## 30.5 Bidding Rules

### 30.5.1 General Bidding Rules

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(z) [Not Used]

(aa) A Scheduling Coordinator for a CAISO Balancing Authority Area resource will indicate through a resource parameter as prescribed in the Business Practice Manual that it has sold capacity to an out-of-balancing authority area Load Serving Entity, and no CAISO Load Serving Entity has a right to such capacity. If the Scheduling Coordinator does not indicate this status, the resource cannot be a designated resource for an export Self-Schedule at Scheduling Points backed by non-Resource Adequacy Capacity. The CAISO will notify a Scheduling Coordinator hourly, to the extent practicable, that its resource, which is flagged to support an export, is designated by another entity to support export Self-Schedules at Scheduling Points backed by non-Resource Adequacy Capacity. Upon receiving the notice, the Scheduling Coordinator for the designated resource shall notify the CAISO if it does not have a contractual commitment to support such export Self-Schedule or does not have a reasonable expectation to be available to support the export Self Schedule. The Scheduling Coordinator for the designated resource and the Scheduling Coordinator for the export Self-Schedule shall designate a resource to support such export only if the resource is expected to have sufficient available capacity to support the export quantity throughout the entire hour. For Variable Energy Resources, this requirement can only be satisfied if the resource’s forecasted output for each of the applicable four (4) fifteen (15) minute intervals at the time of bid submission is for Generation that is equal to or greater than the Self Schedule export quantity. The designated capacity must be the deliverable capacity of a resource with Full Capacity Deliverability Status, Partial Capacity Deliverability Status, or Interim Deliverability Status that is shown on the CAISO’s NQC list.

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### 31.4 CAISO Market Adjustments to Non-Priced Quantities in the IFM

All Self-Schedules are respected by SCUC to the maximum extent possible and are protected from curtailment in the Congestion Management process to the extent that there are Effective Economic Bids that can relieve Congestion. If all Effective Economic Bids in the IFM are exhausted, resource Self-Schedules between the resource’s Minimum Load as defined in the Master File, or if applicable, as modified pursuant to Section 9.3.3, and the first Energy level of the first Energy Bid point will be subject to adjustments by the CAISO Market optimization based on the scheduling priorities listed below. This functionality of the optimization software is implemented through the setting of scheduling parameters as described in Section 27.4.3 and specified in Section 27.4.3.1 and the Business Practice Manuals. Through this process, imports and exports may be reduced to zero, Demand Bids may be reduced to zero, Price Taker Demand (LAP load) may be reduced, and Generation may be reduced to a lower operating limit (or Regulation Limit) (or to a lower Regulation Limit plus any qualified Regulation Down award or Self-Provided Ancillary Services, if applicable). Any Self-Schedules below the Minimum Load level are treated as fixed Self-Schedules and are not subject to these adjustments for Congestion Management. The provisions of this section shall apply only to the extent they do not conflict with any MSS Agreement. In accordance with Section 27.4.3.5, the resources submitted in valid TOR, ETC or Converted Rights Self-Schedules shall not be adjusted in the IFM in response to an insufficiency of Effective Economic Bids. Thus the adjustment sequence for the IFM from highest priority (last to be adjusted) to lowest priority (first to be adjusted), is as follows:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Scheduling Run Priority** | **Scheduling Run Parameters Under Soft Energy Bid Cap (27.4.3.2)** | **Scheduling Run Parameters Under Hard Energy Bid Cap (27.4.3.3)** |
| Reliability Must Run (RMR) Generation pre-dispatch reduction  | -$6000 | -$12000 |
| Day-Ahead TOR Self-Schedules reduction (balanced demand and supply reduction)  | $5,900 (demand)/ - $5,900 (supply) | $11800 (demand)/ -$11800 (supply) |
| Day-Ahead ETC and Converted Rights Self-Schedules reduction; different ETC priority levels will be observed based upon global ETC priorities provided to the CAISO by the Responsible PTOs  | $5100 to $5900 (demand)/ -$5100 to -$5900 (supply) | $10200 to $11800 (demand)/ -$10200 to -$11800 (supply) |
| Internal Transmission Constraint relaxation for the IFM pursuant to Section 27.4.3.1 | $5000 | $10000 |
| Self-Schedules of CAISO Demand reduction subject to Section 31.3.1.3; exports explicitly identified in a Resource Adequacy Plan to be served by Resource Adequacy Capacity explicitly identified and linked in a Supply Plan to the exports; and Self-Schedules of exports at Scheduling Points explicitly sourced by non-Resource Adequacy Capacity | $1800 | $3600 |
| Self-Schedules of exports at Scheduling Points not explicitly sourced by non-Resource Adequacy Capacity, except those exports explicitly identified in a Resource Adequacy Plan to be served by Resource Adequacy Capacity explicitly identified and linked in a Supply Plan to the exports as set forth in Section 31.4(d), and the export Self-Schedule of a non-Priority Wheeling Through | $1050 | $2100 |
| Day-Ahead Regulatory Must-Run Generation and Regulatory Must-Take Generation reduction  | -$1350 | -$2700 |
| Other Self-Schedules of Supply reduction  | -$1100 | -$2200 |
|  |  |  |

