UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

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California Independent System Operator Corporation Docket No. ER00-____-000

PREPARED DIRECT TESTIMONY OF ZORA LAZIC ON BEHALF OF THE CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR CORPORATION

1 Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.

- 2 A. My name is Zora Lazic. My business address is 151 Blue Ravine Road,
- 3 Folsom, California 95630.
- 4

5 Q. BY WHOM ARE YOU EMPLOYED AND IN WHAT CAPACITY?

- 6 A. I am employed by the California Independent System Operator
- 7 Corporation as Vice President of Client Services. In that capacity, I am
- 8 the ISO officer responsible for Client Relations and Contracts &
- 9 Compliance. In particular, since November 1999, I have been the
- 10 executive sponsor responsible for the ISO's development of a revised
- 11 transmission Access Charge methodology.
- 12

1 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL

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QUALIFICATIONS.

- A. I received a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science, as well as a
 Bachelor of Civil Law and a Bachelor of Law (LLB) from McGill University,
 in Montreal. I became a member of the Bar of British Columbia in 1985
 and in 1986 obtained a Master of Laws (LLM) at the University of
 Cambridge, England.
- 8
- 9 Following graduation, I practiced corporate law. I joined the British
- 10 Columbia Hydro and Power Authority in 1989 and served in a number of
- 11 positions including, most recently, as Associate General Counsel at
- 12 Powerex, its power-marketing subsidiary. While in that position, I also
- 13 served as an advisory member of the ISO Board of Governors. In August
- 14 1999, I assumed my present position with the ISO.
- 15

16 Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?

- A. The purpose of this testimony is to describe the objectives that the ISO
 and the ISO Governing Board sought to achieve in developing a revised
 transmission Access Charge methodology and how the transmission
 Access Charge methodology proposed in Amendment No. 27 fulfills those
- 21 objectives.

1		
2	Q.	AS YOU TESTIFY, WILL YOU BE USING ANY SPECIALIZED TERMS?
3	Α.	Yes. I will be using terms defined in the Master Definitions, Appendix A of
4		the ISO Tariff.
5		
6	Q.	WHAT ROLE DID YOU PLAY IN THE ISO'S DEVELOPMENT OF A
7		NEW TRANSMISSION ACCESS CHARGE METHODOLOGY?
8	Α.	Beginning in November 1999, I directed the ISO's participation in the
9		process that had been established to receive the input of stakeholders in
10		connection with the development of a new transmission Access Charge
11		methodology by the ISO. In particular, I took part in the meetings of the
12		negotiating group of members of the ISO Governing Board that was
13		established in October 1999 to flesh out an Access Charge methodology
14		that was consistent with the principles adopted by the ISO Governing
15		Board at that meeting. I also represented the position of ISO
16		management at stakeholder meetings and at meetings of the ISO
17		Governing Board at which the Access Charge methodology was
18		discussed. In these efforts, I worked closely with Deborah Le Vine, the
19		ISO's Director of Contracts & Compliance, and provided executive
20		direction for the ISO's efforts to develop a new Access Charge rate
21		methodology.

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2		I. THE NATURE OF THE PROPOSED
3		TRANSMISSION ACCESS CHARGE METHODOLOGY
4	Q.	HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE THE ACCESS CHARGE RATE
5		METHODOLOGY THAT IS PROPOSED IN AMENDMENT NO. 27?
6	A.	The Access Charge rate methodology that the ISO proposes in
7		Amendment No. 27 is designed to achieve several objectives, which I will
8		discuss later in my testimony. It reflects a clear vision of the "end state"
9		for the Access Charge: the establishment of a single charge for access to
10		the high voltage transmission facilities of the ISO Controlled Grid, based
11		on the costs of facilities owned by all Participating Transmission Owners
12		("Participating TOs") in the region. If transmission owners who currently
13		do not participate decide to join, then the transmission revenue
14		requirements of such new Participating TOs would also be included.
15		
16		At the same time, the proposed Access Charge rate methodology is best
17		understood as a compromise among the interests of the different classes
18		of stakeholders that are affected by the manner in which the costs of the
19		transmission facilities that make up the ISO Controlled Grid are recovered
20		and is a delicate balance of benefits and burdens. The compromise is
21		reflected in a number of inter-related provisions of Amendment No. 27,

