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4.8.1	**4.8.1 Bidding and Settlement** The CAISO shall not accept Bids for an Eligible Intermittent Resource other than through a Scheduling Coordinator. Any Eligible Intermittent Resource that is not a Participating Intermittent Resource, or any Participating Intermittent Resource for which Bids are submitted shall be bid and settled as a Generating Unit for the associated Settlement Periods (except that the Forecast Fee shall apply in such Settlement Periods). ~~Scheduling Coordinators shall not submit Economic Bids for Participating Intermittent Resources that are subject to PIRP Protective Measures.~~	This amendment removes the expired tariff language pertaining to PIRP Protective Measures.
4.8.2.1.1	**4.8.2.1.1 Use of Own Forecast** For purposes of participating in the CAISO Markets, Eligible Intermittent Resource may opt to use their own forecast of their resource's output, and not use the forecast of their output provided by the CAISO, only to the extent the CAISO has certified that the Eligible Intermittent Resource has completed the certification requirements specified in the Business Practice Manuals. If the Eligible Intermittent Resources is certified to provide their own forecast, they must provide at a minimum a three-hour rolling forecast with fifteen- (15) minute granularity, updated every fifteen minutes, and may provide in the alternative a three-hour rolling forecast at five- (5) minute granularity, updated every five minutes. If an Eligible Intermittent Resource opts to provide the forecast of their output at a five-minute granularity, the CAISO will use the average of the projected Energy output for the relevant three five (5)-minute forecasts to determine the Variable Energy Resource Self-Schedule for the Fifteen Minute Market as specified in Section 34. An Eligible Intermittent Resource that has elected to use its own forecast of its output must also submit the meteorological and outage data specified in Appendix Q. For purposes of participating in the CAISO Markets, Participating Intermittent	This amendment removes the expired tariff language pertaining to PIRP Protective Measures.

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	Resources may opt to use their own output forecast if they are certified to do so by the CAISO pursuant to the rules specified in the Business Practice Manuals, in which case: (1) the resource will retain its status as a Participating Intermittent Resource; (2) the CAISO will not submit the updated output forecast for that resource through the Real-Time Market; and (3) the resource will be subject to the same requirements that apply to Eligible Intermittent Resource that use their own output forecast as specified in the CAISO Tariff. ~~Participating Intermittent Resources that are subject to PIRP Protective Measures are not eligible to opt to use a forecast of their output for purposes of participating in the CAISO Markets other than the forecast of their output provided by the CAISO.~~	
4.8.3 (in its entirety)	**4.8.3 [Not USED]~~PIRP Protective Measures~~** **~~4.8.3.1 Request for PIRP Protective Measures~~** **~~4.8.3.1.1 Timing~~** ~~Participating Intermittent Resources or Qualifying Facilities that wish to qualify for PIRP Protective Measures pursuant to Section 4.8.3.2 within the three-year transition period must complete their election for PIRP Protective Measures no later than thirty (30) days after the effective date of this Section 4.8.3.~~ **~~4.8.3.1.2 Materials Submitted with Request~~** ~~For a resource to qualify for PIRP Protective Measures, within thirty (30) days from the effective date of this Section, responsible parties must submit affidavits as described in either Section 4.8.3.1.2.1 or Section 4.8.3.1.2.2. The CAISO reserves the right to audit the representations made in the affidavits by giving written notice at least ten (10) Business Days in advance of the date that the CAISO wishes to initiate such audit, with completion of the audit occurring within 60 days of such notice. The audit shall be for the limited purposes of verifying that the Participating Intermittent~~	This amendment removes the expired tariff language pertaining to PIRP Protective Measures.

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	~~Resource and counterparty to the relevant contract has represented the terms specified in the affidavit accurately. Upon request of the CAISO as part of such audit, the Participating Intermittent Resource or counterparty providing the affidavits specified below shall provide information to support its certification under Sections 4.8.3.1.2.1 or Section 4.8.3.1.2.2, as appropriate. Each party will be responsible for its own expenses related to any audit.~~ **~~4.8.3.1.2.1 Physical Limitations~~** ~~A Participating Intermittent Resource or Qualifying Facility requesting PIRP Protective Measures because of physical limitations, as specified in Section 4.8.3.2.2.1, must submit a sworn affidavit by a representative of the Participating Intermittent Resource or Qualifying Facility, who is authorized to bind the resource legally and financially . The affidavit must state that the resource meets the criteria specified in Section 4.8.3.2.1 and 4.8.3.2.2.1. The sworn affidavit must also state that the relevant party agrees that during the term of the three-year transition period, the party will engage in a good faith effort to upgrade the facility in order to address the limitations specified in Section 4.8.3.2.2.1.~~ **~~4.8.3.1.2.2 Contractual Limitations~~** ~~A Participating Intermittent Resource or Qualifying Facility requesting PIRP Protective Measures because of contractual limitations as specified in Section 4.8.3.2.2.2, must submit a sworn affidavit by a representative of the Participating Intermittent Resource or Qualifying Facility, who that is authorized to bind the resource legally and financially. The affidavit must state that the resource is subject to a contract that meets the criteria specified in Sections 4.8.3.2.1 and 4.8.3.2.2.2. The Participating Intermittent Resource or Qualifying Facility must serve their affidavit electronically to the counterparty to the applicable contract on the same day the affidavit is submitted to the CAISO. A representative of~~	

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	~~the counterparty to the applicable existing bilateral agreement that is authorized to legally and financially bind the counterparty may also submit a sworn affidavit stating that the resource is subject to a contract that meets the criteria specified in Sections 4.8.3.2.1 and 4.8.3.2.2.2. The counterparty must serve the affidavit electronically on the Participating Intermittent Resource or Qualifying Facility on the same day the affidavit is submitted to the CAISO. Each party's respective affidavit must state that during the term of the three-year transition period, the party will engage in a good faith effort with the counterparty to address the existing contractual limitation specified in Section 4.8.3.2.2.2. In the event that the counterparty submits no affidavits within the thirty days, the CAISO deems the counterparty to have acquiesced to the request by the representative of the Participating Intermittent Resource, except if the Participating Intermittent Resource fails to serve the counterparty with the required documents within the prescribed time. If the counterparty later successfully demonstrates through a formal complaint filed at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission that the Participating Intermittent Resource failed to serve the counterparty with the relevant materials as described in this Section, the CAISO will deny, and if appropriate reverse, any PIRP Protective Measures afforded to the requesting party. To the extent that the counterparty instead submits an affidavit by a representative of the company that is fully authorized to legally and financially bind the company stating that the resource's contract does not meet the criteria in Sections 4.8.3.2.1 and 4.8.3.2.2.2, the affidavit must also state that the Participating Intermittent Resource shall not suffer any economic or other repercussions under the contract and because of the terms of the contract were the resource to participate fully in the CAISO Market, including through the submission of~~	

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	~~Economic Bid for economic curtailment. The representative of the Participating Intermittent Resource may choose to withdraw its request in light of the counterparty's affidavit or pursue resolution of a contractual dispute through a dispute resolution process specified in the relevant contract, or if none is available, through the process specified in Section 13 of the CAISO Tariff, or through any dispute resolution process available through the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. During the term that the contract is in dispute, the resource will be subject to PIRP Protective Measures provided it meets all the other criteria specified in this Section 4.8.3. Upon resolution of the dispute, if the dispute resolution process yields a conclusion that the contract is not eligible for PIRP Protective Measures, the resource will resume its status as a Participating Intermittent Resource not subject to PIRP Protective Measures. The CAISO will unwind the Protective Measures provided to the affected Scheduling Coordinator and will process such resettlement charges or payments through the existing resettlement procedures specified in Section 11.29.7. The CAISO will take all reasonable and necessary steps to include the resettlement on the next Recalculation Statement. In unwinding the Protective Measures received, any Scheduling Coordinator that received a payment for the PIRP Protective Measures under the contract in dispute will receive a charge in the amount of the payment previously received plus any interest that may apply under Section 11.29.10.2. Similarly, any Scheduling Coordinator that received a charge due to the provision of the PIRP Protective Measures under the contract in dispute will receive a payment in the amount of the payment previously received plus any interest that may apply under Section 11.29.10.2.~~ **~~4.8.3.2 Criteria~~** ~~Participating Intermittent Resources or Qualifying Facilities~~	

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	~~that are registered as such on the day that this Section 4.8.3 becomes effective may qualify for PIRP Protective Measures if they meet the criteria specified below. Fulfilling such criteria is a requirement in addition to providing the affidavits described in Section 4.8.3.1.2. Qualifying Facilities whose capacity exceeds twenty (20) MW on the day this tariff section becomes effective may qualify if they meet the criteria specified below. Such Qualifying Facilities that elect and qualify for PIRP Protective Measures must also be qualified as a Participating Intermittent Resource for the term over which they are to receive the PIRP Protective Measures.~~ ~~**4.8.3.2.1 Exposure to Real-Time Imbalance Energy**~~ ~~The Participating Intermittent Resource, or Qualifying Facility upon expiration of its Qualifying Facility contract with a Utility Distribution Company, either: (1) is subject to an existing bilateral agreement for power purchases from the affected resource, such as a power purchase agreement, that is in effect the day this Section becomes effective, and such agreement in its totality requires that the resource owner directly or indirectly is subject to Real-Time Imbalance Energy Settlement in the CAISO Market; or (2) is not subject to any bilateral agreement for power purchases from the affected resource on the day this section becomes effective and, therefore, the resource is itself subject to Real-Time Imbalance Energy Settlement in the CAISO Market.~~ ~~**4.8.3.2.2 Ability to Curtail**~~ ~~The affected resource must also meet one of the two criteria below:~~ ~~**4.8.3.2.2.1 Physical Limitation**~~ ~~More than fifty (50) percent of the Participating Intermittent Resource or Qualifying Facility is composed of technology that is unable to curtail output and cannot be made to do so without significant investment. Participating Intermittent Resources that only lack Dispatch, control, and telemetry or~~	

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	~~metering that require upgrades to be able to respond will not qualify. Participating Intermittent Resources that require production facility investments, such as turbine replacements, will qualify.~~ ~~**4.8.3.2.2.2 Contractual Limitation**~~ ~~The resource is subject to an existing bilateral agreement for power purchases, such as a power purchase agreement, that is in effect on the date on which this Section become effective, and that prohibits the resource from curtailing its output (not including times when they are ordered to do so by the CAISO or an affected Utility Distribution Company for reliability reasons).~~ ~~**4.8.3.3 Term of PIRP Protective Measures**~~ ~~The PIRP Protective Measures for a specific Participating Intermittent Resource shall be in effect until the earlier date of (1) three years after the effective date of this Section, or (2) the execution between the Participating Intermittent Resource owner and its counterparty of a new or amended power purchase agreement (or similar contract for services) that addresses their Imbalance Energy settlement.~~ ~~**4.8.3.4 Posting**~~ ~~The CAISO will post on its Website the names of the Participating Intermittent Resources that have elected, and subsequently been qualified, to receive PIRP Protective Measures.~~	
4.13.4.2(a)	**4.13.4.2 Metering Generator Output Methodology** For behind-the-meter generation registered in Proxy Demand Resources or Reliability Demand Response Resources and settling Energy Transactions pursuant to Section 11.6.2, the Generator Output Baseline will be calculated as follows: (a) Meter Data will be collected for the behind-the-meter generation for the same hour as the Trading Hour on calendar days preceding the Trading Day on which the Demand Response Event occurred for which the Generator	The ISO is correcting the Metering Generator Output methodology to be consistent with approved policy. MGO baselines will be set at zero where there is insufficient data to form a baseline.

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	Output Baseline is calculated. Meter Data will consist of Energy output of the behind-the-meter generation up to, but not including, output that represent an export of energy from that location. To determine the hours for which the Meter Data will be collected, the calculation will work sequentially backwards from the Trading Day under examination up to a maximum of forty-five (45) calendar days prior to the Trading Day, including only Business Days if the Trading Day is a Business Day, including only non-Business Days if the Trading Day is a non-Business Day, and excluding hours in which the Proxy Demand Resource was subject to an Outage or previously provided Demand Response Services (other than capacity awarded for AS or RUC) pursuant to a Bid at or above the net benefits test set forth in Section 30.6.3, or the Reliability Demand Response Resource was subject to an Outage as described in the Business Practice Manual or previously provided Demand Response Services pursuant to a Bid at or above the net benefits test set forth in Section 30.6.3, except as discussed below. The calculation will have complete Meter Data for this purpose if and when it is able to collect Meter Data for its target number of hours the same as the Trading Hour, which target number is ten (10) hours if the Trading Day is a Business Day or four (4) hours if the Trading Day is a non-Business Day. If it is not possible to collect Meter Data for the target number of hours, the Meter Data will include a minimum of five (5) hours if the Trading Day is a Business Day or a minimum of four (4) hours if the Trading Day is a non-Business Day. If it is not possible to collect Meter Data for the minimum number of hours described above, the Generator Output Baseline will be set at zero ~~the calculation will instead include Meter Data for the hours on which the Proxy Demand Resource was subject to an Outage or previously provided Demand Response Services (other than capacity awarded for AS or RUC) pursuant to a Bid at or~~	

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	~~above the net benefits test set forth in Section 30.6.3, or the Reliability Demand Response Resource was subject to an Outage as described in the Business Practice Manual or previously provided Demand Response Services, and for which the amount of totalized load was highest during the hours when the Demand Response Services were provided in the forty-five (45) calendar days prior to the Trading Day~~.	
8.4.1.2 (1st paragraph)	**8.4.1.2 Regulation Energy Management** The CAISO will make Regulation Energy Management available to Scheduling Coordinators for Non-Generator Resources located within the CAISO Balancing Authority Area that require Energy from the Real-Time Market to offer their full capacity as Regulation. A Scheduling Coordinator for a resource using Regulation Energy Management may submit a Regulation Bid for capacity (MW) of up to four (4) times the maximum Energy (MWh) the resource can generate or curtail for fifteen (15) minutes after issuance of a Dispatch Instruction. In the Real-Time Market, a Scheduling Coordinator for a resource using Regulation Energy Management will produce~~cure~~ ~~I~~imbalance ~~E~~energy as needed to satisfy the sixty (60) minute continuous Energy requirement for Regulation Awards in the Day-Ahead Market.	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and was replaced with more exacting defined terms. The ISO is proposing to align the tariff with that change.
8.4.1.2 (4th paragraph)	**8.4.1.2 Regulation Energy Management** * * * * The CAISO will settle Dispatches from resources using Regulation Energy Management as ~~Instructed Imbalance E~~energy. The portion of Demand of Non-Generator Resources using Regulation Energy Management that is dispatched as Regulation in any Settlement Interval shall not be considered Measured Demand for purposes of allocating payments and charges pursuant to Section 11 during that Settlement Interval.	"Instructed Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and was replaced with more exacting defined terms. The ISO is proposing to align the tariff with that change.
8.6.2 (1st and 4th paragraphs)	**8.6.2 Right to Self-Provide** Each Scheduling Coordinator may choose to self-provide all,	This amendment provides correction to a typographical error in the first paragraph and deletes

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	or a portion, of its Regulation Up, Regulation Down, Spinning Reserve, and Non-Spinning Reserve obligations in the IFM, and, to the extent needed to satisfy the CAISO's additional requirement, the Real-Time Market, from resources eligible for self-provision, as may be permissible for any given Ancillary Service in these respective markets. The right to self-provide Ancillary Services from capacity that is under a contractual obligation to provide Energy, including but not limited to capacity subject to an RMR Contract and local Resource Adequacy Resources, shall be conditional; self-provision of Ancillary Services from such capacity will only be permitted to the extent that capacity is not needed for Energy as a result of the MPM process described in this CAISO Tariff. To self-provide Ancillary Services a Scheduling Coordinator must provide the CAISO with a Submission to Self-Provide an Ancillary Service. Both Ancillary Service Bids and Submissions to Self-Provide an Ancillary Service can be provided to the CAISO for the same Ancillary Service and for the same hour in the same market. To the extent the Submission to Self-Provide an Ancillary Service is from a resource that is a Partial Resource Adequacy Resource, and Energy is needed, including for purposes under Section 31.3.1.3, from that resource the CAISO shall only disqualify the self-provision of Ancillary Services from the portion of the resource's capacity that has must-offer obligation, provided that the Scheduling Coordinator has not submitted an Energy Bid for the capacity that is not subject to a must-offer obligation. The CAISO will treat resources subject to Resource Adequacy requirements consistently, ~~with~~ and such resources must comply with the bidding requirements in Section 40.6. If there is an Energy Bid submitted for the capacity of a Partial Resource Adequacy Resource that is not subject to a must-offer obligation the CAISO may disqualify the Submission to Self-Provide an Ancillary Service for the	outdated tariff language that is no longer consistent with the settlement rules approved by the Contingency Reserve Cost Allocation tariff amendment. In July of 2014, the ISO filed a tariff amendment that proposed to remove the opportunity for scheduling coordinators to receive a payment of excess self-provision of contingency reserves. The ISO explained that under the proposal a scheduling coordinator's obligation can only go below zero or result in a credit for purposes of inter-scheduling coordinator trades or is associated with energy from imports.

