schedules and awards of Wheeling in kilowatt-hours for each month at each Scheduling Point associated with that transaction, except as provided in Section 4.1 of Appendix I (Station Power Protocol). Schedules and awards that include Wheeling transactions shall be subject to any charges resulting from the CAISO Markets in accordance with Section 27.

26.1.4.1 Wheeling Access Charge.

The Wheeling Access Charge shall be determined by the TAC Area and transmission ownership or Entitlement, less all Encumbrances, associated with the Scheduling Point at which the Energy exits the CAISO Controlled Grid. The Wheeling Access Charge for Scheduling Points contained within a single TAC Area, that are not joint facilities, shall be equal to the High Voltage Access Charge for the applicable TAC Area in accordance with Schedule 3 of Appendix F plus the applicable Low Voltage Access Charge if the Scheduling Point is on a Low Voltage Transmission Facility. Wheeling Access Charges shall not apply for Wheeling under a bundled non-economy Energy coordination agreement of a Participating TO executed prior to July 9, 1996.

26.1.4.2 Wheeling Over Joint Facilities.

To the extent that more than one Participating TO owns or has Entitlement to transmission capacity, less all Encumbrances, exiting the CAISO Controlled Grid at a Scheduling Point, the Scheduling Coordinator shall pay the CAISO each month a rate for Wheeling at that Scheduling Point which reflects an average of the Wheeling Access Charge applicable to those Participating TOs, weighted by the relative share of such ownership or Entitlement to transmission capacity, less all Encumbrances, at such Scheduling Point. If the Scheduling Point is located at High Voltage Transmission Facilities, the Wheeling Access Charge will consist of a High Voltage Wheeling Access Charge component. Additionally, if the Scheduling Point is located at Low Voltage Transmission Facilities, the applicable Low Voltage Wheeling Access Charge component will be added to the Wheeling Access Charge. The methodology for developing the weighted average rate for Wheeling at each Scheduling Point is set forth in Appendix F, Schedule 3, Section 14.4.

26.1.4.3 Disbursement of Wheeling Revenues.

The CAISO shall collect and pay to Participating TOs and other entities as provided in Section 24.7.3 all Wheeling revenues at the same time as other CAISO charges and payments are settled. For Wheeling revenues associated with CRRs allocated to Load Serving Entities outside the CAISO *Balancing Authority Area*, the CAISO shall pay to the Participating TOs and other entities as provided in Section 24.7.3 any

excess prepayment amounts within thirty (30) days of the end of the term of the CRR Allocation. The CAISO shall provide to the applicable Participating TO and other entities as provided in Section 24.7.3 a statement of the aggregate amount of Energy delivered to each Scheduling Coordinator using such Participating TO's Scheduling Point to allow for calculation of Wheeling revenue and auditing of disbursements. Wheeling revenues shall be disbursed by the CAISO based on the following:

26.1.4.3.1 Scheduling Point with All Participating TOs in the Same TAC Area.

With respect to revenues received for the payment of High Voltage Wheeling Access Charges for Wheeling to a Scheduling Point at which all of the facilities and Entitlements, less all Encumbrances, are owned by Participating TOs in the same TAC Area, Wheeling revenues shall be disbursed to each such Participating TO based on the ratio of each Participating TO's High Voltage Transmission Revenue Requirement to the sum of all such Participating TO's High Voltage Transmission Revenue Requirements. If the Scheduling Point is located at a Low Voltage Transmission Facility, revenues received with respect to Low Voltage Wheeling Access Charges for Wheeling to that Scheduling Point shall be disbursed to the Participating TOs that own facilities and Entitlements making up the Scheduling Point in proportion to their Low Voltage Transmission Revenue Requirements. Additionally, if a Participating TO has a transmission upgrade or addition that was funded by a Project Sponsor, the Wheeling revenue allocated to such Participating TO shall be disbursed as provided in Section 24.7.3.

26.1.4.3.2 Scheduling Point without All Participating TOs in the Same TAC Area.

With respect to revenues received for the payment of Wheeling Access Charges for Wheeling to a Scheduling Point at which the facilities and Entitlements, less all Encumbrances, are owned by Participating TOs in different TAC Areas, Wheeling revenues shall be disbursed to such Participating TOs as follows. First, the revenues shall be allocated between such TAC Areas in proportion to the ownership and Entitlements of transmission capacity, less all Encumbrances, at the Scheduling Point of the Participating TOs in each such TAC Area. Second, the revenues thus allocated to each TAC Area shall be disbursed among the Participating TOs in the TAC Area in accordance with Section 26.1.4.3.1.

26.1.4.4 Information Required from Scheduling Coordinators.

Scheduling Coordinators for Wheeling Out or Wheeling Through transactions to a Bulk Supply Point, or other point of interconnection between the CAISO Controlled Grid and the transmission system of a Non-Participating TO, that are located within the CAISO *Balancing Authority* Area, shall provide the CAISO, within five (5) days from the end of the calendar month to which the relevant Trading Day relates, details of such transactions (other than transactions submitted as Self-Schedules pursuant to Existing Contracts) sorted by Bulk Supply Point or point of interconnection for each Settlement Period (including kWh for each transaction). The CAISO shall use such information, which may be subject to review by the CAISO, to settle Wheeling Access Charges and payments. The CAISO shall publish a list of the Bulk Supply Points or interconnection points to which this Section 26.1.4.4 applies together with details of the electronic form and procedure to be used by Scheduling Coordinators to submit the required information on the CAISO Website.

26.1.5 Unbundled Retail Transmission Rates.

The Access Charge for unbundled retail transmission service provided to End-Users by a FERC-jurisdictional electric utility Participating TO shall be determined by the FERC and submitted to the CAISO for information only. For a Local Publicly Owned Electric Utility, retail transmission service rates shall be determined by the Local Regulatory Authority and submitted to the CAISO for information only.

26.2 Tracking Account.

If the Access Charge rate methodology implemented pursuant to Section 26.1 results in Access Charge rates for any Participating TO which are different from those in effect prior to the CAISO Operations Date, an amount equal to the difference between the new rates and the prior rates for the remainder of the period, if any, during which a cost recovery plan established pursuant to Section 368 of the California Public Utilities Code (as added by AB 1890) is in effect for such Participating TO shall be recorded in a tracking account. The balance of that tracking account will be recovered from customers and paid to the appropriate Participating TO after termination of the cost recovery plan set forth in Section 368 of

California Public Utilities Code (as added by AB 1890). The recovery and payments shall be based on an amortization period not exceeding three years in the case of electric corporations regulated by the CPUC or five years for Local Publicly Owned Electric Utilities.

26.3 Addition of New Facilities After CAISO Implementation.

The costs of transmission facilities placed in service after the CAISO Operations Date shall be recovered consistent with the cost recovery determinations made pursuant to Appendix F, Schedule 3 and Section 24.7.3.

26.4 Effect on Tax-Exempt Status.

Nothing in this Section 26 shall compel any Participating TO to violate any restrictions applicable to facilities financed with tax-exempt bonds or contractual restrictions and covenants regarding the use of transmission facilities.

26.5 Transition Mechanism.

During the ten-year TAC Transition Period described in Section 4 of Schedule 3 of Appendix F, the Original Participating TOs collectively shall pay to the CAISO each year an amount equal to, annually, for all New Participating TOs, the amount, if any, by which the New Participating TO's cost of Existing High Voltage Facilities associated with Gross Loads in the PTO Service Territory of the New Participating TO is increased by the implementation of the High Voltage Access Charge described in Schedule 3 of Appendix F. Responsibility for such payments shall be allocated to Original Participating TOs in accordance with Schedule 3 of Appendix F. Amounts payable by Original Participating TOs under this section shall be recoverable as part of the Transition Charge calculated in accordance with Schedule 3 of Appendix F. Amounts received by the CAISO under this section shall be disbursed to New Participating TOs with Existing High Voltage Facilities based on the ratio of each New Participating TO's net increase in costs in the categories described in the first sentence of this section, to the sum of the net increases in such costs for all New Participating TOs with Existing High Voltage Facilities.

26.6 Location Constrained Resource Interconnection Facilities.

The costs of an LCRIF shall be includable in a P*articipating TO's High Voltage* Transmission *Revenue Requirement. Any Participating TO that owns an LCRIF shall set forth in its TO Tariff a charge payable by LCRIGs connected to that facility. The charge shall require each LCRIG to pay on a going forward basis its pro rata share of the Transmission Revenue Requirement associated with the LCRIF, which shall be calculated based on the maximum capacity of the LCRIG relative to the capacity of the LCRIF. Each Participating TO shall credit its High Voltage TRR with revenues received from LCRIGs with respect to such charges either by recording such revenues in its TRBA or through another mechanism approved by FERC.*

26.6.1 Location Constrained Resource Interconnection Facilities that Become Network Facilities.

If the construction of a new transmission facility or upgrade causes an LCRIF to become a network facility, then, effective on the in-service date of such new transmission facility or upgrade, the LCRIGs connected to the LCRIF shall not be required to pay charges described in Section 26.6. The LCRIGs shall remain responsible for charges due prior to that date.

ARTICLE III – MARKET OPERATIONS

27 CAISO MARKETS AND PROCESSES.

In the Day-Ahead and Real-Time time frames the CAISO operates a series of procedures and markets that together comprise the CAISO Markets Processes. In the Day-Ahead time frame, the CAISO conducts the MPM-RRD, an Integrated Forward Market (IFM) and the Residual Unit Commitment (RUC) process. In the Real-Time time frame, the CAISO conducts the Market Power Mitigation and Reliability Requirement Determination, the Hour-Ahead Scheduling Process (HASP), the Short-Term Unit Commitment (STUC), the Real-Time Unit Commitment (RTUC) and the five-minute Real-Time Dispatch (RTD). The CAISO Markets Processes utilize transmission and Security Constrained Unit Commitment and dispatch algorithms in conjunction with a Full Network Model to optimally commit, schedule and Dispatch resources and determine marginal prices for Energy, Ancillary Services and RUC Capacity. Congestion Revenue Rights are available and entitle holders of such instruments to a stream of hourly payments or charges associated with revenue the CAISO collects or pays from the Marginal Cost of Congestion component of hourly Day-Ahead LMPs. Through the operation of the CAISO Markets Processes the CAISO develops Day-Ahead Schedules, Day-Ahead AS Awards and RUC Schedules, HASP Advisory Schedules, HASP Intertie Schedules and AS Awards, Real-Time AS Awards and Dispatch Instructions to ensure that sufficient supply resources are available in Real-Time to balance Supply and Demand and operate in accordance with Reliability Criteria.

27.1 Locational Marginal Pric*es and Ancillary Services Marginal Prices*.

The CAISO Markets are based on*: 1)* Locational Marginal Prices as provided below *in Section 27.1.1* and further provided in Appendix C*; and 2) Ancillary Services Marginal Prices as provided below in Section 27.1.2*.

27.1.1 Locational Marginal Prices for Energy.

The LMP for Energy at any PNode is the marginal cost of serving the next increment of Demand at that PNode consistent with existing transmission facility Constraints and the performance characteristics of resources. The LMPs calculated in the IFM, the HASP for Scheduling Points, and the RTD are based on

Energy Bid Curves. The LMP at any given PNode is comprised of three cost components: the System Marginal Energy Cost (SMEC); Marginal Cost of Losses (MCL); and Marginal Cost of Congestion (MCC). The IFM calculates LMPs for each Trading Hour of the next Trading Day. The HASP, which is an hourly run of the RTUC with the Time Horizon that starts at the beginning of the next Trading Hour, calculates fifteen-minute LMPs (HASP Intertie LMPs) for that Trading Hour. The simple average of the four fifteen-minute LMPs for the Trading Hour computed at each Scheduling Point produces hourly LMPs for HASP Settlement of Energy at that Scheduling Point. The Real-Time Dispatch runs every five (5) minutes throughout each Trading Hour and calculates five-minute LMPs for the next Dispatch Interval. The CAISO uses the Resource-Specific Settlement Interval LMPs for Settlements of the Real-Time Market.

27.1.1.1 System Marginal Energy Cost.

The System Marginal Energy Cost (SMEC) component of the LMP reflects the marginal cost of providing Energy from a designated reference Location. For this designated reference Location the CAISO will utilize a distributed Reference Bus whose constituent PNodes are weighted in pre-specified proportions referred to as Reference Bus distribution factors. The SMEC shall be the same throughout the system.

