

**37 Rules of Conduct.**

**37.1 Objectives, Definitions, and Scope.**

**37.1.1 Purpose.**

Section 37 sets forth the guiding principles for participation in the markets administered by the CAISO. The specified Rules of Conduct are intended to provide fair notice to Market Participants of the conduct expected of them, to provide an environment in which all parties may participate on a fair and equal basis, to redress instances of gaming and other instances of anticompetitive behavior, and thereby to foster confidence of Market Participants, ratepayers and the general public in the proper functioning of the CAISO markets.

**37.1.2 Objectives.**

The objectives of this CAISO Tariff are to:

- (a) Provide clear Rules of Conduct specifying the behavior expected of Market Participants; and
- (b) Establish in advance the Sanctions and other potential consequences for violation of the specified Rules of Conduct.

**37.1.3 Application of Other Remedies.**

The activities and remedies authorized under this Section 37 are in addition to any other actions or relief that may be available to the CAISO elsewhere in the CAISO Tariff or under law, regulation or order. Nothing in this Section 37 limits or should be construed to limit the right of the CAISO to take action or seek relief otherwise available to it, and such action or relief may be pursued in lieu of or in addition to the action or relief specified in this Section 37.

**37.1.4 FERC Authority.**

In addition to any authority afforded Market Monitoring Unit in this Section 37, FERC shall have the authority to assess the sanctions, and otherwise to enforce the rules as set forth and described in this Section 37. FERC shall have authority to remedy a violation under this Section 37 from the date of the violation. Nothing in this Section 37 shall be deemed to be a limitation or condition on the authority of FERC or other entities under current law or regulation.

**37.1.5 Administration.**

The Marketing Monitoring Unit will administer the Rules of Conduct specified herein, except for Section 37.7, which shall be administered by FERC, and except as provided in Section 37.2.5 and Section 37.4.4. Nothing in this CAISO Tariff limits or should be construed to limit the ability of components of the CAISO organization other than the Market Monitoring Unit to analyze data and refer matters to the Market Monitoring Unit for enforcement.

**37.2 Comply with Operating Orders.**

**37.2.1 Compliance with Orders Generally.**

**37.2.1.1 Expected Conduct.**

Market Participants must comply with operating orders issued by the CAISO as authorized under the CAISO Tariff. For purposes of enforcement under this Section 37.2, an operating order shall be an order(s) from the CAISO directing a Market Participant to undertake, a single, clearly specified action (e.g., the operation of a specific device, or change in status of a particular Generating Unit) that is feasible and intended to resolve a specific operating condition. A Market Participant's failure to obey an operating order containing multiple instructions to address a specific operating condition will result in a single violation of Section 37.2. If some limitation prevents the Market Participant from fulfilling the action requested by the CAISO, then the Market Participant must promptly and directly communicate the nature of any such limitation to the CAISO. Compliance with CAISO operating orders requires a good faith effort to achieve full performance as soon as is reasonably practicable in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

**37.2.1.2 Sanctions.**

The Sanction for a violation of this Section shall be the greater of the quantity of Energy non-performance multiplied by the applicable Dispatch Interval Locational Marginal Price or the following: for the first violation in a rolling twelve (12) month period, \$5,000; for the second and subsequent violations in a rolling twelve (12) month period, \$ 10,000. Sanctions under Section 37.2.1 will not be greater than \$10,000 per violation and will be subject to the limitation stated in Section 37.2.6. If a quantity of Energy cannot be objectively determined, then the financial sanctions specified above will apply. A Market Participant may incur Sanctions for more than one violation per day.

**37.2.2 Failure to Curtail Load.**

**37.2.2.1 Expected Conduct.**

A UDC or MSS Operator shall promptly comply with any CAISO operating order to curtail interruptible or firm Load issued pursuant to the CAISO's authority under Section 7.7.11.3.

**37.2.2.2 Sanctions.**

The Sanction for non-compliance with an operating order to curtail Load will be \$10,000 for each violation.

**37.2.3 Operations & Maintenance Practices.**

**37.2.3.1 Expected Conduct.**

Market Participants shall undertake such operating and maintenance practices as necessary to avoid contributing to a major Outage or prolonging response time as indicated by Section 7.7.13.3.

**37.2.3.2 Sanctions.**

The Sanction for a violation of Section 37.2.3 will be \$10,000.

**37.2.4 Resource Adequacy Availability.**

**37.2.4.1 Expected Conduct.**

A Market Participant shall operate a Generating Unit listed as a Resource Adequacy Resource on-line and/or available consistent with a DAM or RUC commitment or Real-Time Dispatch Instructions, subject to Section 40, unless the CAISO releases the Generating Unit after the RUC process is completed, or a derate, Outage or other event outside the control of the Market Participant prevents the Generating Unit from being on-line and available. A Market Participant that fails to perform in accordance with the expected conduct described in this Section 37.2.4.1 shall be subject to Sanction.

**37.2.4.2 Sanctions.**

The Sanctions for a violation of Section 37.2.4 shall be as follows: for the first violation in a rolling twelve (12) month period, \$5,000; for the second and all subsequent violations in a rolling twelve (12) month period, \$10,000. A Market Participant is limited to one Sanction per Generating Unit per calendar day.

**37.2.5 Enhancements and Exceptions.**

Except as otherwise specifically provided, penalty amounts shall be tripled for any violation of Section 37.2.1 through Section 37.2.4 if a CAISO System Emergency exists at the time an operating order becomes effective or at any time during the Market Participant's non-performance. Notwithstanding the foregoing, violations of Section 37.2.1 through Section 37.2.4 are subject to penalty under this rule only to the extent that the CAISO has issued a separate and distinct non-automated Dispatch Instruction to the Market Participant. Any penalty amount that is tripled under this provision and that would exceed the \$10,000 per day penalty limit shall not be levied against a Market Participant until the CAISO proposes and the Commission approves such an enhancement. A Market Participant that is subject to an enhanced penalty amount under this Section 37.2.5 may appeal that penalty amount to FERC if the Market Participant believes a mitigating circumstance not covered in Section 37.9.2 exists. The duty of the Market Participant to pay the enhanced penalty amount will be tolled until FERC renders its decision on the appeal.

**37.2.6 Per Day Limitation on Amount of Sanctions.**

The amount of Sanctions that any Market Participant will incur for committing two or more violations of Section 37.2.1 through Section 37.2.4 on the same day will be no greater than \$10,000 per day.

**37.3 Submit Feasible Energy Bids, RUC Capacity Bids, Ancillary Service Bids, and Submissions to Self-Provide an Ancillary Service.**

**37.3.1 Bidding Generally.**

**37.3.1.1 Expected Conduct.**

Market Participants must submit Bids for Energy, RUC Capacity and Ancillary Services and Submissions to Self-Provide an Ancillary Service from resources that are reasonably expected to be available and capable of performing at the levels specified in the Bid, and to remain available and capable of so performing based on all information that is known to the Market Participant or should have been known to the Market Participant at the time of submission. HASP Intertie Schedules for import or export Energy are not subject to the foregoing requirement, but failure to deliver on such HASP Intertie Schedules can violate the anti-manipulation provisions in Section 37.7 and in any regulations issued by FERC.

**37.3.1.2 Consequence for Non-Performance.**

A Market Participant that fails to perform in accordance with the expected conduct described in Section 37.3.1.1 above shall be subject to having the payment rescinded for any portion of an Ancillary Service or RUC Capacity that is unavailable. If a Market Participant fails to deliver on a HASP Intertie Schedule for import or export Energy, it shall be subject to any charge that may apply in Section 11.31 and to any penalty or sanction FERC may impose for violation of Section 37.7, but shall not be subject to Sanctions pursuant to any other provision of Section 37, including this Section 37.3.

**37.3.2 Exceptions.**

Violations of Section 37.3.1 that result in circumstances in which an Uninstructed Deviation Penalty under Section 11.23 may be assessed or for which payments have been eliminated under Section 8.10.8 are not subject to Sanction under this section. The submission of a Bid or of a Submission to Self-Provide Ancillary Services that causes, or that the CAISO expects to cause Congestion shall not, by itself, constitute a violation of Section 37.3.1 unless the Market Participant fails to comply with an obligation under the CAISO Tariff to modify Bids as determined by the CAISO to mitigate such Congestion or such Bids violate another element of this rule.

**37.4 Comply with Availability Reporting Requirements.**

**37.4.1 Reporting Availability.**

**37.4.1.1 Expected Conduct.**

A Market Participant shall notify the CAISO Control Center of any Outage reportable pursuant to Section 9.3.10.2.1 of a Generating Unit subject to Section 4.6 within sixty (60) minutes after the Outage is discovered.

**37.4.1.2 Sanctions.**

A "violation" for purposes of this Section shall mean each failure to notify the CAISO Control Center about an Outage of a Generating Unit within sixty (60) minutes after the Outage is discovered, as required by Section 37.4.1, except that (a) for each Generating Unit, the first such failure in a calendar month shall not constitute a violation, and (b) for each Generating Unit, multiple failures in the same calendar day shall constitute a single violation. The Sanctions for a violation of Section 37.4.1 shall be as follows:

- (a) for each Generating Unit that is the subject of a violation, the Sanction for the first violation in a calendar month shall be a warning letter;
- (b) for each Generating Unit that is the subject of a violation, the Sanction for the second and subsequent violations in a calendar month will be a financial penalty, as follows:
  - (i) if the Generating Unit has not been the subject of a financial penalty for a previous violation within twelve (12) months of the instant violation, the Sanction will be \$1,000;
  - (ii) if the Generating Unit has been the subject of one financial penalty for a previous violation within twelve (12) months of the instant violation, the Sanction will be \$2,000;
  - (iii) if the Generating Unit has been the subject of two or more financial penalties for previous violations within twelve (12) months of the instant violation, the Sanction will be \$5,000.

