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    • Participating intermittent resource program initiative
      The PIRP Initiative focuses upon understanding the cost drivers for wind generation resources and if improving the forecast accuracy can significantly reduce cost impacts. It also includes development of a tariff filing to address the appropriate charges associated with the export of energy from Participating Intermittent Resources Program resources.
    • Pay for performance regulation
      FERC Order No. 755 required that the ISO modify the compensation mechanism for regulation to include a performance payment with an accuracy adjustment in addition to the existing capacity payment. The ISO has FERC approval of the proposed tariff modifications, and is conducting a one year evaluation of the methodology for calculating mileage accuracy and assessing whether the minimum performance standard and any additional items should be revised.
    • Payment acceleration project
      The California ISO (the ISO) recognizes that the current payment calendar takes too long between trade date and market clearing and presents undue credit risk to market participation. This increased risk may hinder resource availability from out-of-state resources, challenge credit management and expose market participants to additional risk in the event of defaults or bankruptcies. The ISO plans to implement payment acceleration approximately 6 months after the Settlements and Market Clearing System go live. Payment acceleration would provide market clearing on an average of 30 days. Payment acceleration also opens the possibility of other significant settlement improvements, such as providing participants an increased dispute window, and implementing a sunset provision.
    • Payment default allocation
      This initiative is to review with stakeholders whether current tariff provisions regarding payment default allocations should remain in effect, be modified or replaced. This is the ISO methodology for calculating market participant's percentage share of a payment default. The ISO is undertaking this initiative as agreed to by FERC settlement agreement Docket No. EL09-62 signed in 2011.
    • Peak reliability coordinator funding
      In 2014, the Western Electricity Coordinating Council transferred its reliability function to a new independent entity called Peak Reliability. As a result of the change, the ISO will now receive a reliability coordinator services bill from Peak Reliability. This initiative will address changes to the ISO settlement and payment processes necessary to pass the reliability coordinator charges to market participants. The new funding approach will begin with the 2016 budget, with annual invoices to the funding parties issued in November 2015 for payment in early January 2016.
    • Penalty allocation procedure tariff amendment
      The ISO is proposing draft tariff language on the process it intends to follow when seeking authority from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to allocate the cost of any monetary penalties that regulatory bodies impose. The proposed procedure follows FERC’s guidance in its Order Providing Guidance on Recovery of Reliability Penalty Costs by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators.
    • Pool of bids in the integrated forward market
      This initiative modified a current market rule which limits the pool of bids considered in the Integrated Forward Market (IFM) to resources that are dispatched in the Local Market Power Mitigation procedures run prior to the IFM (ISO Tariff Section 31.2). The ISO is considering three options on this market rule: 1) maintain the rule but continue to monitor market impacts under different market conditions; 2) modify tariff/BPM to give ISO operators the option of relaxing the rule if it is significantly impacting IFM results; or 3) modify tariff to require consideration of all bids in IFM.
    • Post emergency bid cost recovery filing review
      The ISO made two emergency filings with FERC in the first half of 2011 to mitigate observed adverse market behavior. Several strategies were being employed that aimed to expand uplift payments. The ISO committed to conducting a process for stakeholders to comment and raise any further changes or refinements to proposed tariff amendments. The ISO has opened this initiative as a forum for stakeholders to discuss market behavior that expands bid cost recovery uplift payments and develop rule changes if necessary needed to address such behavior.
    • Post five-day process price corrections
      Since the start of the new California ISO market design on April 1, 2009, there have been isolated instances in which market prices were corrected outside of the five-day Price Correction Time Horizon. The ISO has not previously published the criteria used to evaluate whether a price correction is warranted after the expiration of the Price Correction Time Horizon. Through this initiative, the ISO will work with stakeholders to determine the circumstances under which post five-day price corrections may be made.
    • Price corrections for invalid congestion
      In January 2013, a software defect in the real-time market application did not accurately reflect certain intervals of prices for congestion observed in the Birds Landing area. The ISO will analyze the market impact to determine if good cause exists to seek regulatory relief from FERC to waive Section 35.3 of the ISO Tariff, extending implementation of price corrections beyond the standard five-day window.
    • Price inconsistency caused by intertie constraints
      Upon the start of convergence bidding, the ISO began enforcing two separate constraints at each intertie scheduling point within the integrated forward market, pursuant to ISO tariff section 31.8. The constraints prevent virtual bids from causing net interchange schedule violations of intertie scheduling limits. Enforcing the separate constraints has resulted in a difference between export pricing and the resources’ bid price. As a result, export schedules are sometimes subject to prices above submitted bid prices. Through this stakeholder initiative, the ISO will evaluate the existing market rule and consider any changes to address adverse outcomes resulting from the current design.
    • Price inconsistency market enhancements
      The ISO is seeking long-term solutions to address price inconsistencies occasionally produced in the ISO market when market solutions result in prices that do not cover the awarded bid prices. These inconsistencies can expose market participants to uneconomical awards and uncertain risks. Through this initiative we seek to: 1) develop enhancements that would reduce or eliminate root causes of price inconsistencies or 2) implement settlement mechanisms to make resources whole to their bid prices.
    • Pricing enhancements
      This initiative includes the scope of the administrative pricing rules initiative plus additional pricing enhancements for improving ISO market efficiency. Through this stakeholder process we will examine tariff provisions regarding market intervention during significant system emergencies and settlement of force majeure events. We also seek enhancements to address multiplicity of prices, compounded congestion due to multiple concurrently binding contingencies and schedule priorities for existing transmission rights.
    • Proposal to eliminate operational review tariff provision
      This stakeholder process seeks stakeholder input on elimination of section 22.1.2.2 of the ISO tariff, which requires that the ISO conduct an annual operational review. Given the maturity of the ISO compliance and audit functions and the NERC and WECC compliance structure the ISO has concluded that this annual review has been supplanted and is no longer needed.