27.1.1.2 Marginal Cost of Losses.

For all PNodes and Aggregated PNodes in the CAISO *Balancing Authority* Area, including Scheduling Points, the use of the FNM in the DAM and the RTM processes incorporates Transmission Losses. At each PNode or Aggregated PNode, the Marginal Cost of Losses is the System Marginal Energy Cost multiplied by the Marginal Loss factor at that PNode or Aggregated PNode. The Marginal Cost of Losses at a Location (PNode or APNode) may be positive or negative depending on whether an increase in Demand at that Location marginally increases or decreases the cost of Transmission Losses, using the distributed Reference Bus to balance it. The Marginal Loss factors are determined through a process that calculates the sensitivities of Transmission Losses with respect to changes in injection at each Location in the FNM. For CAISO Controlled Grid facilities outside the CAISO *Balancing Authority* Area, the CAISO

shall assess the cost of Transmission Losses to Scheduling Coordinators using each such facility based on the quantity of losses agreed upon with the neighboring *Balancing Authority* multiplied by the LMP at the PNode of the Transmission Interface with the neighboring *Balancing Authority* Area. The MCLs calculated for Locations within the CAISO *Balancing Authority* Area shall not reflect the cost of Transmission Losses on those facilities.

27.1.1.3 Marginal Cost of Congestion.

The Marginal Cost of Congestion at a PNode reflects a linear combination of the Shadow Prices of all binding Constraints in the network, each multiplied by the corresponding Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF). The Marginal Cost of Congestion may be positive or negative depending on whether a power injection (i.e., incremental Load increase) at that Location marginally increases or decreases Congestion.

27.1.2 Ancillary Service Prices.

27.1.2.1 Ancillary Service Marginal Prices.

As provided in Section 8.3, Ancillary Services are procured and awarded through the IFM and the Real-Time Market. The IFM calculates hourly Day-Ahead Ancillary Service Awards and establishes Ancillary Service Marginal Prices (ASMPs) for the accepted Regulation Up, Regulation Down, Spinning Reserve and Non-Spinning Reserve Bids. The IFM co-optimizes Energy and Ancillary Services subject to resource, network and regional constraints. In the Real-Time Market, the RTUC process that is performed every fifteen (15) minutes establishes fifteen (15) minute Ancillary Service Schedules, Awards, and prices for the upcoming quarter of the given Trading Hour. ASMPs are determined by first calculating the Ancillary Services shadow prices for each Ancillary Service type and the applicable Ancillary Services Regions. The Ancillary Services shadow prices are produced as a result of the co-optimization of Energy and Ancillary Services for each Ancillary Service Region through the IFM and the Real-Time Market, subject to resource, network, and requirements constraints. The Ancillary Services shadow prices

represent the cost sensitivity of the relevant binding regional constraint at the optimal solution, or the marginal reduction of the combined Energy and Ancillary Service procurement cost associated with a marginal relaxation of that constraint. If the regional constraint is not binding for an Ancillary Services Region, then the corresponding Ancillary Services shadow price in the Ancillary Services Region is zero. The ASMP for a particular Ancillary Service type and Ancillary Services Region is then the sum of the Ancillary Services shadow prices for the specific type of Ancillary Service and all the other types of Ancillary Services for which the subject Ancillary Service can substitute, as described in Section 8.2.3.5, and for the given Ancillary Service Region and all the other Ancillary Service Regions that include that given Ancillary Service Region.

27.1.2.2 Opportunity Cost in Ancillary Services Marginal Prices.

The Ancillary Services shadow price, which as described above, is a result of the Energy and Ancillary Service co-optimization, includes the forgone opportunity cost of the marginal resource, if any, for not providing Energy or other types of Ancillary Services the marginal resource is capable of providing in the relevant market. The ASMPs determined by the IFM *or RTUC* optimization process *for* each resource *whose* Ancillary Service Bid is accepted will be no lower than the sum of (i) the Ancillary Service capacity Bid price submitted for that resource, and (ii) the foregone opportunity cost of Energy in the IFM *or RTUC* for that resource. The foregone opportunity cost of Energy is measured as the positive difference between the IFM *or RTUC* LMP at the resource's Pricing Node and the resource's Energy Bid price. If the resource's Energy Bid price is higher than the LMP, the opportunity cost is $0. If a resource has submitted an Ancillary Service Bid but no Energy Bid and is under an obligation to offer Energy in the DAM (e.g. a non-hydro Resource Adequacy Resource), its Default Energy Bid will be used, and its opportunity cost *will be* calculated accordingly. If a resource has submitted an Ancillary Service Bid but no Energy Bid and is not under an obligation to offer Energy in the DAM, its Energy opportunity cost is $0 since it cannot be dispatched for Energy.

27.1.2.3 Ancillary Services Pricing in the Event of a Supply Insufficiency.

In the event that there is not sufficient supply to meet an Ancillary Services procurement requirement in a particular Ancillary Services Region in the IFM or RTM as required by Section 8.3, the applicable market will relax the relevant Ancillary Service procurement requirement and will use the maximum Ancillary Service Bid price permitted under Section 39.6.1.3 as the pricing parameter for determining the price of the deficient Ancillary Service

27.1.3 Maximum and Minimum CAISO Markets Prices

For Settlements purposes, all LMPs, ASMPs and RUC Availability Prices for the IFM, RUC, HASP and Real-Time Market, as applicable, shall not exceed $2500 per MWh and shall not be less than negative $2500 per MWh. All prices produced by the CAISO Markets will be posted in accordance with the posting of market results as further provided in Section 6.5. Prices exceeding $2500 or less than negative $2500 will be modified for Settlements purposes pursuant to price correction process in Section 35 and the CAISO will post the results. The CAISO will conduct a stakeholder process during the first year of operation after the effective date of this provision to assess whether the maximum and minimum prices for Settlements should be modified or eliminated after the first twelve (12) months of operation.

27.2 Load Aggregation Points (LAP).

The CAISO shall create Load Aggregation Points and shall maintain Default LAPs at which all Demand shall Bid and be settled, except as provided in Sections 27.2.1 and 30.5.3.2.

27.2.1 Metered Subsystems.

The CAISO shall define specific MSS LAPs for each MSS. The MSS LAP shall be made up of the PNodes within the MSS that have Load served off of those Nodes. The MSS LAPs have unique Load Distribution Factors that reflect the distribution of the MSS Demand to the network Nodes within the MSS. These MSS LAPs are separate from the Default LAPs, and the Load Distribution Factors of the Default LAP do not reflect any MSS Load. As further provided in Sections 11.2.3 and 11.5, MSS Demand is settled either at the price at the Default LAP for MSS Operators that have selected gross Settlement or at the price at the applicable MSS LAP for MSS Operators that have selected net Settlement.

27.2.2 Determination of LAP Prices.

27.2.2.1 IFM LAP Prices.

The IFM LAP Price for a given Trading Hour is the weighted average of the individual IFM LMPs at the PNodes within the LAP, with the weights equal to the nodal Demand associated with that LAP that is scheduled by the IFM. The weights used in calculating the Default LAP prices will equal the total Demand scheduled by the IFM in each Default LAP except for the Demand specified in Sections 27.2.1 and 30.5.3.2.

27.2.2.2 Real-Time Market LAP Prices.

The Hourly Real-Time LAP Price is computed as described in Section 11.5.2.2. The weights used for calculating the Hourly Real-Time LAP Price at the time the RTM runs will not exclude the Demand specified in Sections 27.2.1 and 30.5.3.2. The weights used for calculating Hourly Real-Time LAP Price used for Settlements will be calculated based on Meter Data and will appropriately exclude the Demand specified in Sections 27.2.1 and 30.5.3.2. Hourly Real-Time LAP Price are further adjusted for Settlements purposes as described in Section 11.5.2.2.

27.3 Trading Hubs.

The CAISO shall create and maintain Trading Hubs, including Existing Zone Generation Trading Hubs, to facilitate bilateral Energy transactions in the CAISO *Balancing Authority* Area. Each Trading Hub will be based on a pre-defined set of PNodes. The CAISO shall calculate Trading Hub prices for each Settlement Period or Settlement Interval based on an average of the LMPs at the PNodes that constitute the Trading Hub. There will be three Existing Zone Generation Trading Hubs, which correspond geographically to the three Existing Zones. Each Existing Zone Generation Trading Hub will be comprised of an aggregation of PNodes for Generating Units within the corresponding Existing Zone, whose associated LMPs will be used to establish an Existing Zone Generation Trading Hub price representing the weighted-average price paid to Generating Units in that Existing Zone. The weights applied to the constituent nodal LMPs in each Existing Zone will be determined annually and separately

for each season and on-peak and off-peak period based on the ratio of the prior year's total output of Energy at that PNode to the total Generation output in that Existing Zone, for the corresponding season and on-peak or off-peak period. The specification of seasons will be identical to the seasons used in the annual CRR Allocation, and the annual calculation of Existing Zone Generation Trading Hub weights will be performed in a timely manner to be coordinated with the annual CRR Allocation and CRR Auction processes.

27.4 Optimization in the CAISO Markets Processes.

The CAISO runs the DAM, HASP and RTM and their component CAISO Markets Processes utilizing a set of integrated optimization programs, including SCUC and SCED.

27.4.1 Security Constrained Unit Commitment.

The CAISO uses SCUC to run the MPM-RRD processes associated with the DAM and the HASP, the IFM, the RUC, the HASP, the STUC and the RTUC. SCUC uses a multi-interval Time Horizon to commit and schedule resources and to meet Demand for which Bids have been submitted and procure AS in the IFM, and to meet the CAISO Forecast of CAISO Demand in the MPM-RRD, RUC, HASP, STUC and RTUC. In the Day-Ahead MPM-RRD, IFM and RUC processes, the SCUC optimizes over the twenty-four (24) hourly intervals of the next Trading Day. In the RTUC, which runs every fifteen (15) minutes, the SCUC optimizes over from four to seven 15-minute intervals comprising a portion of the current or imminent Trading Hour and the entire subsequent Trading Hour. In the HASP, which is a special run of the RTUC that runs once per hour just before the top of the hour, and its associated MPM-RRD process, the SCUC optimizes over seven (7) 15-minute intervals comprising the last forty-five (45) minutes of the imminent Trading Hour and the entire subsequent Trading Hour. Following the HASP run of the RTUC, each of the next three runs of the RTUC successively drops one 15-minute interval from the front of the optimization Time Horizon. In the STUC, the SCUC optimizes over seventeen fifteen-minute intervals

comprising the *of* last fifteen (15) minutes of the imminent Trading Hour and the entire next four Trading Hours. The CAISO will commit Extremely Long Start Resources, for which commitment in the DAM does not provide sufficient time to Start-Up and be available to supply Energy during the next Trading Day as provided in Section 31.7.

27.4.1.1 Timing of Unit Commitment Instructions.

For the Time Horizon of any given CAISO Markets Process, the associated SCUC optimization will typically commit resources having different Start-Up Times, not all of which need to be started up immediately upon completion of that CAISO Markets Process. The CAISO may defer issuing a Start-Up Instruction to a resource that can be started at a later time and still be available to supply Energy at the time the CAISO Markets Process indicated it would be needed. The CAISO shall re-evaluate the need to commit such resources in a subsequent CAISO Markets Process based on the most recent forecasts and other information about system conditions.

27.4.2 Security Constrained Economic Dispatch.

SCED is the optimization engine used to run the RTD to determine the optimal five-minute Dispatch Instructions throughout the Trading Hour consistent with resource and transmission Constraints within the CAISO *Balancing Authority* Area. The SCED runs every five (5) minutes and utilizes a Time Horizon comprised of up to thirteen (13) five-minute intervals, but produces Dispatch Instructions only for the first five-minute interval of that Time Horizon. The SCED produces LMPs at each PNode that are used for Settlements as described in Section 11.5.