**37.4.2 Scheduling and Final Approval of Outages.**

**37.4.2.1 Expected Conduct.**

A Market Participant shall not undertake an Outage except as approved by the CAISO Outage Coordination Office in accordance with Section 9.3.2, Section 9.3.9, and Section 9.3.6.6. A Market Participant shall not commence any Outage without obtaining final approval from the CAISO Control Center in accordance with Sections 9.3.9 and 9.3.10.

**37.4.2.2 Sanctions.**

The Sanctions for a violation of Section 37.4.2 shall be as follows: for the first violation within a rolling twelve (12) month period, \$5,000; for subsequent violations within a rolling twelve (12) month period, \$10,000. A "violation" shall mean each Outage undertaken for which all required approvals were not obtained.



**37.4.3 Explanation of Forced Outages.**

**37.4.3.1 Expected Conduct.**

As required by Section 9.3.10.6, a Market Participant must provide a detailed explanation of a Forced Outage within two (2) Business Days after the Operator initially notifies the CAISO pursuant to Section 9.3.10.2.1 of the change in maximum output capability. An Operator must promptly provide information requested by the CAISO to enable the CAISO to review the explanation submitted by the Operator and to prepare a report on the Forced Outage.

**37.4.3.2 Sanctions.**

The Sanction for failing to provide a timely explanation of Forced Outage shall be \$500 per day for each day the explanation is late. The Sanction for failing to provide a timely response to information requested shall be as specified in Section 37.6.1.

**37.4.4 Enhancements and Exceptions.**

Except as otherwise specifically provided, penalty amounts shall be tripled for any violation of Section 37.4.1 through Section 37.4.3 that occurs during a CAISO System Emergency. Violations of the above rules that result in circumstances in which an Uninstructed Deviation Penalty under Section 11.23 may be assessed shall not be subject to Sanction under this Section 37.4. A Market Participant that is subject to an enhanced penalty amount under this Section 37.4.4 may appeal that penalty amount to FERC if the Market Participant believes a mitigating circumstance not covered in Section 37.9.2 exists. The duty of the Market Participant to pay the enhanced penalty amount will be tolled until FERC renders its decision on the appeal.

**37.5 Provide Factually Accurate Information.**

**37.5.1 Accurate Information Generally.**

**37.5.1.1 Expected Conduct.**

All applications, Bids, Submissions, reports, and other communications by a Market Participant or agent of a Market Participant to the CAISO, including maintenance and Outage data, Bid data, transaction information, and Load and resource information, must be submitted by a responsible company official who is knowledgeable of the facts submitted. The Market Participant shall provide accurate and factual information and not submit false or misleading information, or omit material information, in any communication with FERC, FERC-approved market monitors, FERC-approved regional transmission organizations, or FERC-approved independent system operators, or jurisdictional transmission providers, unless the Market Participant exercised due diligence to prevent such occurrences.

**37.5.1.2 Sanctions.**

The Sanctions for a violation of Section 37.5.1 shall be as follows: for the first violation within a rolling twelve (12) month period, \$2,500; for the second violation within a rolling twelve (12) month period, \$5,000; subsequent violations within a rolling twelve (12) month period, \$10,000.

**37.5.2 Inaccurate Meter Data.**

**37.5.2.1 Expected Conduct.**

Market Participants shall provide complete and accurate Settlement Quality Meter Data for each Trading Hour and shall correct any errors in such data prior to the issuance of Initial Settlement Statement Reissue or Recalculation Settlement Statements, as relevant. Failure to provide complete and accurate Settlement Quality Meter Data, as required by Section 10 and that results in an error that is discovered after issuance of Initial Settlement Statement Reissue or Recalculation Settlement Statements, as relevant, shall be a violation of this rule.

**37.5.2.2 Sanctions.**

Violations under this Section 37.5.2 shall be subject to Sanction described in Section 37.11.

**37.5.2.3 Disposition of Sanction Proceeds.**

For purposes of redistributing collected market adjustments, any amounts collected under this provision shall be applied first to those parties affected by the conduct. Any excess amounts shall be disposed of as set forth in Section 37.9.4.

**37.6 Provide Information Required by CAISO Tariff.**

**37.6.1 Required Information Generally.**

**37.6.1.1 Expected Conduct.**

Except as provided below in Section 37.6.4 (Review by FERC), all information that is required to be submitted to the CAISO under the CAISO Tariff, CAISO Business Practice Manuals, or jurisdictional contracts must be submitted in a complete, accurate, and timely manner. Market Participants must comply with requests for information or data by the CAISO authorized under the CAISO Tariff, including timelines specified for submitting Bids and other information.

**37.6.1.2 Sanctions.**

Except as otherwise provided below, in Section 37.6.2 and Section 37.6.3, a violation of this rule is subject to a penalty of \$500 for each day that the required information is late.

**37.6.2 Investigation Information.**

**37.6.2.1 Expected Conduct.**

Except as provided below in Section 37.6.4 (Review by FERC), Market Participants must submit timely information in response to a written request by the CAISO for information reasonably necessary to conduct an investigation authorized by the CAISO Tariff.

**37.6.2.2 Sanctions.**

The Sanction for a violation of Section 37.6.2 shall be as follows: for the first violation in a rolling twelve (12) month period, \$1000/day; for the second violation in a rolling twelve (12) month period, \$2000/day; for the third and subsequent violations in a rolling twelve (12) month period, \$5000/day. For purposes of

this subsection, a violation shall be each failure to provide a full response to a written request and the Sanction shall be determined from the date that the response was due until a full response to the request is received.

**37.6.3 Audit Materials.**

**37.6.3.1 Expected Conduct.**

Except as provided below in Section 37.6.4 (Review by FERC), Market Participants shall comply with the CAISO's audit and/or test procedures, and further shall perform and timely submit an annual self-audit as required under the CAISO Tariff.

**37.6.3.2 Sanctions.**

For failure to submit an annual Scheduling Coordinator Self Audit report, the Sanction shall be \$1000/day until such report is received by the CAISO. For all other violations of this rule the Sanctions shall be as follows: for the first violation in a rolling ~~twelve (12)~~ month period, \$1000/day; for the second violation in a rolling ~~twelve (12)~~ month period, \$2000/day; for the third and subsequent violations in a rolling ~~twelve (12)~~ month period, \$5000/day. For purposes of this subsection, a "violation" shall be each failure to provide all information required under the audit or test, from the date that the information was due until all required information is received by the CAISO.

**37.6.4 Review by FERC.**

A Market Participant who objects to an information, audit or test obligation that is enforceable under Section 37.6.1, Section 37.6.2 or Section 37.6.3 above shall have the right immediately (and in all events, no later than the due date for the information) to seek review of the obligation with FERC. In the event that such review is sought, the time for submitting the response or other information to the CAISO shall be tolled until FERC resolves the issue.

**37.7 Prohibition of Electric Energy Market Manipulation.**

It shall be a violation of this CAISO Tariff for an entity, directly or indirectly, in connection with the purchase or sale of electric energy or the purchase or sale of transmission services subject to the jurisdiction of the FERC, (i) to use or employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (ii) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (iii) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business that operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any entity. Violations or potential violations of this rule shall be referred to FERC for appropriate sanction.

Actions or transactions by a Market Participant that are explicitly contemplated in the CAISO Tariff or are undertaken at the direction of the CAISO are not in violation of this Rule of Conduct.

**37.8 Process for Investigation and Enforcement.**

**37.8.1 Purpose; Scope.**

The provisions of this Section 37.8 set forth the procedures by which the Market Monitoring Unit will independently investigate potential violations of the Rules of Conduct and administer enforcement activities. Except as hereinafter provided, and except as provided in Section 37.2.5 and Section 37.4.4, the provisions of this section apply to the Rules of Conduct set forth in Sections 37.2 through 37.7.

**37.8.2 Referrals to FERC.**

Section 37.7 shall be enforced by FERC, in accordance with FERC's rules and procedures. The Market Monitoring Unit shall refer to FERC and its staff all matters in which it has formed a reasonable belief that a violation of Section 37.7 may have occurred. Although Sections 37.2 through 37.6 will generally be enforced by the Market Monitoring Unit, the Market Monitoring Unit shall refer to FERC any matter for which the particular circumstances preclude the objective determination of a Rules of Conduct violation,

and shall refer to FERC any Sanction that it believes should be modified in accordance with Sections 37.2.5, 37.4.4, or 37.9.1. The time limitation contained in Section 37.10.1 to assess a Sanction under this Section 37 shall be determined as of the date that a Sanction is initially assessed by the CAISO, excluding the time required for FERC to investigate a potential Rules of Conduct violation and/or determine a Sanction in accordance with this section, Sections 37.2.5, 37.4.4, or 37.9.1.

**37.8.3 Investigation.**

The Market Monitoring Unit shall conduct a reasonable investigation seeking available facts, data, and other information relevant to the potential Rules of Conduct violation.

**37.8.4 Notice.**

The Market Monitoring Unit shall provide notice of the investigation in sufficient detail to allow for a meaningful response to the Scheduling Coordinator and, as limited below, to all Market Participants the Scheduling Coordinator represents that are the subject(s) of the investigation. The Market Monitoring Unit shall contact the Market Participant(s) that may be involved, so long as the CAISO has sufficient objective information to identify and verify the role of the Market Participant(s) in the potential Rules of Conduct violation. Such Market Participant(s) will likely have an existing contractual relationship with the CAISO (e.g., UDC, MSS, CAISO Metered Entity, Participating Transmission Owner, Participating Generator, or Participating Load).

