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| Section | Proposed Changes | Reason for Change |
| Section 4.5.3.2.2  | Submitting Interchange Schedules prepared in accordance with all NERC, WECC and CAISO requirements, including providing E-Tags for all applicable transactions pursuant to WECC practices. The CAISO shall not accept E-Tags for ten-minute recallable reserve transactions (i.e., transactions with a WECC energy product code of “C-RE”), unless the E-Tag is associated with delivery of emergency assistance Energy from or to another Balancing Authority Area to the CAISO Balancing Authority Area. The CAISO is not, and shall not be listed as, the “Purchasing Selling Entity” for purposes of E-Tags. Title to Energy shall pass directly from the entity that holds title when the Energy enters the CAISO Controlled Grid to the entity that removes the Energy from the CAISO Controlled Grid, in each case in accordance with the terms of this CAISO Tariff. | When CAISO Balancing Authority (BA) is requesting emergency assistance from another BA, if the source BA is only able to provide the emergency energy to CAISO (the sink BA) as recallable, then CAISO BA must be able to receive the tag product code C-RE. CAISO BA operators would need to manually review and decide whether they are willing to accept the C-RE assistance as it will increase CAISO BA’s reserve requirement. When the rule to not accept C-RE tag product code was added to the Tariff, CAISO BA could not foresee a scenario when this would be needed. As CAISO BA has now experienced this scenario, a change is needed to better align with the definitions of the tagging product codes being used by other BAs.  |
| Section 4.5.4.4(b) | A Scheduling Coordinator’s Scheduling Coordinator Agreement may be terminated by the Scheduling Coordinator on ~~sixty~~ninety (~~6~~90) days written notice to the CAISO, provided that such notice shall not be effective to terminate the Scheduling Coordinator Agreement until the Scheduling Coordinator has complied with all applicable requirements of Section 4.5.2. | The SCA termination notification timeline is not consistent with all other agreement types. SCA termination notification is 60 days, wherein all other agreement types are 90 days. This is especially problematic for convergence bidding entities, as the CBEA requires 90 days and SCA requires 60 business days’ notice. |
| Section 6.5.2.3.1.2 | **6.5.2.3.1 Demand Forecasts** **6.5.2.3.1.1** Beginning seven (7) days prior to the target Day-Ahead Market, and updated as necessary, the CAISO will publish the CAISO Forecast of CAISO Demand. **6.5.2.3.1.2** By 6:00 p.m. the day prior to the target Day-Ahead Market, the CAISO will publish the updated CAISO Forecast of CAISO Demand. To the extent that the CAISO does not provide this data on any given Operating Day, the CAISO will endeavor to provide this data within the next thirty (30) days, after which the data will not be provided. | 7 DA forecast is not utilized in the DA market optimization and is provided to market participants for informational purposes. The CAISO has introduced additional controls including alarms on the 7 DA forecast and anticipate this happening infrequently. Nevertheless, the CAISO will endeavor to provide the data within the next 30 days. A similar approach has been used for 6.5.10.1.1, 6.5.10.1.2, 6.5.10.1.3, 6.5.10.1.5, 6.5.11, and 6.5.12. |
| Section 9.3.10.6.1, Second Paragraph, Second Sentence | DMM is to make a non-public referral to FERC in all instances where DMM has reason to believe that the reporting of the Forced Outage or Constraint constitutes a Market Violation other than those Market Violations identified in Section 11.1.~~1~~3 of Appendix P. | Correcting the cross reference to the accurate section.  |
| Section 10.1.2, First Sentence | The CAISO will maintain the effective ~~a record of all~~ Revenue Quality Meter Data and Settlement Quality Meter Data provided to it, as well as the effective Settlement Quality Meter Data it produces, for a period of 18 months on site at the CAISO’s facilities and for a period which, at least, allows for the re-run of data as required by this CAISO Tariff and any adjustment rules of the Local Regulatory Authority governing the Scheduling Coordinators and their End-Use Customers and FERC. | Submitting meter data is an iterative process under Section 10.3.6 of the CAISO tariff. These edits clarify that the CAISO does not retain every record of every meter data submission for 18 months. Principally, for example, when scheduling coordinators correct previous meter data submissions, that meter data supplants the previous meter data.  |
| Sectin 11.2.4.1, First and Second Sentences | For each Settlement Period of the IFM, the CAISO will calculate the IFM Congestion Charge as the IFM MCC amount for all scheduled Demand and Virtual Demand ~~Supply~~ Awards, minus the IFM MCC amount for all scheduled Supply and Virtual Supply Awards. The IFM MCC amount for all scheduled Demand and Virtual Demand Awards is the sum of the products of the IFM MCC and the total of the MWh of Demand scheduled in the Day-Ahead Schedule and Virtual Demand ~~Supply~~ Awards at all the applicable PNodes and Aggregated Pricing Nodes for the Settlement Period. The IFM MCC amount for all scheduled Supply and Virtual Supply Awards is the sum of the products of the IFM MCC and the total of the MWh of Supply scheduled in the Day-Ahead Schedule and the Virtual Supply Awards at all the applicable PNodes for the Settlement Period. | Corrects erroneous use of "supply" where "demand" is the correct term, recognizing that IFM Congestion Charge is generally calculated as demand minus supply. |