27.4.3 CAISO Markets Scheduling and Pricing Parameters.

The SCUC and SCED optimization software for the CAISO Markets utilize a set of configurable scheduling and pricing parameters to enable the software to reach a feasible solution and set appropriate prices in instances where Effective Economic Bids are not sufficient to allow a feasible solution. The scheduling parameters specify the criteria for the software to adjust Non-priced Quantities when such adjustment is necessary to reach a feasible solution. The scheduling parameters are configured so that the SCUC and SCED software will utilize Effective Economic Bids as far as possible to reach a feasible solution, and will skip Ineffective Economic Bids and perform adjustments to Non-priced Quantities

pursuant to the scheduling priorities for Self-Schedules specified in Sections 31.4 and 34.10. The scheduling parameters utilized for relaxation of internal transmission constraints are specified in Section 27.4.3.1. The pricing parameters specify the criteria for establishing market prices in instances where one or more Non-priced Quantities are adjusted by the Market Clearing software. The pricing parameters are specified in Sections 27.1.2.3, 27.4.3.2, 27.4.3.3 and 27.4.3.4. The complete set of scheduling and pricing parameters used in all CAISO Markets is maintained in the Business Practice Manuals.

27.4.3.1 Scheduling Parameters for Transmission Constraint Relaxation.

The internal transmission Constraint scheduling parameter is set to $5000 per MWh for the purpose of determining when the SCUC and SCED software in the IFM and RTM will relax an internal transmission constraint rather than adjust Supply or Demand bids or Non-priced Quantities as specified in Sections 31.3.1.3, 31.4 and 34.10 to relieve Congestion on the constrained facility. The effect of this scheduling parameter value is that if the optimization can re-dispatch resources to relieve Congestion on a constrained transmission facility at a cost of $5000 per MWh or less, the Market Clearing software will utilize such re-dispatch, but if the cost exceeds $5000 per MWh the market software will relax the constraint. The corresponding scheduling parameter in RUC is set to $1250 per MWh.

27.4.3.2 Pricing Parameters for Transmission Constraint Relaxation.

For the purpose of determining how the relaxation of a transmission Constraint will affect the determination of prices in the IFM and RTM, the pricing parameter of the Constraint being relaxed is set to the maximum Energy Bid price specified in Section 39.6.1.1. The corresponding pricing parameter used in the RUC is set at the maximum RUC Availability Bid price specified in Section 39.6.1.2.

27.4.3.3 Insufficient Supply to Meet Self-Scheduled Demand in IFM.

In the IFM, when available supply is insufficient to meet all Self-Scheduled demand, Self-Scheduled demand is reduced to the point where the available supply is sufficient to clear the market. For price-setting purposes in such cases, the cleared Self-Scheduled demand is deemed to be willing to pay the maximum Energy Bid price specified in Section 39.6.1.1.

27.4.3.4 Insufficient Supply to Meet CAISO Forecast of CAISO Demand in the RTM.

In the RTM, in the event that Energy offers are insufficient to meet the CAISO Forecast of CAISO Demand, the SCUC and SCED software will relax the system energy-balance constraint. In such cases the software utilizes a pricing parameter set to the maximum Energy Bid price specified in Section 39.6.1.1 for price-setting purposes.

27.4.3.5 Protection of TOR, ETC and CVR Self-Schedules in the IFM.

In accordance with the submitted and accepted TRTC Instructions, valid Day-Ahead TOR Self-Schedules, Day-Ahead ETC Self-Schedules and Day-Ahead CVR Self-Schedules shall not be adjusted in the IFM in response to an insufficiency of Effective Economic Bids. The scheduling parameters associated with the TOR, ETC, or CVR Self-Schedules will be set to values higher than the scheduling parameter associated with relaxation of an internal transmission Constraint as specified in Section 27.4.3.1, so that when there is a congested transmission Constraint that would otherwise subject a Supply or Demand resource submitted in a valid and balanced ETC, TOR or CVR Self-Schedule to adjustment in the IFM, the IFM software will relax the transmission Constraint rather than curtail the TOR, ETC, or CVR Self-Schedule. This priority will be adhered to by the operation of the IFM Market Clearing software, and if necessary, by adjustment of Schedules after the IFM has been executed and the results have been reviewed by the CAISO operators.

27.5 Full Network Model.

27.5.1 Description of FNM for CAISO Markets.

The FNM is a representation of the CAISO *Balancing Authority* Area that enables the CAISO to conduct power flow analyses to identify transmission Constraints for the optimization of the CAISO Markets. External *Balancing Authority* Areas and external transmission systems are modeled to the extent necessary to support the commercial requirements of the CAISO Markets. External connections are retained between Intertie branches within Transmission Interfaces. Certain external loops are modeled, which allows the CAISO to increase the accuracy of the Congestion Management process. Resources are modeled at the appropriate network Nodes. The pricing Location (PNode) of a Generating Unit generally coincides with the Node where the relevant revenue quality meter is connected or corrected, to reflect the point at which the Generating Units are connected to the CAISO Controlled Grid. The Dispatch, Schedule and LMP of a Generating Unit refers to a PNode, but the Energy injection is modeled in the FNM for network analysis purposes at the corresponding Generating Unit(s) (at the physical interconnection point), taking into account any losses in the transmission network leading to the point where Energy is delivered to Demand. For the CAISO Markets Processes, the FNM incorporates Transmission Losses and models and enforces all network Constraints, which are reflected in the Day-Ahead Schedules, AS Awards and RUC Awards, HASP Intertie Schedules, Dispatch Instructions and the LMPs resulting from each CAISO Markets Process. For the HASP, STUC, RTUC and the RTD processes, the Real-Time power flow parameters developed from the State Estimator are applied to the FNM.

27.5.2 Metered Subsystems.

The FNM includes a full model of MSS transmission networks used for power flow calculations and Congestion Management in the CAISO Markets Processes. Network Constraints (i.e. circuit ratings, thermal ratings, etc.) within the MSS, or at the its boundaries, shall be monitored but not enforced in the

CAISO's FNM. If overloads are observed in the forward markets, are internal to the MSS or at the MSS boundaries, and are attributable to MSS operations, the CAISO shall communicate such events to the Scheduling Coordinator for the MSS and coordinate any manual Re-dispatch required in Real-Time. If, independent of the CAISO, the Scheduling Coordinator for the MSS is unable to resolve Congestion internal to the MSS or at the MSS boundaries in Real-Time, the CAISO will use Exceptional Dispatch Instructions on resources that have been bid into the HASP and RTM to resolve the Congestion. The costs of such Exceptional Dispatch will be allocated to the responsible MSS Operator. Consistent with Section 4.9, the CAISO and MSS Operator shall develop specific procedures for each MSS to determine how network Constraints will be handled.

27.5.3 Integrated Balancing Authority Areas.

To the extent sufficient data is available or adequate estimates can be made for an IBAA, the FNM used by the CAISO for the CAISO Markets Processes will include a model of the IBAA's network topology. The CAISO monitors but does not enforce the network Constraints for an IBAA in running the CAISO Markets Processes, unless enforcement of such Constraints is allowed under a Market Efficiency Enhancement Agreement. Similarly, the CAISO models the resistive component for transmission losses on an IBAA but does not allow such losses to determine LMPs that apply for pricing transactions to and from an IBAA and the CAISO Balancing Authority Area, unless allowed under a Market Efficiency Enhancement Agreement. As described in Section 27.5.3.4, for Bids and Schedules between the CAISO Balancing Authority Area and the IBAA, the CAISO will model the associated sources and sinks that are external to the CAISO Balancing Authority Area using individual or aggregated System Resource injections and withdrawals at locations in the FNM that allow the impact of such injections and withdrawals on the CAISO Balancing Authority Area to be reflected in the CAISO Markets Processes as accurately as possible given the information available to the CAISO.

27.5.3.1 Currently Established Integrated Balancing Authority Areas.

The FNM includes the established IBAAs listed below. Additional details regarding the modeling specifications for these IBAAs are provided in the Business Practice Manuals.

(1) The Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD) IBAA including the transmission facilities of the following entities:

(a) Western Area Power Administration – Sierra Nevada Region

(b) Modesto Irrigation District

(c) City of Redding

(d) City of Roseville

(2) Turlock Irrigation District IBAA

27.5.3.2 Process for Establishing a New Integrated Balancing Authority Area or Market Efficiency Enhancement Agreement or Modifying an Existing Integrated Balancing Authority Area or Market Efficiency Enhancement Agreement.

Except under exigent circumstances, the CAISO must follow a consultative process with the applicable Balancing Authority and CAISO Market Participants pursuant to the process further defined in the Business Practice Manuals, to establish a new IBAA or enter into a new MEEA or modify an existing IBAA or MEEA. Changes to an existing IBAA may include changes to the modeling of the IBAA's network topology or to the specification of the default Resource IDs described in Section 27.5.3.4. Upon completion of this process and having determined it necessary to establish a new IBAA or enter into a new MEEA or modify an existing IBAA or MEEA, the CAISO will make any necessary filings with FERC to amend this CAISO Tariff and to submit for FERC acceptance any related MEEA as appropriate, at which time the CAISO shall also provide its supportive findings for the establishment of the new IBAA or execution of the new MEEA or modification to an existing IBAA or MEEA.

27.5.3.3 Factors to Be Considered in Establishing a New Integrated Balancing Authority Area or Modifying an Existing Integrated Balancing Authority Area.

In establishing a new IBAA or modifying an existing IBAA, the factors that the CAISO will consider shall include, but are not limited to the following:

(1) The number of Interties between the IBAA and the CAISO Balancing Authority Area and the distance between them;

(2) Whether the transmission system(s) within the other Balancing Authority Area runs in parallel to major parts of the CAISO Controlled Grid;

(3) The frequency and magnitude of unscheduled power flows at applicable Interties;

(4) The number of hours where the actual direction of power flows was reversed from scheduled directions;

(5) The availability of information to the CAISO for modeling accuracy; and

(6) The estimated improvement to the CAISO's power flow modeling and Congestion Management processes to be achieved through more accurate modeling of the Balancing Authority Area.

27.5.3.4 Default Designation of External Resource Locations for Modeling Transactions Between the CAISO and an IBAA.

Prior to the establishment of a new IBAA or a change to an existing IBAA, the CAISO will define and publish default Resource IDs to be used for submitting import and export Bids and for settling import and export Schedules between the CAISO Balancing Authority Area and the IBAA. These default Resource IDs will specify in the Master File the default associations of Intertie Scheduling Point Bids and Schedules to supporting individual or aggregate System Resource injection or withdrawal locations in the FNM. The supporting injection and withdrawal locations will be determined by the CAISO to allow the impact of the associated Intertie Scheduling Point Bids and Schedules on the CAISO IBAA to be reflected in the CAISO Markets Processes as accurately as possible given the information available to the CAISO. The CAISO's methodology for determining such default Resource IDs, as well as the specific default Resource IDs that have been adopted for the currently established IBAAs, are provided in the Business Practice Manuals. Alternative Resource IDs to be used instead of the default Resource IDs may be created and adopted for use in conjunction with Intertie Scheduling Point Bids and Schedules between the CAISO Balancing Authority Area and the IBAA based on a Market Efficiency Enhancement Agreement.

27.5.4 Accounting for Changes in Topology in FNM.

The CAISO will incorporate into the FNM information received pursuant to Section 24 for transmission expansion and Section 25 for generation interconnection to account for changes to the CAISO Controlled Grid and other facilities located within the CAISO *Balancing Authority* Area. This information will be incorporated into the network model data base in which the electrical network model is maintained for use by the State Estimator and which forms the basis for the FNM used by the CAISO Markets. The updated

power system network model will be transferred at periodic model update cycle intervals established by the CAISO and incorporated into the FNM for use in the CAISO Markets. The Business Practice Manual for managing the Full Network Model will describe the information to be provided by Market Participants, the process by which the CAISO incorporates this information in the FNM, and operational details of the FNM. If the CAISO becomes aware of a material error or omission in the FNM, it will make a timely correction of the FNM.

27.5.5 Load Distribution Factors.

The CAISO will maintain a library of system-wide Load Distribution Factors for use in distributing Demand scheduled at the Default LAPs. The system Load Distribution Factors are derived from the State Estimator and are stored in the Load Distribution Factor library, and are updated periodically. For IFM the Load Distribution Factor library uses a similar-day methodology for smoothing the most recent Load Distribution Factors. The similar-day methodology uses data separately for each type of day. More recent days are weighted more heavily in the smoothing calculations. The market application then uses the set of Load Distribution Factors from the library that best represents the Load distribution conditions expected for the market Time Horizon. For the RTM, the State Estimator solution is used as a source for determining Load Distribution Factors. The Load Distribution Factor are also maintained for use for Demand scheduled at Custom LAPs. These custom Load Distribution Factors are not generated from the State Estimator and are fixed quantities representing the characteristics of the Custom LAP.