**37.8.5 Opportunity to Present Evidence.**

The Market Monitoring Unit shall provide an opportunity to the Market Participant(s) that are the subject(s) of the investigation to present any issues of fact or other information relevant to the potential Rules of Conduct violation being investigated. The Market Monitoring Unit shall consider all such information or data presented.

**37.8.6 Results of Investigation.**

The Market Monitoring Unit shall notify the Market Participant(s) that are the subject(s) of the investigation of the results of the investigation. The Market Participant(s) shall have **thirty (30)** days to respond to the findings of the Market Monitoring Unit before the Market Monitoring Unit makes a determination of whether a Sanction is required by this CAISO Tariff.

**37.8.7 Statement of Findings and Conclusions.**

Where the investigation results in a Sanction, the Market Monitoring Unit shall state its findings and conclusions in writing, and will make such writing available to the Scheduling Coordinator and, as provided in Section 37.8.4, to the Market Participant(s) that are the subject(s) of the investigation.

**37.8.8 Officer Representative.**

Where an investigation results in a Sanction by the Market Monitoring Unit, the Market Monitoring Unit shall direct its notice of such result to a responsible representative of the Scheduling Coordinator and, as provided in Section 37.8.4, to the Market Participant(s) that are the subject(s) of the investigation at the officer level.

**37.8.9 Record of Investigation.**

Where an investigation results in a Sanction, the Market Monitoring Unit will maintain a record of the investigation until its decision has been finally reviewed, if review is sought, or until the period for seeking review has expired.

**37.8.10 Review of Determination.**

A Market Participant that receives a Sanction may obtain immediate review of the Market Monitoring Unit's determination by directly appealing to FERC, in accordance with FERC's rules and procedures. In such case, the applicable Scheduling Coordinator shall also dispute the **Initial Settlement Statement T + 38 BD** containing the financial penalty, in accordance with Section 11. The **Initial Settlement Statement**

T + 38 BD dispute and appeal to FERC must be made in accordance with the timeline for raising disputes specified in Section 11.29.8.2. The penalty will be tolled until FERC renders its decision on the appeal. The disposition by FERC of such appeal shall be final, and no separate dispute of such Sanction may be initiated under Section 13, except as provided in Section 37.9.3.4. For the purpose of applying the time limitations set forth in Section 37.10.1, a sanction will be considered assessed when it is included on an Initial Settlement Statement T + 38 BD, whether or not the CAISO accepts a Scheduling Coordinator's dispute of such Initial Settlement Statement T + 38 BD pending resolution of an appeal to FERC in accordance with this section or Section 37.9.3.3.

**37.9 Administration of Sanctions.**

**37.9.1 Assessment; Waivers and Adjustments.**

Penalty amounts for violation of these Rules of Conduct shall be calculated as specified in Section 37.2 through Section 37.7. A Sanction specified in this Section 37 may be modified by FERC when it determines that such adjustment is just and reasonable. The CAISO may make a recommendation to FERC to modify a Sanction. An adjustment generally shall be deemed appropriate if the prescribed Sanction appears to be insufficient to deter the prohibited behavior, or if the circumstances suggest that the violation was inadvertent, unintentional, or some other mitigating circumstances exist.

**37.9.2 Excuse.**

The following circumstances shall excuse a violation of a Rule of Conduct under the terms of this CAISO Tariff:

**37.9.2.1 Uncontrollable Force.**

No failure by a Market Participant to satisfy the Rules of Conduct shall be subject to penalty to the extent and for the period that the Market Participant's inability to satisfy the Rules of Conduct is caused by an event or condition of Uncontrollable Force affecting the Market Participant; provided that the Market Participant gives notice to the CAISO of the event or condition of Uncontrollable Force as promptly as possible after it knows of the event or condition and makes all reasonable efforts to cure, mitigate, or remedy the effects of the event or condition.



**37.9.2.2 Safety, Licensing, or Other Requirements.**

Failure by a Market Participant to perform its obligations shall not be subject to penalty if the Market Participant is able to demonstrate that it was acting in accordance with Section 4.2.1.

**37.9.2.3 Emergencies.**

Failure by a Market Participant to perform its obligations may not be subject to penalty if the Market Participant is able to demonstrate that it was acting in good faith and consistent with Good Utility Practice to preserve System Reliability in a System Emergency, unless contrary to a CAISO operating order.

**37.9.2.4 Conflicting Directives.**

To the extent that any action or omission by a Market Participant is specifically required by a FERC order or CAISO operating order, the Market Participant may not be subject to penalty for that act or omission.

**37.9.3 Settlement.**

**37.9.3.1 Settlement Statements.**

The CAISO will administer any penalties issued under this Section 37 through Initial Settlement Statements T + 38 BD, and Initial Settlement Statement Reissues or Recalculation Settlement Statements, as relevant, issued to the responsible Scheduling Coordinator by the CAISO. Before invoicing a financial penalty through the Settlement process, the CAISO will provide a description of the penalty to the responsible Scheduling Coordinator and all Market Participants the Scheduling Coordinator represents that are liable for the penalty, when the CAISO has sufficient objective information to identify and verify responsibility of such Market Participants. The CAISO shall specify whether such penalty is modified pursuant to Section 37.2.5, Section 37.4.4 or Section 37.9.1. The description shall include the identity of the Market Participant that committed the violation and the amount of the penalty. Where FERC has determined the Sanction, the CAISO will provide such of the above information as is provided to it by FERC. The CAISO also may publish this information under the CAISO Website after Initial Settlement Statement Reissues or Recalculation Settlement Statements, as relevant, are issued.

**37.9.3.2 Payment.**

Except as provided in Section 37.2.5, Section 37.4.4, Section 37.8.10 or Section 37.9.3.3 below, the Scheduling Coordinator shall be obligated to pay all penalty amounts reflected on Settlement Statements to the CAISO pursuant to the CAISO's Settlement process, as set forth in Section 11.

**37.9.3.3 Other Responsible Party.**

Where a party or parties other than the Scheduling Coordinator is responsible for the conduct giving rise to a penalty reflected on a Settlement Statement, and where the Scheduling Coordinator bears no responsibility for the conduct, such other party or parties ultimately shall be liable for the penalty. Under such circumstances, the Scheduling Coordinator shall use reasonable efforts to obtain payment of the penalty from the responsible party(ies) and to remit such payment to the CAISO in the ordinary course of the Settlement process. In the event that the responsible party(ies) wish to dispute the penalty, or the Scheduling Coordinator otherwise is unable to obtain payment from the responsible parties, the Scheduling Coordinator shall notify the CAISO and dispute the Initial Settlement Statement T+ 38 BD. The CAISO promptly shall notify FERC. If the CAISO finds that a Market Participant separate from the Scheduling Coordinator that is unable to obtain payment from the responsible party(ies) is solely responsible for a violation, the Scheduling Coordinator that is unable to obtain payment may net its payment of its Invoice amount by the amount of the penalty in question. The CAISO may refuse to offer further service to any responsible party that fails to pay a penalty, unless excused under the terms of the CAISO Tariff, by providing notice of such refusal to the Scheduling Coordinator. Following such notice, the Scheduling Coordinator shall be liable for any subsequent penalties assessed on account of such responsible party.

**37.9.3.4 Dispute of FERC Sanctions.**

The right that a Market Participant may otherwise have under the CAISO Tariff to dispute a penalty that has been determined by FERC shall be limited to a claim that the CAISO failed properly to implement the penalty or other Sanction ordered by FERC, except as provided by Section 37.2.5 and Section 37.4.4.

**37.9.4 Disposition of Proceeds.**

The CAISO shall collect penalties assessed pursuant to this Section 37.9 and deposit such amounts in an interest bearing trust account. After the end of each calendar year, the CAISO shall distribute the penalty amounts together with interest earned through payments to Scheduling Coordinators as provided herein.

For the purpose of this Section 37.9.4, "eligible Market Participants" shall be those Market Participants that were not assessed a financial penalty pursuant to this Section 37 during the calendar year.

Each Scheduling Coordinator that paid GMC during the calendar year will identify, in a manner to be specified by the CAISO, the amount of GMC paid by each Market Participant for whom that Scheduling Coordinator provided service during that calendar year. The total amount assigned to all Market Participants served by that Scheduling Coordinator in such calendar year (including the Scheduling Coordinator itself for services provided on its own behalf), shall equal the total GMC paid by that Scheduling Coordinator.

The CAISO will calculate the payment due each Scheduling Coordinator based on the lesser of the GMC actually paid by all eligible Market Participants represented by that Scheduling Coordinator, or the product of a) the amount in the trust account, including interest, and b) the ratio of the GMC paid by each Scheduling Coordinator for eligible Market Participants, to the total of such amounts paid by all Scheduling Coordinators. Each Scheduling Coordinator is responsible for distributing payments to the eligible Market Participants it represented in proportion to GMC collected from each eligible Market Participant.

Prior to allocating the penalty proceeds, the CAISO will obtain FERC's approval of its determination of eligible Market Participants and their respective shares of the trust account proceeds. If the total amount in the trust account to be so allocated exceeds the total GMC obligation of all eligible Market Participants, then such excess shall be treated in accordance with Section 11.8.5.3(b).

**37.10 Miscellaneous.**

**37.10.1 Time Limitation.**

An investigation of events potentially subject to Sanction under this Section 37 must be commenced within ninety (90) days of discovery of the events. Sanctions may be assessed under this Section 37 up to one year after discovery of the events constituting the violation, but no later than three years after the date of the violation. Nothing in this section shall limit the rights or liabilities of any party under any other provision of applicable laws, regulations or tariff provisions.

**37.10.2 No Limitation on Other Rights.**

Nothing contained in this Section 37 shall limit the ability of the CAISO to collect information from Market Participants or to establish new provisions pursuant to Section 15.