\* \* \* \* \*

### 31.5.5 Selection and Commitment of RUC Capacity

Capacity that is not already scheduled in the IFM may be selected as RUC Capacity through the RUC process of the DAM. The RUC optimization will select RUC Capacity and produce nodal RUC Prices by minimizing total Bid cost based on RUC Availability Bids and Start-Up, Minimum Load Bids and Transition Costs. RUC will not consider Start-Up, Minimum Load Bids, or Transition Costs for resources already committed in the IFM. The RUC Capacity of a resource is the incremental amount of capacity selected in RUC above the resource’s Day-Ahead Schedule. The resource’s Day-Ahead Schedule plus its RUC Capacity comprise the resource’s RUC Schedule. The CAISO will only issue RUC Start-Up Instructions to resources committed in RUC that must receive a Start-Up Instruction in the Day-Ahead in order to be available to meet Real-Time Demand. RUC Schedules will be provided to Scheduling Coordinators even if a RUC Start-Up Instruction is not issued at that time. RUC shall not Shut Down resources scheduled through the IFM and RUC will not commit a Multi-Stage Generating Resource to a lower MSG Configuration that is unable to support the Energy scheduled in the IFM. If the RUC process cannot find a feasible solution given the resources committed in the IFM, the RUC process will adjust constraints as described in Section 31.5.4 to arrive at a feasible solution that accommodates all the resources committed in the IFM, and any necessary de-commitment of IFM committed units shall be effectuated through an Exceptional Dispatch.

### 31.4.1 Temporary Changes to Scheduling Run Parameter Values

If the CAISO determines it is necessary to modify the scheduling run parameter values in sections 31.4, 34.12.1, or 34.12.2 to ensure the market clearing solution is feasible or avoid operational or reliability problems the resolution of which would otherwise require recurring operator intervention outside normal scheduling and market procedures, it may temporarily modify the value for a period up to ninety days, provided however CAISO will file such change with FERC under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act within thirty days of such modification. If circumstances reasonably allow, CAISO will consult with FERC and the CAISO’s Market Monitoring Unit before implementing such modification. In all circumstances, the CAISO will (i) consult with those entities as soon as reasonably possible after implementing a temporary modification, and (ii) notify Market Participants of any temporary modification and explain the reasons for the change. This section does not authorize the CAISO to change the scheduling run parameter values in a manner that changes the relative scheduling run priorities specified in sections 31.4, 34.12.1, and 34.12.2.

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### 34.12.1 Increasing Supply

The scheduling priorities as defined in the RTM optimization to meet the need for increasing Supply as reflected from higher to lower priority are as follows:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Scheduling Run Priority**  | **Scheduling Parameters Under Soft Energy Bid Cap (27.4.3.2)**  | **Scheduling Parameters Under Hard Energy Bid Cap (27.4.3.3)** |
| CAISO Forecast of CAISO Demand; exports explicitly identified in a Resource Adequacy Plan backed by Resource Adequacy Capacity explicitly identified and linked in a Supply Plan to the exports; or Self-Schedules for exports at Scheduling Points in the RTM backed by Generation from non-Resource Adequacy Capacity or from non-RUC Capacity  | $1450 | $2900 |
| RUC schedules that are Self-Schedules of exports at Scheduling Points not backed by Generation from non-Resource Adequacy  | $1250 | $2500 |
| Real-Time Market Self-Schedules of exports at Scheduling Points not backed by Generation from non-Resource Adequacy Capacity  | $1150 | $2300 |
| Contingency Only Operating Reserve if activated by Operator to provide Energy (as indicated by the Contingency Flag and the Contingency condition) | $1000 | $2000 |

### 34.12.2 Decreasing Supply

The scheduling priorities as defined in the RTM optimization to meet the need for decreasing Supply as reflected from higher to lower priority are as follows:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Scheduling Run Priority** | **Scheduling Parameters Under Soft Energy Bid Cap (27.4.3.2)** | **Scheduling Parameters Under Hard Energy Bid Cap (27.4.3.3)** |
| Non-Participating Load increase  | Not Applicable | Not Applicable |
| Reliability Must Run (RMR) Schedule (Day-Ahead manual pre-dispatch or Manual RMR Dispatches or Dispatches that are flagged as RMR Dispatches following the MPM, for Legacy RMR Units and Exceptional Dispatch for RMR Resources process)  | -$6000 | -$12000 |
| Transmission Ownership Right (TOR) Self-Schedule  | -$5900 | -$11800 |
| Existing Rights (ETC) Self-Schedule | -$5100 to -$5900 | -$10200 to -$11800 |
| Regulatory Must-Run and Regulatory Must-Take (RMT) Self-Schedule; | -$1400 | -$2800 |
| Participating Load increase  | Not Applicable | Not Applicable |
| Day-Ahead Supply Schedule  | -$1200 | -$2400 |
| Self-Schedule Hourly Block  | -$1100 | -$2200 |
|  |  |  |

These dispatch priorities as defined in the RTM optimization may be superseded by operator actions and procedures as necessary to ensure reliable operations.

### 34.12.3 [Not Used]

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**Appendix A**

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# - [Not Used]

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