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	portion of the resources capacity that is not under a must-offer obligation consistent with the principles of co-optimization under the CAISO Tariff. * * * * The CAISO shall schedule Self-Provided Ancillary Services to the extent qualified in the IFM and the RTM and Dispatch Self-Provided Ancillary Services in the Real-Time. To the extent that a Scheduling Coordinator self-provides Regulation Up, Regulation Down, Spinning Reserve, and Non-Spinning Reserve, the CAISO shall correspondingly reduce the quantity of the Ancillary Services it procures from Bids submitted in the IFM and the Real-Time Market. ~~To the extent a Scheduling Coordinator's Self-Provided Ancillary Service for a particular Ancillary Service is greater than the Scheduling Coordinator's obligation for that particular Ancillary Service in a Settlement Interval, the Scheduling Coordinator will receive the user rate for the Self-Provided Ancillary Service for the amount of the Self-Provided Ancillary Service in excess of the Scheduling Coordinator's obligation.~~	
11.1.4(e)	**11.1.4 CAISO Estimate for Initial Settlement Statement T+3B** * * * * (e) CAISO Estimated Settlement Interchange Schedule Data for Intertie Schedule resources will be based on total Expected Energy and dispatch of the resources as calculated in the Real-Time Market and as modified by any applicable corrections to the Dispatch Operating Point for the resource.	The ISO is proposing to add language that involves estimating Intertie Schedules for the settlement of T+3B in the same manner as it does for Generation and Load Meters.
11.1.4(f) (former (e))	**11.1.4 CAISO Estimate for Initial Settlement Statement T+3B** * * * * (f) The CAISO will not estimate Unaccounted For Energy under Section 11.5.3, the rescission of payments for Regulation Up and Regulation Down Capacity under Section 8.10.8.6, Real-Time Imbalance Energy Offset adjustment	The ISO is proposing to add additional data to more accurately calculate the T+3B Settlement Statement. This change came in with the changes the ISO made with credit reform and the ISO needed to include a credit run. The ISO also proposes to add the word "the" before "CAISO."

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	under Section 11.5.4.1(c), allocation of RTM Bid Cost Up-lift adjustment under Section 11.8.6.3.2(vi), or MSS deviation payments under 11.7.1 for purposes of calculating Initial Settlement Statement T+3B.	
11.2.3.1.2	**11.2.3 IFM Energy Charges and Payments for Metered Subsystems** * * * * **11.2.3.1.2 IFM Payments for MSS Supply under Gross Energy Settlement** The CAISO shall pay Scheduling Coordinators that submit Bids for MSS Operators that have selected or are subject to gross Energy Settlement an amount equal to the product of the MWh quantity of Supply from the MSS in its Day-Ahead Schedule at the corresponding PNode and the applicable ~~Resource-Specific Settlement Interval~~ IFM LMP ~~at that PNode~~.	"Resources Specific Settlement Interval LMP" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment. The ISO is proposing to align the tariff with those changes.
11.4	**11.4 Black Start Settlements** Payments for Black Start capability shall consist of any payments under any Black Start Agreement. If the Energy price and Start-Up Costs are not specified in the Black Start Agreement, the Black Start Energy will be paid as an Exceptional Dispatch in accordance with Section 11.5.6.1 and the commitment costs for the resource will be entitled to Bid Cost Recovery. Black Start Energy resulting from a performance test shall also be paid as an Exceptional Dispatch in accordance with Section 11.5.6.1. RMR Units providing Black Start are compensated in accordance with the RMR Contract rather than this Section 11.4.	This amendment is to clarify that the ISO will assess the commitment costs and not the energy associated with a Black Start dispatch in bid cost recovery calculations.
11.4.2	**11.4.2 Black Start Capability** The CAISO shall allocate payments for Black Start capability under a Black Start Agreement as Reliability Services Costs to the Participating Transmission Owner in whose ~~Service~~ TAC Area where the Black Start Unit is located.	The ISO proposes to change the reference from "Service Area" to "TAC Area" to clarify that the ISO will allocate payments for Black Start capability under a Black Start Agreement to the area associated with a participating transmission owner as opposed to an area associated with a utility

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		distribution company.
11.5	**11.5 Real-Time Market Settlements** The CAISO shall calculate and account for ~~I~~imbalance ~~E~~energy for each Dispatch Interval and settle ~~I~~imbalance ~~E~~energy in the Real-Time Market for each Settlement Interval for each resource within the CAISO Balancing Authority Area and all System Resources dispatched in Real-Time. There are four (4) ~~two~~ categories of ~~I~~imbalance ~~E~~energy: FMM Instructed Imbalance Energy, ~~and~~ RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy, Uninstructed Imbalance Energy, and Unaccounted for Energy. ~~RTD Imbalance Energy consists of RTD IIE and UIE.~~ FMM IIE includes all Energy associated with the FMM Schedule. FMM Instructed Imbalance Energy is settled pursuant to Section 11.5.1.1, including any Energy related with HASP Intertie Block Schedules cleared through the FMM. RTD IIE is settled pursuant to Section 11.5.1.2, ~~and~~ UIE is settled pursuant to Section 11.5.2, and UFE is settled pursuant to Section 11.5.3. ~~In addition, the CAISO shall settle UFE as part of the Real-Time Market Settlements.~~ To the extent that the sum of the Settlements Amounts for FMM IIE, RTD IIE, ~~and~~ UIE, and UFE does not equal zero, the CAISO will assess charges or make payments for the resulting differences to all Scheduling Coordinators based on a pro rata share of their Measured Demand for the relevant Settlement Interval, as further described in Section 11.5.4. FMM Instructed Imbalance Energy and RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy due to Exceptional Dispatches, as well as the allocation of related costs, including Excess Costs Payments, ~~is~~ are settled as described in Section 11.5.6. The CAISO shall reverse RTM Congestion Charges for valid and balanced ETC and TOR Self-Schedules as described in Section 11.5.7. The CAISO will settle Energy for emergency assistance as described in Section 11.5.8.	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and replaced with more exacting defined terms. This amendment also corrects grammar. The ISO proposes to align the tariff with that change.

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11.5.1.2	**11.5.1.2 RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy Settlements** For each Settlement Interval, RTD IIE consists of the following types of Energy: (1) RTD Optimal Energy; (2) Residual Imbalance Energy; (3) RTD Minimum Load Energy; (4) RTD Exceptional Dispatch Energy; (5) Regulation Energy; (6) Standard Ramping Energy; (7) Ramping Energy Deviation; (8) RTD Derate Energy; (9) MSS Load Following Energy; (10) RTD Pumping Energy; and (11) Operational Adjustments. Payments and charges for RTD IIE attributable to each resource in each Settlement Interval shall be settled by debiting or crediting, as appropriate, the specific Scheduling Coordinator's RTD IIE Settlement Amount. The RTD IIE Settlement Amounts for the Standard Ramping Energy shall be zero. The RTD IIE Settlement Amounts for RTD Optimal Energy, RTD Minimum Load Energy, Regulation Energy, Ramping Energy Deviation, RTD Derate Energy, and RTD Pumping Energy shall be calculated as the product of the sum of all of these types of Energy and the RTD LMP. For MSS Operators that have elected net Settlement, the RTD IIE Settlement Amounts for Energy dispatched through the RTD optimization shall be calculated as the product of the RTD MSS Price and the sum of the following types of Energy: RTD Minimum Load Energy from System Units dispatched in Real-Time, Regulation Energy, Ramping Energy Deviation, RTD Derate Energy, MSS Load Following Energy, and RTD Pumping Energy. For MSS Operators that have elected gross Settlement, regardless of whether that entity has elected to follow its Load or to participate in RUC, the RTD IIE for such entities is settled similarly to non-MSS entities as provided in this Section 11.5.1. The remaining RTD IIE Settlement Amounts are determined as follows: (1) IIE Settlement Amounts for Residual Imbalance Energy are determined pursuant to	This amendment corrects a typographical error.

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	Section 11.5.5~~.~~; and (2) RTD IIE Settlement Amounts for Exceptional Dispatches are settled pursuant to Section 11.5.6.	
11.5.2	**11.5.2 Uninstructed Imbalance Energy** Scheduling Coordinators shall be paid or charged a UIE Settlement Amount for each LAP, PNode or Scheduling Point for which the CAISO calculates a UIE quantity for each Settlement Interval. UIE quantities are calculated for each resource that has a Day-Ahead Schedule, Dispatch Instruction, Real-Time Interchange Export Schedule or Metered Quantity. For MSS Operators electing gross Settlement, regardless of whether that entity has elected to follow its Load or to participate in RUC, the UIE for such entities is settled similarly to how UIE for non-MSS entities is settled as provided in this Section 11.5.2. The CAISO shall account for UIE every five minutes based on the resource's Dispatch Instruction. For all resources, including Generating Units, System Units of MSS Operators that have elected gross Settlement, Physical Scheduling Plants, System Resources, Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations and all Participating Load, Reliability Demand Response Resources, and Proxy Demand Resources, the UIE Settlement Amount is calculated for each Settlement Interval as the product of its UIE MWh quantity and the applicable RTD LMP. The UIE Settlement Amount for non-Participating Load and MSS Demand under gross Settlement is settled as described in Section 11.5.2.2. For MSS Operators that have elected net Settlement, the UIE Settlement Amount is calculated for each Settlement Interval as the product of its UIE quantity and its ~~Real-Time Settlement Interval~~ RTD MSS Price.	"Real-Time Settlement Interval MSS Price" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and the ISO proposes to align the tariff with that change.
11.5.2.2	**11.5.2.2 Hourly Real-Time Demand Settlement** The Default LAP Hourly Real-Time Price will apply to CAISO	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment filing and

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	Demand and MSS Demand under net Settlement of ~~I~~imbalance ~~E~~energy, except for CAISO Demand not settled at the Default LAP as provided in Section 30.5.3.2, and per the methodology as may be further defined in the Business Practice Manuals. For each Settlement Interval, the differences between the Day-Ahead Scheduled CAISO Demand and Metered Demand (MWh) is settled at the Default LAP Hourly Real-Time Price or the Custom LAP Hourly Real-Time Price, as appropriate. For each Default LAP, the CAISO calculates the applicable Default LAP Hourly Real-Time Price as the weighted average LMP of the four Default LAP FMM LMPs and the twelve (12) five-minute Default LAP RTD LMPs. The CAISO calculates the weighted average LMP for each Default LAP as the summation of the weighted average SMEC, the weighted average MCC, and the weighted average MCL for that Default LAP. The CAISO calculates the weighted average SMEC, MCC, and MCL for each applicable Trading Hour based on the four applicable Default LAP FMM SMECs, MCCs, and MCLs, respectively, and the twelve (12) applicable Default LAP RTD SMECs, MCCs, and MCLs, respectively. For each Custom LAP, the CAISO calculates the applicable Custom LAP Hourly Real-Time Price as the weighted average LMP of the four Custom LAP FMM LMPs and the twelve (12) five-minute Custom LAP RTD LMPs. The CAISO calculates the weighted average LMP for each Custom LAP as the summation of the weighted average SMEC, the weighted average MCC, and the weighted average MCL for that Custom LAP. The CAISO calculates the weighted average SMEC, MCC, and MCL for each applicable Trading Hour based on the four applicable Custom LAP FMM SMECs, MCCs, and MCLs, respectively, and the twelve (12) applicable Custom LAP RTD SMECs, MCCs, and MCLs, respectively. In calculating the weighted average SMEC, MCC, and MCL for each hour for either the	replaced with more exacting terms. As such, the ISO is proposing to align the tariff with that change and is un-defining the term “Imbalance Energy.” Furthermore, the ISO is adding language to align the tariff with the applicable Business Practice Manuals.

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	Default LAPs or Custom LAPs, the CAISO determines the weights based on the difference between Day-Ahead Schedules at the applicable LAP and the CAISO Forecast of CAISO Demand used in the FMM multiplied by the relevant FMM LMP at the applicable LAP plus the difference between the CAISO Forecast of CAISO Demand used in the FMM and the CAISO Forecast of CAISO Demand used in the RTD multiplied by the relevant RTD LMP at the applicable LAP divided by the sum of the difference between Day-Ahead Schedules at the applicable LAP and the CAISO Forecast of CAISO Demand used in the FMM plus the difference between the CAISO Forecast Of CAISO Demand used in the FMM and the CAISO Forecast Of CAISO Demand used in the RTD. Furthermore, the Default LAP Hourly Real-Time Prices and the Custom LAP Hourly Real-Time Prices will be bounded by the maximum ~~positive LMP and the~~ lowest ~~negative~~ LMP and its components, for the applicable Trading Hour from those relevant intervals at the relevant LAP. If the calculated price exceeds the upper boundary or is below the lower boundary, then the Default LAP Hourly Real-Time Price or the Custom LAP Hourly Real-Time Price, as appropriate, instead will be calculated based on a weighted average price with the weightings based on gross deviations (absolute value of each deviation). The Default LAP Hourly Real-Time Prices and the Custom LAP Hourly Real-Time Prices are further determined by the requirements in Section 27.2.2.2.1 and 27.2.2.2.2, respectively.	
11.5.3	**11.5.3. Unaccounted For Energy (UFE)** For each Settlement Interval, the CAISO will calculate UFE for each utility Service Area for which the IOU or Local Publicly Owned Electric Utility has requested separate UFE calculation and has met the requirements applicable to a CAISO Metered Entity. The UFE will be settled ~~as Imbalance~~	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and replaced with more exacting terms. The ISO is proposing to align the tariff with that change.

Section	Proposed Revisions	Reason for Change
	~~Energy~~ at the ~~Default~~ applicable LAP Hourly Real-Time Price calculated for each utility Service Area for which UFE is calculated separately. UFE will be allocated to each Scheduling Coordinator based on the ratio of its metered CAISO Demand within the relevant utility Service Area for which UFE is calculated separately to total metered CAISO Demand within that utility Service Area. UFE charges will not be estimated or included on Initial Settlement Statement T+3B.	
11.5.6.2.1	**11.5.6 Settlement Amounts for IIE From Exceptional Dispatch** * * * * **11.5.6.2 Settlement of IIE from Exceptional Dispatches Caused by Modeling Limitations** * * * * **11.5.6.2.1 [NOT USED]** **11.5.6.2.2 [NOT USED]**	The ISO is adding a placeholder tariff section so that the numbering remains sequential.
11.5.6.2.3	**11.5.6.2.3 Settlement of Excess Cost Payments for Exceptional Dispatches used for Transmission-Related Modeling Limitations** The Excess Cost Payment for Exceptional Dispatches used for transmission-related modeling limitations as described in Section 34.11.3 is calculated for each resource for each Settlement Interval as the cost difference between the Settlement amount calculated pursuant to Section 11.5.6.2.~~1 or 11.5.6.2.2~~ for the applicable delivered Exceptional Dispatch quantity at the FMM or RTD LMP and one of the following three costs: (1) the resource's Energy Bid Cost;~~,~~ (2) the Default Energy Bid cost;~~,~~ or (3) the Energy cost at the negotiated price, as applicable for System Resources, for the relevant Exceptional Dispatch.	This amendment removes tariff section cross-references that are noted as "[NOT USED]." This amendment also proposes to correct punctuation.
11.5.6.2.5.1	**11.5.6.2.5.1 Allocation of Exceptional Dispatch Excess Cost Payments to PTOs** The total Excess Cost Payments calculated pursuant to	This amendment corrects a tariff cross-reference. Tariff section 34.9.3 was changed to 34.11.3 in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment.

Section	Proposed Revisions	Reason for Change
	Section 11.5.6.2.3 for the IIE from Exceptional Dispatches instructed as a result of a transmission-related modeling limitation in the FNM as described in Section 34.11~~9~~.3 in that Settlement Interval shall be charged to the Participating Transmission Owner in whose PTO Service Territory the transmission-related modeling limitation as described in Section 34.11~~9~~.3 is located. If the modeling limitation affects more than one Participating TO, the Excess Cost Payments shall be allocated in proportion to the Transmission Revenue Requirements of the affected Participating TOs with PTO Service Territories. Costs allocated to Participating TOs under this section shall constitute Reliability Services Costs.	
11.5.6.2.5.2(ii)	**11.5.6.2.5.2 Allocation of Exceptional Dispatch Costs to Scheduling Coordinators** * * * * (ii) the amount obtained by multiplying the Scheduling Coordinator's Net Negative Uninstructed Deviation for each Settlement Interval and a weighted average price. The weighted average price is equal to the total Excess Cost Payments to be allocated divided by the MWh of RTD Exceptional Dispatch Energy or FMM Exceptional Dispatch Energy associated with the Excess Cost Payment.	"Exceptional Dispatch Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and was replaced with more exacting terms. As such, the ISO is proposing to align the tariff with that change.
11.5.6.3.2(a)	**11.5.6.3.2 Allocation of Costs from Exceptional Dispatch Calls to Condition 2 RMR Units** (a) All costs associated with Energy provided by a Condition 2 RMR Unit operating other than according to a RMR Dispatch shall be allocated ~~like other Instructed Imbalance Energy~~ in accordance with Section 11.5.4.2.	"Instructed Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and was replaced with more exacting terms. The ISO is proposing to align the tariff with that change.
11.5.6.5	**11.5.6.5 Settlement of ~~RTD~~ IIE from Black Start** Unless otherwise specified in a Black Start Agreement, all FMM Instructed Imbalance Energy or RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy Settlement Amounts associated with Black Start receive the Exceptional Dispatch Settlement price as provided in Section 11.5.6.1, but the costs are allocated	The ISO proposes to make the following changes to reflect that instructed imbalance energy amounts may be settled at the applicable Fifteen Minute Market or Real-Time Dispatch interval consistent with the ISO's current practice.

