**Appendix A**

**- Charging Constraint**

A constraint that reflects a storage resource’s election not to charge beyond the output of its co-located Variable Energy Resource.

**8.4.1.1 Regulation**

A resource offering Regulation must have the following operating characteristics and technical capabilities:

(a) it must be capable of being controlled and monitored by the CAISO EMS by means of the installation and use of a standard CAISO direct communication and direct control system, a description of which and criteria for any temporary exemption from which, the CAISO shall publish on the CAISO Website;

(b) it must be capable of achieving at least the Ramp Rates (increase and decrease in MW/minute) stated in its Bid for the full amount of Regulation capacity offered;

(c) the Regulation capacity offered must not exceed the maximum Ramp Rate (MW/minute) of that resource times ten (10) minutes;

(d) the resource to CAISO Control Center telemetry must, in a manner meeting CAISO standards, include indications of whether the resource is on or off CAISO EMS control at the resource terminal equipment;

(e) the resource must be capable of the full range of movement within the amount of Regulation capability offered without manual resource operator intervention of any kind;

(f) each Ancillary Service Provider must ensure that its CAISO EMS control and related SCADA equipment for its resource are operational throughout the time period during which Regulation is required to be provided;

(g) Regulation capacity offered must be dispatchable on a continuous basis for at least sixty (60) minutes in the Day-Ahead Market and at least thirty (30) minutes in the Real-Time Market after issuance of the Dispatch Instruction. The CAISO will measure continuous Energy from the time a resource reaches its award capacity. In the Real-Time Market, where a storage resource using the Non-Generator Resource model will not have sufficient State of Charge to meet its Ancillary Services Schedule, the CAISO will dispatch the storage resource to have sufficient State of Charge to meet its Ancillary Services Schedule. Scheduling Coordinators for Non-Generator Resources located within the CAISO Balancing Authority Area that require Energy from the Real-Time Market to offer their full capacity as Regulation may request the use of Regulation Energy Management as described in Section 8.4.1.2. Consistent with the requirements of this Section, the CAISO will use all reasonable efforts to commit, schedule, and dispatch Non-Generator Resources offering Regulation while recognizing the impact of Regulation awards on their State of Charge in the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets. The CAISO will include examples in the Business Practice Manual detailing how the Day-Ahead and Real-Time optimizations will account for Regulation awards in determining the State of Charge in subsequent intervals; and

(h) Regulation capacity offered must meet or exceed the minimum performance threshold of twenty-five (25) percent measured accuracy as specified in Section 8.2.3.1.1.

### 11.5.6 Settlement Amounts for RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy from Exceptional Dispatch

…

**11.5.6.1 Settlement for FMM Instructed Imbalance Energy or RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy from Exceptional Dispatches used for System Emergency Conditions, for a Market Disruption, to Mitigate Overgeneration or to Prevent or Relieve Imminent System Emergencies**

…

**11.5.6.1.2 Settlement for Instructed Imbalance Energy from Exceptional Dispatches to Storage Resources to Hold State of Charge**

The CAISO will settle storage resources that receive an Exceptional Dispatch to hold a State of Charge pursuant to Sections 11.5.6 and 11.5.6.1 for any FMM Instructed Imbalance Energy or RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy to move to the targeted State of Charge plus the resource’s opportunity cost for holding the State of Charge. The CAISO will calculate this opportunity cost starting from the first Operating Interval when the resource met and followed the Exceptional Dispatch through the end of the Operating Day. The CAISO will calculate the difference between the resource’s maximum potential RTM Energy revenues without the Exceptional Dispatch to hold the State of Charge and the resource’s maximum potential RTM Energy revenues with the Exceptional Dispatch to hold State of Charge. If the resource’s maximum potential RTM Energy revenues without the Exceptional Dispatch to hold State of Charge are higher than the resource’s maximum potential RTM Energy revenues with the Exceptional Dispatch to hold State of Charge, then the resource will receive the positive difference between these two values, which is its opportunity cost. The CAISO will calculate the resource’s opportunity costs based on its Master File characteristics, Bids, State of Charge, Day-Ahead Schedules, and the applicable Locational Marginal Prices.