**37.11 Method for Calculating Penalties.**

**37.11.1 Method for Calculating Inaccurate Meter Data Penalty.**

There is no Sanction for the submission of inaccurate Meter Data used for an Initial Settlement Statement T+ 38 BD. However, an error in submitted Meter Data that is discovered after issuance of an Initial Settlement Statement Reissue or Recalculation Settlement Statement, as applicable, constitutes a Rule of Conduct violation. The level of the Sanction depends on whether the Scheduling Coordinator or the CAISO discovered the error. An increased penalty will apply for errors that are discovered by the CAISO. Table A1 below shows how the level of the Sanction depends on the following factors: whether or not the Scheduling Coordinator finds the error; whether or not the Scheduling Coordinator owes the market, and whether or not the CAISO performs a Settlement Statement Re-run of the market. If the CAISO performs a Settlement Statement Re-run, then Settlement to all Scheduling Coordinators is recalculated, and the impact of such re-runs on charges assessed will be considered. A penalty charge equal to thirty percent (30%) of the estimated value of the Energy error will apply if the Scheduling Coordinator discovers the

error or **seventy-five percent (75%)** of the estimated value of the Energy error if the CAISO discovers the error. Penalty assessment and disposition of penalty proceeds will be administered as described in Section 37.9.1 and Section 37.9.4 respectively. A Sanction will not be imposed unless such Sanction is more than \$1,000 for at least one Trading Day during the period for which there was incomplete or inaccurate **Meter Data**.

Table A1 – Calculation of Inaccurate Meter Data Penalty When There Is A **Settlement Statement** Re-run

Case	Does SC Owe Market?	
Case 1: SC Identifies Inaccurate Meter Data	Yes	<b>Penalty</b> = (MWh x <b>applicable price</b> ) x 0.30
Case 1: SC Identifies Inaccurate Meter Data	No	<b>Penalty</b> = (MWh x <b>applicable price</b> ) x 0.30
Case 2: CAISO Identifies Inaccurate Meter Data	Yes	<b>Penalty</b> = (MWh x <b>applicable price</b> ) x 0.75
Case 2: CAISO Identifies Inaccurate Meter Data	No	<b>Penalty</b> = (MWh x <b>applicable price</b> ) x 0.75

Note to Table A1:

The applicable price will be the greater of the **relevant hourly** LMP or \$10/MWh. The LMP used will be the **values** posted on OASIS for each Trading Hour of the applicable Trading Day **period**.

2. Method for Calculating Inaccurate Meter Data Penalty When there is not a Settlement Statement Re-run.

If the CAISO does not perform a Settlement Statement Re-run, for cases of inaccurate Meter Data, Table A2 will be used to determine and allocate penalty and any market adjustment amount. The market adjustment approximates the financial impact on the market; however, it does not completely reflect all the Settlement consequences of inaccurately submitted Meter Data. The approximated value of the inaccurate Meter Data in question will be calculated and returned to the market based on the average of the pro rata share of Unaccounted for Energy (UFE) charged in the utility Service Area during the period of the inaccurate Meter Data event. The thirty percent (30%) or seventy-five percent (75%) penalty will be distributed as discussed in Section 37.9.4. For cases where the CAISO does not perform a Settlement Statement Re-run and the Scheduling Coordinator does not owe the market, then no market adjustment will be performed.

TABLE A2- Calculation Of Inaccurate Meter Data Penalty When There Is a Settlement Statement Re-run

Case	Does SC Owe Market?	CAISO does not perform a Settlement Statement Re-run
Case 1: SC Identifies Inaccurate Meter Data	Yes	Market Adjustment = (MWh x applicable price) Penalty = (MWh x applicable price) x 0.30
Case 1: SC Identifies Inaccurate Meter Data	No	No market adjustment will be made Penalty = (MWh x Hourly LMP) x 0.30
Case 2: CAISO Identifies Inaccurate Meter Data	Yes	Market Adjustment = (MWh x applicable price) Penalty = (MWh x applicable price) x 0.75
Case 2: CAISO Identifies Inaccurate Meter Data	No	No market adjustment will be made Penalty = (MWh x Hourly LMP) x 0.75

Notes to Table A2:

The applicable price will be the greater of the relevant hourly LMP or \$10/MWh. The LMP used will be the value posted on OASIS for each Trading Hour of the applicable Trading Day.

A Sanction will be imposed only if the Sanction is more than \$1,000 for at least one Trading Day during the period for which there was incomplete or inaccurate Meter Data.

If the error is to the detriment of the responsible Scheduling Coordinator (e.g., under-reported **Generation** or over-reported **Demand**), and the CAISO does not **perform a Settlement Statement Re-run**, then no **market adjustment** will be made. If the **CAISO performs a Settlement Statement Re-run** after the error is corrected, then the Scheduling Coordinator will be given credit for the additional Energy through the normal Settlement process. If the Scheduling Coordinator is paid for an error due to a **Settlement Statement Re-run**, then a Sanction will be assessed to assure that **Settlement Statement Re-runs** do not diminish the incentive to correct such errors. This Sanction would be **thirty percent (30%)** of the Energy value of the error if the Scheduling Coordinator discovers the error or **seventy-five percent (75%)** estimated value of the error if the CAISO discovers the error.

If the error is to the detriment of the market, then a charge equal to **thirty percent (30%)** or **seventy-five (75%)** of the estimated value of the error, as appropriate, will be added to the charge for the Energy. If there is no **Settlement Statement Re-run**, then the cost of Energy supplied by the CAISO (and inappropriately charged to the market as Unaccounted for Energy) must be recovered as well, and the charge will be equal to 130% or 175% of the estimated value of the error, as appropriate.



**38 Market Monitoring.**

**38.1 Objectives and Scope.**

This Section 38 sets forth the framework under which the CAISO Department of Market Monitoring and CAISO Market Surveillance Committee will monitor the CAISO Markets to identify abuses of market power, to ensure to the extent possible the efficient working of the CAISO Markets immediately upon commencement of their operation, and to provide for their protection from abuses of market power in both the short term and the long term, and from other abuses that have the potential to undermine their effective functioning or overall efficiency in accordance with Section 38.1.1. Such monitoring activities will be carried out by, among other CAISO departments, the CAISO Department of Market Monitoring and the CAISO Market Surveillance Committee to be established and to operate under the terms of this CAISO Tariff, as set forth below. This Section provides a general framework for the operation of the Department of Market Monitoring and the Market Surveillance Committee and are not intended to limit the activities or remedies available to these entities or to the CAISO as a whole elsewhere in the CAISO Tariff or otherwise under law.

**38.1.1 Market Surveillance: Changes to Operating Rules and Procedures.**

The CAISO shall keep the operation of the markets that it administers under review to determine whether changes in its operating rules, Business Practice Manuals, or CAISO Tariff would improve the efficiency of those markets or prevent the exercise of market power by any Market Participant; and it shall institute necessary changes in accordance with this Section 38.

**38.1.2 Reporting Requirements.**

This Section 38 sets forth the information dissemination, publication and reporting activities and other means of providing information that the CAISO generally undertakes to meet its reporting requirements to regulatory agencies, Market Participants and others. The goal of the reporting provisions is to adequately inform regulatory agencies, law enforcement agencies, policymakers, Market Participants and others of the state of the CAISO Markets, especially their competitiveness and efficiency. This function is designed to facilitate efficient corrective actions to be taken by the appropriate body or bodies when required.

**38.2 Practices Subject to Scrutiny – General.**

The Department of Market Monitoring shall monitor the activities of Market Participants that affect the operation of the CAISO Markets and that provide indications of the phenomena set forth below in this Section 38.2 and will monitor for violations of the market behavior rules specified in Section 37 and any FERC orders establishing market behavior rules for Market Participants. Any corrective actions taken in response to potential violations of market behavior rules shall be made consistent with Section 37 and the applicable FERC orders. Where appropriate, it will take such further action as it considers necessary under Section 38.4.

**38.2.1 Abuse of Reliability Must-Run Unit Status.**

Where Generating Units are determined by the CAISO to be Reliability Must-Run Units, circumstances that indicate that such Generating Units are being operated in a manner that will adversely affect the competitive nature and efficient workings of the CAISO Markets.

**38.2.2 CAISO and Other Market Design Flaws.**

The Department of Market Monitoring shall monitor design flaws and inefficiencies in the CAISO Tariff, Business Practices Manuals, and Operating Procedures, including the potential for problems between the CAISO and other independent power markets or exchanges insofar as they affect the CAISO Markets.

**38.2.3 Market Structure Flaws.**

With respect to flaws in the overall structure of the California Energy markets that may reveal undue concentrations of market power in Generation or other structural flaws, the Department of Market Monitoring shall provide such information or evidence of such flaws and such analysis as it may conduct to the CAISO CEO and/or to the CAISO Governing Board, subject to due protections of confidential or commercially sensitive information. After due internal consultation, if instructed by any of such CAISO institutions or persons, the Department of Market Monitoring shall also provide such information or evidence to the Market Surveillance Committee, the appropriate regulatory and antitrust enforcement

agency or agencies, subject to due protections of confidential or commercially sensitive information. The Department of Market Monitoring shall, at the direction of the CAISO CEO and/or the CAISO Governing Board, or their designee, provide such other evidence, views, analyses or testimony as may be appropriate or required and as it is reasonably capable of providing to assist the investigations of such agencies.

**38.3 Scrutiny of Market Participant Changes Potentially Affecting Market Structure.**

The Department of Market Monitoring may undertake the following measures to monitor the special circumstances that may affect the operation of the CAISO Markets due to corporate reorganizations including bankruptcies or changes in Affiliate relationships and may recommend corrective actions as provided in Section 38.4.