| Section 27.9, First Paragraph, Third Sentence | The CAISO will observe MWh constraints in Real-Time Dispatch, including constraints of resources using Regulation~~ory~~ Energy Management. | Correcting typogarphical error. Regulation Energy Management is the correct defined term. |
| Section 31.2.1, Third Sentence | The MPM process enforces all Transmission Constraints that are expected to be enforced in the relevant market and produces dispatch levels for all resources with submitted Bids and LMPs for all Locations. Bid mitigation is determined by decomposing the Congestion component of each LMP determined in the MPM process into competitive Congestion and non-competitive Congestion components. The ~~competitive Congestion component of each LMP is calculated as the sum of the product of the shift factor and the Shadow Price for all competitive Transmission Constraints and the~~ non-competitive Congestion component of each LMP is calculated as the sum of the product of the shift factor and the Shadow Price for all non-competitive Transmission Constraints. The Reference Bus used in the MPM process will be either: (1) the Midway 500kV bus if Path 26 flow is from north to south; or (2) the Vincent 500kV bus if Path 26 flow is from south to north. The treatment of a particular Transmission Constraint as competitive or non-competitive for purposes of the MPM process is determined pursuant to Section 39.7.2. | The CAISO is eliminating unnecessary language. The CAISO calculates a non-competitive Congestion component of locational marginal prices for use in its market power mitigation process. The remaining portion of the Congestion component of a locational marginal price is considered competitive.  |
| Section 34.20.2, Headers | 34.20.2 Determining Real-Time LMPs34.20.2.1 Dispatch Interval Real-Time LMPs34.20.2.1.1~~2~~ Computation…34.20.2.1.2~~3~~ Eligibility to Set the Real-Time LMP | Correcting sub-section numbering |
| Section 40.4.7.3(b), Second sentence | To the extent the Resource Adequacy Capacity of a Resource Adequacy Resource included in a Supply Plan is greater than the Resource Adequacy Capacity designated for the resource in the Resource Adequacy Plan, ~~or includes Resource Adequacy Capacity that is scheduled to take an Approved Maintenance Outage during the month,~~ the CAISO will notify the Scheduling Coordinator for the Resource Adequacy Resource and the respective Scheduling Coordinators for each Load Serving Entity and CPE that has included the Resource Adequacy Resource in its Resource Adequacy Plan that there is a discrepancy, which will be treated as a mismatch under Section 40.7.  | The Approved Maintenance Outage has a separate process (RASC). It's not necessary to have it in this section or a part of this process. |
| Section 40.4.7.3(b), Third sentence | To the extent the Resource Adequacy Capacity of a Resource Adequacy Resource included in a Supply Plan is less than the Resource Adequacy Capacity designated for the resource in the Resource Adequacy Plan, ~~or includes Resource Adequacy Capacity that is scheduled for an Approved Maintenance Outage during the month~~, the CAISO will notify the Local Regulatory Authority, the Scheduling Coordinator for the Resource Adequacy Resource, and the respective Scheduling Coordinators for each Load Serving Entity that has included the Resource Adequacy Resource in its Resource Adequacy Plan that there is a discrepancy, which will be treated as a mismatch under Section 40.7. | The Approved Maintenance Outage has a separate process (RASC). It's not necessary to have it in this section or a part of this process. |
| Section 40.4.7.3, second to last sentence | Disputes regarding the CAISO’s determination of Net Qualifying Capacity shall be subject to Section 40.4~~5~~.2. | Updating cross reference to accurate tariff section.  |
| Section 40.4.7.3, last sentence |  The provisions of this Section shall not affect a Resource Adequacy Resource’s Net Qualifying Capacity posted by the CAISO under Section 40.4~~5~~.2. | Updating cross reference to accurate tariff section.  |
| Appendix Q, Section 2.2.1, Last Sentence | If an Eligible Intermittent Resource intends to become a Participating Intermittent Resource, it must also execute a letter of intent, which when executed and delivered to the CAISO shall initiate the process of certifying the Participating Intermittent Resource. The form of the letter of intent shall be specified by the CAISO in a Business Practice Manual **or on the CAISO website**. | Provide flexibility on how the form of the letter is provided to market participants.  |
| Appendix Q, Section 4, last sentence | **4 FORECASTING** The CAISO is responsible for overseeing the development of tools or services to forecast Energy for Participating Intermittent Resources. The CAISO will use its best efforts to develop accurate and unbiased forecasts, as limited by the availability of relevant explanatory data. Objective criteria and thresholds for unbiased, accurate forecasts shall be used to certify Participating Intermittent Resources ~~in accordance with Section 2.2.4 of this EIRP~~. | Correcting Circular reference between Section 2.2.4 and Section 4 within App Q |