### 11.8.4 RTM Bid Cost Recovery Amount

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**11.8.4.2 RTM Market Revenue Calculations**

**11.8.4.2.1** For each Settlement Interval in a CAISO Real-Time Market Commitment Period, the RTM Market Revenue for a Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource is the algebraic sum of the elements listed below in this Section. For Multi-Stage Generating Resources the RTM Market Revenue calculations will be made at the Generating Unit level.

(a) The sum of the products of the FMM or RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy (including Minimum Load Energy of the Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource committed in RUC and where for Pumped-Storage Hydro Units and Participating Load operating in the pumping mode or serving Load, the MWh is negative), except Standard Ramping Energy, Residual Imbalance Energy, Exceptional Dispatch Energy, Derate Energy, MSS Load following Energy, Ramping Energy Deviation and Regulation Energy, with the relevant FMM and RTD LMP, for each Dispatch Interval in the Settlement Interval. These amounts are subject to the Real-Time Performance Metric and the Persistent Deviation Metric as described in Sections 11.8.4.4 and 11.17, respectively. For storage resources that receive an Exceptional Dispatch to hold a State of Charge, the RTM Market Revenue will include revenues from the opportunity cost to hold the State of Charge but not the Exceptional Dispatch Energy to reach the State of Charge.

(b) The product of the Real-Time Market AS Award from each accepted Real-Time Market AS Bid in the Settlement Interval with the relevant ASMP, divided by the number of fifteen (15)-minute Commitment Intervals in a Trading Hour (4), and prorated to the duration of the Settlement Interval.

(c) The relevant tier-1 No Pay charges for that Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource in that Settlement Interval.

(d) The Forecasted Movement and Uncertainty Awards Settlement Amounts as calculated pursuant to Section 11.25 are included in the RTM Market Revenues calculation, not including:

(1) the amounts rescinded pursuant to Section 11.25.3;

(2) Forecasted Movement revenue when there are changes in Self-Schedules across consecutive Trading Hours; and

(3) Forecasted Movement revenue when there are changes in EIM Base Schedules across consecutive Trading Hours without Economic Bids.

**27.13 Aggregate Capability Constraint**

At the request of the Interconnection Customer or Pseudo-Tie Generating Facility, the CAISO may enforce an Aggregate Capability Constraint for Generating Facilities with Co-located Resources that reflects a Generating Facility’s maximum and minimum capability or a portion of that capability for purposes of Day-Ahead Market Awards, Real-Time Market Awards, and Real-Time Dispatch as described in the CAISO’s Business Practice Manuals. If the combined PMax of Co-located Resources associated with a single Generating Facility would exceed the Interconnection Service Capacity of that Generating Facility, the Interconnection Customer may request that the CAISO enforce an Aggregate Capability Constraint or multiple Aggregate Capability Constraints at the Generating Facility as described in the CAISO’s Business Practice Manuals. If the Interconnection Customer requests that the CAISO enforce multiple Aggregate Capability Constraints, the CAISO will enforce an Aggregate Capability Constraint at the Generating Facility level and subordinate Aggregate Capability Constraints at the level of Resource IDs.

If the Interconnection Customer does not elect an Aggregate Capability Constraint(s), the combined PMax of the Co-located Resources registered in the Master File for that Generating Facility may not exceed the Generating Facility’s Interconnection Service Capacity. EIM Participating Resource Scheduling Coordinators also may request that the CAISO enforce an Aggregate Capability Constraint or multiple Aggregate Capability Constraints for Co-located Resources, subject to the prior written approval of the applicable EIM Entity Balancing Authority that enforcing an Aggregate Capability Constraint(s) for Co-located Resources does not create a threat to safety or reliability.

As described in the CAISO’s Business Practice Manuals the CAISO may relax enforcement of subordinate Aggregate Capability Constraints in its Real-Time Market prior to relaxing enforcement of the system energy-balance constraint specified in Sections 27.4.3.3.4 to ensure there is sufficient Supply to meet the CAISO Forecast of CAISO Demand.