1	which are discussed in detail in the testimony of Ms. Le Vine. They
2	include provisions that provide incentives for entities that own
3	transmission facilities that could be included in the ISO Controlled Grid (or
4	have contractual entitlements to use such facilities) to become
5	Participating TOs. They also include provisions that are designed to
6	prevent or limit abrupt shifts in the costs paid by customers for access to
7	the ISO Controlled Grid during the transition toward a single rate for
8	access to the grid's high voltage transmission facilities.
9	
10	As with any compromise, the proposed Access Charge rate methodology
11	will necessarily appear imperfect when viewed from the standpoint of any
12	particular stakeholder or class of stakeholders. Also, the compromise
13	Access Charge rate methodology is not a perfect means of achieving any
14	single objective. For example, as I will explain, one of the ISO's principal
15	objectives was to develop an Access Charge methodology that would
16	encourage entities with transmission facilities and contractual Entitlements
17	to become Participating TOs. The ISO nevertheless recognizes that this
18	negotiated compromise Access Charge methodology cannot and does not
19	ensure that all such entities will immediately place their transmission
20	facilities and Entitlements under the ISO's Operational Control.

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1		Thus, while the proposed Access Charge methodology does not satisfy
2		fully the concerns of any stakeholder or class of stakeholders or achieve
3		fully the objectives of any class of stakeholders, the ISO believes that it
4		represents a fair and equitable means of recovering the costs of the
5		transmission facilities included in the ISO Controlled Grid. The ISO also
6		believes that it has selected appropriate objectives for an Access Charge
7		methodology and that the proposal embodied in Amendment No. 27
8		represents a reasonable compromise among those objectives.
9		
10	Q.	WHAT ROLE DID THE ISO GOVERNING BOARD PLAY IN THE
11		DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROPOSED ACCESS CHARGE RATE
12		METHODOLOGY?
13	A.	The ISO Governing Board played a critical role in the development of the
14		proposed Access Charge methodology. As I will explain, the ISO
15		Governing Board was charged by California law with the responsibility of
16		developing an Access Charge rate methodology that results in "an
17		equitable balance of costs and benefits" among the affected parties. The
18		ISO Governing Board took this responsibility very seriously. As
19		Ms. Le Vine explains in detail in her testimony, the ISO Governing Board,
20		after considering input from stakeholders, considered and approved a set
21		of basic principles to guide the development of an Access Charge

1	methodology. Then, over the first three months of this year, the ISO
2	Governing Board held numerous meetings, including both public sessions
3	and executive sessions, to evolve the first compromise proposal to the
4	point that represents a high degree of consensus on the proposed Access
5	Charge methodology.
6	
7	The ISO also was able to use the composition of the ISO Governing Board
8	to develop a representative negotiating group which assisted in
9	developing the package of compromises that is embodied in
10	Amendment No. 27. As also explained by Ms. Le Vine, when the ISO
11	became concerned in the Fall of 1999 that the large stakeholder group
12	was not progressing toward a consensus, the ISO put forth its own "straw"
13	proposal. During the October Governing Board meeting, the Board
14	provided guidance to ISO management on how to refine this proposal.
15	The Board also believed that the assistance of a negotiating group could
16	aid the discussions. Accordingly, the Chief Executive Officer of the ISO
17	recommended the appointment of a six-member negotiating group from
18	the ISO Governing Board. The members of that group included two
19	representatives of each of the stakeholder sectors that would be most
20	directly affected by an Access Charge methodology: the current
21	Participating TOs; the publicly owned utilities that could become