**38.3.1 Exercises of Horizontal Market Power.**

The Department of Market Monitoring may analyze the impact of changes in market structure on the ability of Market Participants to exercise short-term horizontal market power.

**38.4 Response Action by CAISO.**

**38.4.1 Corrective Actions.**

Where the monitoring activities or any consequent investigations carried out by the Department of Market Monitoring pursuant to Section 38.2 and Appendix P.1 reveal a significant possibility of the presence of or potential for exercises of market power that would adversely affect the operation of the CAISO Markets, or other markets interconnected or interdependent on the CAISO Markets, the Department of Market Monitoring shall take the appropriate measures under this section and under Appendix P to institute the corrective action most effective and appropriate for the situation or, in the case of markets interconnected to or interdependent on the CAISO Markets, the Department of Market Monitoring may recommend corrective actions to the appropriate regulatory agencies.

**38.4.2 Further Actions.**

Where the monitoring activities of or any consequent investigations carried out by the Department of Market Monitoring pursuant to Sections 38.2 and 38.3 reveal that activities or behavior of Market Participants in the CAISO Markets have the effect of, or potential for, undermining the efficiency, workability or reliability of the CAISO Markets to give or to serve such Market Participants an unfair competitive advantage over other Market Participants, the Department of Market Monitoring shall fully investigate and analyze the effect of such activities or behavior and make recommendations to the CAISO CEO and the CAISO Governing Board for further action by the CAISO or, where necessary, by other entities. The Department of Market Monitoring may, where appropriate, make specific recommendations to the CAISO CEO and to the CAISO Governing Board for amendment to rules and protocols under its control, or for changes to the structure of the CAISO Markets, and the Department of Market Monitoring may recommend actions, including fines or suspensions, against specific entities in order to deter such activities or behavior.

**38.4.3 Adverse Effects of Transition Mechanisms.**

Should the monitoring and analysis conducted reveal significant adverse effects of transition mechanisms on competition in or the efficient operation of the CAISO Markets, the Department of Market Monitoring shall examine and fully assess the efficacy of all possible measures that may be taken by the CAISO, in order to prevent or to mitigate such adverse effects. The Department of Market Monitoring shall make such recommendations to the CAISO CEO and to the CAISO Governing Board as it considers appropriate for action by the CAISO and/or for referral to regulatory or law enforcement agencies. Such proposed measures may include, but shall not be limited to the following:

- (a) the use of direct Bid caps as a mechanism to prevent or mitigate artificially high Market Clearing Prices caused by abuses of market power;

- (b) the use of contracts for differences for eliminating the incentive for Generators to bid CAISO prices to artificially high levels enabled by the presence of market power;
- (c) calling upon Reliability Must-Run Units to operate; and to modify Reliability Must-Run Contracts;
- (d) Bid floors to prevent or mitigate the possible exercise of below-cost bidding or predatory pricing.

In the event that the CAISO Governing Board adopts, and where necessary obtains regulatory approval for, any measure proposed pursuant to this Section 38.4.3, the Department of Market Monitoring shall monitor the implementation and effect of such measure on the state of the CAISO Markets and shall periodically report on them to the CAISO CEO and the CAISO Governing Board.

**39 Market Power Mitigation Procedures.**

**39.1** These CAISO market power mitigation measures ("Mitigation Measures") are intended to provide the means for the CAISO to mitigate the market effects of any conduct that would substantially distort competitive outcomes in the CAISO Markets while avoiding unnecessary interference with competitive price signals. These Mitigation Measures are intended to minimize interference with an open and competitive market, and thus to permit, to the maximum extent practicable, price levels to be determined by competitive forces under the prevailing market conditions. To that end, the Mitigation Measures authorize the mitigation only of specific conduct identified through explicit procedures specified below. In addition, the CAISO shall monitor the markets it administers for conduct that it determines constitutes an abuse of market power but is not addressed by the market power mitigation procedures specified below. If the CAISO identifies any such conduct, it shall make a filing under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824d, with FERC requesting authorization to apply appropriate mitigation measures. Any such filing shall identify the particular conduct the CAISO believes warrants mitigation, shall propose a specific mitigation measure for the conduct, and shall set forth the CAISO's justification for imposing that mitigation measure.

**39.2 Conditions for the Imposition of Mitigation Measures.**

**39.2.1** In general, the CAISO shall consider a Market Participant's conduct to be inconsistent with competitive conduct if the conduct would not be in the economic interest of the Market Participant in the absence of market power. The categories of conduct that are inconsistent with competitive conduct include, but may not be limited to, the four categories of conduct specified in Section 39.3 below.

**39.3 Categories of Conduct that May Warrant Mitigation.**

**39.3.1** Mitigation Measures may be applied to bidding, scheduling or operation of an Electric Facility or as specified in Section 39.3.1. The following categories of conduct, whether by a single firm or by multiple firms acting in concert, may cause a material effect on prices or generally the outcome of the CAISO Markets if exercised from a position of market power. Accordingly, the CAISO shall monitor the CAISO Markets for the following categories of conduct, and shall impose appropriate Mitigation Measures if such conduct is detected and the other applicable conditions for the imposition of Mitigation Measures are met:

- (1) Physical withholding of an Electric Facility, in whole or in part, that is, not offering to sell or schedule the output of or services provided by an Electric Facility capable of serving a CAISO Market. Such withholding may include, but not be limited to: (i) falsely declaring that an Electric Facility has been forced out of service or otherwise become totally or partially unavailable, (ii) refusing to offer Bids for an Electric Facility when it would be in the economic interest, absent market power, of the withholding entity to do so, (iii) declining Bids called upon by the CAISO (unless the CAISO is informed in accordance with established procedures that the relevant resource for which the Bid is submitted has undergone a forced outage or derate), or (iv) operating a Generating Unit in Real-Time to produce an output level that is less than the Dispatch Instruction.
- (2) Economic withholding of an Electric Facility, that is, submitting Bids for an Electric Facility that are unjustifiably high (relative to known operational characteristics and/or the known operating cost of the resource) so that: (i) the Electric Facility is not or will not be dispatched or scheduled, or (ii) the Bids will set LMPs.

- (3) Uneconomic production from an Electric Facility that is, increasing the output of an Electric Facility to levels that would otherwise be uneconomic in order to cause, and obtain benefits from, a transmission constraint.
- (4) Bidding practices that distort prices or uplift charges away from those expected in a competitive market, such as registering Start-Up Cost and Minimum Load Cost data or submitting Bid Costs on behalf of an Electric Facility that are unjustifiably high (relative to known operational characteristics and/or the known operating cost of the resource) or misrepresenting the physical operating capabilities of an Electric Facility resulting in uplift payments or prices significantly in excess of actual costs.

**39.3.2** Mitigation Measures may also be imposed to mitigate the market effects of a rule, standard, procedure, design feature, or known software imperfection of a CAISO Market that allows a Market Participant to manipulate market prices or otherwise impair the efficient operation of that market, pending the revision of such rule, standard, procedure design feature, or software defect to preclude such manipulation of prices or impairment of efficiency.

**39.3.3** Taking advantage of opportunities to sell at a higher price or buy at a lower price in a market other than a CAISO Market shall not be deemed a form of withholding or otherwise inconsistent with competitive conduct.



**39.3.4** The CAISO shall monitor CAISO Markets for other categories of conduct, whether by a single firm or by multiple firms acting in concert, that have material effects on prices in a CAISO Market or other payments. The CAISO shall seek to amend the foregoing list as may be appropriate to include any such conduct that would substantially distort or impair the competitiveness of any of the CAISO Markets.

**39.4 Sanctions for Physical Withholding.**

The CAISO may report a Market Participant the CAISO determines to have engaged in physical withholding, including providing the CAISO false information regarding derating or outage of an Electric Facility, to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in accordance with Section 9.3.10.5. In addition, a Market Participant that fails to operate a Generating Unit in conformance with CAISO Dispatch Instructions shall be subject to the penalties set forth in Section 11.23.

**39.5 FERC-Ordered Measures.**

In addition to any mitigation measures specified above, the CAISO shall administer, and apply when appropriate in accordance with their terms, such other mitigation measures as it may be directed to implement by order of the FERC.

**39.6 Rules Limiting Certain Energy, Ancillary Services, And Residual Unit Commitment Bids.**

**39.6.1 Maximum Bid Prices.**

Notwithstanding any other provision of this CAISO Tariff, maximum Bid price provisions of Section 39 shall apply to limit, Energy Bids, RUC Availability Bids, and Ancillary Service Bids as specified below.

**39.6.1.1 Maximum Price for Energy Bids**

For the twelve (12) months following the effective date of this Section, the maximum Energy Bid prices shall be \$500/MWh. After the twelfth month following the effective date of this Section, the maximum Energy Bid price shall be \$750/MWh. After the twenty-fourth month following the effective date of this Section, the maximum Energy Bid price shall be \$1,000/MWh.

**39.6.1.2 Maximum RUC Availability Bid Prices**

The maximum RUC Availability Bid price shall be \$250/MW/h.

**39.6.1.3 Maximum Ancillary Services Bid Prices**

The maximum level for Ancillary Services Bid prices shall be \$250/MWh.

**39.6.1.4 Minimum Bid Price for Energy Bids.**

Energy Bids into the CAISO Markets less than  $-\$30/\text{MWh}$  are not eligible to set any LMP. If the CAISO dispatches a resource with an Energy Bid less than  $-\$30/\text{MWh}$ , the Scheduling Coordinator on behalf of the resource will be eligible to be paid the Bid price upon the submission of detailed information justifying the cost components of the Bid to the CAISO and FERC no later than seven (7) days after the end of the month in which the Bid was submitted. The CAISO will treat such information as confidential and will apply the procedure in Section 20.4 with regard to requests for disclosure of such information. The CAISO shall pay Scheduling Coordinators for amounts in excess of  $-\$30/\text{MWh}$  minimum Bid price upon FERC acceptance of the information justifying the cost components.