Section	Proposed Revisions	Reason for Change
	pursuant to Section 11.4.	
11.5.6.7.1	**11.5.6.7 Settlement of RTD or FMM Exceptional Dispatch Energy** * * * * **11.5.6.7.1 Settlement of RTD or FMM Exceptional Dispatch Energy from Exceptional Dispatches of Resources Eligible for Supplemental Revenues** Except as specified in Section 11.5.6.7.3, the Exceptional Dispatch Settlement price for the RTD Exceptional Dispatch Energy or FMM Exceptional Dispatch Energy delivered by a resource that satisfies all of the criteria set forth in Section 39.10.1 shall be the higher of (a) the resource's Energy Bid price or (b) the FMM or RTD LMP.	"Exceptional Dispatch Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and was replaced with more exacting terms. The ISO is proposing to align the tariff with that change.
11.5.6.7.2	**11.5.6.7.2 Settlement of RTD or FMM Exceptional Dispatch Energy from Exceptional Dispatches of Resources Not Eligible for Supplemental Revenues** Except as specified in Section 11.5.6.7.3, the Exceptional Dispatch Settlement price for the RTD Exceptional Dispatch Energy or FMM Exceptional Dispatch Energy delivered by a resource that satisfies all of the criteria set forth in Section 39.10.2 shall be the higher of (a) the Default Energy Bid price or (b) the Resource-Specific Settlement Interval LMP.	"Exceptional Dispatch Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and was replaced with more exacting terms. The ISO is proposing to align the tariff with that change.
11.5.6.7.3	**11.5.6.7.3 Exception to the Other Provisions of Section 11.5.6.7** ~~Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Section 11.5.6.7, i~~If the Energy Bid price for a resource that satisfies all of the criteria set forth in Sections 39.10.1 or 39.10.2 is lower than the Default Energy Bid price for the resource, and the FMM or RTD LMP is lower than both the Energy Bid price for the resource and the Default Energy Bid price for the resource, the Exceptional Dispatch Settlement price for the RTD Exceptional Dispatch Energy or FMM Exceptional Dispatch	The ISO proposes to add clarity to the first sentence by removing reference to "this section." "Exceptional Dispatch Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and was replaced with more exacting terms. The ISO is proposing to align the tariff with that change.

Section	Proposed Revisions	Reason for Change
	Energy delivered by the resource shall be the Energy Bid price for the resource.	
11.5.7.1	**11.5.7 Congestion Credit and Marginal Cost of Losses Credit** **11.5.7.1 RTM Congestion Credit for ETCs and TORs** The CAISO shall not apply charges or payments to Scheduling Coordinators related to the MCC associated with all Points of Receipt and Points of Delivery pairs associated with valid and balanced ETC Self-Schedules or TOR Self-Schedules after the Day-Ahead Market. The balanced portion for each ETC or TOR contract for each Settlement Interval will be based on the difference between: (1) the minimum of (a) the total Demand, (b) the total ETC or TOR Supply Self-Schedule submitted in RTM, including changes after twenty (20) minutes before the applicable Trading Hour if such change is permitted by the Existing Contract, or (c) the Existing Contract maximum capacity as specified in the TRTC Instructions; and (2) the valid and balanced portion of the Day-Ahead Schedule. In determining the balanced portions, the CAISO evaluates the amounts based on the following variables: (a) for exports and imports, the CAISO shall use the schedule quantity specified in the Interchange schedule used for check out between CAISO and other Balancing Authority Areas; (b) for CAISO Demand, the CAISO shall use the metered CAISO Demand associated with the applicable ETC or TOR; and (c) for all Generation the CAISO shall use the quantity specified in the Dispatch Instructions. For each Scheduling Coordinator, the CAISO shall determine for each Settlement Interval the applicable RTM Congestion Credit for FMM Instructed Imbalance Energy or RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy, which can be positive or negative, as the sum of the product of the relevant MWh quantity and the applicable weighted average MCC at each Point of Receipt and Point of Delivery associated with	"Instructed Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and was replaced with more exacting terms. The ISO is proposing to align the tariff with that change. The ISO proposes adding the word "applicable" before "weighted average" in order to provide clarity.

Section	Proposed Revisions	Reason for Change
	the valid and balanced portions of that Scheduling Coordinator's ETC or TOR Self-Schedules. The weights in the two markets will be based on the absolute values of the (a) deviation of the FMM Schedule or the CAISO Forecast Of CAISO Demand used in the FMM from Day-Ahead Schedules and (b) deviation of the RTD schedule or the CAISO Forecast Of CAISO Demand used in the RTD from Day-Ahead Schedules.	
11.5.7.2	**11.5.7.2 RTM Marginal Cost of Losses Credit for Eligible TOR Self-Schedules** For all Points of Receipt and Points of Delivery pairs associated with a valid and balanced TOR Self-Schedule submitted to the RTM pursuant to an existing agreement between the TOR holder and either the CAISO or a Participating TO as specified in Section 17.3.3, the CAISO shall not impose any charge or make any payment to the Scheduling Coordinator related to the MCL associated with such TOR Self-Schedules and will instead impose any applicable charges for losses as specified in the existing agreement between the TOR holder and either the CAISO or a Participating TO applicable to the relevant TOR. In any case in which the TOR holder has an existing agreement regarding its TORs with either the CAISO or a Participating TO, the provisions of the agreement shall prevail over any conflicting provisions of this Section 11.5.7.2. Where the provisions of this Section 11.5.7.2 do not conflict with the provisions of the agreement, the provisions of this Section 11.5.7.2 shall apply to the subject TORs. The balanced portion of the TOR Self-Schedule after the Day-Ahead Market is the same balanced quantity mentioned in this Section 11.5.7.2 for the TOR Self-Schedule. For each Scheduling Coordinator, the CAISO shall determine for each Settlement Interval the applicable RTM Marginal Cost of Losses Credit for Eligible TOR Self-Schedules for FMM	"Exceptional Dispatch Energy" was eliminated in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and replaced with more exacting defined terms. As such, the ISO is proposing to align the tariff with that change. The ISO is also proposing a correction to punctuation by adding a colon to notate a list and semicolons, rather than commas, between each list item. This amendment also proposes grammatical correctness.

Section	Proposed Revisions	Reason for Change
	Instructed Imbalance Energy and RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy, which can be positive or negative, as the sum of the product of the relevant MWh quantity and the weighted average MCL at each of the eligible Points of Receipt and Points of Delivery associated with the valid and balanced portions of that Scheduling Coordinator's TOR Self-Schedules. The weights in the two markets will be based on the absolute values of the: (a) deviation of the FMM Schedule or the CAISO Forecast Of CAISO Demand used in the FMM from Day-Ahead Schedules; and (b) deviation of the RTD schedule or the CAISO Forecast Of CAISO Demand used in the RTD from Day-Ahead Schedules. For losses that the CAISO shall charge pursuant to Section 17.3.3, the specific loss charge amount shall be the product of: (a) the specific loss percentage as may be specified in an applicable agreement between the TOR holder and the CAISO or an existing agreement between the TOR holder and a Participating TO; (b) the weighted average SMEC price from the FMM and RTD markets with weights based on the absolute values of (1) deviation of FMM schedule or CAISO Forecast Of CAISO Demand used in the FMM from Day-Ahead Schedules and (2) deviation of RTD schedule or CAISO Forecast Of CAISO Demand used in the RTD from Day-Ahead Schedules; and (c) the balanced contract quantity mentioned in Section 11.5.7.1.	
11.7.1.1	**11.7.1 MSS Load Following Deviation Penalty** * * * * **11.7.1.1** If the metered Generation resources and imports into the MSS exceed: (i) the metered Demand and exports from the MSS; and (ii) Energy expected to be delivered by the Scheduling Coordinator for the MSS in response to the CAISO's Dispatch Instructions and/or Regulation Set Point signals issued by the CAISO's AGC by more than the MSS Deviation Band, then the payment for excess Energy outside	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and replaced with more exacting defined terms. As such, the ISO is proposing to align the tariff with that change. This amendment also proposes a small punctuation change by changing a comma to a semicolon to separate the romanette numerals.

Section	Proposed Revisions	Reason for Change
	of the MSS Deviation Band shall be rescinded and Scheduling Coordinator for the MSS Operator will pay the CAISO an amount equal to one hundred percent (100%) of the product of the highest LMP paid to the MSS Operator for its Generation in the Settlement Interval and the amount of the FMM Instructed Imbalance Energy or RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy that is supplied in excess of the MSS Deviation Band.	
11.7.1.2	**11.7.1.2** If metered Generation resources and imports into the MSS are insufficient to meet: (i) the metered Demand and exports from the MSS~~,~~; and (ii) Energy expected to be delivered by the Scheduling Coordinator for the MSS in response to the CAISO's Dispatch Instructions and/or Regulation Set Point signals issued by the CAISO's AGC by more than the MSS Deviation Band, then the Scheduling Coordinator for the MSS Operator shall pay the CAISO an amount equal to the product of the Default LAP price for the Settlement Interval and two hundred percent (200%) of the shortfall that is outside of the MSS Deviation Band. The payment in the previous sentence is in addition to the charges for the FMM Instructed Imbalance Energy or RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy that serves the excess MSS Demand that may be applicable under Section 11.5.	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and replaced with more exacting defined terms. As such, the ISO is proposing to align the tariff with that change. This amendment also proposes a small punctuation change by changing a comma to a semicolon to separate the romanette numerals.
11.8.4	**11.8.4 RTM Bid Cost Recovery Amount** For purposes of determining the RTM Unrecovered Bid Cost Uplift Payments as determined in Section 11.8.5, and for the purposes of allocation of Net RTM Bid Cost Uplift as described in Section 11.8.6.6 the CAISO shall calculate the RTM Bid Cost Shortfall or the RTM Bid Cost Surplus as the algebraic difference between the RTM Bid Cost and the RTM Market Revenues for each Settlement Interval. The RTM Bid Costs shall be calculated pursuant to Section 11.8.4.1. The RTM Market Revenues shall be calculated pursuant to Section 11.8.4.2. The Energy subject to RTM Bid Cost	"Instructed Imbalance Energy," "Exceptional Dispatch Energy," and "Derate Energy" were eliminated as defined terms in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and replaced with more exacting terms. The ISO is proposing to align the tariff with those changes.

Section	Proposed Revisions	Reason for Change
	Recovery is the FMM Instructed Imbalanced Energy or RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy described in Section 11.5.1, excluding Standard Ramping Energy, Residual Imbalance Energy, FMM Exceptional Dispatch Energy or RTD Exceptional Dispatch Energy, FMM Derate Energy or RTD Derate Energy, Ramping Energy Deviation, Regulation Energy and MSS Load Following Energy regardless of whether the Energy is from the FMM or RTD, and is subject to the application of the Real-Time Performance Metric as described in Section 11.8.4.4 and the Persistent Deviation Metric described in Section 11.17.	
11.8.4.1.1(c)	**11.8.4.1.1 RTM Start-Up Cost** * * * * (c) The Real-Time Market Start-Up Cost is zero if the Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource is started within the Real-Time Market Commitment Period pursuant to an Exceptional Dispatch issued in accordance with Section 34.~~9~~11.2 to: (1) perform Ancillary Services testing; (2) perform pre-commercial operation testing for Generating Units; or (3) perform PMax testing.	This amendment corrects a tariff cross-reference to ISO tariff section 34.9.2. This amendment also adds punctuation by adding a colon to notate a list within the paragraph.
11.8.4.1.1(e)	(e) If a Real-Time Market Start-Up is terminated in the Real-Time within the applicable Real-Time Market Commitment Period through an Exceptional Dispatch Shut-Down Instruction issued while the Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource is starting up, the Real-Time Market Start-Up Cost is prorated by the ratio of the Start-Up Time before termination over the Real-Time Market Start-Up Time.	This amendment adds punctuation.
11.8.4.1.1(h)	(h) For Short-Start Units, the first Start-Up Costs within a CAISO IFM Commitment Period are qualified IFM Start-Up Costs as described above in Section 11.8.2.1.1(g~~h~~). For subsequent Start-Ups of Short-Start Units after the CAISO Shuts Down a resource and then the CAISO issues a Start-Up Instruction pursuant to a CAISO RTM Commitment within the CAISO IFM Commitment Period, the Start-Up Costs shall	This amendment corrects an ISO tariff section cross-reference.

Section	Proposed Revisions	Reason for Change
	be qualified as Real-Time Start-Up costs, provided that the resource actually Shut-Down and Started-Up based on CAISO Shut-Down and Start-Up Instructions.	
11.8.4.1.2	**11.8.4.1.2 RTM Minimum Load Cost** The RTM Minimum Load Cost is the Minimum Load Cost of the Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource submitted to the CAISO for the Real-Time Market, as adjusted pursuant to Section 30.7.10.2, if applicable, divided by the number of Settlement Intervals in a Trading Hour. For each Settlement Interval, only the RTM Minimum Load Cost in a CAISO RTM Commitment Period is eligible for Bid Cost Recovery. The RTM Minimum Load Cost for any Settlement Interval is zero if: (1) the Settlement Interval is included in a RTM Self-Commitment Period for the Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource; (2) the Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource has been manually dispatched under an RMR Contract or the resource has been flagged as an RMR Dispatch in the Day-Ahead Schedule or the Real-Time Market in that Settlement Interval; (3) for all resources that are not Multi-Stage Generating Resources, that Settlement Interval is included in an IFM or RUC Commitment Period; or (4) the Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource is committed pursuant to Section 34.11~~9~~.2 for the purpose of performing Ancillary Services testing, pre-commercial operation testing for Generating Units, or PMax testing. A resource's RTM Minimum Load Costs for Bid Cost Recovery purposes are subject to the application of the Real-Time Performance Metric as specified in Section 11.8.4.4. For Multi-Stage Generating Resources, the commitment period is further determined based on application of Section 11.8.1.3. For all Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resources that the CAISO Shuts Down, either through an Exceptional Dispatch or an Economic Dispatch through the Real-Time Market, from its Day-Ahead Schedule that was also from a CAISO commitment, the RTM Minimum	This amendment corrects a tariff cross-reference to ISO tariff section 34.9.2.

Section	Proposed Revisions	Reason for Change
	Load Costs will include negative Minimum Load Costs for Energy between the Minimum Load as registered in the Master File, or if applicable, as modified pursuant to Section 9.3.3, and zero (0) MWhs.	
11.8.4.1.5	**11.8.4.1.5 RTM Energy Bid Cost** For any Settlement Interval, the RTM Energy Bid Cost for the Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource except Participating Loads shall be computed as the sum of the products of each RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy ~~(IIE)~~ portion, except Standard Ramping Energy, Residual Imbalance Energy, FMM Exceptional Dispatch Energy or RTD, Exceptional Dispatch Energy, FMM Derate Energy or RTD Derate Energy, MSS Load Following Energy, Ramping Energy Deviation and Regulating Energy, with the relevant Energy Bid prices, the Default Energy Bid price, or the Locational Marginal Price, if any, as further described in Section 11.17, for each Dispatch Interval in the Settlement Interval. For Settlement Intervals for which the Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource is ramping up to or down from a rerated Minimum Load that was increased pursuant to Section 9.3.3 for the Real-Time Market, the RTM Energy incurred by the ramping will be classified as FMM Derate Energy or RTD Derate Energy and will not be included in Bid Cost Recovery. For a Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource that is ramping up to or down from an Exceptional Dispatch, the relevant Energy Bid Cost related to the Energy caused by ramping will be settled on the same basis as the Energy Bid used in the Settlement of the Exceptional Dispatch that led to the ramping. The RTM Energy Bid Cost for a Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource, including Participating Loads and Proxy Demand Response Resources, for a Settlement Interval is subject to the Real-Time Performance Metric as described in Section 11.8.4.4 and the Persistent Deviation Metric as described in Section 11.17. Any Uninstructed Imbalance Energy in excess of	"Instructed Imbalance Energy" and "Derate Energy" were both eliminated as defined terms in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and replaced with more exacting terms. The ISO is proposing to align the tariff with those changes.