1		Participating TOs, but had elected thus far not to do so; and the End-
2		Users who ultimately pay the costs recovered through the Access
3		Charges. That group was able, working with the ISO, to develop the
4		compromise Access Charge methodology proposal that was later
5		approved by the ISO Governing Board.
6		
7		II. OBJECTIVES OF THE ACCESS CHARGE METHODOLOGY
8	Q.	WHAT OBJECTIVES DID THE ISO SEEK TO ADVANCE THROUGH
9		THE ACCESS CHARGE METHODOLOGY?
10	A.	The ISO developed the Access Charge rate methodology proposed in
11		Amendment No. 27 in order to advance six principal objectives. They are:
12		(1) the establishment of an Access Charge that creates an equitable
13		balance of costs and benefits among the various affected classes of
14		stakeholders; (2) the development of an Access Charge rate methodology
15		that was acceptable to the largest possible majority of the members of the
16		ISO Governing Board; (3) the establishment ultimately of a single rate for
17		access to the high voltage transmission facilities forming the backbone of
18		California's regional transmission grid; (4) the treatment of all Participating
19		TOs on the same basis; (5) the creation of incentives for additional entities
20		to include their transmission facilities and contractual Entitlements in the
21		regional grid controlled by the ISO and the removal of disincentives; and

1 (6) the strengthening of the ISO's independence by increasing the extent 2 to which the design of charges for transmission access was incorporated 3 in the ISO Tariff. 4 5 Q, PLEASE DISCUSS THE FIRST OBJECTIVE YOU MENTIONED, THE 6 DEVELOPMENT OF AN ACCESS CHARGE METHODOLOGY 7 ACCEPTABLE TO THE ISO GOVERNING BOARD. 8 Α. Certainly. In the orders it issued prior to the start-up of the ISO, the 9 Commission recognized that the initial design of the Access Charge was 10 subject to review under the terms of the California electricity restructuring 11 legislation (A.B. 1890). Under that legislation, adopted in 1996, the ISO 12 was directed to recommend to the Commission, within two years of its 13 initial operation, a new rate methodology "determined by a decision of the 14 Independent System Operator governing board." 15 16 While the restructuring legislation provided for a number of fallback 17 mechanisms if the ISO Governing Board failed to reach a decision 18 (including alternative dispute resolution and a default rate methodology), the ISO believed strongly that the Governing Board, if at all possible, 19 20 should rise to the challenge presented to it by the California legislature. 21 Accordingly, one of the key objectives of the ISO was to develop an

1	Access Charge methodology that was acceptable to a large number of
2	members of the ISO Governing Board. Because, as I have mentioned,
3	the members of the ISO Governing Board are elected by different classes
4	of stakeholders, this objective in turn required that the Access Charge
5	methodology represent a fair compromise among the interests of the
6	different groups of stakeholders.

7

8 Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE SECOND OBJECTIVE YOU MENTIONED,

9 ASSURING THAT THE ACCESS CHARGE METHODOLOGY RESULTS

10 IN AN EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF COSTS AND BENEFITS.

- A. The California restructuring legislation that I mentioned specified that a
 rate methodology determined by the ISO Governing Board be "based on
 principles approved by the governing board including, but not limited to, an
 equitable balance of costs and benefits." The ISO interpreted this to
 require an equitable balance of costs and benefits among the different
 classes of stakeholders whose interests are affected by the Access
- 17 Charge methodology.
- 18
- 19 This objective is closely related to the first objective I mentioned,
- 20 developing an Access Charge methodology that could win the support of a
- 21 large majority of the ISO Governing Board. Plainly, in order to obtain the

1	support of Board members representing a broad range of stakeholder
2	groups, the ISO would have to present an Access Charge methodology
3	that results in an equitable allocation of the costs and benefits of the ISO
4	Controlled Grid.