**39.6.1.5 Minimum Bid Price for Ancillary and RUC Bids.**

Ancillary Service Bids and RUC Availability Bids submitted into CAISO markets must have Bid prices not less than  $\$0/\text{MW/h}$ .

**39.6.1.6 Maximum Start-Up Cost and Minimum Load Cost Registered Cost Values.**

*The maximum Start-Up Cost and Minimum Load Cost values registered in the Master File by Scheduling Coordinators for resources located within a Local Capacity Area that elect the Registered Cost option in accordance with Section 30.4 will be limited to 200% of the Projected Proxy Cost. The maximum Start-Up Cost and Minimum Load Cost values registered in the Master File by Scheduling Coordinators for resources that are not located in Local Capacity Areas that elect the Registered Cost option in accordance with Section 30.4 will be limited to 400% of the Projected Proxy Cost.*

### **39.7 Local Market Power Mitigation for Energy Bids.**

Local market power mitigation is based on a periodic assessment and designation of transmission constraints as competitive or non-competitive. Such periodic assessment will be performed at a minimum on an annual basis and potentially more frequently if needed due to changes in system conditions, network topology, or market performance. Any changes in constraint designations will be publicly noticed prior to making the change. Upon determination that an ad hoc assessment is warranted, the CAISO will notice market participants that such an assessment will be performed. The determination whether a unit is being dispatched to relieve congestion on a competitive or non-competitive transmission constraint is based on two preliminary market runs that are performed prior to the actual pricing run of the market and are described in Sections 31 and 33 for the DAM and RTM, respectively.

#### **39.7.1 Calculation of Default Energy Bids**

Default Energy Bids shall be calculated by the CAISO, for the on-peak hours and off-peak hours for both the DAM and RTMs, pursuant to one of the methodologies described in this Section. The Scheduling Coordinator for each Generating Unit owner or Participating Load must rank order the following options of calculating the Default Energy Bid starting with its preferred method. The Scheduling Coordinator must provide the data necessary for determining the Variable Costs unless the Negotiated Rate Option precedes the Variable Cost option in the rank order, in which case the Scheduling Coordinator must have a negotiated rate established with the Independent Entity charged with calculating the Default Energy Bid. If no rank order is specified for a Generating Unit or Participating Load, then the default rank order of (1) Variable Cost Option, (2) Negotiated Rate Option, (3) LMP Option will be applied.

**39.7.1.1 Variable Cost Option.**

For natural gas-fueled units, the Variable Cost Option will calculate the Default Energy Bid by adding incremental fuel cost with variable operation and maintenance cost, adding ten percent (10%) to the sum, and adding a Bid Adder if applicable. For non-natural gas-fueled units, the Variable Cost Option will calculate the Default Energy Bid by summing incremental fuel cost plus ten percent (10%) of fuel cost plus a Bid Adder if applicable.

**39.7.1.1.1 Incremental Fuel Cost Calculation Under the Variable Cost Option.**

For natural gas-fueled units, incremental fuel cost is calculated based on an incremental heat rate curve multiplied by the natural gas price calculated as described below.

Resource owners shall submit to the CAISO average heat rates (Btu/kWh) measured for at least two (2) and up to eleven (11) generating operating points (MW), where the first and last operating points refer to the minimum and maximum operating levels (i.e., PMin and PMax), respectively. The average heat rate curve formed by the (Btu/kWh, MW) pairs is a piece-wise linear curve between operating points, and two (2) average heat rate pairs yield one (1) incremental heat rate segment that spans two (2) consecutive operating points. The incremental heat rates (Btu/kWh) in the incremental heat rate curve are calculated by converting the average heat rates submitted by resource owners to the CAISO to requirements of heat input (Btu/h) for each of the operating points and dividing the changes in requirements of heat input from one (1) operating point to the next by the changes in MW between two (2) consecutive operating points as specified in the Business Practice Manual. For each segment representing operating levels below eighty percent (80%) of the unit's PMax, the incremental heat rate is limited to the maximum of the average heat rates for the two (2) operating points used to calculate the incremental heat rate segment.

The unit's final incremental fuel cost curve is calculated by multiplying this incremental heat rate curve by the applicable natural gas price, and then, if necessary, applying a left-to-right adjustment to ensure that the final incremental cost curve is monotonically non-decreasing.

For non-natural gas-fueled units, incremental fuel cost is calculated based on an average cost curve as described below.

Resource owners for non-natural gas-fueled units shall submit to the CAISO average fuel costs (\$/MW) measured for at least two (2) and up to eleven (11) generating operating points (MW), where the first and last operating points refer to the minimum and maximum operating levels (i.e., PMin and PMax), respectively. The average cost curve formed by the (\$/MWh, MW) pairs is a piece-wise linear curve between operating points, and two (2) average cost pairs yield one (1) incremental cost segment that spans two (2) consecutive operating points. For each segment representing operating levels below eighty percent (80%) of the unit's PMax, the incremental cost rate is limited to the maximum of the average cost rates for the two (2) operating points used to calculate the incremental cost segment. The unit's final incremental fuel cost curve is then adjusted, if necessary, applying a left-to-right adjustment to ensure that the final incremental cost curve is monotonically non-decreasing.

Heat rate curves and average cost curves shall be stored, updated, and validated in the Master File. To calculate the natural gas price, the CAISO will use different gas price indices for the Day-Ahead Market and the Real-Time Market and each gas price index will be calculated using at least two prices from two or more of the following publications: Natural Gas Intelligence, Btu Daily Gas Wire, Platt's Gas Daily and the Intercontinental Exchange. For the Day-Ahead Market, the CAISO will update the gas price index between 00:00 and 03:00 Pacific Time in the Day-Ahead using natural gas prices published on the prior day, unless gas prices are not published on that day, in which case the CAISO will use the most recently published prices that are available. For the Real-Time Market, the CAISO will update gas price indices between the hours of 19:00 and 22:00 Pacific Time using natural gas prices published in the Day-Ahead, unless gas prices are not published on that day, in which case the CAISO will use the most recently published prices that are available.

**39.7.1.1.2 Variable Operation and Maintenance Cost Under the Variable Cost Option.**

The default value for the variable operation and maintenance cost portion will be \$2/MWh. Generating Units that are of the combustion turbine or reciprocating engine technology will be eligible for a default variable operation and maintenance cost of \$4/MWh. Resource specific values may be negotiated with the Independent Entity charged with calculating the Default Energy Bid.

**39.7.1.2 LMP Option.**

The CAISO will calculate the LMP Option for the Default Energy Bid as a weighted average of the lowest quartile of LMPs at the Generating Unit PNode in periods when the unit was Dispatched during the preceding ninety (90) days. The weighted average will be calculated based on the quantities Dispatched

within each segment of the Default Energy Bid curve. The LMP Option for Default Energy Bids will not be available until **ninety (90)** days of LMP pricing has occurred. Each Bid segment created under the LMP Option for Default Energy Bids will be subject to a feasibility test, as set forth in a Business Practice Manual, to determine whether there are a sufficient number of data points to allow for the calculation of an LMP based Default Energy Bid. The feasibility test is designed to avoid excessive volatility of the Default Energy Bid under the LMP Option that could result when calculated based on a relatively small number of prices.

**39.7.1.3 Negotiated Rate Option.**

**39.7.1.3.1 Submission Process**

Scheduling Coordinators that elect the Negotiated Rate Option for the Default Energy Bid shall submit a proposed Default Energy Bid along with supporting information and documentation as described in a BPM. Within ten (10) Business Days of receipt, the CAISO or an Independent Entity selected by the CAISO will provide a written response. If the CAISO or Independent Entity accepts the proposed Default Energy Bid, it will become effective within three (3) Business Days from the date of acceptance by the CAISO and remain in effect until: (1) the Default Energy Bid is modified by FERC; (2) the Default Energy Bid is modified by mutual agreement of the CAISO and the Scheduling Coordinator; or (3) the Default Energy Bid expires, is terminated or is modified pursuant to any agreed upon term or condition or pertinent FERC order.

If the CAISO or Independent Entity selected by the CAISO does not accept the proposed Default Energy Bid, the CAISO or Independent Entity selected by the CAISO and the Scheduling Coordinator shall enter a period of good faith negotiations that terminates **sixty (60)** days following the date of submission of a proposed Default Energy Bid by a Scheduling Coordinator. If at any time during this period, the CAISO or Independent Entity selected by the CAISO and the Scheduling Coordinator agree upon the Default Energy Bid, it will become effective within three (3) Business Days of the date of agreement and

remain in effect until: (1) the Default Energy Bid is modified by FERC; (2) the Default Energy Bid is modified by mutual agreement of the CAISO and the Scheduling Coordinator; or (3) the Default Energy Bid expires, is terminated or is modified pursuant to any agreed upon term or condition or pertinent FERC order.

If by the end of the sixty (60)-day period the CAISO or Independent Entity selected by the CAISO and the Scheduling Coordinator fail to agree on the Default Energy Bid to be used under the Negotiated Rate Option, the Scheduling Coordinator has the right to file a proposed Default Energy Bid with FERC pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act.

During the sixty (60)-day period following the submission of a proposed negotiated Default Energy Bid by a Scheduling Coordinator, and pending FERC's acceptance in cases where the CAISO or Independent Entity selected by the CAISO fail to agree on the Default Energy Bid for use under the Negotiated Rate Option and the Scheduling Coordinator filed a proposed Default Energy Bid with FERC pursuant to Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, the Scheduling Coordinator has the option of electing to use any of the other options available pursuant to Section 39.7. If the Scheduling Coordinator does not elect to use any of the other options available pursuant to Section 39.7, or if sufficient data do not exist to calculate a Default Energy Bid using any of these options, the CAISO may establish a temporary Default Energy Bid as specified in Section 39.7.1.5.