27.6 State Estimator.

The State Estimator produces a power flow solution based upon the modeled representation of the electrical network and available Real-Time SCADA telemetry. When this solution is applied to the FNM, it provides a reference of system conditions for determining Dispatch Instructions. The State Estimator also provides a reference for Real-Time Load Distribution Factors used to distribute the Real-Time CAISO Forecast of CAISO Demand as well as provide a source of historical data for the LDF library. If the State

Estimator is not capable of providing CAISO with a solution to clear the CAISO Markets, the CAISO shall use the last best State Estimator solution for determining Dispatch Instructions, provided the State Estimator is not unavailable for an extended period. If the State Estimator is not available for an extended period of time, the CAISO shall use the Load Distribution Factors from the Load Distribution Factors library as applicable to the prevailing system and time of use conditions to determine Dispatch Instructions.

27.7 Constrained Output Generators.

27.7.1 Start-Up and Minimum Load Costs and Energy Bids of Constrained Output Generators.

COGs will be eligible to set LMPs in the IFM based on their Energy Bids, as set out in this Section 27.7.1. Before each calendar year, the COG must elect one of the methods described in Section 27.7.1.1 for specifying its Start-Up Costs and Minimum Load Costs, and must elect one of the methods described in Sections 27.7.1.2 and 27.7.1.3 for determining its Energy Bids.

27.7.1.1 Start-Up and Minimum Load Cost Options.

A COG may elect to recover Start-Up Costs and Minimum Load Costs through a cost-based option based on heat rate and fuel costs. Fuel costs are adjustable by the CAISO on a daily basis for gas fired resources, or are registered non-adjustable costs for other resources. Alternatively, a COG may elect to register in the Master File a six-month value of its own choosing that does not need to be cost-based and will not be adjusted for fuel cost changes.

27.7.1.2 Energy Bids Calculated from Start-Up and Minimum Load Costs.

Under both options for specifying Start-Up Costs and Minimum Load Costs described in Section 27.7.1.1, a COG's Energy Bid will be determined by dividing its Minimum Load Cost by the MW quantity of its PMin. Based on the assumption that its PMin equals its PMax, it will be eligible to set the LMP in the IFM and the RTD based on this Energy Bid.

27.7.1.3 Eligibility to Submit Market-Based Energy Bids by Waiving COG Status.

For the purposes of specifying an Energy Bid that is not based on its Minimum Load Cost, a COG may elect to be modeled with different PMin and PMax values if the physical characteristics of the resource support such differences. Under this election the COG's PMin must be greater than or equal to its PMax minus the maximum of three (3) MW or five percent (5%) of its PMax. Under this option, if the resource is capable of being dispatched at an operating point other than zero (0) or its PMax, the resource does not meet the definition of COG and the resource is treated in the CAISO Markets Processes like any other resource. Such a resource may submit a market Energy Bid for the MW difference between its PMin and PMax, and if scheduled or issued a CAISO Schedule or Dispatch Instruction in this range it would be subject to Local Market Power Mitigation, eligible to set the LMP and would receive any appropriate BCR like any other resource.

27.7.2 Constrained Output Generators in the IFM.

In the IFM, COGs that elect the option described in Section 27.7.1.2 are modeled as though they are not constrained and can operate flexibly between zero and their PMax, which equals their PMin. Such a COG is eligible to set IFM LMPs in any Settlement Period in which a portion of its output is needed as a flexible resource to serve Demand. Such a COG is not eligible for recovery of Minimum Load Costs or BCR in the IFM due to the conversion of its Minimum Load Cost to an Energy Bid and its treatment by the IFM as a flexible resource. Such a COG is eligible for Start-Up Cost recovery based on its Commitment Period as determined in the RUC, HASP, STUC or RTUC. COGs that elect the option described in Section 27.7.1.3 are treated in the IFM like other resources having Energy Bids for a flexible Dispatch range above their Minimum Load.

27.7.3 Constrained Output Generators in RUC.

In RUC, any COG that elects the option described in Section 27.7.1.2 and is offered in the IFM but not scheduled in the IFM is treated as constrained, so that the entire capacity of the COG is scheduled in RUC and not a portion thereof. Because PMin and PMax are equal for such a COG, and RUC Awards apply to scheduled capacity in RUC in excess of the higher of: (a) the relevant Day-Ahead Schedule; or

(b) the relevant Minimum Load, such a COG is not eligible to receive a RUC Award. COGs that elect the option described in Section 27.7.1.3 are treated in the RUC like other resources having Energy Bids for a flexible Dispatch range above their Minimum Load and may be eligible to receive a RUC Award in accordance with Section 31.5.

27.7.4 Constrained Output Generators in the Real-Time Market.

A COG that can be started up and complete its Minimum Run Time within a five-hour period can be committed by the STUC. A COG that can be started up within the Time Horizon of a RTUC run, which varies from 60 to 105 minutes, can be committed by the RTUC. If the resource elects the method described in Section 27.7.1.2 for determining its Energy Bid, no Energy Bid Curve can be submitted for the resource. In this case, in the RTD the CAISO will dispatch a COG up to its PMax or down to zero (0) to ensure a feasible Real-Time Dispatch. The COG is eligible to set the RTM LMP in any Dispatch Interval in which a portion of its output is needed to serve Demand, not taking into consideration its Minimum Run Time constraint. For the purpose of making this determination and setting the RTM LMP, the CAISO treats a COG as if it were flexible with an infinite Ramp Rate between zero (0) and its PMax, and uses the COG's Energy Bid as determined in Section 27.7.1.2. In any Dispatch Interval where none of the output of a COG is needed as a flexible resource to serve Demand, the CAISO shall not dispatch the unit. In circumstances in which the output of the COG is not needed as a flexible resource to serve Demand, but the unit nonetheless is online as a result of a previous commitment or Dispatch Instruction by the CAISO, the COG is eligible for Minimum Load Cost compensation. If the resource elects the method described in Section 27.7.1.3 for determining its Energy Bid, the RTM will treat it like any other resource that is flexible over a non-zero operating range.

28 INTER-SC TRADES

28.1 INTER-SC TRADES OF ENERGY

28.1.1 Purpose.

Scheduling Coordinators submit Inter-SC Trades of Energy consistent with the provisions in this Section 28.

28.1.2 Availability of Inter-SC Trades of Energy.

The CAISO allows Inter-SC Trades of Energy at individual PNodes of Generating Units within the CAISO *Balancing Authority* Area and at Aggregated Pricing Nodes. The CAISO does not allow Inter-SC Trades of Energy at Scheduling Points. The CAISO allows submission of Inter-SC Trades of Energy in the DAM and the HASP. Inter-SC Trades of Energy submitted for the DAM are settled at the applicable Aggregated Pricing Nodes or PNodes for Generating Units. Inter-SC Trades of Energy submitted in the HASP are settled hourly based on the simple average of the Dispatch Interval LMPs at the applicable Aggregated Pricing Nodes or PNodes of Generating Units in those hours.

28.1.3 Submission of Inter-SC Trades of Energy.

A Scheduling Coordinator may submit Inter-SC Trades of Energy that it intends to have settled based on DAM LMPs at any time during the Day-Ahead Inter-SC Trade Period and may submit Inter-SC Trades of Energy for a particular hour that it intends to have settled based on the simple average of the Dispatch Interval LMPs during that hour at any time during the HASP Inter-SC Trade Period.

28.1.4 Information Requirements.

An Inter-SC Trade of Energy must consist of trades from both Scheduling Coordinators and contain the following information: (i) the Scheduling Coordinator ID Code (SCID) of the Scheduling Coordinator from which the Energy is traded; (ii) the SCID of the Scheduling Coordinator to which the Energy is traded; (iii) the location of the Energy trade; (iv) the CAISO Market the trade is to be settled in; (v) the time period over which the bilateral Energy trade will take place, including the start-date and Trading Hour and the end-date and Trading Hour; and (vi) the quantity (MWh) of the Energy traded.

28.1.5 General Validation Rules for Inter-SC Trades.

For all Inter-SC Trades of Energy the CAISO shall verify that the Scheduling Coordinators for the Inter-SC Trade of Energy mutually agree on the quantity, location, time period , and CAISO Market LMPs (DAM LMP or Dispatch Interval LMP) for settling the Inter-SC Trade of Energy. Any individual Inter-SC Trade of Energy that is deemed invalid by the CAISO due to inconsistencies between the trading Scheduling Coordinators on these terms will be rejected. The CAISO will notify trading Scheduling Coordinators within a reasonable time if their Inter-SC Trades of Energy fail these general validation rules as described in the Business Practice Manuals.

28.1.6 Validation Procedures for Physical Trades.

All Inter-SC Trades at PNodes will be subject to validation procedures as specified in this Section. Physical Trades can occur at any individual Generating Unit's PNode provided the Physical Trade satisfies the CAISO's Physical Trades validation procedures described herein. The Scheduling Coordinators must demonstrate that the trade is supported (directly or through an Inter-SC Trade of Energy with another Scheduling Coordinator) by a Day-Ahead Schedule for a Generating Unit at the same location for the Inter-SC Trade of Energy at a level greater than or equal to the amount of the Inter-SC Trade of Energy. The CAISO's validation procedures for Physical Trades include three components: (1) Physical Trade submittal screening, (2) Physical Trade pre-market validation, and (3) Physical Trade post-market confirmation.

28.1.6.1 Physical Trade Submittal Screening.

The CAISO's Physical Trade validation procedures begin upon initial submission of a Physical Trade to the CAISO. The first stage of that process, Physical Trade submittal screening, validates that the submitted Physical Trade does not exceed the PMax of the identified Generating Unit. The CAISO will reject Physical Trades that exceed the PMax and notify the responsible Scheduling Coordinators.

28.1.6.2 Physical Trade Pre-Market Validation.

The purpose of the pre-market validation is to determine whether the total MWh quantity of all submitted Physical Trades at a PNode of an individual Generating Unit exceeds the Generating Unit's Energy Bid MWh. Pre-market validation is performed on all Physical Trades that pass the submittal screening set forth in Section 28.1.6.1. Scheduling Coordinators are notified within a reasonable time of their Physical Trades status as the CAISO conducts the pre-market validation to indicate, at a minimum, whether the Physical Trade is currently "valid" or "invalid." These Physical Trade notices are preliminary and subject to change until the final pre-market validation at the close of the HASP Inter-SC Trade Period. A Physical Trade with a "valid" status may be rendered "invalid" due to the actions of the Scheduling Coordinators to that Physical Trade or by other trading activities that are linked to the Generating Unit identified for the relevant Physical Trade whenever the quantities specified in the relevant Inter-SC Trades cannot be supported by the underlying Generating Unit's Bid. Scheduling Coordinators can use these status notices to make modifications to complete or correct invalid Physical Trades. The CAISO performs a final pre-market validation at the close of the HASP Inter-SC Trade Period. Physical Trades that are individually valid are concatenated (daisy chained) with other supporting Physical Trades at the same PNode of the Generating Unit. Once that concatenation is complete, the CAISO will determine whether the concatenated Physical Trades are physically supported by either another Inter-SC Trade of Energy at that same location or the Bid submitted in the relevant CAISO Market for the Generating Unit identified for that Physical Trade, individually and in the aggregate. If a Physical Trade is not adequately physically supported, the quantities in the Physical Trades of that Scheduling Coordinator and its downstream trading counter-parties are reduced on a pro-rata basis until those Physical Trades are valid. In performing physical pre-market validation of Inter-SC Trades of Energy in HASP, the CAISO also

considers final Inter-SC Trades of Energy for the DAM in determining whether the HASP Physical Trades are physically supported individually or in the aggregate. Specifically, the CAISO determines whether the Generating Unit's submitted Bid in HASP is greater than or equal to the sum of: (1) final Day-Ahead Inter-SC Trades of Energy at that location and (2) the additional Inter-SC Trades of Energy for the HASP at that location. If the amounts are greater than the Generating Unit's submitted Bids in HASP, the CAISO will adjust down on a prorated basis the HASP Physical Trades. Final Day-Ahead Physical Trades are not adjusted in the HASP pre-market validation. The CAISO does not perform any Settlement on Physical Trade quantities (MWh) that are curtailed during Physical Trade pre-market validation.