Section	Proposed Revisions	Reason for Change
	FMM Instructed Imbalance Energy and RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy is also not eligible for Bid Cost Recovery. For a Multi-Stage Generating Resource the CAISO will determine the RTM Energy Bid Cost based on the Generating Unit level.	
11.8.4.3.1	**11.8.4.3.1 MSS Elected Gross Settlement** For an MSS Operator that has elected gross Settlement, regardless of other MSS optional elections (Load following or RUC opt-in or out), the RTM Bid Cost and RTM Market Revenue of the ~~Real-Time~~ RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy subject to Bid Cost Recovery is determined for each resource in the same way these amounts are determined for a non-MSS resource pursuant to the rules specified in Section 11.8.4. The RTM Bid Cost Shortfall or Surplus for Energy and Ancillary Services in total is determined for each Trading Hour of the RTM over the Trading Day by taking the algebraic difference between the RTM Bid Cost and RTM Market Revenue.	"Instructed Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and replaced with more exacting terms. The ISO is proposing to align the tariff with those changes.
11.8.4.3.2	**11.8.4.3.2 MSS Elected Net Settlement** For MSS entities that have elected net Settlement regardless of other MSS optional elections (i.e., Load following or not, or RUC opt-in or out), unlike non-MSS resources, the RUC and RTM Bid Cost Shortfall or Surplus is treated at the MSS level and not at the resource specific level, and is calculated as the RUC and RTM Bid Cost Shortfall or Surplus of all BCR Eligible Resources within the MSS. In calculating the Energy RTM Market Revenue for all the resources within the MSS as provided in Section 11.8.4.2, the CAISO will use the FMM MSS Price or the RTD MSS Price, as applicable~~Real-Time Settlement Interval MSS Price~~. The RUC and RTM Bid Cost Shortfall and Surplus for Energy, RUC Availability and Ancillary Services are first calculated separately for the MSS for each Settlement Interval of the Trading Day, with qualified Start-Up Cost, qualified Minimum Load Cost and qualified	"Real-Time Settlement Interval MSS Price" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and the ISO proposes to align the tariff with that change.

Section	Proposed Revisions	Reason for Change
	Multi-Stage Generator transition cost included into the RUC and RTM Bid Cost Shortfalls and Surpluses of Energy calculation. The MSS's overall RUC and RTM Bid Cost Shortfall or Surplus is then calculated as the algebraic sum of the RUC and RTM Bid Cost Shortfall or Surplus for Energy and the RUC and RTM Bid Cost Shortfall or Surplus AS for each Settlement Interval.	
11.9.1	**11.9.1 Physical Trades** Inter-SC Trades of Energy in the Day-Ahead Market will be settled separately from Inter-SC Trades of Energy in the RTM. Both the Day-Ahead and RTM Inter-SC Trades of Energy will be settled on an hourly basis and the two respective Settlement amounts between the two parties for each market shall net to zero. All MWh quantities of Physical Trades submitted to the CAISO for Settlement in the Day-Ahead Market that are confirmed through the Physical Trade post market confirmation as provided in Section 28.1.6.3 shall be settled at the Day-Ahead LMP at the relevant PNode. All MWh quantities of Physical Trades that are reduced during the Physical Trade post market confirmation shall be settled at the relevant Existing Zone (EZ) Generation Trading Hub price. All MWh quantities of Physical Trades submitted to the CAISO for Settlement in the RTM that are confirmed through the Physical Trade post market confirmation pursuant to Section 28.1~~6~~.6~~1~~.3 shall be settled at the simple average of the four FMM LMPs at the relevant Pricing Node. All MWh quantities of Physical Trades submitted for Settlement in RTM that are reduced during the Physical Trade post market confirmation shall be settled at the FMM price for the EZ Generation Trading Hub.	This amendment proposes to correct a tariff section cross-reference that was typographically transposed.
11.10.1.2.1	**11.10.1 Settlements for Contracted Ancillary Services** * * * * **11.10.1.2.1 Congestion Charges**	This amendment provides clarification by adding the phrase "or payment."

Section	Proposed Revisions	Reason for Change
	If a Scheduling Coordinator, including a Scheduling Coordinator for a Pseudo-Tie of a Generating Unit to the CAISO Balancing Authority Area, receives an Ancillary Services Award or provides a qualified Self- Provided Ancillary Service at a congested Scheduling Point, the CAISO will charge or pay the Scheduling Coordinator for Congestion. The charge or payment for Congestion at such locations is equal to the simple average of the fifteen (15) minute applicable intertie constraint Shadow Price over the applicable Trading Hour at the location of the Ancillary Service Award, multiplied by the quantity of Ancillary Services Award or the capacity of the qualified Self-Provided Ancillary Service for the Settlement Period. No such charge or payment for Congestion will apply when the Scheduling Coordinator provides Ancillary Services from HASP Block Intertie Schedules at Scheduling Points pursuant to the CAISO Tariff rules that apply to Existing Rights and Transmission Ownership Rights.	
11.10.1.4	**11.10.1.4 Voltage Support** The total payments for each Scheduling Coordinator for Voltage Support in any Settlement Period shall be the sum of the opportunity costs of limiting Energy output to enable reactive energy production in response to a CAISO instruction. The opportunity cost shall be calculated based on the product of the Energy amount that would have cleared the market at the price of the ~~Resource-Specific Settlement Interval~~ FMM or RTD LMP minus the higher of the Energy Bid price or the Default Energy Bid price. If applicable, Scheduling Coordinators shall also receive any payments under any long-term contracts due for the Settlement Period. FMM Exceptional Dispatches or RTD Exceptional Dispatches for incremental or decremental Energy needed for Voltage Support procured through Exceptional Dispatch pursuant to Section 34.11~~9~~.2 will be	"Resource Specific Settlement Interval" and was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and replaced with more exacting terms. This amendment proposes to align the ISO tariff with that change. This amendment also proposes to correct a tariff section cross-reference and clarify exceptional dispatches as being from the FMM or RTD.

Section	Proposed Revisions	Reason for Change
	paid and settled in accordance with Section 11.5.6. RMR Units providing Voltage Support are compensated in accordance with the RMR Contract rather than this Section 11.10.1.4.	
11.10.2 (last paragraph)	**11.10.2 Settlement for User Charges For Ancillary Services** * * * * With respect to each Settlement Period, in addition to Ancillary Service charges at the applicable user rates determined in accordance with this Section 11.10.2, each Scheduling Coordinator shall be charged additional neutrality adjustment amounts for each Ancillary Service type pursuant to Sections 11.10.2.1.4, 11.10.2.2.3, 11.10.3.~~4~~3, and 11.10.4.~~4~~3 and a neutrality adjustment amount for upward Ancillary Service types pursuant to Section 11.14.	This amendment corrects typographical errors by correcting ISO tariff section cross-references.
11.10.3	**11.10.3 Spinning Reserves** **11.10.3.1 Spinning Reserves Obligation** * * * * If the Scheduling Coordinator's Operating Reserve Obligation (before self-provision or Inter-SC Trade of Spinning Reserve or Non-Spinning Reserve) is negative, the SC may be entitled to a credit rather than a charge. In that case, the quantity of the SC's negative Operating Reserve Obligation (before self-provision and Inter-SC Trade) shall be multiplied by the Negative Operating Reserve Obligation Credit Adjustment Factor (NOROCAF) computed for the Trading Hour as specified in Section 11.10.5. * * * * **11.10.3.2~~1~~ Hourly User Rate for Spinning Reserves** * * * * **11.10.3.3~~2~~ Hourly Net Obligation for Spinning Reserves** * * * * **11.10.3.4~~3~~ Spinning Reserve Neutrality Adjustment**	This amendment proposes to modify the numbering sequence in order to provide clarity, corrects ISO tariff section cross-references, and corrects punctuation.

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	For each Settlement Period, the difference between the Spinning Reserve net requirement at the hourly Spinning Reserve user rate determined in Section 11.10.3.2~~1~~ and the total revenue collected from all Scheduling Coordinators in the Spinning Reserve charge pursuant to Section 11.10.3.3~~2~~ shall be allocated to all Scheduling Coordinators in proportion to their Spinning Reserve obligation quantity. The Spinning Reserve net requirement is the Real-Time Spinning Reserve requirement net of the sum of effective qualified Spinning Reserve self-provision over all resources.	
11.10.4	**11.10.4 Non-Spinning Reserves** **11.10.4.1 Non-Spinning Reserves Obligation** * * * * If the Scheduling Coordinator's Operating Reserve Obligation (before self-provision or Inter-SC Trade of Spinning Reserve or Non-Spinning Reserve) is negative, the Scheduling Coordinator may be entitled to a credit rather than a charge. In that case, the quantity of the Scheduling Coordinator's negative Non-Spinning Reserve Obligation (before self-provision and Inter-SC Trade) shall be multiplied by the Negative Operating Reserve Obligation Credit Adjustment Factor (NOROCAF) computed for the Trading Hour as specified in Section 11.10.5. * * * * **11.10.4.2~~1~~ Hourly User Rate Non-Spinning Reserves** * * * * **11.10.4.3~~2~~ Hourly Net Obligation for Non-Spinning Reserves** * * * * **11.10.4.4~~3~~ Non-Spinning Reserve Neutrality Adjustment** For each Settlement Period, the difference between the Non-Spinning Reserve net requirement at the hourly Non-Spinning Reserve user rate determined in Section 11.10.4.2~~1~~	This amendment proposes to modify the numbering sequence in order to provide clarity, corrects ISO tariff section cross-references, and corrects punctuation.

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	and the total revenue collected from all Scheduling Coordinators in the Non-Spinning Reserve charge pursuant to Section 11.10.4.3~~2~~ shall be allocated to all Scheduling Coordinators in proportion to their Non-Spinning Reserve Obligation quantity. The Non-Spinning Reserve net requirement is the Real-Time Non-Spinning Reserve requirement net of the sum of effective qualified Non-Spinning Reserve self-provision over all resources.	
11.10.6	**11.10.6 Upward Ancillary Services Neutrality Adjustment** For each Settlement Period the difference between the upwards Ancillary Service cost and the ~~product~~ sum of the total Ancillary Service~~s obligation and neutrality adjustments net requirements at the relevant Ancillary Service user rate~~ will be allocated to all Scheduling Coordinators in proportion to their upward Ancillary Service Obligation (before taking into consideration the Inter-SC Trades of Ancillary Services). The CAISO shall exclude EIM Transfers between the CAISO and an EIM Entity from the calculation of the upwards Ancillary Service Obligation for this neutrality adjustment. The upwards Ancillary Service cost is the sum of the upward Ancillary Services payments made pursuant to ~~Regulation Up, Spinning Reserve and Non-Spinning Reserve cost described in~~ Sections 11.10.1.1~~2.1~~, 11.10.1.2, and 11.10.3.1 ~~and 11.10.4.1~~. The total upward Ancillary Service~~s obligation and neutrality adjustments net requirement~~ is the sum of the requirements in Sections 11.10.2.2.2, 11.10.2.2.3, 11.10.3.1, 11.10.3.4, 11.10.4.1, and 11.10.4.4~~Real-Time Regulation Up net requirement in Section 11.10.2.2.3, Spinning Reserve net requirement in Section 11.10.3.3 and Non-Spinning Reserve net requirement in Section 11.10.4.3~~.	This amendment proposes to align the tariff language with the NERC's BAL-002. This change will cause the upward Ancillary Service Obligation to be neutral.
11.10.9.3	**11.10.9.3 Rescission of Payments for Undelivered Ancillary Service Capacity.** If the total metered output of a Generating Unit, Participating	"Instructed Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term from the ISO tariff in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and replaced with more exacting

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	Load, System Unit or System Resource is insufficient to supply the amount of FMM Instructed Imbalance Energy or RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy associated with a Dispatch Instruction issued in accordance with awarded or self-provided Spinning Reserves or awarded or self-provided Non-Spinning Reserves in any Settlement Interval, then the capacity payment associated with the difference between the scheduled amount of each Ancillary Service for which insufficient Energy was delivered and the actual output attributed to the response to the Dispatch Instruction shall be rescinded. If, after the issuance of a Dispatch Instruction associated with Non-Spinning Reserves, the actual response of a Proxy Demand Resource is insufficient to supply the amount of FMM Instructed Imbalance Energy or RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy associated with a Dispatch Instruction issued in accordance with awarded or self-provided Non-Spinning Reserves, then the capacity payment associated with the difference between the scheduled amount and the actual amount attributed to the response to the Dispatch Instruction (as established pursuant to the applicable Business Practice Manual) shall be rescinded. However, no capacity payment shall be rescinded if the shortfall in the metered output of the Generating Unit, Participating Load, Proxy Demand Resource, System Unit, or System Resource is less than a deadband amount published by the CAISO on the CAISO Website at least twenty-four hours prior to the Settlement Interval. For any Settlement Interval with respect to which no deadband amount has been published by the CAISO, the deadband amount shall be zero MWh.	definitions. As such, the ISO is proposing to align the tariff with that change. This amendment also proposes to add the word "the" before the word "CAISO" for grammatical purposes.
11.12.1.2	**11.12.1.2 [Not Used] ~~PIRP Protective Measures Monthly Adjustments~~** ~~At the end of the month, the CAISO will calculate the PIRP Protective Measures monthly resettlement, which it will base~~	This amendment removes the expired tariff language pertaining to PIRP Protective Measures.

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	~~on the forecast established for the Participating Intermittent Resource 90 minutes prior to the applicable Trading Hour. For each month the CAISO will calculate the PIRP Protective Measures Settlement Amount as the total of: (1) the sum of the product of the 90 minute MWh amounts, for each hour of the month multiplied by the simple average of the RTD LMP for the applicable Trading Hour; and (2) the product of (a) the monthly netted MWh quantities under PIRP Protective Measures, which is the sum of the hourly differences between the ninety (90) minute MWh amounts and the Participating Intermittent Resource's 5-minute metered MWhs, and (b) the resource's monthly weighted average RTD LMP, where the weights are the metered Generation quantities associated with each RTD LMP. If the Scheduling Coordinator submits an Economic Bid or Self-Schedule to the Real-Time Market, the resource will be disqualified from PIRP Protective Measures for the remaining term that the PIRP Protective Measures are otherwise intended to apply. The disqualification will be in effect as of the Trading Day for which the Scheduling Coordinators submitted the Economic Bid. The CAISO will take the necessary steps to implement that disqualification and will make any necessary Settlement adjustments consistent with the change in status. In addition, for the intervals in which the Scheduling Coordinator submitted an Economic Bid for the resource while it was still qualified as a resource subject to PIRP Protective Measures, the resource will not be eligible for any Bid Cost Recovery related payments for such Economic Bids.~~	
11.12.2	**11.12.2 [Not Used]** ~~**Allocation of PIRP Protective Measures Costs/Revenues**~~ ~~For each month, the CAISO will calculate the difference between the charges and payments made to the Scheduling Coordinator for each Participating Intermittent Resource under its Settlement as specified in Sections 11, and the~~	This amendment removes the expired tariff language pertaining to PIRP Protective Measures.

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	~~PIRP Protective Measurement resettlement amounts. The CAISO will charge or credit the differences to the Scheduling Coordinator and will allocate a corresponding credit or charge to all Scheduling Coordinators in proportion to each Scheduling Coordinator's aggregate Net Negative Uninstructed Deviations in that month relative to the aggregate Net Negative Uninstructed Deviations for all Scheduling Coordinators in the CAISO Balancing Authority Area in that month.~~	
11.12.3	**11.12.3 Payment of Participating Resource Fees** **11.12.3.1 Forecasting Fee** A fee to defray the costs of the implementation of the forecasting service for Eligible Intermittent Resources shall be assessed to Scheduling Coordinators for Eligible Intermittent Resources as specified in Schedule 4 of Appendix F. **11.12.3.2 [Not Used]** **11.12.3.3 [Not Used]~~Participating Intermittent Resource Export Fee~~** ~~A Participating Intermittent Resource Export Fee will be levied to Participating Intermittent Resources that have elected for PIRP Protective Measures in accordance with Section 5.3 of Appendix Q and Schedule 4 of Appendix F.~~	This amendment removes the expired tariff language pertaining to PIRP Protective Measures.
11.17.1.2.2	**11.17.1.2.2 Rule 2** If seven (7) or more Settlement Intervals of the previous twenty-four (24) Settlement Intervals are flagged as exceeding the Persistent Deviation Metric Threshold, then for all the previous twenty-four (24) Settlement Intervals in the two-hour window: (a) the RTM Energy Bid Costs specified in Section 11.8.4.1.5 (i) for FMM Optimal Energy or RTD Optimal Energy above the Day-Ahead Scheduled Energy will be based on the lesser of the applicable Default Energy Bid price, the applicable Energy Bid price, as mitigated, or the applicable FMM or RTD Locational Marginal Price; ~~,~~ and (ii)	"Optimal Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and replaced with more exacting definitions. The ISO proposes to align the tariff with that change. The ISO also is providing additional language to (a)(ii) to make it consistent with (a)(i), and proposes correction to punctuation.