Notwithstanding Section 34.13, a Generating Facility whose Co-located Resources, including Variable Energy Resources, do not comply with Dispatch Instructions such that their output exceeds the Interconnection Service Capacity of the Generating Facility, will be ineligible for the Aggregate Capability Constraint. In such cases, the CAISO will adjust the PMaxes of those Co-located Resources proportionate to each Generating Unit’s capacity such that the sum of the PMax values equals the Interconnection Service Capacity of the Generating Facility, or as requested by the Interconnection Customer so long as the total value does not exceed the Interconnection Service Capacity of the Generating Facility.

Similar to other Generating Facilities with multiple Resource IDs, the CAISO will have no liability with respect to Co-located Resources or their Scheduling Coordinators if Co-located Resources do not comply with Dispatch Instructions and infringe on Interconnection Service Capability used by other Co-located Resources at a Generating Facility.

In the event that Co-located Resources in an EIM Entity Balancing Authority area do not comply with Dispatch Instructions such that their output exceeds the interconnection service capacity for the Co-located Resources, the CAISO will ask the applicable EIM Entity Balancing Authority whether it will revoke its prior approval of enforcing the Aggregate Capability Constraint for such Co-located Resources.

The following resources are not eligible to use the Aggregate Capability Constraint: Multi-Stage Generators, Proxy Demand Response, Pumped Storage Hydro Units, Metered Subsystems, and Use-Limited Resources.

Scheduling Coordinators may not offer or self-provide Ancillary Services into the CAISO’s Markets or receive Uncertainty Awards from Generating Units that are subject to Aggregate Capability Constraints until the CAISO issues a Market Notice stating this restriction will no longer apply. The Pricing Node for the Generating Units or EIM Participating Resources subject to an Aggregate Capability Constraint will be their Point of Interconnection.

**27.14 Charging Constraint**

At the request of the Scheduling Coordinator of a Co-Located Resource that is a storage resource, the CAISO will enforce a Charging Constraint that reflects the storage resource’s election not to charge beyond the output of its co-located Variable Energy Resource(s). Where a storage resource has a Charging Constraint registered in the Master File, the CAISO will not issue (a) Day-Ahead Schedules for Energy less than the negative value of the co-located Variable Energy Resource’s Day-Ahead Schedules; or (b) FMM Schedules or RTD Schedules for Energy that are less than the negative value of the co-located Variable Energy Resource’s Dispatch Operating Target, in the same Operating Intervals. The CAISO will not observe Charging Constraints in Operating Intervals where the storage resource receives an Ancillary Service Award to provide Regulation or where the storage resource elects to use Regulation Energy Management.