28.1.6.3 Physical Trade Post-Market Confirmation.

The CAISO conducts post-market confirmation of Physical Trades that pass pre-market validation in Section 28.1.6.2 after the Market Clearing and the market results are posted to ensure that the Generating Unit has a Schedule that can support all of the Physical Trades. During the post-market confirmation process, the MWh quantity of Physical Trades that passed the CAISO's pre-market validation process may be reduced if the Generating Unit supporting the Physical Trades has a Schedule that is below the quantity of Physical Trades at that Location. The MWh quantities of Physical Trades that are reduced during the post-market confirmation process are settled at the Existing Zone Generation Trading Hub price for the Existing Zone associated with the Generating Unit identified in the Inter-SC Trade of Energy. The portion of Physical Trades that remains intact will be settled at the LMP for the identified PNode for the Generating Unit.

28.1.6.4 Inter-SC Trades of Energy at Aggregated Pricing Nodes.

Inter-SC Trades of Energy at Aggregated Pricing Nodes that are also defined Trading Hubs or Default LAPs are subject to the general validation procedures in Section 28.1.5 but are not subject to the three-stage physical validation procedures for Physical Trades described in Section 28.1.6 above.

28.2 Inter-SC Trades Of Ancillary Services.

Inter-SC Trades of Ancillary Services enable a Scheduling Coordinator to transfer any fixed quantity of Ancillary Services (MW) to another Scheduling Coordinator. An Inter-SC Trade of AS shall consist of a quantity in MWs traded between two Scheduling Coordinators for a specific hour and for a specific Ancillary Service type. The Inter-SC Trade of AS is a financial trade. The CAISO shall charge and pay the two parties of the trade based on the quantity (MW) of the Ancillary Service Obligation traded times the user rate for the Ancillary Service trades for the Trading Hour. Scheduling Coordinators may submit Inter-SC Trades of Ancillary Services for Regulation Up, Regulation Down, Spinning and Non-Spinning Reserves.

28.2.1 Information Requirements.

An Inter-SC Trade of Ancillary Services shall contain the following information: (i) the Scheduling Coordinator ID Code (SCID) for the Scheduling Coordinator from whom the MW amounts of Ancillary Service is traded; (ii) the SCID for the Scheduling Coordinator to whom the MW amounts of AS is traded; (iii) the type of AS being traded; (iv) the time period over which the trade will take place, including the start-date and time and the end-date and time; and the (v) quantity (MW) of the AS to be traded.

28.2.2 Validation.

The CAISO's validation of Inter-SC Trades of AS will begin upon submission of an Inter-SC Trade of AS. The CAISO shall conduct a final validation for Inter-SC Trades of AS at the end of the HASP Inter-SC Trade Period. The CAISO will validate each submitted Inter-SC Trade of AS to verify that the contents of the submission match the submittal by the counter-party Scheduling Coordinator by type (Regulation Up, Regulation Down, Spinning Reserve and Non-Spinning Reserve), quantity (MW), and time period. The CAISO will inform the submitting Scheduling Coordinators regarding the validity of a submitted trade of an AS and will allow the Scheduling Coordinator to resubmit the entire Inter-SC Trade of AS if it is not accepted. If only one of the two Scheduling Coordinators successfully submits an Inter-SC Trade of AS,

the CAISO will notify both Scheduling Coordinators that the Inter-SC Trade of AS for the specific hour does not match the corresponding Inter-SC Trade of AS. If both Scheduling Coordinators successfully submit the Inter-SC Trade of AS, the CAISO will notify the Scheduling Coordinators that their Inter-SC Trade of AS for the specific hour has been accepted. An Inter-SC Trade of Ancillary Services submitted at a later time, but before the deadline for the submission of the trade for the Trading Hour, renders a previously submitted Inter-SC Trade of AS invalid if it applies to the same hour, same type of AS, and the same Scheduling Coordinators to whom and from whom the AS is traded.

28.2.3 Submission of Inter-SC Trades of Ancillary Services.

Scheduling Coordinators may submit Inter-SC Trades of Ancillary Services at any time during the HASP Inter-SC Trade Period.

28.3 Inter-SC Trades Of IFM Load Uplift Obligation.

Scheduling Coordinators may submit system-wide Inter-SC Trades of IFM Load Uplift Obligations from within the CAISO *Balancing Authority* Area. Inter-SC Trades of IFM Load Uplift Obligations enable a Scheduling Coordinator to transfer any amount of net IFM Load Uplift Obligation (MW) to another Scheduling Coordinator. An Inter-SC Trade of IFM Load Uplift Obligation shall consist of a quantity in MWs traded between two Scheduling Coordinators for a specific Trading Hour of the IFM.

28.3.1 Information Requirements.

An Inter-SC Trade of IFM Load Uplift Obligation shall contain the following information: (i) the Scheduling Coordinator identification for the Scheduling Coordinator from whom the MW amounts of IFM Load Uplift Obligation is traded; (ii) the Scheduling Coordinator identification for the Scheduling Coordinator to whom the MW amounts of IFM Load Uplift Obligation is traded; (iii) the applicable Location of the Inter-SC Trade of IFM Load Uplift Obligation; (iv) the time period over which the trade will take place, including the start-date and time and the end-date and time; and (v) the quantity (MW) of the IFM Load Uplift Obligation to be traded.

28.3.2 Validation.

The CAISO's validation of Inter-SC Trades of IFM Load Uplift Obligations will begin upon submission of an Inter-SC Trade of IFM Load Uplift Obligation. The CAISO shall conduct a final validation for Inter-SC Trades of IFM Load Uplift Obligations at the end of the HASP Inter-SC Trade Period. The CAISO will validate each submitted Inter-SC Trade of IFM Load Uplift Obligation to verify that the contents of the submission match the submittal by the counter-party Scheduling Coordinator in terms of quantity (MW), and time period. The CAISO will inform the submitting Scheduling Coordinators regarding the validity of a submitted Inter-SC Trade of IFM Load Uplift Obligation and will allow the Scheduling Coordinator to resubmit the entire Inter-SC Trade of IFM Load Uplift Obligation if it is not accepted. If only one of the two Scheduling Coordinators successfully submits an Inter-SC Trade of IFM Load Uplift Obligation, the CAISO will notify both Scheduling Coordinators that the Inter-SC Trade of IFM Load Uplift Obligation for the specific hour does not match the corresponding Inter-SC Trade of IFM Load Uplift Obligation. If both Scheduling Coordinators successfully submit the Inter-SC Trade of IFM Load Uplift Obligation, the CAISO will notify the Scheduling Coordinators that their Inter-SC Trade of IFM Load Uplift Obligations for the specific hour has been accepted. The CAISO will verify that an Inter-SC Trade of IFM Load Uplift Obligation is between different Scheduling Coordinators that are authorized to participate in the CAISO Markets during the time period covered by the trade and that the Trading Hour and the quantity of the trade must be greater than or equal to zero. An Inter-SC Trade of IFM Load Uplift Obligation submitted at a later time renders a previously submitted Inter-SC Trade of IFM Load Uplift Obligation invalid if it applies to the same hour and the same Scheduling Coordinators to whom and from whom the net IFM Load Uplift Obligation is traded.

28.3.3 Submission of Inter-SC Trades of IFM Load Uplift Obligation.

Scheduling Coordinators may submit Inter-SC Trades of IFM Load Uplift Obligations at any time during the HASP Inter-SC Trade Period.

29 [NOT USED]

[Ten Sheet Numbers Reserved for Future Filings]

30. BIDS, INCLUDING SELF-SCHEDULES, SUBMISSION FOR ALL CAISO MARKETS

30.1 Bids, Including Self-Schedules.

Scheduling Coordinators shall submit Bids to participate in the CAISO Markets, as well as any Self-Schedules, ETC Self-Schedules, TOR Self-Schedules, or Self-Provided Ancillary Services. Bidding rules for each type of resource are contained in this Section 30 and additional specifications regarding bidding practices are contained in the Business Practice Manuals posted on the CAISO Website. Bids will consist of various components described in this Section 30 through which the Scheduling Coordinator provides information regarding the parameters and conditions pursuant to which the Bid may be optimized by the CAISO Markets.

30.1.1 Day-Ahead Market.

Bids submitted in the DAM apply to the twenty-four (24) hours of the next Trading Day (23 or 25 hours on the Daylight Savings transition days) and are used in both the IFM and RUC. Bids for the Regulation Up, Regulation Down, Spinning Reserve, and Non-Spinning Reserve service in the Day-Ahead Market must be received by Market Close for the Day-Ahead Market. The Bids shall include information for each of the twenty-four (24) Settlement Periods of the Trading Day. Failure to provide the information within the stated time frame shall result in the Bids being declared invalid by the CAISO. Scheduling Coordinators may submit Bids for the DAM as early as seven (7) days ahead of the targeted Trading Day.

30.1.2 HASP and Real-Time Market.

Bids submitted in the HASP apply to a single Trading Hour and are used in the HASP and the RTM. The CAISO will require Scheduling Coordinators to honor their Day-Ahead Ancillary Services Awards when submitting Ancillary Services Bids in the HASP. Bids for Regulation Up, Regulation Down, Spinning Reserve, and Non-Spinning Reserve service for each Settlement Period must be received at least seventy-five minutes prior to the commencement of that Settlement Period. The Bids shall include information for only the relevant Settlement Period. Failure to provide the information within the stated time frame shall result in the Bids being declared invalid by the CAISO.

30.2 Bid Types.

There are three types of Bids: Energy Bids, Ancillary Services Bids, and RUC Availability Bids. Each Bid type can be submitted as either an Economic Bid or a Self-Schedule (except for RUC Availability Bids, which cannot be self-scheduled). Economic Bids specify prices for MW amounts of capacity or MWh amounts of Energy. Self-Schedules do not have any prices associated for MW or MWh. Energy Bids, including both Economic Bids and Self-Schedules, may be either Supply Bids or Demand Bids. Ancillary Services Bids and RUC Availability Bids are Supply Bids only. Ancillary Services may be self-provided by providing a Submission to Self-Provide an Ancillary Service and having that submission accepted by the CAISO. Rules for submitting the three types of Bids vary by the type of resource to which the Bid applies as described in Section 30.5 and as further required in each CAISO Markets process as specified in Sections 31, 33, and 34.

30.3 [NOT USED]

30.4 Election for Start-Up Costs and Minimum Load Costs.

Scheduling Coordinators for Generating Units and Resource-Specific System Resources may elect on a semi-annual basis either of the two options provided below (the Proxy Cost option or the Registered Cost option) for specifying their Start-Up Costs and Minimum Load Costs to be used for those resources in the CAISO Markets Processes. Unless the Scheduling Coordinator has registered Start-Up Costs and Minimum Load Costs *in the Master File* in accordance with the Registered Cost option, the CAISO will assume the Proxy Cost option as the default option.

(1) **Proxy Cost Option.** *For natural gas fired resources, the Proxy Cost* option uses fuel-cost adjusted formulas for Start-Up Costs and Minimum Load Costs based on the resource's actual unit-specific performance parameters. The Start-Up Costs and Minimum Load Costs values utilized in the CAISO Markets Processes will be these formulaic values adjusted for fuel-cost variation on a daily basis as calculated pursuant to a Business Practice Manual. Start-Up Costs also include the cost of auxiliary power calculated using the unit-specific MWh quantity of auxiliary power used for Start-Up multiplied by a resource specific electricity price. Minimum Load Costs also includes operations and maintenance costs as provided in Section 39.7.1.1.2. *For all other resources, this*

option shall be based on the relevant cost information of the particular resource, which will be provided to the CAISO by the Scheduling Coordinator and maintained in the Master File. In the event that the Scheduling Coordinator for a unit does not provide sufficient data for the CAISO to determine the unit's Proxy Costs, the CAISO will assume that the unit's Start-Up Costs and Minimum Load Costs are zero.

(2) **Registered Cost Option.** Under *the Registered Cost* option, the Scheduling Coordinator may *register* values of its choosing for Start-Up Costs and Minimum Load Costs *in the Master File subject to the maximum limit specified in Section 39.6.1.6. For a resource to be eligible for the Registered Cost option there must be sufficient information in the Master File to calculate the Proxy Cost option. The* Start-Up Cost and Minimum Load Cost values utilized in the CAISO Markets Processes will be these pre-specified values and will be fixed for six months in the Master File *unless the resource's costs, as calculated pursuant to the Proxy Cost option, exceed the Registered Cost option, in which case the Scheduling Coordinator may elect to switch to the Proxy Cost option for the balance of the six-month period*.