#### **39.7.1.3.2 Informational Filings With FERC**

The CAISO shall make an informational filing with FERC of any Default Energy Bids negotiated pursuant to this section, or any temporary Default Energy Bids established pursuant to Section 39.7.1.5, no later than seven (7) days after the end of the month in which the Default Energy Bids were established.

#### **39.7.1.4 Frequently Mitigated Unit Option.**

A Frequently Mitigated Unit that is eligible for a Bid Adder may select a fourth Default Energy Bid option, which is equal to the Variable Cost Option plus the Bid Adder as described in Section 39.7.



**39.7.1.5 Temporary Default Energy Bid.**

If the Scheduling Coordinator does not elect to use any of the other options available pursuant to Section 39.7.1, or if sufficient data do not exist to calculate a Default Energy Bid using any of the available options, the CAISO will first seek to obtain from the Scheduling Coordinator any additional data required for calculating the Default Energy Bid options available pursuant to 39.7.1. If the provision of additional data by a Scheduling Coordinator results in additional or modified Default Energy Bid options pursuant to 39.7.1, the Scheduling Coordinator will have another opportunity to elect one of these options as its temporary Default Energy Bid. If the Scheduling Coordinator does not elect to use any of the options available pursuant to Section 39.7.1, or if sufficient data still do not exist to calculate a Default Energy Bid using any of the available options, the CAISO may establish a temporary Default Energy Bid based on one or more of the following: (1) operating cost data, opportunity cost, and other appropriate input from the Market Participant; (2) the CAISO's estimated operating costs of the Electric Facility, taking the best information available to the CAISO; (3) an appropriate average of competitive Bids of one or more similar Electric Facilities; or (4) any of the other options for determining a Default Energy Bid for which data are available.

**39.7.1.6 Default Energy Bids for RMR Units.**

The available capacity in excess of the Maximum Net Dependable Capacity (MNDC) specified in the RMR Contract up to the maximum generation capacity (PMax) is subject to Local Market Power Mitigation. The Scheduling Coordinator for the RMR Unit must rank order its preferences between the Variable Cost Option, the LMP Option, and the Negotiated Rate Option, which shall be the default rank order if no rank order is specified by the Scheduling Coordinator. These preferences will be used to determine the Default Energy Bids for the capacity between the MNDC and PMax. RMR Proxy Bids for RMR Units based on contractually specified costs are used in lieu of Default Energy Bids for the contractual RMR Unit capacity between the minimum generating capacity (PMin) and the MNDC. The

CAISO or Independent Entity will concatenate these two calculation methodologies (for calculating RMR Proxy Bids and Default Energy Bids for RMR Units) and will adjust them for monotonicity without lowering any price on either curve to create a single Energy Bid Curve to be used in the MPM-RRD processes as described in Sections 31 and 33 for the DAM and RTM, respectively. RMR Units are not eligible to receive a Bid Adder pursuant to Section 39.8 for contractual RMR Unit capacity between PMin and MNDC.

### **39.7.2 Competitive Path Designation.**

#### **39.7.2.1 Timing of Assessments.**

The CAISO will complete the first assessment of competitiveness of transmission constraints prior to the effective date of this provision. Constraint designations resulting from the first assessment will be applied in the MPM-RRD mechanism on the day this CAISO Tariff becomes effective and will not be changed until a subsequent assessment has been performed. The CAISO may perform additional competitive constraint assessments during the year if changes in transmission infrastructure, generation resources, or Load, in the CAISO **Balancing Authority** Area and adjacent **Balancing Authority** Areas suggest material changes in market conditions or if market outcomes are observed that are inconsistent with competitive market outcomes. The CAISO will calculate and post path designations not less than once prior to the effective date of this tariff provision and not less than four (4) times each year thereafter to provide timely seasonal path designations.

#### **39.7.2.2 Criteria.**

A transmission constraint will be deemed competitive if no three unaffiliated suppliers are jointly pivotal in relieving congestion on that constraint. The determination of whether or not the pivotal supplier criteria for an individual constraint are violated will be assessed using the Feasibility Index described in Section 39.7.2.4. Assessment of competitiveness will be performed assuming various system conditions potentially including but not limited to season, load, planned transmission and resource outages. If an individual constraint fails the pivotal supplier criteria under any of these system conditions, the constraint will be deemed uncompetitive for the entire year under all system conditions until a subsequent

assessment deems the constraint competitive. In general, a constraint may be an individual transmission line or a collection of lines that create a distinct transmission constraint. For purposes of the competitive assessment, the set of constraints that will be included in the network model are those modeled along with transmission limits to be enforced in the FNM used in clearing the CAISO Markets.

### **39.7.2.3 Candidate Path Identification.**

The first assessment of competitive constraints will be determined prior to the effective date of this provision and will consider all interfaces to neighboring control areas and all inter-zonal interfaces for zones that existed prior to the effective date of this provision to be competitive. The set of candidate constraints that will be evaluated for competitiveness in the initial assessment will be limited to intra-zonal constraints for zones that existed prior to the effective date of this provision, that were managed for Congestion in Real-Time in greater than five hundred (500) hours in the most recent twelve (12)-month period. The Congestion frequency threshold of **five-hundred (500)** hours for designation of competitive constraint candidates will be based on the combination of real-time intra-zonal congestion hours that predated the effective date of this provision, and congestion in IFM and Real-Time markets after the effective date of this provision for the twelve (12) months of historical data. Subsequent assessments will again consider all pre-existing interfaces to neighboring control areas and all inter-zonal interfaces to be competitive and will not be included in the set of candidate constraints for assessment. The set of candidate constraints will be further reduced to those remaining constraints that were congested or managed for congestion in greater than five hundred (500) hours in the prior twelve (12) months.

### **39.7.2.4 Feasibility Index.**

The CAISO will perform a pivotal supplier test on all suppliers in the CAISO **Balancing Authority** Area for each path to be assessed using the Feasibility Index (FI). Suppliers will be considered in two groups: those suppliers with the largest portfolios will be considered in the preliminary simulations, and any additional suppliers who are likely to be pivotal given the competitive designations from the preliminary

simulations. The FI requires solving the network model having removed all internal resources of a supplier and modifying the candidate constraints of the network model such that the flow limits of the set of candidate constraints can be exceeded with a penalty imposed for excess flow. The resulting solution to the network model produces constraint flows that can be used to calculate the FI. The FI is calculated for each constraint as the proportion of the constraint limit that is exceeded to solve the FNM without the specified supplier's supply. FI values less than zero indicate the supplier is pivotal in relieving Congestion on the specified constraint. The process is repeated by removing the supply portfolio of two and three suppliers for paths with non-negative FI. If any three suppliers are jointly pivotal in relieving congestion on a candidate path, as indicated by an FI value less than zero, the candidate path will be deemed uncompetitive. Otherwise, the candidate path will be deemed competitive. The portfolio of each supplier will be based on ownership information available to the CAISO, taking into account any material transfer of sufficient length that the transfer of control could have persistent impact on the relative shares of supply within the CAISO **Balancing Authority** Area. These transfers of control will be utilized in the assessment as provided to the CAISO by the supplier reflecting its triennial filing with FERC for market-based rate authority.

### **39.8 Eligibility for Bid Adder.**

A Scheduling Coordinator submitting Bids for Generating Units is eligible to have a Bid Adder applied to a Generating Unit for the next operating month if the criteria in Section 39.8.1 are met as determined on a monthly basis in the preceding month.

#### **39.8.1 Bid Adder Eligibility Criteria.**

To receive a Bid Adder, a Generating Unit must: (i) have a Mitigation Frequency that is greater than eighty percent (80%) in the previous twelve (12) months; and (ii) must not have a contract to be a Resource Adequacy Resource for its entire **Net Qualifying Capacity** **or be designated under the ICPM for its entire Eligible Capacity**, or be subject to an obligation to make capacity available under this CAISO Tariff. **If a**

Generating Unit *is designated under the ICPM for a portion of its Eligible Capacity, the provisions of this section apply only to the portion of the capacity not designated. Scheduling Coordinators for Generating Units seeking to receive Bid Adders* must *further* agree to be subject to the Frequently Mitigated Unit option for a Default Energy Bid. Run hours are those hours during which a Generating Unit has positive metered output. During the first *twelve (12)* months after the effective date of this Section, the Mitigation Frequency will be based on a rolling *twelve (12)*-month combination of RMR *D*ispatches and incremental *B*ids dispatched out of economic merit order to manage local *C*ongestion from the period prior to the effective date of this Section, which will serve as a proxy for being subject to Local Market Power Mitigation, and a Generating Unit's Local Market Power Mitigation frequency after the effective date of this Section. Generating Units that received RMR *D*ispatches and/or incremental *B*ids dispatched out of economic merit order to manage local Congestion in an hour prior to the effective date of this Section will have that hour counted as a mitigated hour in their Mitigation Frequency. After the first *twelve (12)* months from the effective date of this Section, the Mitigation Frequency will be based entirely on a Generating Unit being mitigated under the MPM-RRD procedures in Sections 31 and 33.

### **39.8.2 New Generating Units.**

For new Generating Units, with less than *twelve (12)* months of operation, determination of eligibility for the Bid Adder will be based on data beginning with the first date the Generating Unit participated in the CAISO Markets through the end date of the period for which the Mitigation Frequency is being calculated. The 200 run hour criteria will be pro-rated for the proportion of a *twelve (12)*-month period that the new Generating Unit submitted effective Bids in the CAISO markets.