**30.5.2.7 Ancillary Service Bids**

There are four distinct Ancillary Services: Regulation Up, Regulation Down, Spinning Reserve and Non-Spinning Reserve. A resource shall be eligible to provide Ancillary Service if it has complied with the CAISO’s certification and testing requirements as contained in Appendix K and the CAISO’s Operating Procedures. Scheduling Coordinators may use Dynamic System Resources to Self-Provide Ancillary Services as specified in Section 8. All System Resources, including Dynamic System Resources and Non-Dynamic System Resources, will be charged the Shadow Price as prescribed in Section 11.10, for any awarded Ancillary Services. A Scheduling Coordinator may submit Ancillary Services Bids for Regulation Up, Regulation Down, Spinning Reserve, and Non-Spinning Reserve for the same capacity by providing a separate price in $/MW per hour as desired for each Ancillary Service. The Bid for each Ancillary Services is a single Bid segment. Only resources certified by the CAISO as capable of providing Ancillary Services are eligible to provide Ancillary Services and submit Ancillary Services Bids. In addition to the common elements listed in Section 30.5.2.1, all Ancillary Services Bid components of a Supply Bid must contain the following: (1) the type of Ancillary Service for which a Bid is being submitted; (2) Ramp Rate (Operating Reserve Ramp Rate and Regulation Ramp Rate, if applicable); and (3) Distribution Curve for Physical Scheduling Plant or System Unit. A Scheduling Coordinator may only submit an Ancillary Services Bid or Submission to Self-Provide an Ancillary Service for Multi-Stage Generating Resources for the Ancillary Service for which the specific MSG Configurations are certified. For any such certified MSG Configurations the Scheduling Coordinator may submit only one Operating Reserve Ramp Rate and Regulation Ramp Rate. An Ancillary Services Bid or Submission to Self-Provide an Ancillary Service submitted to the Day-Ahead Market when submitted to the Day-Ahead Market may be, but are not required to be, accompanied by an Energy Bid that covers the capacity offered for the Ancillary Service. Notwithstanding any other provision, Scheduling Coordinators for storage resources participating as Non-Generator Resources must submit accompanying Energy Bids in the Real-Time Market that cover at least half the capacity awarded for Ancillary Services from the Day-Ahead Market. Such covering Energy Bids must be the opposite direction of the Ancillary Service; namely, Bids to charge must accompany capacity awarded for Regulation Up, Spinning Reserve, and Non-Spinning Reserve; and Bids to discharge must accompany capacity awarded for Regulation Down.. If a Scheduling Coordinator’s Submission to Self-Provide an Ancillary Service is qualified as specified in Section 8.6, the Scheduling Coordinator must submit an Energy Bid that covers the self-provided capacity prior to the close of the Real-Time Market for the day immediately following the Day-Ahead Market in which the Ancillary Service Bid was submitted. Except as provided below, the Self-Schedule for Energy need not include a Self-Schedule for Energy from the resource that will be self-providing the Ancillary Service. If a Scheduling Coordinator is self-providing an Ancillary Service from a Short Start Unit, no Self-Schedule for Energy for that resource is required. If a Scheduling Coordinator proposes to self-provide Spinning Reserve, the Scheduling Coordinator is obligated to submit a Self-Schedule for Energy for that particular resource, unless as discussed above the particular resource is a Short Start Unit. When submitting Ancillary Service Bids in the Real-Time Market, Scheduling Coordinators for resources that either have been awarded or self-provide Spinning Reserve or Non-Spinning Reserve capacity in the Day-Ahead Market must submit an Energy Bid for at least the awarded or self-provided Spinning Reserve or Non-Spinning Reserve capacity, otherwise the CAISO will apply the Bid validation rules described in Section 30.7.6.1.

As provided in Section 30.5.2.6.4, a Submission to Self-Provide an Ancillary Service shall contain all of the requirements of a Bid for Ancillary Services with the exception of Ancillary Service Bid price information. In addition, Scheduling Coordinators must comply with the Ancillary Services requirements of Section 8. Scheduling Coordinators submitting Self-Schedule Hourly Blocks for Ancillary Services Bids for the Real-Time Market must also submit an Energy Bid for the associated Ancillary Services Bid under the same Resource ID, otherwise the bid validation rules in Section 30.7.6.1 will apply to cover any portion of the Ancillary Services Bid not accompanied by an Energy Bid. As described in Section 34.2.3, if the resource submits a Self-Scheduled Hourly Block, the CAISO will only use the Ancillary Services Bid in the RTM optimization and will not use the associated Energy Bid for the same Resource ID to schedule Energy from the Non-Dynamic System Resource in the RTM. Scheduling Coordinators must also comply with the bidding rules associated with the must offer requirements for Ancillary Services specified in Section 40.6.

**30.5.2.7.1 Regulation Up or Regulation Down Bid Information**

In the case of Regulation Up or Regulation Down, the Ancillary Services Bid or submission to self-provide must also contain: (a) the upward and downward range of generating capacity over which the resource is willing to provide Regulation in ten (10) minutes; (b) the Bid price of the capacity reservation, stated separately for Regulation Up and Regulation Down ($/MW); and (c) the Bid price ($) of the Mileage stated separately for Regulation Up and Regulation Down. For submissions to self-provide Regulation Up or Regulation Down, the price for the capacity reservation shall be $0/MWh and the price for Mileage shall be $0. In the case of Regulation Up or Regulation Down from Dynamic System Resources, the Ancillary Services Bid must also contain the Contract Reference Number, if applicable. Scheduling Coordinators may include inter-temporal opportunity costs in their Regulation capacity bids, but these inter-temporal opportunity costs must be verifiable. Ancillary Services Bids submitted to the Day-Ahead or Real-Time Market for Regulation need not be accompanied by an Energy Supply Bid that covers the Ancillary Services capacity being offered. A Regulation Down Bid will be erased unless there is an Energy Supply Bid or Energy Self-Schedule at a level that would permit the resource to provide Regulation Down to its lower Regulation Limit. A submission to self-provide Regulation Down will be erased unless there is an Energy Self-Schedule at a level that would permit the resource to provide Regulation Down to its lower Regulation Limit. A Regulation Up Bid will be erased unless there is an Energy Supply Bid or Energy Self-Schedule at a level that would permit the resource to provide Regulation Up within its Regulation Limit. A submission to self-provide Regulation Up will be erased unless there is an Energy Self-Schedule at a level that would permit the resource to provide Regulation Up within its Regulation Limit.