30.5 Bidding Rules.

30.5.1 General Bidding Rules.

(a) All Energy and Ancillary Services Bids of each Scheduling Coordinator submitted to the DAM for the following Trading Day shall be submitted at or prior to 10:00 a.m. on the day preceding the Trading Day, but no sooner than *seven (*7*)* days prior to the Trading Day. All Energy and Ancillary Services Bids of each Scheduling Coordinator submitted to the HASP for the following Trading Day shall be

submitted starting from the time of publication, at 1:00 p.m. on the day preceding the Trading Day, of DAM results for the Trading Day, and ending seventy-five (75) minutes prior to each applicable Trading Hour in the RTM. The CAISO will not accept any Energy or Ancillary Services Bids for the following Trading Day between 10:00 a.m. on the day preceding the Trading Day and the publication, at 1:00 p.m. on the day preceding the Trading Day, of DAM results for the Trading Day;

(b) Bid prices submitted by *a* Scheduling Coordinator for Energy accepted and cleared in the IFM and scheduled in the Day-Ahead Schedule *may be increased or decreased in the HASP*. Bid prices for Energy submitted but not scheduled in the Day-Ahead Schedule may be increased or decreased in the HASP. Incremental Bid prices for Energy associated with Day-Ahead AS or RUC Awards in Bids submitted to the HASP may be revised. Scheduling Coordinators may revise ETC Self-Schedules for Supply only in the HASP to the extent such a change is consistent with TRTC Instructions provided to the CAISO by the Participating TO in accordance with Section 16. Scheduling Coordinators may revise TOR Self-Schedules for Supply only in the HASP to the extent such a change is consistent with TRTC Instructions provided to the CAISO by the Non-Participating TO in accordance with Section 17. Energy associated with awarded Ancillary Services capacity cannot be offered in the HASP or Real-Time Market separate and apart from the awarded Ancillary Services capacity;

(c) Scheduling Coordinators may submit Energy, AS and RUC Bids in the DAM that are different for each Trading Hour of the Trading Day;

(d) Bids for Energy or capacity that are submitted to one CAISO Market, but are not accepted in that market are no longer a binding commitment and Scheduling Coordinators may submit Bids in a subsequent CAISO Market at a different price; and

(e) The CAISO shall be entitled to take all reasonable measures to verify that Scheduling Coordinators meet the technical and financial criteria set forth in Section 4.5.1 and the accuracy of information submitted to the CAISO pursuant to this Section 30.

30.5.2 Supply Bids.

30.5.2.1 Common Elements for Supply Bids.

In addition to the resource-specific Bid requirements of this Section, all Supply Bids must contain the following components: Scheduling Coordinator ID Code; Resource ID; Resource Location; PNode or Aggregated Pricing Node as applicable; Energy Bid Curve; Self-Schedule component; Ancillary Services Bid; RUC Availability Bid; the Market to which the Bid applies; Trading Day to which the Bid applies; Priority Type (if any). Supply Bids offered in the CAISO Markets must be monotonically increasing. Energy Bids in the RTM must also contain a Bid for Ancillary Services to the extent the resource is certified and capable of providing Ancillary Service in the RTM up to the registered certified capacity for that Ancillary Service less any Day-Ahead Ancillary Services Awards.

30.5.2.2 Supply Bids for Participating Generators.

In addition to the common elements listed in Section 30.5.2.1, Supply Bids for Participating Generators shall contain the following components: Start-Up Bid, Minimum Load Bid, Ramp Rate, Minimum and Maximum Operating Limits; Energy Limit, Regulatory Must-Take/Must-Run Generation; Contingency Flag; and Contract Reference Number (if any). A Scheduling Coordinator for a Physical Scheduling Plant or a System

Unit may include Generation Distribution Factors as part of its Supply Bid. If the Scheduling Coordinator has not submitted the Generation Distribution Factors applicable for the Bid, the CAISO will use default Generation Distribution Factors stored in the Master File. All Generation Distribution Factors used by the CAISO will be normalized based on Outage data that is available to the automated market systems. Combined-cycle Generating Units may only be registered under a single Resource ID.

30.5.2.3 Supply Bids for Participating Loads, Including Pumped-Storage Hydro Units and Aggregated Participating Loads.

In addition to the common elements listed in Section 30.5.2.1, Scheduling Coordinators submitting Supply Bids for Participating Loads, which includes Pumping Load or Pumped-Storage Hydro Units, may include the following components: Pumping Load (MW), Minimum Load Bid (Generation mode only of a Pumped-Storage Hydro Unit), Load Distribution Factor, Ramp Rate, Energy Limit (Generation mode only of a Pumped-Storage Hydro Unit), Pumping Cost, and Pump Shut-Down Costs. If no values for Pumping Cost or Pump Shut-Down Costs are submitted, the CAISO will generate these Bid components based on values in the Master File. Scheduling Coordinators may only submit Supply Bids for Aggregated Participating Loads by using a Generating Unit or Physical Scheduling Plant Resource ID for the Demand reduction capacity represented by the Aggregated Participating Load as set forth in a Business Practice Manual. The CAISO will use Generation Distribution Factors provided by the Scheduling Coordinator for the Aggregated Participating Load.

30.5.2.4 Supply Bids for System Resources.

In addition to the common elements listed in Section 30.5.2.1, Supply Bids for System Resources shall also contain: the relevant Ramp Rate; Start-Up Costs; and Minimum Load Costs. Resource-Specific System Resources may elect the Proxy Cost option or Registered Cost option for Start-Up Costs and Minimum Load Costs as provided in Section 30.4. Other System Resources are not eligible to recover Start-Up Costs and Minimum Load Costs. Resource-Specific System Resources are eligible to

participate in the Day-Ahead Market on an equivalent basis as Generating Units and are not obligated to participate in RUC or the RTM if the resource did not receive a Day-Ahead Schedule unless the resource is a Resource Adequacy Resource. If the Resource-Specific System Resource is a Resource Adequacy Resource, the Scheduling Coordinator for the resource is obligated to make it available to the CAISO Market as prescribed by Section 40.6. Dynamic Resource-Specific System Resources are also eligible to participate in the HASP and RTM on an equivalent basis as Generating Units. Non-Dynamic Resource-Specific System Resources will be treated like other System Resources in the HASP and RTM. The quantity (in MWh) of Energy categorized as Interruptible Imports (non-firm imports) can only be submitted through Self-Schedules in the Day-Ahead Market and cannot be incrementally increased in the HASP or RTM. Bids submitted to the Day-Ahead Market for ELS Resources will be applicable for two days after they have been submitted and cannot be changed the day after they have been submitted.

30.5.2.4.1 Intertie Block Bids.

Intertie Block Bids must contain the same energy Bid price for all hours of the period for which the Intertie Block Bid is submitted. Intertie Block Bids may only be submitted in the DAM.

30.5.2.5 Supply Bids for Metered Subsystems.

Consistent with the bidding rules specified in this Section 30.5, Scheduling Coordinators that represent MSS Operators may submit Bids for Energy and Ancillary Services, including Self-Schedules and Submissions to Self-Provide an Ancillary Service, to the DAM. All Bids to supply Energy by MSS Operators must identify each Generating Unit on an individual unit basis. The CAISO will not accept aggregated Generation Bids without complying with the requirements of Section 4.9.12 of the CAISO Tariff. All Scheduling Coordinators that represent MSS Operators must submit Demand Bids at the relevant MSS LAP. Scheduling Coordinators that represent MSS Operators must comply with Section 4.9 of the CAISO Tariff. Scheduling Coordinators that represent MSS Operators that have opted out of RUC participation pursuant to Section 31.5 must Self-Schedule one hundred percent (100%) of the Demand

Forecast for the MSS. For an MSS that elects Load following, the MSS Operator shall also self-schedule or bid Supply to match the Demand Forecast. All Bids for MSSs must be identify each Generating Unit on an individual unit basis or a System Unit. For an MSS that elects Load following consistent with Section 4.9.13.2, the Scheduling Coordinator for the MSS Operator must include the following additional information with its Bids: the Generating Unit(s) that are Load following; the range of the Generating Unit(s) being reserved for Load following; whether the quantity of Load following capacity is either up or down; and, if there are multiple Generating Units in the MSS, the priority list or distribution factors among the Generating Units. The CAISO will not dispatch the resource within the range declared as Load following capacity, leaving that capacity entirely available for the MSS to dispatch. The CAISO uses this information in the IFM runs and the RUC to simulate MSS Load following. The Scheduling Coordinator for the MSS Operator may change these characteristics through the Bid submission process in the HASP. If the Load following resource is also an RMR Unit, the MSS Operator must not specify the Maximum Net Dependable Capacity specified in the RMR Contract as Load following up or down capacity to allow the CAISO to access such capacity for RMR Dispatch.

30.5.2.6 Ancillary Services Bids.

There are four distinct Ancillary Services: Regulation Up, Regulation Down, Spinning Reserve and Non-Spinning Reserve. Participating Generators are eligible to provide all Ancillary Services. Dynamic System Resources are eligible to provide Operating Reserves and Regulation. Non-Dynamic System Resources are eligible to provide Operating Reserves only. No System Resource, including Dynamic Resource-Specific System Resources and Non-Dynamic Resource-Specific System Resources, can be used for self-provision of Ancillary Services. All System Resources, including Dynamic Resource-Specific System Resources and Non-Dynamic Resource-Specific System Resources, will be charged the Shadow Price as prescribed in Section 11.10. Participating Loads are eligible to provide Non-Spinning Reserve only. A Scheduling Coordinator may submit Ancillary Services Bids for Regulation Up, Regulation Down, Spinning Reserve, and Non-Spinning Reserve for the same capacity by providing a separate price in

$/MW per hour as desired for each Ancillary Service. The Bid for each Ancillary Services is a single Bid segment. Only resources certified by the CAISO as capable of providing Ancillary Services are eligible to provide Ancillary Services. In addition to the common elements listed in Section 30.5.2.1, all Ancillary Services Bid components of a Supply Bid must contain the following: (1) the type of Ancillary Service for which a Bid is being submitted; (2) Ramp Rate (Operating Reserve Ramp Rate and regulating Ramp Rate, if applicable); (3) Distribution Curve for Physical Scheduling Plant or System Unit; and (4) Maximum Operating Limit (MOLmax) and Minimum Operating Limit (MOLmin). An Ancillary Services Bid submitted to the Day-Ahead Market when submitted to the Day-Ahead Market may be, but is not required to be, accompanied by an Energy Bid that covers the capacity offered for the Ancillary Service. Submissions to Self-Provide an Ancillary Services submitted to the Day-Ahead Market when submitted to the Day-Ahead Market may be, but are not required to be, accompanied by an Energy Bid that covers the capacity to be self-provided; provided, however, that such an Energy Bid shall be submitted prior to the close of the Real-Time Market for the day immediately following the Day-Ahead Market in which the Ancillary Service Bid was submitted if the Submission to Self-Provide an Ancillary Service is qualified as specified in Section 8.6. Submissions to Self-Provide an Ancillary Services submitted in the Day-Ahead Market must be accompanied by a Self-Schedule. When submitting Ancillary Service Bids in the Real-Time, Scheduling Coordinators for resources that either have been awarded or self-provide Spinning Reserve or Non-Spinning Reserve capacity in the Day-Ahead Market must submit an Energy Bid for at least the awarded or self-provided Spinning Reserve or Non-Spinning Reserve capacity, otherwise the CAISO will apply the Bid validation rules described in Section 30.9. As provided in Section 30.5.2.6.4, a Submission to Self-Provide an Ancillary Service shall contain all of the requirements of a Bid for Ancillary Services with the exception of Ancillary Service Bid price information. In addition, Scheduling Coordinators must comply with the Ancillary Services requirements of Section 8.

30.5.2.6.1 Regulation Up or Regulation Down Bid Information.

In the case of Regulation Up or Regulation Down, the Ancillary Services Bid must also contain: (a) the upward and downward range of generating capacity over which the resource is willing to provide Regulation within a range from a minimum of ten (10) minutes to a maximum of thirty (30) minutes; and (b) the Bid price of the capacity reservation, stated separately for Regulation Up and Regulation Down ($/MW). In the case of Regulation Up or Regulation Down from Dynamic System Resources, the Ancillary Services Bid must also contain: (a) the Scheduling Point (the name), (b) Interchange ID code of the selling entity, (c) external Control Area ID, (d) Schedule ID (NERC ID number), and (e) the Contract Reference Number, if applicable. Ancillary Services Bids submitted to the Real-Time Market for Regulation need not be accompanied by an Energy Bid that covers the Ancillary Services capacity being offered into the Real-Time Market.