5

6Q.PLEASE DISCUSS THE THIRD OBJECTIVE YOU MENTIONED, THE7ESTABLISHMENT OF A SINGLE CHARGE FOR ACCESS TO THE

8 HIGH VOLTAGE TRANSMISSION SYSTEM.

9 Α. The ISO believes that it is appropriate ultimately to assess the same rate 10 for access to the high voltage transmission facilities that form the 11 backbone of the ISO Controlled Grid, regardless of where the customer is 12 located. The ISO was established to separate control of transmission 13 facilities, including control of access to transmission facilities, from the 14 interests of the utilities that own those facilities and to foster broad and 15 open competitive markets for electricity. The high voltage backbone 16 transmission facilities play a key role in enabling Market Participants 17 throughout the region to engage in trade and in permitting consumers 18 throughout the region to reap the benefits of competitive markets. Since 19 customers and Market Participants throughout the region benefit from 20 these facilities and rely on them, the ISO believes it is appropriate that

1		ultimately their costs be recovered through a uniform Access Charge that
2		does not vary with the location of the customer or Market Participant.
3		
4	Q.	PLEASE DISCUSS THE FOURTH OBJECTIVE YOU MENTIONED,
5		RELATING TO AFFORDING THE SAME TREATMENT TO ALL
6		PARTICIPATING TOS.
7	A.	The ISO believes that it must afford comparable treatment not only to
8		transmission customers that rely on the ISO Controlled Grid, but also to
9		transmission owners that place their facilities under the ISO's Operational
10		Control. If the ISO's Access Charge methodology affords special
11		treatment for some Participating TOs, without substantial reasons for
12		doing so and without limiting the extent and duration of the special
13		treatment, transmission owners will be discouraged from contributing their
14		facilities to the ISO Controlled Grid. Accordingly, while the proposed
15		Access Charge methodology does include provisions that afford benefits
16		for new Participating TOs that current Participating TOs do not enjoy,
17		fidelity to this objective led the ISO to limit the extent and duration of such
18		benefits.
19		

1	Q.	PLEASE DISCUSS THE FIFTH OBJECTIVE YOU DESCRIBED,
2		EXPANDING PARTICIPATION IN THE ISO BY ENTITIES WITH
3		TRANSMISSION FACILITIES AND CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS.
4	A.	In Order No. 2000, the Commission recognized that a regional
5		transmission organization should have sufficient appropriate scope and
6		configuration to enable competitive electricity markets to function
7		efficiently on a regional basis. The Commission also affirmed the
8		importance of voluntary participation in regional transmission
9		organizations by all entities with transmission facilities that constitute a
10		part of the regional grid.
11		
12		The ISO recognized that the methodology through which charges for
13		access are determined can have a significant impact on the willingness of
14		entities to include their transmission facilities and contractual rights among
15		those it controls on a regional basis. Entities that are prospective
16		Participating TOs would seek assurance that their transmission costs
17		would receive fair and appropriate recognition in the development of
18		Access Charges. In addition, if costs incurred by those entities might
19		increase as a result of a decision to relinquish control of their transmission
20		facilities and Entitlements to the ISO, they would want protection against

1 those increases. If these conditions are not satisfied for a particular entity, 2 then it would decline to participate. 3 4 Q. IS THERE ANY REASON WHY ENCOURAGING PARTICIPATION IS 5 **ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT IN CALIFORNIA?** 6 Α. Yes. California's publicly-owned utilities were exempted from the 7 provisions of the restructuring legislation that required the state's investor-8 owned utilities to place their transmission facilities under the ISO's 9 operational control. Publicly-owned utilities own transmission facilities that 10 constitute approximately twenty-five percent of the transfer capability 11 between the ISO Control Area and other control areas. Combining the 12 operation of those facilities with the facilities currently controlled by the 13 ISO would increase the efficiency of the regional grid, reducing 14 transmission congestion, and providing other benefits to the marketplace. 15 16 In addition, many publicly-owned utilities in California have transmission 17 rights to portions of the ISO Controlled Grid under contracts that predate 18 the ISO Operations Date. The Commission has directed the ISO to 19 continue to honor those Existing Contracts, including provisions enabling 20 the transmission customer to schedule transactions after the scheduling 21 deadlines normally applied by the ISO in its Day-Ahead and Hour-Ahead