**30.5.2.7.2 Spinning Reserve Capacity Bid Information**

In the case of Spinning Reserve capacity, the Ancillary Services Bid must also contain: (a) MW of additional capability synchronized to the system, immediately responsive to system frequency, and available within ten (10) minutes; (b) Bid price of capacity reservation, and (c) an indication whether the capacity reserved would be available to supply imbalance energy only in the event of the occurrence of an unplanned Outage, a Contingency or an imminent or actual System Emergency (Contingency Flag). In the case of Spinning Reserve capacity from System Resources, the Ancillary Services Bid must also contain: (a) Schedule ID (NERC ID number); and (b) a Contract Reference Number, if applicable. Ancillary Services Bids and Submissions to Self-Provide an Ancillary Services submitted to the Real-Time Market for Spinning Reserves must also submit an Energy Bid that covers the Ancillary Services capacity being offered into the Real-Time Market.

**30.5.2.7.3 Non-Spinning Reserve Capacity**

In the case of Non-Spinning Reserve, the Ancillary Service Bid must also contain: (a) the MW capability available within ten (10) minutes; (b) the Bid price of the capacity reservation; (c) time of synchronization following notification (minutes); and (d) an indication whether the capacity reserved would be available to supply imbalance energy only in the event of the occurrence of an unplanned Outage, a Contingency or an imminent or actual System Emergency (Contingency Flag). In the case of Non-Spinning Reserve Capacity from System Resources, the Ancillary Services Bid must also contain: (a) Schedule ID (NERC ID number); and (b) a Contract Reference Number, if applicable. In the case of Non-Spinning Reserve Capacity from Participating Load within the CAISO Balancing Authority Area, the Ancillary Service Bid must also contain: (a) a Load identification name and Location Code; (b) Demand reduction available within ten (10) minutes; (c) time to interruption following notification (minutes); and (d) maximum allowable curtailment duration (hour). In the case of Aggregated Participating Load, and Proxy Demand Resources, Scheduling Coordinators must submit Bids using a Generating Unit, Physical Scheduling Plant Resource ID, or Resource ID for the Proxy Demand Resource for the Demand reduction capacity of the Aggregated Participating Load through a Bid to provide Non-Spinning Reserve or a Submission to Self-Provide an Ancillary Service for Non-Spinning Reserve. Ancillary Services Bids and Submissions to Self-Provide an Ancillary Services submitted to the Real-Time Market for Non-Spinning Reserves must also submit an Energy Bid that covers the Ancillary Services capacity being offered into the Real-Time Market.

**30.5.2.7.4 Additional Rules for Self-Provided Ancillary Services**

Scheduling Coordinators electing to self-provide Ancillary Services shall supply the information referred to in this Section 30.5 in relation to each Ancillary Service to be self-provided, excluding the capacity price information, but including the name of the trading Scheduling Coordinator in the case of Inter-Scheduling Coordinator Ancillary Service Trades. The portion of the Energy Bid that corresponds to the high end of the resource’s operating range, shall be allocated to any awarded or Self-Provided Ancillary Services in the following order from higher to lower capacity: (a) Regulation Up; (b) Spinning Reserve; and (c) Non-Spinning Reserve. For resources providing Regulation Up, the upper regulating limit shall be used if it is lower than the highest operating limit. The remaining portion of the Energy Bid (i.e. that portion not associated with capacity committed to provide Ancillary Services) shall constitute a Bid to provide Energy.

**30.5.6 Non-Generator Resource Bids**

Scheduling Coordinators must ensure that Non-Generator Resource Bids or Bids from resources using Non-Generator Resource Generic Modeling functionality contain the Bid components specified in this Section 30.5 based on how the resource is then participating in the CAISO Markets, namely, whether it is providing Supply, Demand, and/or Ancillary Services Bids. Scheduling Coordinators representing Non-Generator Resources using Regulation Energy Management must submit Bids compliant with the requirements of Section 8.4.1.2.