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	for FMM Optimal Energy or RTD Optimal Energy below the Day-Ahead Scheduled Energy will be based on the greater of the applicable Default Energy Bid price, the applicable Energy Bid price, as mitigated, or the applicable FMM or RTD Locational Marginal Price; and (b) Residual Imbalance Energy as specified in Section 11.5.5 (i) for Residual Imbalance Energy above the Day-Ahead Scheduled Energy will be based on the lesser of the applicable Default Energy Bid price, the relevant Energy Bid Price, as mitigated, or the applicable RTD Locational Marginal Price;~~,~~ and (ii) Residual Imbalance Energy below the Day-Ahead Scheduled Energy will be based on the greater of the applicable Default Energy Bid price, the relevant Energy Bid Price, or the applicable RTD Locational Marginal Price.	
11.17.2.2	**11.17.2.2 Disqualification Based on ADS Shut-Down Instruction** In the event that the CAISO issues a binding Shut-Down Instruction through ADS, a resource will not be eligible for recovery of RTM or RUC Minimum Load Costs from the point of the Shut-Down Instruction forward for the duration of the resource's registered Minimum Down Time. If a resource ignores the binding Shut-Down Instruction and it has a Day-Ahead Schedule, the resource is not eligible for IFM Minimum Load Cost recovery as specified in Section 11.8.2.1.2~~3~~ for the minimum of: 1) the resource's Minimum Down Time;~~,~~ and 2) the IFM Commitment Period.	This amendment proposes to correct an ISO tariff section cross-reference. This amendment also adds punctuation – a colon to denote a list and a semicolon to separate sub-parts 1) and 2).
11.20.4(f)	**11.20.4 Process for Invoicing NERC/WECC Charges** With regard to the NERC/WECC Charges to be assessed by the WECC for each NERC/WECC Charge Assessment Year, the following processes shall apply: * * * * (f) Within fifteen (15) Business Days after receipt of the WECC invoice to the CAISO setting forth the assessment for	Remedies a typographical error by correcting an ISO tariff section cross-reference.

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	NERC/WECC Charges for the NERC/WECC Charge Assessment Year, the CAISO will issue Final NERC/WECC Charge Invoices that allocate NERC/WECC Charges for the NERC/WECC Charge Assessment Year to Scheduling Coordinators based on (i) each Scheduling Coordinator's NERC/WECC Metered Demand as adjusted pursuant to Sections 11.20.4(b) and 11.20.4(e) and pursuant to any additional adjustments that the WECC provides to the CAISO in a written statement in accordance with the CAISO-WECC Billing Services Agreement, multiplied by (ii) the Final NERC/WECC Charge Rate for the NERC/WECC Charge Assessment Year. If and to the extent that a Scheduling Coordinator has not already paid all of the NERC/WECC Charges for the NERC/WECC Charge Assessment Year that it is required to pay, the Scheduling Coordinator's Final NERC/WECC Charge Invoice will show the amount the Scheduling Coordinator is still required to pay. If and to the extent that a Scheduling Coordinator has already paid in excess of the NERC/WECC Charges for the NERC/WECC Charge Assessment Year that the Scheduling Coordinator is required to pay, the Scheduling Coordinator's Final NERC/WECC Charge Invoice will show the amount the Scheduling Coordinator will be credited.	
11.21.1	**11.21.1 CAISO Demand and Exports** If the CAISO corrects an LMP in the upward direction pursuant to Section 35 that impacts Demand in the Day-Ahead Market and the FMM such that either a portion of or the entire cleared CAISO Demand or export Economic Bid curve becomes uneconomic, then the CAISO will calculate and apply the Price Correction Derived LMP for settlement of day-ahead CAISO Demand and exports in Sections 11.2.1.2, 11.2.1.3, and 11.2.1.4, and FMM exports in Section 11.54.1.1. The CAISO shall not calculate and apply a Price Correction Derived LMP for settlement of exports that are	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and replaced with more exacting definitions, and the ISO is proposing aligning the tariff with that change. The ISO is also correcting a tariff section cross-reference.

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	part of a Schedule that results from Bids submitted in violation of Section 30.5.5. The CAISO will calculate a Price Correction Derived LMP for each affected CAISO Demand and exports as follows: the total cleared MWhs of CAISO Demand or exports in the Day-Ahead Schedule or FMM Schedule, as applicable, multiplied by the corrected LMP, minus the make-whole payment amount, all of which is divided by the total cleared MWhs of CAISO Demand or export in the Day-Ahead Schedule or FMM Schedule, as applicable. The make-whole payment amount will be calculated on an hourly basis determined by the area between the Scheduling Coordinator's CAISO Demand or Export Bid curve and the corrected LMP, which is calculated as the MWhs for each of the cleared bid segments in the Day-Ahead Schedule or FMM Schedule for the affected resource, multiplied by the maximum of zero or the corrected LMP minus the bid segment price. For the purpose of this calculation, the CAISO will not factor in a make-whole payment amount for Self-Scheduled CAISO Demand or exports. Any non-zero amounts in revenue collected as a result of the application of the Price Correction Derived LMP will be captured through the calculation of the IFM Congestion Charge reflected in Section 11.2.4.1 and the allocation of non-zero amounts of the sum of FMM Instructed Imbalance Energy and RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy, Uninstructed Imbalance Energy, and Unaccounted for Energy in accordance with Section 11.5.4.	
11.29(a) (last paragraph)	**11.29 CAISO as Counterparty; Billing and Payment** * * * * Bids for Supply submitted by a Scheduling Coordinator for any resource funded by Municipal Tax Exempt Debt are not, and shall not be construed or deemed to be, a sale to the CAISO or other transaction that is financially settled by the CAISO to the extent that the load serving entity that holds	This amendment proposes to correct a typographical error in making the name "ISO" consistent throughout the ISO tariff.

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	entitlements to the resource for which such Bids for Supply are submitted is using its entitlements to serve native load during that interval. For purposes of this subsection only, a load serving entity is using its entitlements to a resource to serve native load under the following conditions: A) For a Load Serving Entity that is serving demand inside the CAISO Balancing Authority Area, if the total MW volume of such Bids for Supply that clear in any settlement interval is less than or equal to the metered CAISO Demand for that settlement interval for the Load Serving Entity that holds entitlements to the resources for which such Bids for Supply are submitted, or B) for load serving entities that serve demand outside of the CAISO Balancing Authority Area by wheeling through or exporting from the CAISO Balancing Authority Area, if the total MW volume of such Bids for Supply that clear in any settlement interval is less than or equal to the total of wheel throughs or exports that are used to serve the native load for the load serving entity that holds entitlements to the resources for which such Bids for Supply are submitted during that settlement interval. Nothing in the two preceding sentences shall affect credit requirements under Section 12 of the CAISO Tariff or settlements charges or credits issued pursuant to any section of the CAISO tariff. The details of such Bids for Supply may be included in Settlement Statements by the CAISO for purposes of calculating settlement charges and credits other than for Supply.	
11.29(b)	(b) The purchase or sale of any products or service, or any other transaction, ~~that~~ which is financially settled by CAISO under this CAISO Tariff shall be deemed to occur within the State of California. To the extent permitted by applicable law, any warranties provided by the sellers to the CAISO of such products or services, whether express, implied or statutory, are hereby passed to the Business Associates who purchase such products or services from the	The ISO is proposing to removing the term “Business Customer” and replacing it with “Business Associate.” The ISO also proposes to correct a typographical error of the word “INCLUDING.”

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	CAISO on a “pass through basis” and to the extent not passed through, any such warranties are hereby assigned by the CAISO to the purchasing Business Associates. Sellers to the CAISO and Business ~~Customers~~ Associates acknowledge that warranties on such products are limited to that offered by the seller to CAISO and will exist, if at all, solely between the seller to the CAISO and the purchasing Business Associate. AS BETWEEN THE PURCHASING BUSINESS ASSOCIATE AND THE CAISO AS COUNTERPARTY, NO EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES ARE MADE BY THE CAISO REGARDING THE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES SOLD BY THE CAISO AS COUNTERPARTY, AND ANY SUCH PRODUCTS AND SERVICES ARE PROVIDED ON AN “AS IS” AND “AS AVAILABLE” BASIS. THE CAISO MAKES NO WARRANTY OR REPRESENTATION THAT THE PRODUCTS OR SERVICES WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED OR ERROR FREE. PURCHASING BUSINESS ASSOCIATES HEREBY WAIVE, AND THE CAISO HEREBY DISCLAIMS, ALL OTHER WARRANTIES, EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, TITLE AND NON-INFRINGEMENT. THE CAISO DOES NOT WARRANT THAT THE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES OFFERED WILL MEET CUSTOMER’S REQUIREMENTS. NO ORAL OR WRITTEN INFORMATION OR ADVICE GIVEN BY THE CAISO OR ANY AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CAISO SHALL CREATE A WARRANTY OR IN ANY WAY INCREASE THE SCOPE OF ANY PASS THROUGH OR ASSIGNED WARRANTY. SOME JURISDICTIONS DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, SO THE ABOVE EXCLUSION APPLIES ONLY TO THE EXTENT	

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	PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW.	
11.29.8.4.6	**11.29.8.4.6 Dispute of Recalculation Settlement Statement T+3~~5~~M** * * * * *	This amendment corrects an error in the heading by changing T+35M to T+33M to be consistent with the section.
11.29.8.4.8	**11.29.8.4.8 Unscheduled Recalculation Settlement Statements** Each Scheduling Coordinator, CRR Holder, Black Start Generator, or Participating TO may submit disputes regarding Incremental Changes on an Unscheduled Recalculation Settlement Statement issued pursuant to Section 11.29.7.3 no later than twenty-two (22) Business Days after the publication date of the Unscheduled Recalculation Settlement Statement. A dispute must only be based on Incremental Changes between the Unscheduled Recalculation Settlement Statement and prior applicable Recalculation Settlement Statement. Valid disputes regarding data appearing on an Unscheduled Recalculation Settlement Statement will be reflected on a later Recalculation Settlement Statement. If a Scheduling Coordinator, CRR Holder, Black Start Generator, or Participating TO disagrees with the CAISO's resolution of a dispute regarding data appearing on an Unscheduled Recalculation Settlement Statement, it may initiate dispute resolution under Section 13 of the CAISO Tariff pursuant to the deadlines set forth in Section 13. If a Scheduling Coordinator, CRR Holder, Black Start Generator, or Participating TO does not initiate dispute resolution under Section 13 of the CAISO Tariff within the time period set forth in Section 13, the Scheduling Coordinator, CRR Holder, Black Start Generator, or Participating TO will be deemed to have validated each Unscheduled Recalculation Settlement Statement T+~~55B~~9M.	This amendment proposes to correct the reference to the Recalculated Settlement Statement to be T+9M.

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11.29.9.3	**11.29.9.3 Accounts for Scheduling Coordinators, CRR Holders, Black Start Generators, and Participating TOs** Each Scheduling Coordinator, CRR Holder, Black Start Generator, and Participating TO shall establish and maintain at all times a Settlement Account at a commercial bank located in the United States and reasonably acceptable to the CAISO which can effect money transfers via Fedwire and, at its option, may also maintain an account capable of ACH transfers where payments to and from the CAISO Clearing Account shall be made in accordance with this CAISO Tariff. Scheduling Coordinators, CRR Holders, and Black Start Generators may, but will not be required to, maintain separate accounts for receipts and payments. Each Scheduling Coordinator, CRR Holder, and Black Start Generator shall notify the CAISO of its account details and of any changes to those details in accordance with the provisions of its Scheduling Coordinator Agreement, CRR Entity Agreement, or ~~Interim~~ Black Start Agreement. Participating TOs will notify the CAISO of their Settlement Account details in accordance with Section 2.2.1 of their Transmission Control Agreement and may notify the CAISO from time to time of any changes by giving at least seven (7) days written notice before the new account becomes operational.	The ISO proposes to modify the term “Interim Black Start Agreement” to be consistent with the definition in Appendix A, Master Definitions Supplement, and the ISO’s tariff.
11.31	**11.31 Intertie Schedules Decline Charges** The Decline Potential Charge shall apply to Intertie transactions as discussed below. The Decline Potential Charge does not apply to FMM Schedules of Economic Bids, ~~D~~dynamic ~~T~~ transfers, and Variable Energy Resources located outside the CAISO Balancing Authority Area that have been qualified to use the forecast of their output	“Dynamic Transfer” is not a defined term in the ISO tariff. As such, the ISO proposes to un-capitalize the “D” and “T” to provide clarity.

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	produced by the CAISO as specified in Section 4.8.2.1.2.	
12.5.1 (last paragraph)	**12.5.1 Under-Secured and Non-Compliant Market Participants** * * * * In addition, the CAISO may restrict or suspend a Market Participant's right to submit further Bids, including Self-Schedules, or require the Market Participant to increase its Financial Security Amount if at any time such Market Participant's potential additional liability for ~~I~~imbalance ~~E~~energy and other CAISO charges is determined by the CAISO to be excessive by comparison with the likely cost of the amount of Energy reflected in Bids or Self-Schedules submitted by the Market Participant.	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term from the ISO tariff in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and the ISO is proposing to align the tariff with that change.
16.11	**16.11 Inter-Balancing Authority Area ETC Self-Schedule Bid Changes** Changes to ETC Self-Schedules that occur during the CAISO's Real-Time Market that involve changes to CAISO Balancing Authority Area imports or exports with other Balancing Authority Areas (that is, inter-Balancing Authority Area changes to ETC Self-Schedules) will be allowed and will be recorded by the CAISO based upon notification received from the Scheduling Coordinator representing the holder of the Existing Rights. The Scheduling Coordinator representing the holder of the Existing Right must notify the CAISO of any such changes to external import/export in submitted ETC Self-Schedules. The Scheduling Coordinator representing the holder of the Existing Right must notify the CAISO of Real-Time Market changes to external import/export Interchange Schedules in submitted ETC Self-Schedules, by telephone. The timing and content of any such notification must be consistent with the TRTC Instructions previously submitted to the CAISO by the Responsible PTO. The CAISO will manually adjust or update the FMM Schedule for the	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term from the ISO tariff in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and the ISO is proposing to align the tariff with that change.

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	Scheduling Coordinator to conform with the other Balancing Authority Area's net ETC Self-Schedule in Real-Time, and the notifying Scheduling Coordinator will be responsible for and manage any resulting Energy imbalance. These FMM Instructed Imbalance Energy deviations will be priced and charged to the Scheduling Coordinator representing the holder of Existing Rights in accordance with the FMM LMP.	
16.12	**16.12 Intra-Balancing Authority Area ETC Self-Schedule Changes** Changes to ETC Self-Schedules that occur during the CAISO's Real-Time processes that do not involve changes to CAISO Balancing Authority Area imports or exports with other Balancing Authority Areas (that is, intra-Balancing Authority Area changes to Schedules) will be allowed and will give rise to FMM Instructed Imbalance Energy and RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy ~~deviations~~. These ~~se~~ ~~I~~imbalance ~~E~~energy ~~deviations~~ will be priced and charged to the Scheduling Coordinator representing the holder of Existing Rights in accordance with the ~~Real-Time~~ FMM or RTD LMP.	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated from the ISO tariff as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and replaced with more exacting defined terms. As such, the ISO is proposing to align the tariff with those changes. The ISO is also proposing to remove the term "deviations" in order to provide clarity to the language.
17.3.3(3)	**17.3.3 Settlement Treatment of Valid TOR Self-Schedules** * * * * (3) The CAISO will assess only charges applicable to Ancillary Services, ~~I~~imbalance ~~E~~energy, Transmission Losses, Flexible Ramping Product, and Grid Management Charges for the use of a TOR and will not assess charges for neutrality, UFE, transmission Access Charges, Minimum Load Costs, or other charges that might otherwise be applicable to the Demand or exports served solely over the TOR. The CAISO will assess charges applicable to Ancillary Services for the use of a TOR only to the extent that the CAISO must procure Ancillary Services for the TOR holder because Ancillary Services are not self-provided by the TOR holder. The CAISO will assess charges and provide payments for TOR Self-Schedules pursuant to the rules	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated from the ISO tariff in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and the ISO proposes to align the tariff with that change.

Section	Proposed Revisions	Reason for Change
	specified in Sections 11.2.1.5 and 11.5.7.2. The CAISO will assess charges applicable to ~~I~~imbalance ~~E~~energy for the use of a TOR only if the CAISO must procure ~~I~~imbalance ~~E~~energy for the TOR holder. The CAISO will assess Grid Management Charges for the use of a TOR only in accordance with the provisions of Section 11.22 and Appendix F, Schedule 1.	
17.3.3(5)	(5) Parties with TORs shall continue to pay for Transmission Losses or Ancillary Services requirements in accordance with any Existing Contracts applicable to those TORs as they may be modified or changed in accordance with the terms of the Existing Contract. Any affected Participating TOs shall continue to provide Transmission Losses and any other Ancillary Services to the holder of a TOR subject to an Existing Contract as may be required by the Existing Contract. As described in Section 17.3.3(3) above, the CAISO will charge Scheduling Coordinators submitting the TOR Self-Schedule the charges applicable to Transmission Losses, Ancillary Services, and ~~I~~imbalance ~~E~~energy in accordance with the CAISO Tariff (e.g., the Transmission Losses Charge based on the Marginal Cost of Losses), and any shortfall or surplus between the CAISO charges and the provisions of any applicable Existing Contract shall be settled bilaterally between the Existing Contract parties or through the relevant TO Tariff. To enable holders of TORs to determine whether the CAISO's calculations result in any associated shortfall or surplus and to enable the parties to the Existing Contracts to settle the differences bilaterally or through the relevant TO Tariff, the CAISO shall calculate and provide the Scheduling Coordinator's Settlements the amounts paid for the MCL for the amounts of MWh submitted with a valid TOR Self-Schedule. Each Participating TO will be responsible for recovering any deficits or crediting any surpluses associated	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated from the ISO tariff in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and the ISO proposes to align the tariff with that change.