1		Markets. As Ms. Le Vine explains in her testimony, the ISO's need to
2		reserve transmission capacity for the exercise of these within-the-hour
3		scheduling rights has given rise to a phenomenon known as "phantom
4		Congestion," which creates higher costs for Market Participants and
5		consumers. Decisions by publicly-owned utilities to convert their existing
6		transmission rights to ISO transmission service would reduce the costs
7		created by this scheduling disparity, benefiting all Market Participants and
8		relieving congestion on scarce import paths to California.
9		
10	Q.	PLEASE DISCUSS THE LAST OBJECTIVE YOU DESCRIBED,
11		INCREASING THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE DESIGN OF ACCESS
12		CHARGES IS DETERMINED UNDER THE ISO TARIFF.
13	Α.	In approving the ISO's formation, the Commission determined that the ISO
14		was structured and governed in a manner that assured its independence
14 15		was structured and governed in a manner that assured its independence from Market Participants and the utilities that own the transmission
15		from Market Participants and the utilities that own the transmission
15 16		from Market Participants and the utilities that own the transmission facilities it operates. More recently, in Order No. 2000, the Commission
15 16 17		from Market Participants and the utilities that own the transmission facilities it operates. More recently, in Order No. 2000, the Commission indicated that maintaining the independence of a regional transmission
15 16 17 18		from Market Participants and the utilities that own the transmission facilities it operates. More recently, in Order No. 2000, the Commission indicated that maintaining the independence of a regional transmission organization requires that the regional transmission organization, rather

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2		The current Access Charge methodology gives Participating TOs
3		substantial latitude in the design of charges for access to the ISO
4		Controlled Grid. This latitude arises from the fact that Access Charges
5		currently are collected under the Transmission Owner Tariffs filed by each
6		Participating TO. So, for example, one Participating TO (Pacific Gas and
7		Electric Company) has designed separate charges for the recovery of the
8		costs of its high voltage transmission facilities and its low voltage
9		transmission facilities. The other two Participating TOs, in contrast, have
10		designed single Access Charges for the recovery of the costs of all their
11		transmission facilities.
12		
13		Consistent with the Commission's determination in Order No. 2000, the
14		ISO has endeavored in the proposed Access Charge methodology to
15		increase the extent to which the design of Access Charges is determined
16		under the ISO Tariff, rather than under the Participating TOs' individual
17		tariffs.
18		
19	Q.	HOW DOES THE PROPOSED ACCESS CHARGE METHODOLOGY
00		

20 ADVANCE THE OBJECTIVES YOU HAVE DISCUSSED?

1	Α.	The proposed Access Charge methodology advances each of these
2		objectives through a balanced and integrated package of provisions that
3		implement the overall compromise reflected in the ISO's filing.
4		
5		First, the proposed Access Charge methodology did receive the support of
6		a large majority of the ISO Governing Board, which approved the proposal
7		reflected in Amendment No. 27 by a 16-5 vote, with one abstention. A
8		copy of the Board resolution in provided as Exhibit No (ISO-2). While
9		complete consensus was not possible, the proposed Access Charge
10		methodology was supported by Board members representing numerous
11		stakeholder classes.
12		
13		Second, the proposed Access Charge methodology does result in an
14		equitable balance of costs and benefits, albeit a delicate balance, to the
15		various affected stakeholder classes. This balance is the product of the
16		integrated operation of the different provisions of Amendment No. 27,
17		which are described in detail by Ms. Le Vine. Basically, the proposed
18		Access Charge methodology recognizes that expanded participation in the
19		ISO by new Participating TOs has the potential to benefit all Market
20		Participants through reduced charges for the recovery of the ISO's

21 expenses, reduced Congestion costs through the elimination or reduction

1 of phantom Congestion, and potentially lower market prices for Energy 2 and Ancillary Services. In recognition of these benefits, the proposed 3 Access Charge methodology allows for increases in the Access Charges 4 paid by customers of current Participating TOs, with the amount of the 5 increases dependent upon the extent of increased participation by new 6 Participating TOs. In addition, in acknowledgement of the fact that many 7 of these benefits are difficult to quantify precisely, the potential increases 8 in transmission costs are capped at levels that are considered reasonable 9 by the members of the ISO Governing Board, including representatives of 10 the End-User sector that will pay the increased charges. Other 11 components of the proposed filing discussed by Ms. Le Vine further 12 mitigate cost shifts that could result from its implementation.