**30.5.6.1 State of Charge Bid Components**

In addition to the Bid components listed in this Section 30.5, Scheduling Coordinators representing Non-Generator Resources may submit Bids including the State of Charge for the Day-Ahead Market to indicate the forecasted starting physical position of the Non-Generator Resource. In the Real-Time Markets, Scheduling Coordinators representing Non-Generator Resources may submit Bids including end-of-hour state-of-charge parameters as MWh ranges or specific MWh values. Where Scheduling Coordinators seek a state-of-charge range, they may submit a minimum and maximum MWh target. Where Scheduling Coordinators seek a specific state-of-charge value, they may submit equal minimum and maximum MWh targets. The CAISO will use reasonable efforts to commit, schedule, and dispatch Non-Generator Resources to meet their end-of-hour state-of-charge targets or ranges. Scheduling Coordinators may not submit MWh targets that (i) exceed their Master File energy or capacity limits; (ii) exceed their State of Charge limits; (iii) include a minimum MWh target greater than the maximum MWh target; (iv) conflict with RA Capacity obligations; or (v) preclude meeting an Ancillary Service Award, Schedule, or Obligation. Where Scheduling Coordinators elect to submit end-of-hour state-of-charge targets, the CAISO RTM optimization processes will give them precedence over other Bid components, including without limitation, the Energy Bid Curve and Ancillary Services Bid. Where Scheduling Coordinators elect to submit end-of-hour state-of-charge parameters, the Non-Generator Resources will be ineligible for Bid Cost Recovery pursuant to Section 11.6.6. Scheduling Coordinators representing Non-Generator Resources using Regulation Energy Management may not include end-of-hour state-of-charge parameters.

**30.5.6.2 Hybrid Resource Bids**

In addition to the Bid components listed in this Section 30.5, Scheduling Coordinators representing Hybrid Resources will submit Hybrid Dynamic Limits representing Hybrid Resources’ upper economic limit and lower economic limit in each Real-Time Market five-minute Trading Interval for a rolling six-hour look-ahead period. These limits will reflect the range of the Hybrid Resource’s Economic Bids or Self-Schedules. Hybrid Dynamic Limits should reflect resource availability based on operating capabilities such as State of Charge and forecasted output from the variable component of a Hybrid Resource. Scheduling Coordinators may also use Hybrid Dynamic Limits to manage onsite charging of an energy storage component of a Hybrid Resource.

The CAISO will use reasonable efforts to issue Real-Time Market Schedules that respect Hybrid Dynamic Limits. Scheduling Coordinators may not submit Hybrid Dynamic Limits in the Day-Ahead Market.

**31.5.1 RUC Participation[[1]](#footnote-1)**

**31.5.1.1 Capacity Eligible for RUC Participation**

RUC participation is voluntary for capacity that has not been designated as Resource Adequacy Capacity. Scheduling Coordinators may make such capacity available for participation in RUC by submitting a RUC Availability Bid, provided the Scheduling Coordinator has also submitted an Energy Bid (other than a Virtual Bid) for such capacity into the IFM. Virtual Bids are not eligible to participate in RUC. Non-Generator Resources are not eligible to participate in RUC. Capacity from Non-Dynamic System Resources that has not been designated Resource Adequacy Capacity is not eligible to participate in RUC. Capacity from resources including System Resources that has been designated as qualified Resource Adequacy Capacity must participate in RUC. RUC participation is required for Resource Adequacy Capacity to the extent that Resource Adequacy Capacity is not committed following the IFM. System Resources eligible to participate in RUC will be considered on an hourly basis; that is, RUC will not observe any multi-hour block constraints. In RUC the CAISO may commit a Multi-Stage Generating Resource with a Resource Adequacy must-offer obligation at any MSG Configuration with capacity equal to or greater than the MSG Configuration committed in the Integrated Forward Market. RUC will observe the Energy Limits that may have been submitted in conjunction with Energy Bids to the IFM. Legacy RMR Unit capacity will be considered in RUC in accordance with Section 31.5.1.3. MSS resources may participate in RUC in accordance with Section 31.5.2.3. COG resources are accounted for in RUC, but may not submit or be paid RUC Availability Payments. The ELS Resources committed through the ELC Process conducted two days before the day the RUC process is conducted for the next Trading Day as described in Section 31.7 are binding.