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	with differences in Transmission Losses and Transmission Loss requirements and/or Ancillary Services requirements, through its bilateral arrangements or its Transmission Owner Tariff.	
17.6	**17.6 Inter-Balancing Authority Area TOR Self-Schedule Bid Changes** Changes to TOR Self-Schedules that occur during the CAISO's Real-Time Market that involve changes to CAISO Balancing Authority Area imports or exports with other Balancing Authority Areas (that is, inter-Balancing Authority Area changes to TOR Self-Schedules) will be allowed and will be recorded by the CAISO based upon notification received from the Scheduling Coordinator representing the holder of the TOR. The Scheduling Coordinator representing the holder of the TOR must notify the CAISO of any such changes to external import/export in submitted TOR Self-Schedules. The Scheduling Coordinator representing the holder of the TOR must notify the CAISO of Real-Time Market changes to external import/export Interchange Schedules in submitted TOR Self-Schedules, by telephone. The timing and content of any such notification must be consistent with the TRTC Instructions previously submitted to the CAISO by the Non-Participating TO. The CAISO will manually adjust or update the FMM Schedule for the Scheduling Coordinator to conform with the other Balancing Authority Area's net TOR Self-Schedule in Real-Time, and the notifying Scheduling Coordinator will be responsible for and manage any resulting Energy imbalance. The~~se~~ FMM Instructed Imbalance Energy ~~deviations~~ will be priced and charged to the Scheduling Coordinator representing the holder of the TOR in accordance with the FMM LMP.	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated from the ISO tariff as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and replaced with more exacting defined terms. As such, the ISO is proposing to align the tariff with those changes. The ISO is also proposing to remove the term "deviations" in order to provide clarity to the language.
17.7	**17.7 Intra-Balancing Authority Area TOR Self-Schedule Changes** Changes to TOR Self-Schedules that occur during the	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated from the ISO tariff as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and replaced with more exacting defined

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	CAISO's Real-Time processes that do not involve changes to CAISO Balancing Authority Area imports or exports with other Balancing Authority Areas (that is, intra-Balancing Authority Area changes to Schedules) will be allowed and will give rise to FMM Instructed Imbalance Energy and RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy ~~deviations~~. The~~se~~ ~~I~~imbalance ~~E~~energy ~~deviations~~ will be priced and charged to the Scheduling Coordinator representing the holder of the TOR in accordance with the ~~Real-Time~~FMM or RTD LMP.	terms. As such, the ISO is proposing to align the tariff with those changes. The ISO is also proposing to remove the term "deviations" in order to provide clarity to the language.
27.5.1.2 to 27.5.1.2.3	**27.5.1 Network Models used in CAISO Markets** * * * * **27.5.1.2 [Not Used] ~~Accuracy Metric for Modeled External Unscheduled Flow in the Day-Ahead Market~~** **27.5.1.2.1 [Not Used]~~Accuracy Metric~~** ~~For each Day-Ahead Market, the CAISO will calculate the external unscheduled flow accuracy metric as described further in this Section 27.5.1.2. The accuracy metric is a comparison of the magnitude of the difference between the following two amounts under two scenarios: 1) the actual unscheduled flows on the Interties caused by external Balancing Authority Area generation, load, and interchanges; and 2) the CAISO's modeled Day-Ahead external unscheduled flow on the Interties per hour in MW. In the first scenario, the CAISO models the external unscheduled flow impacts of external Balancing Authority Area schedules in the Day-Ahead Market. In the second scenario, the CAISO does not model these flow impacts. For purposes of the accuracy metric, the external unscheduled flow is defined as the flow impact over the CAISO Interties of supply, demand, and area-to-area net scheduled interchanges between external Balancing Authority Areas. The external unscheduled flow will be derived based on a power flow solution and will be calculated separately for the Day-Ahead and actual network~~	The ISO has met the metric and is proposing to remove this requirement from the ISO tariff.

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	~~conditions on an average hourly basis for each Intertie. For the Day-Ahead, the CAISO will rerun a solved case and isolate the flow impact of external Balancing Authority Areas, if modeled, to derive the modeled external unscheduled flow. For the actual network conditions, the CAISO will use the actual external area-to-area net scheduled Interchange and the State Estimator solution to capture the actual supply, demand, and topology, and will isolate the flow impact of external Balancing Authority Areas to derive the actual external unscheduled flow. To calculate the external unscheduled flow accuracy metric, the CAISO will compare the Day-Ahead modeled external unscheduled flow and the actual external unscheduled flow for each of the scenarios. For the first scenario, the CAISO will take the difference per Intertie, per Trading Hour of the actual external unscheduled flow and the modeled Day-Ahead external unscheduled flow. For the second scenario, the CAISO will also take the difference per Intertie, per Trading Hour of the actual external unscheduled flow and the modeled Day-Ahead external unscheduled flow. Under the second scenario, the modeled Day-Ahead external unscheduled flow is zero, so the resulting difference is the absolute value of the actual external unscheduled flow. The CAISO will sum the absolute value of these sets of differences under the two scenarios.~~ **27.5.1.2.2 [Not Used] ~~Accuracy Metric Threshold and Suspension~~** ~~To determine whether or not the CAISO has met the accuracy metric, the CAISO calculates the accuracy metric on an Intertie basis per Trading Hour and then sums the absolute value of the differences per Intertie, per Trading Hour across all Interties and all Trading Hours to calculate a three-week rolling average per the scenarios described in Section 27.5.1.2.1. The CAISO excludes from the accuracy metric the impact of the following unforeseen Real-Time~~	

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	~~events: the loss of direct current transmission lines, unexpected outages of generators over 1,000 MW, or a derate of over 1,000 MW at any Intertie. If the three-week rolling average of the aggregated accuracy metric shows that the magnitude of the difference under the first scenario is greater than the magnitude of the difference under the second scenario, as described in Section 27.5.1.2.1, the CAISO will suspend its consideration of external unscheduled flow due to external Balancing Authority Area schedules in the Day-Ahead Market by disabling the impact of the net scheduled interchange between external Balancing Authority Areas. The suspension will be in place until the CAISO demonstrates that the three-week rolling average of the aggregated accuracy metric under the first scenario is less than it is under the second scenario. Even when the accuracy metric threshold is met, if the CAISO determines that the consideration of the external unscheduled flow is hampering the CAISO's ability to operate the system reliably, the CAISO may elect to suspend the consideration of the unscheduled flow in the Day-Ahead Market until it has determined that considering the external unscheduled flow no longer hampers its ability to operate the system reliably. Any suspension and return of the CAISO's consideration of external unscheduled flow in the Day-Ahead Market will be conducted as soon as practicable, consistent with and as permitted by the CAISO Markets timelines and the CAISO's processes. During any period of suspension, the CAISO will continue to calculate the accuracy metric offline and will base its reinstatement of external unscheduled flow consideration in the Day-Ahead Market on the accuracy metric being met based on the three-week rolling average.~~ **27.5.1.2.3 [Not Used] ~~Sunset~~** ~~Section 27.5.1.2 and its subsections will no longer be~~	

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	~~effective, if the CAISO has not failed the metric described therein for twelve (12) consecutive months after the first twelve months that this section is effective.~~	
27.5.3.2.2 (1st and last paragraphs)	**27.5.3.2.2 Information Needed to Determine Application of MEEA-Specific Pricing in any Settlement Interval or Settlement Period** If an MEEA signatory submits a Bid in the CAISO Market and seeks to obtain an MEEA-specific LMP for an interchange transaction, the CAISO must be capable of verifying what portion (output in ~~megawatt hours~~MWh) of the resources identified in the MEEA, if any, were dispatched to implement the interchange transaction. To the extent that the resources identified in the MEEA, or portion thereof, were dispatched and operated for purposes other than the interchange transaction submitted in the CAISO Market, the Schedule or ~~I~~imbalance ~~E~~energy associated with the Bid submitted and cleared in the CAISO Market will not receive an MEEA-specific LMP, and will instead receive the default IBAA price specified in Appendix C, Section ~~G~~I.1.1. The CAISO will establish Resource IDs that are to be used only to submit Bids, including Self-Schedules, for the purpose of obtaining MEEA-specific pricing. MEEA signatories may obtain and use other Resource IDs to submit Bids, including Self-Schedules, that are not covered by an MEEA. Prior to obtaining and settling Resource IDs under the terms of the MEEA, the relevant Scheduling Coordinator shall attest that use of the Resource ID shall mean that the MEEA signatory dispatched a resource identified in an MEEA to support the MEEA interchange transaction. This attestation shall be executed under oath by an officer of the MEEA with knowledge of the MEEA signatory's operations. By actually using such Resource IDs, the Scheduling Coordinator represents that MEEA resources are dispatched to support such Bids, including Self-Schedules. The CAISO may	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment filing. As such, the ISO is proposing to align the tariff with that change. This amendment also proposes to correct an ISO tariff appendix section cross-reference and change a term to the acronym to be consistent throughout the ISO tariff.

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	challenge the use of these Resource IDs and conduct an audit under Section 27.5.3.7. * * * * In addition, in the event that there is a Dynamic Resource-Specific System Resource in the IBAA, the MEEA may further provide that the MEEA signatory in control of such resource may also obtain pricing under the MEEA for imports to the CAISO Balancing Authority Area from the Dynamic Resource-Specific System Resource. For any portion of an interchange transaction for which the MEEA Entity has not self-certified that the resources were used to support interchange transactions, the default IBAA price specified in Appendix C, Section ~~G~~I.1.1 will apply for the corresponding volume and time period.	
27.8.3 (last paragraph)	**27.8.3 Changes in Status and Configurations of Resource** * * * * When transitioning to implement these changes across the midnight hour, for any Real-Time Market run in which the changes specified in this Section 27.8.3 are to take effect within the ~~T~~time ~~H~~horizon of any of the Real-Time Market runs, the CAISO will Schedule, Dispatch, or award resources consistent with either the prior or new status and definitions, as appropriate, and required by any Real-Time conditions regardless of the resource's state scheduled or awarded in the immediately preceding Day-Ahead Market. A Scheduling Coordinator may unregister a Generating Unit from its Multi-Stage Generating Resource status subject to the timing requirements for Master File changes, and such changes are not subject to the timing requirements in Section 27.8.3. Changes to the attributes listed above in this Section may take effect, including the registration of new Multi-Stage Generating Resources, provided Scheduling Coordinators have previously followed the	"Time Horizon" was eliminated in the ISO's 2011 tariff clarification compliance filing and the ISO proposes to align the tariff with that change. The ISO will also be correcting all records related to Section 27.8 as these records were inadvertently filed as one record and each to the point three decimal should be a separate, individual record.

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	registration process requirements listed in Section 27.8.1. Changes to these attributes may only be made every sixty (60) days after the day on which any such changes have taken effect.	
29.10(e)(2)	**29.10 Metering and Settlement Data.** * * * * (e) **EIM Energy Imbalance with an External Balancing Authority Area.** For each EIM External Intertie Bid that clears the FMM resulting in a 15-minute EIM External Intertie schedule – (1) the EIM Entity Scheduling Coordinator must submit to the CAISO the corresponding hourly transmission profile and 15-minute Energy profiles from the respective E-Tags, which must reflect the Point of Receipt and Point of Delivery that was declared in the FMM Bid submittal, at least 20 minutes before the start of the Operating Hour; and (2) the EIM Entity Scheduling Coordinator must provide an updated Energy profile to the extent required by Section 30.5.7~~6.2~~.	Tariff Section 30.6.2 entitled "E-Tag Rules and Treatment of Intertie Schedules" is being moved to Section 30.3 and this amendment will change the cross-reference.
29.11(n)	**29.11 Settlements and Billing for EIM Market Participants.** * * * * (n) **EIM Transfers and Settlement for Contingency Reserve Obligations.** The CAISO shall allocate Operating Reserve Obligations to EIM Entity Scheduling Coordinators for EIM Transfers as follows – (1) EIM Entity Scheduling Coordinators will receive a payment equal to three (3) percent of the hourly MW EIM Transfer into the CAISO Balancing Authority Area multiplied by the hourly user rate for Spinning Reserves and Non-Spinning Reserves, as calculated per Section 11.10.3.3~~2~~ and 11.10.4.3~~2~~, respectively; and (2) EIM Entity Scheduling Coordinators will receive a charge equal to three (3) percent of the hourly MW	This amendment corrects ISO Tariff Section cross-references.

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	EIM Transfer out of the CAISO Balancing Authority Area multiplied by the hourly user rate for Spinning Reserves and Non-Spinning Reserves, as calculated per Section 11.10.3.3~~2~~ and 11.10.4.3~~2~~, respectively.	
29.34(I)(4)(a)	**29.34 EIM Operations** * * * * **(I) EIM Resource Plan Evaluation.** * * * * **(4) Additional Hourly Capacity Requirements.** (A) In General. If the CAISO determines under the procedures set forth in the Business Practice Manual for the Energy Imbalance Market that a~~n~~ Balancing Authority Area in the EIM Area has historically high import or export schedule changes between forty minutes and twenty minutes before the start of the Trading Hour, the CAISO will add to the Balancing Authority Area in the EIM Area's capacity requirements an additional requirement.	This amendment corrects a typographical and grammatical error by changing the word "an" to "a."
30.5.2.4	**30.5.2.4 Supply Bids for System Resources** In addition to the common elements listed in Section 30.5.2.1, Supply Bids for System Resources shall also contain: the relevant Ramp Rate; Start-Up Costs; and Minimum Load Costs. Resource-Specific System Resources are subject to the Proxy Cost methodology or the Registered Cost methodology for Start-Up Costs and Minimum Load Costs as provided in Section 30.4, and Transaction ID as created by the CAISO. Other System Resources are not eligible to recover Start-Up Costs and Minimum Load Costs. Resource-Specific System Resources are eligible to participate in the Day-Ahead Market on an equivalent basis as Generating Units and are not obligated to participate in RUC or the RTM if the resource did not receive a Day-Ahead Schedule unless the resource is a Resource Adequacy Resource. If the Resource-Specific System Resource is a Resource	This amendment aligns the ISO tariff with the Order No. 764 tariff amendment filing and removes the term "HASP."

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	Adequacy Resource, the Scheduling Coordinator for the resource is obligated to make it available to the CAISO Market as prescribed by Section 40.6. Dynamic Resource-Specific System Resources are also eligible to participate in ~~the HASP and~~ RTM on an equivalent basis as Generating Units. The quantity (in MWh) of Energy categorized as Interruptible Imports (non-firm imports) can only be submitted through Self-Schedules in the Day-Ahead Market and cannot be incrementally increased in the ~~HASP or~~ RTM. Bids submitted to the Day-Ahead Market for ELS Resources will be applicable for two days after they have been submitted and cannot be changed the day after they have been submitted.	
30.5.2.7.2	**30.5.2.7.2 Spinning Reserve Capacity Bid Information** In the case of Spinning Reserve capacity, the Ancillary Services Bid must also contain: (a) MW of additional capability synchronized to the system, immediately responsive to system frequency, and available within ten (10) minutes; (b) Bid price of capacity reservation, and (c) an indication whether the capacity reserved would be available to supply ~~i~~imbalance ~~E~~energy only in the event of the occurrence of an unplanned Outage, a Contingency or an imminent or actual System Emergency (Contingency Flag). In the case of Spinning Reserve capacity from System Resources, the Ancillary Services Bid must also contain: (a) Schedule ID (NERC ID number), and (b) a Contract Reference Number, if applicable. Ancillary Services Bids and Submissions to Self-Provide an Ancillary Services submitted to the Real-Time Market for Spinning Reserves must also submit an Energy Bid that covers the Ancillary Services capacity being offered into the Real-Time Market.	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and the ISO proposes to align the tariff with that change.
30.5.2.7.3	**30.5.2.7.3 Non-Spinning Reserve Capacity** In the case of Non-Spinning Reserve, the Ancillary Service Bid must also contain: (a) the MW capability available within	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and the ISO proposes to align the tariff with that change.