13

14 Third, the proposed rate methodology does ultimately result in a single 15 charge for access to the high voltage transmission facilities included in the 16 ISO Controlled Grid. To mitigate the changes in Access Charges that 17 would result from the adoption of a single "postage stamp" transmission 18 rate, the uniform rate is phased in over ten years. Additionally, all new 19 high voltage transmission facilities and capital additions to such facilities 20 are immediately included in the ISO Grid-wide component of the High 21 Voltage Access Charge.

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2	Fourth, the proposed Access Charge methodology specifies that, after the
3	ten-year transition period is completed, all Participating TOs will receive
4	uniform treatment with respect to the determination of Access Charges
5	and other tariff provisions. To be sure, the proposed methodology
6	includes provisions that treat current Participating TOs differently from
7	new Participating TOs during the transition period. Those
8	accommodations, however, were necessary for a circumscribed period to
9	balance other objectives with the objective of equal treatment.
10	
11	Fifth, the proposed Access Charge methodology includes a number of
12	features as incentives for utilities, including publicly owned utilities in
13	California, to become Participating TOs and removes certain
14	disincentives. These features include the movement toward a uniform
15	high voltage Access Charge, which benefits higher cost transmission
16	owners that have not yet decided to join the ISO. In addition, the Access
17	Charge methodology includes provisions to hold new Participating TOs
18	harmless during a transition period against cost increases associated with
19	the Access Charge and the GMC they might otherwise experience.
20	

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1		Finally, the new methodology would determine the Access Charges for the
2		recovery of the costs of Participating TOs' high voltage transmission
3		facilities under the ISO Tariff, rather than the individual Transmission
4		Owner's Tariffs. This step increases the ability of the ISO to exercise
5		control, subject to Commission review, over the design of Access
6		Charges.
7		
8	Q.	HAVE ALL OF THE ISO'S OBJECTIVES BEEN FULFILLED
9		COMPLETELY?
10	Α.	No. As I have explained, the proposed Access Charge methodology
11		reflects a package of compromises. In addition, some of the objectives I
12		have described were in tension with others; some objectives could not be
13		achieved completely unless other objectives were sacrificed. As a result,
14		a number of the ISO's objectives, as well as the objectives of the different
15		stakeholder classes, are fulfilled only in part. That is the essence of
16		compromise.
17		
18		For example, the proposed Access Charge methodology defers the
19		adoption of a uniform Access Charge. This result reflects a compromise

- 20 between those stakeholders who wanted a uniform high voltage Access
- 21 Charge implemented immediately and others who were concerned that

any blending of the revenue requirements of different Participating TOs
 would create unacceptable cost shifts.

3

4 In a similar vein, the proposed Access Charge methodology does not 5 ensure each entity that it will incur no cost increases at all as a result of a 6 decision to become a Participating TO. The proposal also incorporates 7 limitations on the pace at which a new Participating TO with relatively 8 higher transmission costs can obtain contributions toward those costs 9 from customers on the systems of other Participating TOs. The ISO 10 recognizes that these aspects of the proposal may cause some entities to 11 conclude that it is not in their interests to become Participating TOs at this 12 time. As I explained earlier, however, the ISO and the Governing Board 13 determined through the extensive stakeholder and negotiating processes 14 that it was not possible to satisfy fully the concerns of prospective new 15 Participating TOs without allowing for some trade-offs between important 16 objectives, including the principle that costs and benefits should be 17 distributed equitably and the goal of limiting the extent to which any 18 Participating TO received treatment more favorable than that of another 19 Participating TO.

20

1 Q. THANK YOU, MS. LAZIC. I HAVE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS AT THIS

2 **TIME**.