**31.5.3 RUC Procurement Target**

The procurement target for RUC in any given Trading Hour will be determined based on the next day’s hourly CAISO Forecast of CAISO Demand less the Energy scheduled in the Day-Ahead Schedule, and accounting for other factors, as appropriate, such as Demand Forecast error and estimated incremental RTM Bids including those from Participating Intermittent Resources. The procurement target for RUC procurement in any given Trading Hour will reflect both discharging and charging schedules for Non-Generator Resources that clear the Integrated Forward Market. The adjustments listed in Sections 31.5.3.1 to 31.5.3.1.6 will be made to the CAISO Forecast of CAISO Demand to account for the conditions as provided therein. Adjustments may be made on a RUC Zone basis to ensure that RUC results in adequate local capacity procurement. The RUC procurement target setting procedure is designed to meet the requirements of reliable grid operation without unnecessary over-procurement of RUC Capacity or over-commitment of resources. Additional detail on the process for setting the RUC procurement target is specified in the Business Practice Manuals.

**34.11 Exceptional Dispatch**

The CAISO may issue Exceptional Dispatches for the circumstances described in this Section 34.11, which may require the issuance of forced Shut-Downs, forced Start-Ups, or forced MSG Transitions and shall be consistent with Good Utility Practice. Dispatch Instructions issued pursuant to Exceptional Dispatches shall be entered manually by the CAISO Operator into the Day-Ahead or RTM optimization software so that they will be accounted for and included in the communication of Day-Ahead Schedules and Dispatch Instructions to Scheduling Coordinators. Exceptional Dispatches are not used to establish the LMP at the applicable PNode. The CAISO will record the circumstances that have led to the Exceptional Dispatch. When considering the issuance of an Exceptional Dispatch to RA Capacity, the CAISO shall consider the effectiveness of the resource from which the capacity is being provided, along with Start-Up Bids, Transition Bids, and Minimum Load Bids, as adjusted pursuant to Section 30.7.10.2, if applicable, when issuing Exceptional Dispatches to commit a resource to operate at Minimum Load. When the CAISO issues Exceptional Dispatches for Energy to RA Capacity, the CAISO shall also consider Energy Bids, if available and as appropriate. Additionally, where the Exceptional Dispatch results in a CPM designation, the CAISO shall make CPM designations of Eligible Capacity for an Exceptional Dispatch by applying the criteria and procedures specified in Section 43A.4.

**34.11.1 System Reliability Exceptional Dispatches**

The CAISO may issue a manual Exceptional Dispatch for all types of Generating Units, System Units, Participating Loads, Proxy Demand Resources, Reliability Demand Response Resources, Dynamic System Resources, RMR Resources, and Condition 2 Legacy RMR Units pursuant to Section 41.9 in Appendix H, in addition to or instead of resources with a Day-Ahead Schedule dispatched by RTM optimization software during a System Emergency, or to prevent an imminent System Emergency or a situation that threatens System Reliability and cannot be addressed by the RTM optimization and system modeling. To the extent possible, the CAISO shall utilize available and effective Bids from resources before dispatching resources without Bids. To deal with any threats to System Reliability, the CAISO may also issue a manual Exceptional Dispatch in the Real-Time for Non-Dynamic System Resources that have not been or would not be selected by the RTM for Dispatch, but for which the relevant Scheduling Coordinator has received a HASP Block Intertie Schedule.

**34.13.3 Co-located Resources and Dispatch Instructions**

Co-located Resources that are Non-Generator Resources may deviate from Dispatch Instructions only pursuant to this Section. A Co-located Resource that is a Non-Generator Resource may deviate from a Dispatch Instruction where a co-located Eligible Intermittent Resource at the same Generating Facility is producing above its Dispatch Operating Target due to meteorological conditions such that the Co-located Resources’ combined output would exceed the Interconnection Service Capacity of the Co-located Resources, or otherwise threaten reliability or safety. Such deviations may only occur through proper control technologies that ensure the combined output of all Co-located Resources does not exceed the Generating Facility’s Interconnection Service Capacity.