30.5.2.6.2 Spinning Reserve Capacity Bid Information.

In the case of Spinning Reserve capacity, the Ancillary Services Bid must also contain: (a) MW of additional capability synchronized to the system, immediately responsive to system frequency, and available within ten (10) minutes; (b) Bid price of capacity reservation, and (c) an indication whether the capacity reserved would be available to supply Imbalance Energy only in the event of the occurrence of an unplanned Outage, a Contingency or an imminent or actual System Emergency (Contingency Flag). In the case of Spinning Reserve capacity from System Resources, the Ancillary Services Bid must also contain: (a) Interchange ID code of the selling entity, (b) Schedule ID (NERC ID number, and (c) a Contract Reference Number, if applicable. Ancillary Services Bids and Submissions to Self-Provide an Ancillary Services submitted to the Real-Time Market for Spinning Reserves must also submit an Energy Bid that covers the Ancillary Services capacity being offered into the Real-Time Market.

30.5.2.6.3 Non-Spinning Reserve Capacity.

In the case of Non-Spinning Reserve, the Ancillary Service Bid must also contain: (a) the MW capability available within ten (10) minutes; (b) the Bid price of the capacity reservation; (c) time of synchronization following notification (minutes); and (d) an indication whether the capacity reserved would be available to supply Imbalance Energy only in the event of the occurrence of an unplanned Outage, a Contingency or an imminent or actual System Emergency (Contingency Flag). In the case of Non-Spinning Reserve Capacity from System Resources, the Ancillary Services Bid must also contain: (a) Interchange ID code of the selling entity, (b) Schedule ID (NERC ID number); and (c) a Contract Reference Number, if applicable. In the case of Non-Spinning Reserve Capacity from Participating Load within the CAISO Control Area, the Ancillary Service Bid must also contain: (a) a Load identification name and Location Code, (b) Demand reduction available within ten (10) minutes, (c) time to interruption following notification (minutes), and (d) maximum allowable curtailment duration (hour). In the case of Aggregated Participating Load, Scheduling Coordinators must submit Bids using a Generating Unit or Physical Scheduling Plant Resource ID for the Demand reduction capacity of the Aggregated Participating Load through a Bid to provide Non-Spinning Reserve or a Submission to Self-Provide an Ancillary Service for Non-Spinning Reserve. Ancillary Services Bids and Submissions to Self-Provide an Ancillary Services submitted to the Real-Time Market for Non-Spinning Reserves must also submit an Energy Bid that covers the Ancillary Services capacity being offered into the Real-Time Market.

30.5.2.6.4 Additional Rules For Self-Provided Ancillary Services.

Scheduling Coordinators electing to self-provide Ancillary Services shall supply the information referred to in this Section 30.5 in relation to each Ancillary Service to be self-provided, excluding the capacity price information, but including the name of the trading Scheduling Coordinator in the case of Inter-Scheduling Coordinator Ancillary Service Trades. The portion of the single Energy Bid that corresponds to the high end of the resource's operating range, shall be allocated to any awarded or Self-Provided Ancillary

Services in the following order from higher to lower capacity: (a) Regulation Up; (b) Spinning Reserve; and (c) Non-Spinning Reserve. For resources providing Regulation Up, the upper regulating limit shall be used if it is lower than the highest operating limit. The remaining portion of the Energy Bid (i.e. that portion not associated with capacity committed to provide Ancillary Services) shall constitute a Bid to provide Energy.

30.5.2.7 RUC Availability Bids.

Scheduling Coordinators may submit RUC Availability Bids for specific Generating Units in the DAM; however, Scheduling Coordinators for Resource Adequacy Capacity or ICPM Capacity must submit RUC Availability Bids for that capacity to the extent that the capacity has not been submitted in a Self-Schedule or already been committed to provide Energy or capacity in the IFM. Capacity that does not have Bids for Supply of Energy in the IFM will not be eligible to participate in the RUC process. The RUC Availability Bid component is MW-quantity of non-Resource Adequacy Capacity in $/MW per hour, and $0/MW for Resource Adequacy Capacity or ICPM Capacity.

30.5.3 Demand Bids.

Each Scheduling Coordinator representing Demand, including Non-Participating Load and Aggregated Participating Load, shall submit Bids indicating the hourly quantity of Energy in MWh that it intends to purchase in the IFM for each Trading Hour of the Trading Day. Scheduling Coordinators must submit Demand Bids, including Self Schedules, for CAISO Demand at Load Aggregation Points except as provided in Section 30.5.3.2. Scheduling Coordinators must submit a zero RUC Availability Bid for the portion of their qualified Resource Adequacy Capacity. If submitting Self-Schedules at Scheduling Points for export in the IFM, the Scheduling Coordinator shall indicate whether or not the export is served from Generation from Resource Adequacy Capacity, and if submitting Self-Schedules at Scheduling Points for export in HASP the Scheduling Coordinator shall indicate whether or not the export is served from Generation from Resource Adequacy Capacity or RUC Capacity. The procedure for identifying the non-Resource Adequacy Capacity or non-RUC Capacity is specified in the Business Practice Manuals.

30.5.3.1 Demand Bids Components.

Demand Bids must have the following components: Scheduling Coordinator ID code; a Demand Bid curve that is a monotonically decreasing staircase function of no more than ten (10) segments defined by eleven (11) ordered pairs of MW and $/MWh; Location Code for the LAP, Custom LAP or PNode, as applicable; and hourly scheduled MWh within the range of the Bid curve, including any zero values, for each Settlement Period of the Trading Day.

30.5.3.2 Exceptions to Requirement for Submission of Demand Bids and Settlement at the LAP.

The following are exceptions to the requirement that Demand Bids be submitted and settled at the LAP:

(a) ETC or TOR Self-Schedules submitted consistent with the submitted TRTC Instructions;

(b) Participating Load and Aggregated Participating Load Bids for Supply and Demand may be submitted and settled at a PNode or Custom LAP, as appropriate; and

(c) Export Bids are submitted and settled at Scheduling Points, which do not constitute a LAP.

30.5.4 Wheeling Through Transactions.

A Wheeling Through transaction consists of an Export Bid and an Import Bid that includes: matching Self-Schedules or Economic Bids (i.e. the Export Bid and Import Bid pair must have matching MW quantities for each Trading Hour) and the same Wheeling reference (a unique identifier for each Wheeling Through transaction). If the Wheeling reference does not match at the time the relevant market closes, the Wheeling Through transaction will be treated as separate Export Bids and Import Bids, as appropriate. If the MW quantities of the Wheel Through transaction do not match at the time the relevant market closes, the Wheel Through transaction will be considered the minimum of the import and export MW quantities submitted.

30.6 [NOT USED]

30.7 Bid Validation.

The CAISO shall validate submitted Bids pursuant to the procedures set forth in this Section 30.7 and the rules set forth in the Business Practice Manuals.

30.7.1 Scheduling Coordinator Access.

Each Scheduling Coordinator will be provided access to the CAISO's secure communication system to submit, modify and cancel Bids prior to the close of both the DAM and HASP, as specified in Section 30.5.1. The CAISO shall provide information regarding submitted Bids including, but not be limited to, the following: (i) notification of acceptance; (ii) notification of validation; (iii) notification of rejection; (iv) notification of status; (v) notification of submission error(s); and (vi) default modification or generation of Bids as further provided below, if any, on behalf of Scheduling Coordinators.

30.7.2 Timing of CAISO Validation.

Once a Bid is submitted to the CAISO Markets, the Bid is available for validation, which is conducted in multiple steps. Clean Bids will be generated after Market Close.

30.7.3 DAM Validation.

30.7.3.1 Validation Prior to Market Close and Master File Update.

The CAISO conducts Bid validation in three steps:

Step 1: The CAISO will validate all Bids after submission of the Bid for content validation which determines that the Bid adheres to the structural rules required of all Bids as further described in the Business Practices Manuals. If the Bid fails any of the content level rules the CAISO shall assign it a rejected status and the Scheduling Coordinator must correct and resubmit the Bid.

Step 2: After the Bids are successfully validated for content, but prior to the Market Close of the DAM, the Bids will continue through the second level of validation rules to verify that the Bid adheres to the

applicable CAISO Market rules and if applicable, limits based on Master File data. If the Bid fails any level two validation rules, the CAISO shall assign the Bid as invalid and the Scheduling Coordinator must either correct or resubmit the Bid.

Step 3: If the Bid successfully passes validation in Step 2, it will continue through the third level of validation where the Bid will be analyzed based on its contents to identify any missing Bid components that must be either present for the Bid to be valid consistent with the market rules contained in Article III of this CAISO Tariff and as reflected in the Business Practice Manuals. At this stage the Bid will either be automatically modified for correctness and assigned a status of conditionally modified or modified, or if it can be accepted as is, the Bid will be assigned a status of conditionally valid, or valid. A Bid will be automatically modified and assigned a status of modified or conditionally modified Bid, whenever the CAISO inserts or modifies a Bid component. The CAISO will insert or modify a Bid component whenever (1) a Self-Schedule quantity is less than the lowest quantity specified as an Economic Bid for either an Energy Bid or Demand Bid, in which case the CAISO extends the Self-Schedule to cover the gap; (2) for non-Resource Adequacy Resources, the CAISO will extend the Energy Bid Curve using Proxy Costs to cover any capacity in a RUC Bid component, if necessary; and (3) for a Resource Adequacy Resource, the CAISO will extend the Energy Bid Curve using Proxy Costs to cover any capacity in a RUC Bid component and, if necessary, up to the full registered Resource Adequacy Capacity. The CAISO will generate a Proxy Bid or extend an Energy Bid or Self-Schedule to cover any RUC Award or Day-Ahead Schedule in the absence of any Self-Schedule or Economic Bid components, or to fill in any gaps between any Self-Schedule Bid and any Economic Bid components to cover a RUC Award or Day-Ahead Schedule. To the extent that an Energy Bid to the HASP/RTM is not accompanied by an Ancillary Services Bid, the CAISO will insert a Spinning Reserve and Non-Spinning Reserve Ancillary Services Bid at $ 0/MW for any certified Operating Reserve capacity. The CAISO will also generate a Self-Schedule

Bid for any Generating Unit that has a Day-Ahead Schedule but has not submitted Bids in HASP/RTM, up to the quantity in the Day-Ahead Schedule. Throughout the Bid evaluation process, the Scheduling Coordinator shall have the ability to view the Bid and may choose to cancel the Bid, modify and re-submit the Bid, or leave the modified, conditionally modified or valid, conditionally valid Bid as is to be processed in the designated CAISO Market.

30.7.3.2 Master File Data Update.

Except as otherwise prescribed in this tariff, once a day the Master File data is updated with changes to the Master File that were submitted between at least five (5) and up to eleven (11) Business Days in advance, after which all conditional Bids must be re-validated prior to the trading period when the Bid will take effect. After this re-validation takes place, the status of all conditionally modified and conditionally valid Bids may be changed to modified or valid, if the Bid period is for the next relevant DAM.

30.7.3.3 Validation Prior to Market Close and After Master File Update.

Prior to the Market Close of the DAM, after the Master File data has been updated, all Bids must be re-validated using the same process as described in Section 30.7.3.1 to produce either valid Bids or modified Bids. Throughout this process the Scheduling Coordinator shall have the ability to view the Bid and may choose to re-submit (at which point the Bid would undergo the Bid validation process described in this Section 30.7 again), cancel, or modify the Bid. Valid or modified Bids that are not re-submitted or cancelled become Clean Bids after the Market Close of the DAM. Modified Bids for Resource Adequacy Resources will reflect the full capability of the resource as defined in the Master File.