| Appendix S, Section 4.5 (entire section) | **4.5. Confidentiality**4.5.1 Confidential Information shall mean any confidential and/or proprietary information provided by one Party to another Party that is clearly marked or otherwise designated "Confidential." For purposes of this SGIP, all design, operating specifications, and metering data provided by the Interconnection Customer shall be deemed Confidential Information regardless of whether it is clearly marked or otherwise designated as such.4.5.2 Confidential Information does not include information previously in the public domain, required to be publicly submitted or divulged by Governmental Authorities (after notice to the other Parties and after exhausting any opportunity to oppose such publication or release), or necessary to be divulged in an action to enforce this SGIP. Each Party receiving Confidential Information shall hold such information in confidence and shall not disclose it to any third party nor to the public without the prior written authorization from the Party providing that information, except to fulfill obligations under this SGIP, or to fulfill legal or regulatory requirements.4.5.2.1 Each Party shall employ at least the same standard of care to protect Confidential Information obtained from the other Parties as it employs to protect its own Confidential Information.4.5.2.2 Each Party is entitled to equitable relief, by injunction or otherwise, to enforce its rights under this provision to prevent the release of Confidential Information without bond or proof of damages, and may seek other remedies available at law or in equity for breach of this provision.4.5.3 Notwithstanding anything in this section to the contrary, and pursuant to 18 CFR § 1b.20, if FERC, during the course of an investigation or otherwise, requests information from one of the Parties that is otherwise required to be maintained in confidence pursuant to this SGIP, the Party shall provide the requested information to FERC, within the time provided for in the request for information. In providing the information to FERC, the Party may, consistent with 18 CFR § 388.112, request that the information be treated as confidential and non-public by FERC and that the information be withheld from public disclosure. Parties are prohibited from notifying the other Parties prior to the release of the Confidential Information to FERC. The Party shall notify the other Parties when it is notified by FERC that a request to release Confidential Information has been received by FERC, at which time any of the Parties may respond before such information would be made public, pursuant to 18 CFR § 388.112. Requests from a state regulatory body conducting a confidential investigation shall be treated in a similar manner if consistent with the applicable state rules and regulations. | Administrative error - tariff language wasn't formally filed with FERC as a tariff language during the fifth replacement filing, converting the CAISO tariff to the e-tariff format (ER10-1563) |
| Appendix X, Section 2.3.1 | **2.3.1** Except for the obligations set forth in Sections 5.6, 5.10, 10.1.1, 10.3, and Article 15~~.3~~, this Agreement shall terminate when the Project has been turned over to CAISO Operational Control. | Correcting the cross reference to the accurate section.  |
| Appendix X, Section 4.2, Fourth Sentence | This separate agreement with each Interconnecting PTO or other entity must provide, at a minimum, for the Interconnecting PTO or other entity to take any procedural steps required in this Agreement with respect to the transmission interconnection, including Sections 5.3.4, 5.4.2, 5.4.3, 5.5.~~1.~~3, 5.6.2, 6.1, 8.1, and 9.2, and must identify the Transmission Interconnection Facilities that an Interconnecting PTO is responsible for, and must pay for in accordance with Section 24.14.2 of the CAISO Tariff.  | Correcting the cross reference to the accurate section.  |
| Appendix X, Section 12.4 | 12.6 Notice of Regulatory Filings. The Approved Project Sponsor will provide to the CAISO, Participating TOs (as listed on Appendix F to the Transmission Control Agreement), and other Approved Project Sponsors, a copy of all initial filings it submits in a FERC docket that affects the rates (including Transmission Revenue Requirement), terms, or conditions of service for the Project. | Fixing Typo |
| Appendix X, Section 21.3.2 | **21.3.2** Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Agreement, the Approved Project Sponsor’s rights to audit the CAISO’s accounts and records shall be as set forth in Section 22~~1~~.1 of the CAISO Tariff. | Correcting the cross reference to the accurate section.  |
| Appendix X, Section 21.4 | **21.4** Audit Rights Period for Construction-Related Accounts and Records. Accounts and records related to the design, engineering, procurement, and construction of Project constructed by the Approved Project Sponsor shall be subject to audit and verification by the CAISO for a period of twenty-four months following the issuance of a final cost summary in accordance with Section 5.~~2.7.~~6.1. | Correcting the cross reference to the accurate section.  |
| Appendix DD, Section 8.9.2, Sixth Paragraph, First sentence | Interconnection Customers may seek or retain a TP Deliverability allocation ~~under Groups A or B~~ if they meet all tariff criteria except the counterparty criterion (2); however, within thirty (30) days of receiving a TP Deliverability allocation, they must demonstrate they meet the counterparty criterion or provide a deposit of $10,000 per MW of allocated TP Deliverability, but in no case less than $500,000. | Clarifies that provision in this paragraph applies to renetion as well, consisten with language right above.  |