Co-located Resources that are Non-Generator Resources may deviate from Dispatch Instructions to observe their registered Charging Constraints pursuant to Section 27.14.

All deviations from Dispatch Instruction will be subject to Uninstructed Imbalance Energy. A Co-located Resource that is a Non-Generator Resource may not deviate from a Dispatch Instruction pursuant to this section if it is providing Ancillary Services in the same Dispatch Interval.

**39.7.1.8 Storage Resource Option**

For storage resources participating as Non-Generator Resources, the storage resource option will calculate the Default Energy Bid by selecting the maximum of (1) the sum of the expected energy cost and the variable storage operation cost and, (2) the storage opportunity cost. The calculation is completed by adding ten percent (10%) to the value. To calculate the Default Energy Bid, the CAISO will use the PMin, PMax, Run Times, and other charging and discharging parameters registered in the Master File.

The expected energy cost represents the average cost to procure the amount of energy needed to charge the resource during the lowest-priced continuous block of time such that the resource can discharge completely, accounting for the resource’s charging duration and round-trip efficiency, and excluding losses. To calculate this component in the Day-Ahead Market, the CAISO will use the average price of Energy during the lowest priced hours based upon the final Energy Supply Bids from the MPM process at the relevant PNode, not to be below $0/MWh. To calculate this component in the Real-Time Market, the CAISO will use the average price of Energy during the lowest priced hours based upon the LMP from the IFM at the relevant PNode on the Trading Day, not to be below $0/MWh.

The variable storage operation cost represents the variable costs of operating a storage resource beyond its designed daily cycling range, submitted by the Scheduling Coordinator in $/MWh. The CAISO will validate the storage operation cost based on manufacturer warranty, available data, and supporting documentation submitted by the Scheduling Coordinator. The storage opportunity cost represents the opportunity cost of being dispatched during lower-priced intervals, equal to the cost of Energy the resource could discharge during the highest-priced continuous block, accounting for the resource’s discharge duration. To calculate this component in the Day-Ahead Market, the CAISO will use the lowest price of Energy during the highest priced period over which the resource could have discharged, based upon advisory prices from the Market Power Mitigation process at the relevant PNode. To calculate this component in the Real-Time Market, the CAISO will use the lowest price of Energy during the highest priced period over which the resource could have discharged, based upon the LMP from the IFM at the relevant PNode on the Trading Day.

**40.6.1.1 Day-Ahead Availability - Specific RA Resource Types[[2]](#footnote-2)**

(a) **Distributed Generation Facilities.** Distributed Generation Facilities shall comply with the IFM and RUC bidding requirements that apply to the same technology type of a resource connected to the CAISO Controlled Grid.

(b) **Non-Generator Resources**

(1) Non-Generator Resources that do not use Regulation Energy Management shall submit Economic Bids or Self-Schedules into the IFM for all RA Capacity for all hours of the month the resource is physically capable of operating; and

(2) Non-Generator Resources using Regulation Energy Management shall submit Economic Bids or Self-Schedules into the IFM for all RA Capacity for Regulation for all hours of the month the resource is physically capable of operating.

(c) **Extremely Long-Start Resources.** Extremely Long-Start Resources that are Resource Adequacy Resources must make themselves available to the CAISO by complying with:

(1) the Extremely Long-Start Commitment Process under Section 31.7 or otherwise committing the ELS Resource upon instruction from the CAISO, if physically capable; and

(2) the applicable provisions of Section 40.6.1 regarding Day-Ahead availability for the Trading Days for which it was committed.

1. The CAISO also may include tariff clarifications regarding Non-Generator Resource participation in RUC. These changes do not reflect any policy change, and are only intended to clarify existing policy for better transparency. These clarifications may be included in one of the Energy Storage Enhancements filings for administrative efficiency.

   For storage resources, RUC does not currently consider RA capacity above IFM schedules. RUC only considers the capacity up to storage resources’ energy awards (charging and discharging) from the IFM. Resource adequacy capacity from these resources is still available in real-time and subject to real-time must offer obligations. *See* Section 7.1 of the CAISO’s Business Practice Manual for Market Instruments. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. See footnote 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)