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	ten (10) minutes; (b) the Bid price of the capacity reservation; (c) time of synchronization following notification (minutes); and (d) an indication whether the capacity reserved would be available to supply ~~I~~imbalance ~~E~~energy only in the event of the occurrence of an unplanned Outage, a Contingency or an imminent or actual System Emergency (Contingency Flag). In the case of Non-Spinning Reserve Capacity from System Resources, the Ancillary Services Bid must also contain: (a) Schedule ID (NERC ID number); and (b) a Contract Reference Number, if applicable. In the case of Non-Spinning Reserve Capacity from Participating Load within the CAISO Balancing Authority Area, the Ancillary Service Bid must also contain: (a) a Load identification name and Location Code, (b) Demand reduction available within ten (10) minutes, (c) time to interruption following notification (minutes), and (d) maximum allowable curtailment duration (hour). In the case of Aggregated Participating Load, and Proxy Demand Resources, Scheduling Coordinators must submit Bids using a Generating Unit, Physical Scheduling Plant Resource ID, or Resource ID for the Proxy Demand Resource for the Demand reduction capacity of the Aggregated Participating Load through a Bid to provide Non-Spinning Reserve or a Submission to Self-Provide an Ancillary Service for Non-Spinning Reserve. Ancillary Services Bids and Submissions to Self-Provide an Ancillary Services submitted to the Real-Time Market for Non-Spinning Reserves must also submit an Energy Bid that covers the Ancillary Services capacity being offered into the Real-Time Market.	
30.5.7	**30.5.7~~30.6.2~~ E-Tag Rules and Treatment of Intertie Schedules** In addition to complying with all generally applicable E-Tagging requirements, Scheduling Coordinators must submit their E-tags consistent with the requirements specified in this	The ISO is moving Section 30.6.2 entitled “E-Tag Rules and Treatment of Intertie Schedules” to Section 30.5.7 as two separate tariff sections are currently assigned to the same tariff section number.

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	Section 30.5.7. If a Scheduling Coordinator receives an intra-hour Schedule change, then the Scheduling Coordinator must, by twenty minutes before the start of the FMM interval to which the Schedule change applies, ensure that an updated energy profile reflects the change. Absent extenuating circumstances, the CAISO automatically updates Energy profiles on E-tags for Energy Schedules that change from HASP to the FMM within a Trading Hour. In performing this service for a Scheduling Coordinator, the CAISO does not assume any responsibility for compliance with any E-tag requirements or obligations to which the Scheduling Coordinator is subject. The changed energy profile will apply for the balance of the operating hour unless it is subsequently changed by a further updated energy profile.	
30.5.7.1	**30.5.7.1~~30.6.2.1~~ Self-Scheduled Hourly Blocks** By twenty minutes prior to the applicable Trading Hour, the Scheduling Coordinator must submit an E-Tag in support of Self-Scheduled Hourly Blocks. The transmission profile must be greater than or equal to the Energy profile, and the Energy profile must equal the Self-Scheduled Hourly Block. The CAISO may modify the Energy profile due to Reliability related curtailments.	The ISO is moving Section 30.6.2.1 entitled "Self-Scheduled Hourly Blocks" to Section 30.5.7.1 as two separate tariff sections are currently assigned to the same tariff section number.
30.5.7.2	**30.5.7.2~~30.6.2.2~~ Variable Energy Resource Self-Schedule** By twenty minutes prior to the applicable Trading Hour, the Scheduling Coordinator must submit an E-Tag in support of a Variable Energy Resource Self-Schedule. The transmission profile must be greater than or equal to the Energy profile, and the Energy profile must equal the Variable Energy Resource Self-Schedule. The CAISO may modify the Energy profile due to Reliability related curtailments.	The ISO is moving Section 30.6.2.2 entitled "Variable Energy Resource Self-Schedule" to Section 30.5.7.2 as two separate tariff sections are currently assigned to the same tariff section number.
30.5.7.3	**30.5.7.3~~30.6.2.3~~ Economic Hourly Bid** By twenty minutes prior to the applicable Trading Hour, the Scheduling Coordinator must submit an E-Tag in support of	The ISO is moving Section 30.6.2.3 entitled "Economic Hourly Bid" to Section 30.5.7.3 as two separate tariff sections are currently assigned to the

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	an Economic Hourly Block Bid. The transmission profile must be greater than or equal to the Energy profile, and the Energy profile must equal the Economic Hourly Block Bid as awarded through HASP. The CAISO may modify the Energy profile due to Reliability related curtailments.	same tariff section number.
30.5.7.4	**30.5.7.4~~30.6.2.4~~ Economic Hourly Block Bid with Intra-Hour Option** By twenty minutes prior to the applicable Trading Hour, the Scheduling Coordinator must submit an E-Tag in support of an Economic Hourly Block Bid. The transmission profile must be greater than or equal to the Energy profile, and the Energy profile must equal the Economic Hourly Block Bid as awarded through HASP. The CAISO may modify the Energy profile due to Reliability related curtailments. In the case of an intra-hour redispatch from the FMM, the CAISO may increment or decrement the Energy profile to correspond to the intra-hour redispatch.	The ISO is moving Section 30.6.2.4 entitled "Economic Hourly Block Bid with Intra-Hour Option" to Section 30.5.7.4 as two separate tariff sections are currently assigned to the same tariff section number.
30.5.7.5	**30.5.7.5~~30.6.2.5~~ FMM Economic Bid** By twenty minutes prior to the applicable Trading Hour, the Scheduling Coordinator must submit an E-Tag in support of a FMM Economic Bid. The transmission profile must be greater than or equal to the maximum bid-in capacity for the Trading Hour, and the Energy profile must equal the MWs awarded for the first FMM interval of the Operating Hour. If the Scheduling Coordinator intends to limit its participation in the FMM to the quantity in the HASP advisory energy schedule (including zero), the Scheduling Coordinator may update its transmission profile to the maximum amount it wants to make available to the FMM prior to the start of the binding FMM optimization, which is no earlier than thirty-seven and a half minutes before the applicable Trading Hour. If the Scheduling Coordinator does not have a transmission profile greater than or equal to its advisory Energy schedule, then the CAISO will limit the schedule for Energy in the FMM	The ISO is moving Section 30.6.2.5 entitled "FMM Economic Bid" to Section 30.5.7.5 as two separate tariff sections are currently assigned to the same tariff section number.

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	so that it does not exceed amounts greater than what is listed in the transmission profile. Cleared FMM Economic Bids are eligible for Bid Cost Recovery as specified in Section 11.8.	
30.6.2	**30.6.2 Bidding and Scheduling of RDRRs** Unless otherwise specified in the CAISO Tariff and applicable Business Practice Manuals, and subject to Section 30.6.3, the CAISO will treat Bids for Energy on behalf of Reliability Demand Response Resources like Bids for Energy on behalf of other types of supply resources. A Scheduling Coordinator for a Demand Response Provider representing a Reliability Demand Response Resource may submit Energy Bids for the Reliability Demand Response Resource only in the Day-Ahead Market and in the Real-Time Market, but may not submit Energy Self-Schedules for the Reliability Demand Response Resource, may not Self-Provide Ancillary Services from the Reliability Demand Response Resource, and may not submit RUC Availability Bids or Ancillary Service Bids for the Reliability Demand Response Resource. The Demand Response Provider's Demand Response Services for Reliability Demand Response Resources will be bid separately and independently from the LSE's underlying Demand Bid. **30.6.2.1 Bidding and Scheduling of RDRRs in the Real-Time Market** **30.6.2.1.1 Limitations on Obligation to Bid in the Real-Time Market** Within each Reliability Demand Response Services Term, any capacity of a Reliability Demand Response Resource that remains uncommitted after the Day-Ahead Market shall be bid in the Real-Time Market in order to be available to provide Demand Response Services in Real-Time until such time as the Reliability Demand Response Resource has reached the RDRR Availability Limit for the Reliability Demand Response Services Term. Within each Reliability	The ISO is submitting an eTariff record for Section 30.6.2 to read as "Bidding and Scheduling of RDRRs," as there are currently two separate tariff sections assigned to the same tariff section number.

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	Demand Response Services Term, any capacity of a Reliability Demand Response Resource that remains uncommitted after the Day-Ahead Market may be (but is not required to be) bid in the Real-Time Market in order to be available to provide Demand Response Services in Real-Time after the Reliability Demand Response Resource has reached the RDRR Availability Limit during the Reliability Demand Response Services Term. **30.6.2.1.2 Real-Time Dispatch Options** For purposes of bidding and scheduling in the Real-Time Market, each Scheduling Coordinator for a Demand Response Provider representing a Reliability Demand Response Resource shall select either the Marginal Real-Time Dispatch Option or the Discrete Real-Time Dispatch Option prior to the start of the initial Reliability Demand Response Services Term applicable to the Reliability Demand Response Resource. The selection for each Reliability Demand Response Resource shall remain in effect until such time as the Scheduling Coordinator for the Reliability Demand Response Resource chooses to change its selection from the Marginal Real-Time Dispatch Option to the Discrete Real-Time Dispatch Option or vice versa, in which case the change in selection shall go into effect at the start of the next Reliability Demand Response Services Term applicable to the Reliability Demand Response Resource. A Reliability Demand Response Resource that is subject to either the Marginal Real-Time Dispatch Option or the Discrete Real-Time Dispatch Option shall have Minimum Load Costs of zero (0) dollars registered in the Master File. **30.6.2.1.2 Marginal Real-Time Dispatch Option** A Reliability Demand Response Resource that is subject to the Marginal Real-Time Dispatch Option: (a) May submit either a single-segment Bid or a multi-segment bid in the Real-Time Market that must be at least	

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	ninety-five (95) percent of the applicable maximum Bid price and can be no greater than one hundred (100) percent of the applicable maximum Bid price set forth in Section 39.6.1.1. (b) Shall be dispatched as a marginal resource if it is dispatched by the CAISO. **30.6.2.1.2.2 Discrete Real-Time Dispatch Option** A Reliability Demand Response Resource that is subject to the Discrete Real-Time Dispatch Option: (a) May submit only a single-segment Bid in the Real-Time Market that must be at least ninety-five (95) percent of the applicable maximum Bid price and can be no greater than one hundred (100) percent of the applicable maximum Bid price set forth in Section 39.6.1.1. (b) Shall be dispatched as a discrete (non-marginal) resource if it is dispatched by the CAISO. ~~**30.6.2 -Tag Rules and Treatment of Intertie Schedules**~~ ~~In addition to complying with all generally applicable E-Tagging requirements, Scheduling Coordinators must submit their E-tags consistent with the requirements specified in this Section 30.6.2. If a Scheduling Coordinator receives an intra-hour Schedule change, then the Scheduling Coordinator must, by twenty minutes before the start of the FMM interval to which the Schedule change applies, ensure that an updated energy profile reflects the change. Absent extenuating circumstances, the CAISO automatically updates Energy profiles on E-tags for Energy Schedules that change from HASP to the FMM within a Trading Hour. In performing this service for a Scheduling Coordinator, the CAISO does not assume any responsibility for compliance with any E-tag requirements or obligations to which the Scheduling Coordinator is subject. The changed energy profile will apply for the balance of the operating hour unless it is subsequently changed by a further updated energy profile.~~ ~~**30.6.2.1 Self-Scheduled Hourly Blocks** By twenty~~	

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	~~minutes prior to the applicable Trading Hour, the Scheduling Coordinator must submit an E-Tag in support of Self-Scheduled Hourly Blocks. The transmission profile must be greater than or equal to the Energy profile, and the Energy profile must equal the Self-Scheduled Hourly Block. The CAISO may modify the Energy profile due to Reliability related curtailments.~~ ~~**30.6.2.2 Variable Energy Resource Self-Schedule**~~ ~~By twenty minutes prior to the applicable Trading Hour, the Scheduling Coordinator must submit an E-Tag in support of a Variable Energy Resource Self-Schedule. The transmission profile must be greater than or equal to the Energy profile, and the Energy profile must equal the Variable Energy Resource Self-Schedule. The CAISO may modify the Energy profile due to Reliability related curtailments.~~ ~~**30.6.2.3 Economic Hourly Block Bid**~~ ~~By twenty minutes prior to the applicable Trading Hour, the Scheduling Coordinator must submit an E-Tag in support of an Economic Hourly Block Bid. The transmission profile must be greater than or equal to the Energy profile, and the Energy profile must equal the Economic Hourly Block Bid as awarded through HASP. The CAISO may modify the Energy profile due to Reliability related curtailments.~~ ~~**30.6.2.4. Economic Hourly Block Bid with Intra-Hour Option**~~ ~~By twenty minutes prior to the applicable Trading Hour, the Scheduling Coordinator must submit an E-Tag in support of an Economic Hourly Block Bid. The transmission profile must be greater than or equal to the Energy profile, and the Energy profile must equal the Economic Hourly Block Bid as awarded through HASP. The CAISO may modify the Energy profile due to Reliability related curtailments. In the case of an intra-hour redispatch from the FMM, the CAISO may increment or decrement the Energy profile to correspond to~~	

Section	Proposed Revisions	Reason for Change
	~~the intra-hour redispatch.~~ ~~**30.6.2.5 FMM Economic Bid**~~ ~~By twenty minutes prior to the applicable Trading Hour, the Scheduling Coordinator must submit an E-Tag in support of a FMM Economic Bid. The transmission profile must be greater than or equal to the maximum bid-in capacity for the Trading Hour, and the Energy profile must equal the MWs awarded for the first FMM interval of the Operating Hour. If the Scheduling Coordinator intends to limit its participation in the FMM to the quantity in the HASP advisory energy schedule (including zero), the Scheduling Coordinator may update its transmission profile to the maximum amount it wants to make available to the FMM prior to the start of the binding FMM optimization, which is no earlier than thirty-seven and a half minutes before the applicable Trading Hour. If the Scheduling Coordinator does not have a transmission profile greater than or equal to its advisory Energy schedule, then the CAISO will limit the schedule for Energy in the FMM so that it does not exceed amounts greater than what is listed in the transmission profile. Cleared FMM Economic Bids are eligible for Bid Cost Recovery as specified in Section 11.8.~~	
34.1.1	**34.1.1 Day-Ahead Market Results as Inputs to the Real-Time Market** All of the Real-Time Market processes utilize results produced by the Day-Ahead Market for each Trading Hour of the Trading Day, including the combined commitments contained in the Day-Ahead Schedules, Day-Ahead Ancillary Services Awards, and RUC Awards. ~~Although the RTM utilizes such~~ These DAM results ~~as an~~ are inputs to the RTM. ~~and t~~The transactions associated with ~~those~~ DAM results are settled based on the relevant DAM prices, ~~such transactions~~ and are not deemed performed ~~until~~ in the Real-Time Market.	The ISO proposes language to clarify about when transactions are in the day-ahead market being deemed to be performed.
34.1.6.3	**34.1.6.3 [Not Used]~~Participating Intermittent Resources under PIRP Protective Measures~~**	This amendment removes reference to PIRP Protective Measures, which expired in May of 2017.

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	~~For Participating Intermittent Resources that have elected PIRP Protective Measures, the CAISO will use a Self-Schedule of MWhs that is equal to the MWhs specified in the output forecast for that resource created by the CAISO ninety (90) minutes before the applicable Trading Hour to clear the resource in the RTM.~~	
34.5.3	**34.5.3 Real-Time Manual Dispatch** RTMD mode of operation for RTD is a merit-order run activated upon CAISO Operator request as a backup process in case the normal RTED process fails to converge. The RTMD run will provide the CAISO Operator a list of resources and quantity of MW available for Dispatch in merit-order based on Operational Ramp Rate but otherwise ignores Transmission Losses and Transmission Constraints. The CAISO Operator may dispatch resources from the list by identifying the quantity of FMM Instructed Imbalance Energy or RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy that is required for the system and/or directly selecting resources from the merit order taking into consideration actual operating conditions. After Dispatches have been selected, reviewed and accepted by the CAISO Operator, Dispatch Instructions will be communicated in accordance with Section 6.3. While the RTMD mode is being used for Dispatch a uniform five-minute MCP will be produced for all PNodes based on the merit order Dispatch. Until RTMD is actually run and RTMD-based Dispatch Instructions are issued after RTED fails to converge, all five-minute Dispatch Interval LMPs will be set to the last LMP at each Node produced by the last RTED run that converged.	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term and replaced with more exacting definitions in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment. As such, the ISO is proposing to align the ISO tariff with that change.
34.8(b)(ii)	**34.8 Dispatch Instructions to Units, Participating Loads, PDRs and RDRRs** * * * * (b) Energy, which may be used for: (i) Congestion relief;	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and the ISO proposes to align the tariff with that change.

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	(ii) provision of ~~I~~imbalance ~~E~~energy; or (iii) replacement of an Ancillary Service;	
34.8(f)-(h)	**34.8 Dispatch Instructions to Units, Participating Loads, PDRs and RDRRs** * * * * (f) Dispatch necessary to respond to a System Emergency or imminent emergency; (g) Transition Instructions; (h) Dispatch of Reliability Demand Response Resources pursuant to Section 34.22~~18~~; or (i) Uncertainty Awards.	This amendment corrects an ISO Tariff Section cross-reference.
34.11.3	**34.11.3 Transmission-Related Modeling Limitations** The CAISO may also manually Dispatch resources in addition to or instead of resources with a Day-Ahead Schedule or dispatched by the RTM optimization software, during or prior to the Real-Time as appropriate, to address transmission-related modeling limitations in the Full Network Model. Transmission-related modeling limitations for the purposes of Exceptional Dispatch, including for settlement of such Exceptional Dispatch as described in Section 11.5.6, shall consist of any FNM modeling limitations that arise from transmission maintenance, lack of Voltage Support at proper levels as well as incomplete or incorrect information about the transmission network, for which the Participating TOs have primary responsibility. The CAISO shall also manually Dispatch resources under this Section 34.11.3 in response to system conditions including threatened or imminent reliability conditions for which the timing of the Real-Time Market optimization and system modeling are either too slow or incapable of bringing the CAISO Controlled Grid back to reliable operations in an appropriate time-frame based on the timing and physical characteristics of available resources to the CAISO. All reliability-based Exceptional Dispatch	This amendment corrects an ISO Tariff Section cross-reference.