### **39.8.3 Bid Adder Values.**

The value of the Bid Adder will be either: (i) a unit-specific value determined in consultation with the CAISO or an independent entity selected by the CAISO, or (ii) a default Bid Adder of \$24/MWh. For Generating Units with a portion of their capacity identified as meeting an LSE's Resource Adequacy Requirements, that Generating Unit's Bid Adder value will be reduced by the percent of the Generating Unit's capacity that is identified as meeting an LSE's Resource Adequacy Requirements. The reduced Bid Adder will be applied to that Generating Unit's entire Default Energy Bid Curve.

**39.9 CRR Monitoring and Affiliate Disclosure Requirements.**

The CAISO will monitor the CRR holdings and CAISO Markets activity for anomalous market behavior, gaming, or exercise of market power resulting from CRR ownership concentrations that are not aligned with actual transmission usage as a result of secondary market auction outcomes. If the CAISO identifies such behavior it may seek FERC approval to impose position limits on the total number or MW quantity of CRRs that may be held by any single entity and its Affiliates. Each CRR Holder or Candidate CRR Holder must notify the CAISO of all entities that are Affiliates or become Affiliates of the CRR Holder or Candidate CRR Holder.

**39.10 Mitigation of Exceptional Dispatches of Resources.**

*The CAISO shall apply Mitigation Measures to Exceptional Dispatches of resources when such resources are committed or dispatched under Exceptional Dispatch for purposes of: (1) addressing reliability requirements related to transmission Constraints not modeled in the Competitive Constraints Run of the MPM-RRD; (2) Ramping units up from Minimum Load to minimum dispatchable levels in order to protect against reliability Contingencies that are not directly incorporated into the Full Network Model or sufficiently met by the CAISO's market software; or (3) addressing other special unit-specific operating or environmental Constraints not incorporated into the Full Network Model or the CAISO's market software.*

*This entire Section 39.10, except for Section 39.10.2 as described therein, and the entirety of related Section 11.5.6.7, except for Section 11.5.6.7.3 as described therein, shall be effective until the end of the 24<sup>th</sup> month following the effective date of this Section 39.10, after which date this entire Section 39.10 and the entirety of related Section 11.5.6.7, except for Section 11.5.6.7.3 as described therein, shall no longer apply.*

**39.10.1 Application of Mitigation Measures to Exceptional Dispatches of Resources.**

*This Section 39.10.1 shall become effective on the first day of the fifth calendar month following the effective date of Section 39.10.*

**39.10.1.1 Application of Mitigation Measures to Exceptional Dispatches of Resources Eligible for Supplemental Revenues.**

In all cases where a resource is committed or dispatched under Exceptional Dispatch for any of the purposes set forth in Section 39.10, and the resource is eligible for supplemental revenues pursuant to Section 39.10.1.3, Exceptional Dispatch Energy delivered by the resource shall be settled as set forth in either Section 11.5.6.7.1 or Section 11.5.6.7.4, whichever is applicable.

**39.10.1.2 Application of Mitigation Measures to Exceptional Dispatches of Resources Not Eligible for Supplemental Revenues.**

In all cases where a resource is committed or dispatched under Exceptional Dispatch for any of the purposes set forth in Section 39.10, and the resource is not eligible for supplemental revenues pursuant to Section 39.10.1.3, Exceptional Dispatch Energy delivered by the resource shall be settled as set forth in either Section 11.5.6.7.2 or Section 11.5.6.7.4, whichever is applicable.

**39.10.1.3 Eligibility for Supplemental Revenues.**

A resource that is committed or dispatched under Exceptional Dispatch shall be eligible for supplemental revenues only during such times that the resource meets all of the following criteria:

- (i) the resource has been mitigated for one of the purposes set forth in Section 39.10;
- (ii) the resource is not under an RMR Contract, is not designated as ICPM Capacity, and is not a Resource Adequacy Resource, unless the resource is a Partial Resource Adequacy Resource or a partial ICPM resource, and the Exceptional Dispatch requires non-RA Capacity or non-ICPM Capacity, in which case only the capacity not committed as Resource Adequacy Capacity or ICPM Capacity is eligible for supplemental revenues;

(iii) the resource has a Bid in the IFM, HASP, and RTM for the applicable Operating Day or Operating Hour in which the resource is committed or dispatched under Exceptional Dispatch; and

(iv) the resource has not accrued an amount of Exceptional Dispatch supplemental revenues within a 30-day period (this 30-day period begins on the day of the first Exceptional Dispatch of the resource and re-starts on the day of the first Exceptional Dispatch of the resource following the end of any prior 30-day period) equal to or greater than the monthly ICPM Capacity Payment, without any ICPM Availability Factor adjustment, for which the resource would be eligible pursuant to Section 43.6 had it been designated as an ICPM resource.

**39.10.1.4 Calculation of Exceptional Dispatch Supplemental Revenues Within a 30-Day Period.**

The amount of Exceptional Dispatch supplemental revenues accrued by a resource within any 30-day period as defined in Section 39.10.1.3(iv) shall be a running total of the sum of supplemental revenues received during that 30-day period. The calculation of supplemental revenues accrued by a resource within a 30-day period is based on the higher of (a) the Energy Bid price for the resource minus the Default Energy Bid price for the resource or (b) the Resource-Specific Settlement Interval LMP minus the Default Energy Bid price for the resource. The greater of (a) or (b) is multiplied by the amount of Energy provided by the resource under Exceptional Dispatch, and the results of that multiplication are summed across the successive hours of the 30-day period. Once the resource has accrued an amount of supplemental revenues within the 30-day period, based on the calculation above, that equals the monthly ICPM Capacity Payment, without any ICPM Availability Factor adjustment, for which the resource would be eligible pursuant to Section 43.6 had it been designated as an ICPM resource, then the Settlement for the resource will be as provided in Section 11.5.6.7.2 and the resource will not be eligible for additional supplemental revenues for the rest of the 30-day period.



**39.10.2 Interim Rules for Application of Mitigation Measures to Exceptional Dispatches of Resources.**

*This Section 39.10.2 shall be effective until the last calendar day of the fourth calendar month following the effective date of Section 39.10, after which date it shall no longer apply.*

**39.10.2.1 Interim Rules for Application of Mitigation Measures to Exceptional Dispatches of Resources Eligible for an Adder to the Default Energy Bid Price.**

*In all cases where a resource is committed or dispatched under Exceptional Dispatch for any of the purposes set forth in Section 39.10, and the resource is eligible for an adder to the Default Energy Bid price pursuant to Section 39.10.2.3, Exceptional Dispatch Energy delivered by the resource shall be settled as set forth in either Section 11.5.6.7.3 or Section 11.5.6.7.4, whichever is applicable.*

**39.10.2.2 Interim Rules for Application of Mitigation Measures to Exceptional Dispatches of Resources Not Eligible for an Adder to the Default Energy Bid Price.**

*In all cases where a resource is committed or dispatched under Exceptional Dispatch for any of the purposes set forth in Section 39.10, and the resource is not eligible for an adder to the Default Energy Bid price pursuant to Section 39.10.2.3, Exceptional Dispatch Energy delivered by the resource shall be settled as set forth in either Section 11.5.6.7.2 or Section 11.5.6.7.4, whichever is applicable.*

**39.10.2.3 Interim Requirements to Be Eligible for an Adder to the Default Energy Bid Price.**

*A resource that is committed or dispatched under Exceptional Dispatch shall be eligible for an adder to the Default Energy Bid price only during such times that the resource meets all of the following criteria:*

- (i) the resource has been mitigated for one of the purposes set forth in Section 39.10,*
- (ii) the resource is not under an RMR Contract, is not designated as ICPM Capacity, and is not a Resource Adequacy Resource, unless the resource is a Partial Resource Adequacy Resource or a partial ICPM resource, and the Exceptional Dispatch requires non-RA Capacity or non-ICPM Capacity, in which case only the capacity not committed as Resource Adequacy Capacity or ICPM Capacity is eligible for an adder to the Default Energy Bid price,*

(iii) the resource has a Bid in the IFM, HASP, and RTM for the applicable Operating Day or Operating Hour in which the resource is committed or dispatched under Exceptional Dispatch; and

(iv) the resource has not accrued an amount of Exceptional Dispatch supplemental revenues within a 30-day period (this 30-day period begins on the day of the first Exceptional Dispatch and re-sets on the day of the first Exceptional Dispatch of the resource following the end of any prior 30-day period) equal to or greater than the monthly ICPM Capacity Payment, without any ICPM Availability Factor adjustment, for which the resource would be eligible pursuant to Section 43.6 had it been designated as an ICPM resource.

**39.10.2.4 Interim Calculation of Exceptional Dispatch Supplemental Revenues Within a 30-Day Period.**

The amount of Exceptional Dispatch supplemental revenues accrued by a resource within any 30-day period as defined in Section 39.10.2.3(iv) shall be a running total of the sum of supplemental revenues received during that 30-day period. The calculation of supplemental revenues accrued by a resource within a 30-day period is based on the higher of (a) the Resource-Specific Settlement Interval LMP minus the Default Energy Bid price for the resource or (b) the Default Energy Bid price plus a \$24/MWh adder minus the Default Energy Bid price for the resource. The greater of (a) or (b) is multiplied by the amount of Energy provided by the resource under Exceptional Dispatch, and the results of that multiplication are summed across the successive hours of the 30-day period. Once the resource has accrued an amount of supplemental revenues within the 30-day period, based on the calculation above, that equals the monthly ICPM Capacity Payment, without any ICPM Availability Factor adjustment, for which the resource would be eligible pursuant to Section 43.6 had it been designated as an ICPM resource, then the Settlement for the resource will be as provided in Section 11.5.6.7.2 and the resource will not be eligible for additional supplemental revenues for the rest of the 30-day period.