30.7.3.4 Validation after Market Close.

To the extent that Scheduling Coordinators fail to enter a Bid for resource that is required to submit Bids in the full range of available capacity consistent with the Resource Adequacy provisions of Section 40, the CAISO will create a Bid for the Scheduling Coordinator, which is referred to as the Generated Bid. This does not apply to Load-following MSSs. The Generated Bid will be created only after the Market Close for the DAM and will be based on data registered in the Master File, and, if applicable, published natural gas pricing data. The Scheduling Coordinator may view Generated Bids, but may not modify such Bids. The CAISO will provide notice to the Scheduling Coordinator of the use of a Generated Bid prior to Market Clearing of the IFM. In addition validation of export priority pursuant to Sections 31.4 and 34.10.1 and Wheeling Through transactions pursuant to Section 30.5.4 occur after the Market Close for the DAM.

30.7.4 HASP and RTM Validation.

The HASP and RTM Bids will include the same validation process implemented in the DAM except that the CAISO will not validate the Bid before and again after the Master File Data update. HASP and RTM Bids are only validated based on the current Master File Data on the relevant Trading Day.

30.7.5 Validation of ETC Self-Schedules.

ETC Self-Schedules shall be validated pursuant to the procedures set forth in Section 16.6.

30.7.6 Validation and Treatment of Ancillary Services Bids.

30.7.6.1 Validation of Ancillary Services Bids.

Throughout the validation process described in Section 30.7, the CAISO will verify that each Ancillary Services Bid conforms to the content, format and syntax specified for the relevant Ancillary Service. If the Ancillary Services Bid does not so conform, the CAISO will send a notification to the Scheduling Coordinator notifying the Scheduling Coordinator of the errors in the Bids as described in Section 30.7. When the Bids are submitted, a technical validation will be performed to verify that the bid quantity of Regulation, Spinning Reserve, or Non-Spinning Reserve does not exceed the certified Ancillary Services

capacity for Regulation, or Operating Reserves on the Generating Units, System Units, Participating Loads and external imports/exports bid. The Scheduling Coordinator will be notified within a reasonable time of any validation errors. For each error detected, an error message will be generated by the CAISO in the Scheduling Coordinator's notification screen, which will specify the nature of the error. The Scheduling Coordinator can then look at the notification messages to review the detailed list of errors, make changes, and resubmit if it is still within the CAISO's timing requirements. The Scheduling Coordinator is also notified of successful validation. If a resource is awarded or has qualified Self-Provided Ancillary Services in the Day-Ahead Market, if no Energy Bid is submitted to cover the awarded or Self-Provided Ancillary Services by the Market Close of HASP and the RTM, the CAISO will generate or extend an Energy Bid as necessary to cover the awarded or Self-Provided Ancillary Services capacity using the registered values in the Master File and relevant fuel prices as described in the Business Practice Manuals for use in the HASP and IFM. If an AS Bid or Submission to Self-Provide an AS is submitted in the Real-Time for Spinning Reserve or Non-Spinning Reserve without an accompanying Energy Bid at all, the AS Bid or Submission to Self-Provide an Ancillary Service will be erased. If an AS Bid or Submission to Self-Provide an AS is submitted in the Real-Time Market for Spinning Reserve and Non-Spinning Reserve with only a partial Energy Bid for the AS capacity, the CAISO will generate an Energy Bid for the uncovered portions. For Generating Units with certified Regulation capacity, if there no Bid for Regulation in the Real-Time Market, but there is a Day-Ahead award for Regulation Up or Regulation Down or a submission to self-provide Regulation Up or Regulation Down, respectively, the CAISO will generate a Regulation Up or Regulation Down Bid at the default Ancillary Service Bid price of $0 up to the certified Regulation capacity for the Generating Unit minus any Regulation awarded or self-provided in the Day-Ahead. If there is a Bid for Regulation Up or Regulation Down in the Real-Time Market, the CAISO will increase the respective Bid up to the certified Regulation capacity for the Generating Unit minus any Regulation awarded or self-provided in the Day-Ahead.

30.7.6.2 Treatment of Ancillary Services Bids.

When Scheduling Coordinators bid into the Regulation Up, Regulation Down, Spinning Reserve, and Non-Spinning Reserve markets, they may submit Bids for the same capacity into as many of these markets as desired at the same time by providing the appropriate Bid information to the CAISO. The CAISO optimization will evaluate AS Bids simultaneously with Energy Bids. A Scheduling Coordinator may specify that its Bid applies only the markets it desires. A Scheduling Coordinator shall also have the ability to specify different capacity prices for the Spinning Reserve, Non-Spinning Reserve, and Regulation markets. A Scheduling Coordinator providing one or more Regulation Up, Regulation Down, Spinning Reserve or Non-Spinning Reserve services may not change the identification of the Generating Units offered in the Day-Ahead Market or in the Real-Time Market for such services unless specifically approved by the CAISO (except with respect to System Units, if any, in which case Scheduling Coordinators are required to identify and disclose the resource specific information for all Generating Units and Participating Loads constituting the System Unit for which Bids and Submissions to Self-Provide Ancillary Services are submitted into the CAISO's Day-Ahead Market and Real-Time Market.

The following principles will apply in the treatment of Ancillary Services Bids in the CAISO Markets:

(a) not differentiate between bidders for Ancillary Services and Energy other than through cost, price, effectiveness, and capability to provide the Ancillary Service or Energy, and the required locational mix of Ancillary Services;

(b) select the bidders with most cost effective Bids for Ancillary Service capacity which meet its technical requirements, including location and operating capability to minimize the costs to users of the CAISO Controlled Grid;

(c) evaluate the Day-Ahead Bids over the twenty-four (24) Settlement Periods of the following Trading Day along with Energy, taking into transmission constraints and AS Regional Limits;

(*d*) evaluate Import Bids along with internal resources;

(*e*) establish Real-Time Ancillary Service Awards *through RTUC* from *imports and* generation internal to the CAISO Balancing Authority Area at fifteen (15) minutes intervals to the hour of operation; and

(*f*) procure sufficient Ancillary Services in the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets to meet its forecasted requirements.

30.7.7 Format and Validation of Operational Ramp Rates.

The submitted Operational Ramp Rate expressed in megawatts per minute (MW/min) as a function of the operating level, expressed in megawatts (MW), must be a staircase function with up to four segments. There is no monotonicity requirement for the Operational Ramp Rate. The submitted Operational Ramp Rate shall be validated as follows:

(a) The range of the submitted Operational Ramp Rate must cover the entire capacity of the resource, from the minimum to the maximum operating capacity, as registered in the Master File for the relevant resource.

(b) The operating level entries must match exactly (in number, sequence, and value) the corresponding minimum and maximum Operational Ramp Rate breakpoints, as registered in the Master File for the relevant resource.

(c) If a Scheduling Coordinator does not submit an Operational Ramp Rate for a generating unit for a day, the CAISO shall use the maximum Ramp Rate for each operating range set forth in the Master File as the Ramp Rate for that unit for that same operating range for the Trading Day.

(d) The last Ramp Rate entry shall be equal to the previous Ramp Rate entry and represent the maximum operating capacity of the resource as registered in the Master File. The resulting Operational Ramp Rate segments must lie between the minimum and maximum Operational Ramp Rates, as registered in the Master File.

(e) The submitted Operational Ramp Rate must be the same for each hour of the Trading Day, i.e., the Operational Ramp Rate submitted for a given Trading Hour must be the same with the one(s) submitted earlier for previous Trading Hours in the same Trading Day.

(f) Outages that affect the submitted Operational Ramp Rate must be due to physical constraints, reported in SLIC and are subject to CAISO approval. All approved changes to the submitted Operational Ramp Rate will be used in determination of Dispatch Instructions for the shorter period of the balance of the Trading Day or duration of reported Outage.

(g) If an Operational Ramp Rate is derated in SLIC, the Ramp Rate will only be to four segments. Ramping capability through Forbidden Operating Regions are not affected by derates entered in SLIC.

(h) The amount of change in Ramp Rates from one operating range to a subsequent operating range must not exceed a 10 to 1 ratio, and any Ramp Rate change in excess will be adjusted to achieve the 10 to 1 ratio. This adjustment will also include the implicit ramp rate in the Forbidden Operating Region.

(i) For all CAISO Dispatch Instructions of Reliability Must-Run Units the Operational Ramp Rate will be the Ramp Rate declared in the Reliability Must Run Contract Schedule A.

30.7.8 Format and Validation of Start-Up and Shut-Down Times.

For a Generating Unit or a Resource-Specific System Resource, the submitted Start-Up Time expressed in minutes (min) as a function of down time expressed in minutes (min) must be a staircase function with up to three (3) segments defined by a set of 1 to 4 down time and Start-Up Time pairs. The Start-Up Time is the time required to start the resource if it is offline longer than the corresponding down time. The last segment will represent the time to start the unit from a cold start and will extend to infinity. The submitted Start-Up Time function shall be validated as follows:

(a) The first down time must be zero (0) min.

(b) The down time entries must match exactly (in number, sequence, and value) the corresponding down time breakpoints of the maximum Start-Up Time function, as registered in the Master File for the relevant resource.

(c) The Start-Up Time for each segment must not exceed the Start-Up Time of the corresponding segment of the maximum Start-Up Time function, as registered in the Master File for the relevant resource.

(d) The Start-Up Time function must be strictly monotonically increasing, i.e., the Start-Up Time must increase as down time increases.

For Participating Load, a single Shut-Down time in minutes is the time required for the resource to Shut-Down after receiving a Dispatch Instruction.

30.7.9 Format and Validation of Start-Up Costs and Shut-Down Costs.

For a Generating Unit or a Resource-Specific System Resource, the submitted Start-Up Cost expressed in dollars ($) as a function of down time expressed in minutes must be a staircase function with up to three (3) segments defined by a set of 1 to 4 down time and Start-Up Cost pairs. The Start-Up Cost is the cost incurred to start the resource if it is offline longer than the corresponding down time. The last segment will represent the cost to start the resource from cold Start-Up and will extend to infinity. The submitted Start-Up Cost function shall be validated as follows:

(a) The first down time must be zero (0) min.

(b) The down time entries must match exactly (in number, sequence, and value) the corresponding down time breakpoints of the Start-Up Cost function, as registered in the Master File for the relevant resource as either the Proxy Cost or Registered Cost.

(c) The Start-Up Cost for each segment must not be negative and must be equal to the Start-Up Cost of the corresponding segment of the Start-Up Cost function, as registered in the Master File for the relevant resource. If a value is submitted in a Bid for the Start-Up Cost, it will be overwritten by the Master File value as either the Proxy Cost or Registered Cost based on the option elected pursuant to Section 30.4. If no value for Start-Up Cost is submitted in a Bid, the CAISO will insert the Master File value, as either the Proxy Cost or Registered Cost based on the option elected pursuant to Section 30.4.

(d) The Start-Up Cost function must be strictly monotonically increasing, i.e., the Start-Up Cost must increase as down time increases.

For Participating Loads, a single Shut-Down Cost in dollars ($) is the cost incurred to Shut-Down the resource after receiving a Dispatch Instruction. The submitted Shut-Down Cost must not be negative.

30.7.10 Format and Validation of Minimum Load Costs.

For a Generating Unit or a Resource-Specific System Resource, the submitted Minimum Load Cost expressed in dollars per hour ($/hr) is the cost incurred for operating the unit at Minimum Load. The submitted Minimum Load Cost must not be negative and must be equal to the Minimum Load Cost under the Proxy Cost option or Registered Cost option, as registered in the Master File for the relevant resource.

For Participating Loads, the submitted Minimum Load Cost ($/hr) is the cost incurred while operating the resource at reduced consumption after receiving a Dispatch Instruction. The submitted Minimum Load Cost must not be negative.

30.8 Prohibition on Bidding Across Out-of-Service Transmission Paths at Scheduling Points.

Scheduling Coordinators shall not submit any Bids or ETC Self-Schedules at Scheduling Points using a transmission path for any Settlement Period for which the Operating Transfer Capability for that path is zero (0) MW. The CAISO shall reject Bids or ETC Self-Schedules submitted at Scheduling Points where the Operating Transfer Capability on the transmission path is zero (0) MW. If the Operating Transfer Capability of a transmission path at the relevant Scheduling Point is reduced to zero (0) after Day-Ahead Schedules have been issued, then, if time permits, the CAISO shall direct the responsible Scheduling Coordinators to reduce all MWh associated with the Bids on such zero-rated transmission paths to zero (0) in the HASP. As necessary to comply with Applicable Reliability Criteria, the CAISO shall reduce any non-zero (0) HASP Bids across zero-rated transmission paths to zero after the Market Close for the HASP.