Mitigation of Exceptional Dispatches for Local Reliability



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Background

- MRTU tariff provides CAISO with broad authority to issue Exceptional Dispatches to maintain reliability.
- Potential reasons for Exceptional Dispatches include:
 - System Energy
 - Reliability requirements not incorporated or fully met by MRTU network model
 - Other unit operating or environmental constraints not incorporated in MRTU model
- Two types of Exceptional Dispatches:
 - Unit commitment (at minimum operating level)
 - Energy (above minimum operating level)



Background (Continued)

- Under current MRTU tariff, Exceptional Dispatches for energy are paid the <u>higher</u> of the unit's:
 - Market Energy Bid Price, or
 - Locational Marginal Price (LMP)
- If Exceptional Dispatches are needed for local or unit level reliability requirements, units may exercise market power by submitting extremely high bid prices (e.g. at or near \$500 bid cap).
- Thus, even if Exceptional Dispatches are relatively limited, cost impacts could be significant.



Proposed Tariff Changes

- Payment for some Exceptional Dispatches for energy would be limited to the higher of the unit's:
 - Default Energy Bid (DEB), or
 - LMP
- Mitigation would only apply to Exceptional Dispatches for:
 - Reliability requirements associated with <u>non-competitive</u> transmission constraints
 - Other special unit operating or environmental constraints not incorporated in MRTU model
- Mitigation would <u>not</u> apply to Exceptional Dispatches for:
 - System-wide energy needs
 - Congestion on competitive transmission constraints



MRTU Implementation Impacts

- Proposed mitigation can be implemented without change in scope or functionality of MRTU software using manual approach if necessary.
- Reasons for Exceptional Dispatches must be will be logged by operators.
 - FERC has already required CAISO to post detailed information on Exceptional Dispatches on OASIS.
- Payment adjustments may be applied through a manual settlement workaround.
 - Mitigation does not effect any market prices.
 - Settlement adjustments could be made after normal settlement cycle.



Stakeholder Comments

- CAISO proposal strongly supported by LSEs and CPUC
- Generation owner concerns/comments:
 - CAISO should minimize use of Exceptional Dispatches.
 - CAISO should wait to see if market power is problem before proposing mitigation for Exceptional Dispatches.
 - Local reliability requirements should be met by RMR/RA units.
 - Compensation is inadequate