Section	Proposed Revisions	Reason for Change
	Instructions for Reliability Demand Response Resources, including for testing, will be issued under this Section 34.11~~9~~.3.	
34.13.2 (Second Paragraph)	**34.13.2 Failure To Conform To Dispatch Instructions** * * * * When a resource demonstrates that it is not following Dispatch Instructions, the RTM will no longer assume that the resource will ramp from its current output level. The RTM assumes the resource to be "non-compliant" if it is deviating its five (5)-minute Ramping capability for more than N intervals by a magnitude determined by the CAISO based on its determination that it is necessary to improve the calculation of the expected ~~I~~imbalance ~~E~~energy as further defined in the BPM. When a resource is identified as "non-compliant," RTM will set the Dispatch operating target for that resource equal to its actual output in the Market Clearing software such that the persistent error does not cause excessive AGC action and consequently require CAISO to take additional action to comply with reliability requirements. Such a resource will be considered to have returned to compliance when the resource's State Estimator or telemetry value (whichever is applicable) is within the above specified criteria. During the time when the resource is "non-compliant.~~,~~" the last applicable Dispatch target shall be communicated to the Scheduling Coordinator as the Dispatch operating target. The last applicable Dispatch target may be (i) the last Dispatch operating target within the current Trading Hour that was instructed prior to the resource becoming "non-compliant," or (ii) the Day-Ahead Schedule, or (iii) awarded Self-Schedule Hourly Block depending on whether the resource submitted a Bid and the length of time the resource was "non-compliant," or (iv) for a Dynamic System Resource or a Pseudo-Tie Generating Unit that is an	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and the ISO proposes to align the tariff with that change. The ISO proposes correction to punctuation.

Section	Proposed Revisions	Reason for Change
	Eligible Intermittent Resource, the most recently available telemetry for the actual output. During the time the resource is deemed to be "non-compliant" the CAISO will suspend the resource's eligibility for Ancillary Services and Uncertainty Awards.	
34.17.1(b)	**34.17.1 Resource Constraints** * * * * (b) Forbidden Operating Regions. When ramping in the Forbidden Operating Region, the implicit ramp rate will be used as determined based on the time it takes for the resource to cross its Forbidden Operating Region. A resource can only be ramped through a Forbidden Operating Region after being dispatched into a Forbidden Operating~~on~~ Region. The CAISO will not Dispatch a resource within its Forbidden Operating Regions in the Real-Time Market, except that the CAISO may Dispatch the resource through the Forbidden Operating Region in the direction that the resource entered the Forbidden Operating Region at the maximum applicable Ramp Rate over consecutive Dispatch Intervals. A resource with a Forbidden Operating Region cannot provide Ancillary Services in a particular fifteen (15) minute Dispatch Interval unless that resource can complete its transit through the relevant Forbidden Operating Region within that particular Dispatch Interval.	This amendment corrects a typographical error to reflect the term "Operating" rather than "Operation."
34.17.1(c)	**34.17.1 Resource Constraints** * * * * (c) Operational Ramp Rates and Start-Up Times. The submitted Operational Ramp Rate for resources shall be used as the basis for all Dispatch Instructions, provided that the Dispatch Operating Point for resources that are providing Regulation remains within their applicable Regulating Range. The Regulating Range will limit the Ramping of Dispatch Instructions issued to resources that are providing Regulation. The Ramp Rate for Non-Dynamic System	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and the ISO proposes to align the tariff with that change.

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	Resources cleared in the FMM will not be observed. Rather, the ramp of the Non-Dynamic System Resource will respect inter-Balancing Authority Area Ramping conventions established by WECC. Ramp Rates for Dynamic System Resources will be observed like Participating Generators in the RTD. Each Energy Bid shall be Dispatched only up to the amount of ~~I~~imbalance ~~E~~energy that can be provided within the Dispatch Interval based on the applicable Operational Ramp Rate. The Dispatch Instruction shall consider the relevant Start-Up Time as, if the resource is off-line, the relevant Operational Ramp Rate function, and any other resource constraints or prior commitments such as Schedule changes across hours and previous Dispatch Instructions. The Start-Up Time shall be determined from the Start-Up Time function and when the resource was last shut down. The Start-Up Time shall not apply if the corresponding resource is on-line or expected to start.	
34.17.1(g)	**34.17.1 Resource Constraints** * * * * (g) Non-Dynamic System Resources. If Dispatched, each Non-Dynamic System Resource flagged for hourly pre-dispatch in the next Trading Hour shall be Dispatched to operate at a constant level over the entire Trading Hour. The HASP shall perform the hourly pre-dispatch for each Trading Hour once prior to the Operating Hour. The hourly pre-dispatch shall not subsequently be revised by the SCED and the resulting HASP Block Intertie Schedules are financially binding and are settled pursuant to Section 11.5~~4~~.	This amendment corrects an ISO Tariff Section cross-reference.
34.17.4	**34.17.4 Inter-Hour Dispatch Of Resources With Real-Time Energy Bids** Dispatch Instructions associated with the ramp between the Real-Time Market Bid in one hour and the Real-Time Market Bid in the immediately succeeding Trading Hour shall be determined optimally by the SCED if the CAISO has Bids for	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term and replaced with more exacting definitions in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment. As such, the ISO is proposing to align the ISO Tariff with that change.

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	either or both relevant Operating Hours. For any Operating Hour(s) for which Bids have been submitted Dispatch Instructions will be optimized such that the Dispatch Operating Point is within the Bid range(s). For any Operating Hour without submitted Bids, Dispatch Instructions will be optimized such that the Dispatch Operating Point conforms to the Schedule within the Operating Hour. Energy resulting from the Standard Ramp shall be deemed Standard Ramping Energy and will be settled in accordance with Section 11.5.1. Energy resulting from any ramp extending beyond the Standard Ramp will be deemed Ramping Energy Deviation and will be settled in accordance with Section 11.5.1. Energy delivered or consumed as a result of CAISO Dispatch of a resource's Energy Bid in one Operating Hour to a Dispatch Operating Point such that the resource cannot return to its successive Operating Hour Schedule or to an infra-marginal operating point by the beginning of the next Operating Hour is Residual Imbalance Energy and shall be settled as RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy as provided for in Section 11.5.1 and also may be eligible for recovery of its applicable Energy Bid Costs in accordance with Section 11.8. Similarly, Energy delivered or consumed as a result of CAISO Dispatch of a resource's Energy Bid in a future Operating Hour to a Dispatch Operating Point different from its current Operating Point prior to the end of the current Operating Hour is also considered Residual Imbalance Energy and shall be settled as RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy as provided for in Section 11.5.1 and also may be eligible for recovery of its applicable Energy Bid Costs in accordance with Section 11.8. When Ramping Energy Deviation and Residual Imbalance Energy coexist within a given Dispatch Interval, the Ramping Energy Deviation shall be the portion of RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy that is produced or consumed within the Schedule-change band defined by the accepted RTM Bids of	

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	the two consecutive Settlement Periods; the Residual Imbalance Energy shall be the portion of RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy that is produced or consumed outside the Schedule-change band.	
34.17.6	**34.17.6 Intra-Hour Exceptional Dispatches** For the special case where an Exceptional Dispatch begins in the new hour and the rules above would result in the violation of the resource's inter-temporal constraint(s), the following rules are applied and the Energy is settled as FMM Exceptional Dispatch or RTD Exceptional Dispatch Energy as described in Section 11.5.6.	"Exceptional Dispatch Energy" was eliminated as a defined term and replaced with more exacting defined terms in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment. The ISO is proposing to align the ISO Tariff with that change.
34.20.1	**34.20.1 General Principles** FMM Instructed Imbalance Energy and RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy shall be paid or charged at the applicable FMM or RTD LMP. ~~and~~ Uninstructed Imbalance Energy shall be paid or charged the applicable ~~FMM or~~ RTD LMP. These prices are determined using the Dispatch Interval LMPs. The Dispatch Interval LMPs shall be based on the Bid of the marginal Generating Units, System Units, Participating Loads, Reliability Demand Response Resources, and Proxy Demand Resources dispatched by the CAISO to increase or reduce Demand or Energy output in each Dispatch Interval as provided in Section 34.20.2.1. The CAISO will respond to the Dispatch Instructions issued by the SCED to the extent practical in the time available and acting in accordance with Good Utility Practice. The CAISO will record the reasons for any variation from the Dispatch Instructions issued by the SCED.	"Instructed Imbalance Energy" and "Uninstructed Imbalance Energy" were eliminated as defined terms and replaced with more exacting defined terms in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment. The ISO also proposes to add language that was inadvertently omitted in overlapping tariff amendment filings in Docket Nos. ER13-2192 and ER14-480. The ISO is proposing to align the ISO Tariff with those changes.
34.20.2.2	**34.20.2.2 Computation** For each Dispatch Interval, the CAISO will compute updated ~~I~~imbalance ~~E~~energy needs and will Dispatch Generating Units, System Units, Dynamic System Resources, Participating Load, Reliability Demand Response Resources, and Proxy Demand Resources according to the CAISO's	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment. The ISO is proposing to align the ISO tariff with that change.

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	SCED during that time period to meet ~~I~~imbalance ~~E~~energy requirements. The RTM transactions will be settled at the Dispatch Interval LMPs in accordance with Section 11.5.	
34.22	**34.22~~18~~ Real-Time Dispatch of RDRRs** The CAISO may issue an Exceptional Dispatch Instruction for the Reliability Demand Response Resource for reliability or to perform a test as provided in Section 34.9.3. An entity other than the CAISO that has a contractual or tariff-based right to do so may dispatch a Reliability Demand Response Resource in Real-Time in order to (1) mitigate a local transmission or distribution system emergency pursuant to applicable state or local programs, contracts, or regulatory requirements not set forth in the CAISO Tariff or (2) perform a test. If an entity other than the CAISO dispatches a Reliability Demand Response Resource in Real-Time in order to mitigate a local transmission or distribution system emergency or perform a test, the Scheduling Coordinator for the Demand Response Provider representing the Reliability Demand Response Resource shall immediately inform the CAISO, through the CAISO's Outage reporting system, that such dispatch has occurred or will occur and the MW amount of the dispatch.	The ISO is creating new Tariff Section 34.22 and is moving current ISO Tariff Section 34.18 entitled "Real-Time Dispatch of RDRRs" as currently there are two separate ISO Tariff Sections assigned to the same Tariff Section number.
34.22.1	**34.22~~18~~.1 Testing of RDRRs** The CAISO may issue one (1) unannounced Exceptional Dispatch Instruction per year to each Reliability Demand Response Resource pursuant to Section 34.9.2 in order to test the availability and performance of the Reliability Demand Response Resource. The Demand Response Provider representing the Reliability Demand Response Resource may also test its Reliability Demand Response Resources in coordination with the CAISO. Any Demand Response Provider initiated testing will not trigger any CAISO settlement. The CAISO will share the results of all tests of the Reliability Demand Response Resource with the	The ISO is creating new Tariff Section 34.22 and is moving current ISO Tariff Section 34.18 entitled "Real-Time Dispatch of RDRRs" as currently there are two separate ISO Tariff Sections assigned to the same Tariff Section number.

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	applicable Local Regulatory Authority. All tests of the Reliability Demand Response Resource shall count toward its RDRR Availability Limit. If, prior to the performance of a CAISO unannounced yearly test, the Reliability Demand Response Resource provides Demand Response Services in that year, its provision of Demand Response Services will eliminate the need for that year's test. Testing of Reliability Demand Response Resources will be conducted as described in the applicable Operating Procedure or Business Practice Manual.	
39.10.1	**39.10 Mitigation of Exceptional Dispatches of Resources** The CAISO shall apply Mitigation Measures to Exceptional Dispatches of resources when such resources are committed or dispatched under Exceptional Dispatch for purposes of: (1) addressing reliability requirements related to non-competitive Transmission Constraints; (2) ramping resources with Ancillary Services Awards or RUC Capacity to a dispatch level that ensures their availability in Real-Time; (3) ramping resources to their Minimum Dispatchable Level in Real-Time; and (4) addressing unit-specific environmental constraints not incorporated into the Full Network Model or the CAISO's market software that affect the dispatch of Generating Units in the Sacramento Delta and are commonly known as ""Delta Dispatch."".	
39.10.1	**39.10.1 Measures for Resources Eligible for Supplemental Revenues** In all cases where a resource is subject to Mitigation Measures under Section 39.10, and the resource is eligible for supplemental revenues pursuant to Section 39.10.3, FMM Exception Dispatch Energy or RTD Exceptional Dispatch Energy delivered by the resource shall be settled as set forth in either Section 11.5.6.7.1 or Section 11.5.6.7.3, whichever is applicable.	"Exceptional Dispatch Energy" was eliminated as a defined term and replaced with more exacting defined terms in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment. The ISO is proposing to align the ISO Tariff with that change.

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39.10.2	**39.10.2 Resources Not Eligible for Supplemental Revenues** In all cases where a resource is subject to Mitigation Measures under Section 39.10, and the resource is not eligible for supplemental revenues pursuant to Section 39.10.3, FMM Exceptional Dispatch or RTD Exceptional Dispatch Energy delivered by the resource shall be settled as set forth in either Section 11.5.6.7.2 or Section 11.5.6.7.3, whichever is applicable.	"Exceptional Dispatch Energy" was eliminated as a defined term and replaced with more exacting defined terms in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment. The ISO is proposing to align the ISO Tariff with that change.
39.10.5	**39.10.5 Calculation of Exceptional Dispatch Supplemental Revenues** The amount of Exceptional Dispatch supplemental revenues accrued by a resource within any 30-day period as defined in Section 39.10.4 shall be a running total of the sum of supplemental revenues received during that 30-day period. The calculation of supplemental revenues accrued by a resource within a 30-day period is based on the higher of (a) the Energy Bid price for the resource minus the Default Energy Bid price for the resource or (b) the ~~Resource-Specific Settlement Interval~~ relevant FMM or RTD LMP minus the Default Energy Bid price for the resource. The greater of (a) or (b) is multiplied by the amount of Energy provided by the resource under Exceptional Dispatch, and the results of that multiplication are summed across the successive hours of the 30-day period. Once the resource has reached the limit on supplemental revenues described in Section 39.10.4 based on the calculation above, then the Settlement for the resource will be as provided in Section 11.5.6.7.2 and the resource will not be eligible for additional supplemental revenues for the rest of the 30-day period.	"Resource Specific Settlement Interval LMP" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment. The ISO is proposing to align the ISO Tariff with that change.
Appendix A - Ancillary Service or AS Obligation	**- Ancillary Services Obligation or AS Obligation** A Scheduling Coordinator's hourly obligation for Regulation Down, Regulation Up, Spinning Reserves, and Non-Spinning Reserves calculated pursuant to Sections 11.10.2.1.3,	This amendment corrects ISO Tariff Section cross-references.

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	11.10.2.2.2, 11.10.3.32, and 11.10.4.32, respectively.	
Appendix A - Dispatch Interval LMP	**- Dispatch Interval LMP** The price of ~~I~~imbalance ~~E~~energy determined at each Dispatch Interval in accordance with Section 11.5.4.	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated from the ISO Tariff as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment. The ISO proposes to align the ISO Tariff with that change.
Appendix A - Dispatch Operating Point	**- Dispatch Operating Point** The expected operating point of a resource that has received a Dispatch Instruction. The resource is expected to operate at the Dispatch Operating Point after completing the Dispatch Instruction, taking into account any relevant Ramp Rate and time delays. Energy expected to be produced or consumed above or below the Day-Ahead Schedule in response to a Dispatch Instruction constitutes FMM Instructed Imbalance Energy or RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy. For resources that have not received a Dispatch Instruction, the Dispatch Operating Point defaults to the corresponding Day-Ahead Schedule.	"Instructed Imbalance Energy" was eliminated from the ISO Tariff as a defined term and replaced with more exacting definitions in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment. The ISO is proposing to align the ISO Tariff with that change.
Appendix A - FMM Instructed Imbalance Energy (FMM IIE)	**- FMM Instructed Imbalance Energy (FMM IIE)** The accounted for energy resulting from the difference between a resource's ~~portion of Imbalance Energy resulting from~~ Day-Ahead Schedules or EIM Base Schedules and FMM Schedules determined pursuant to Section 11.5.1.1.	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated from the ISO Tariff as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment. The ISO proposes to align the ISO Tariff with that change.
Appendix A - IIE	**- [Not Used] ~~IIE~~** ~~Instructed Imbalance Energy~~	The term "Instructed Imbalance Energy," and the acronym for it (IIE), was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment. This ISO is proposing to align the ISO Tariff with that change and marking the acronym "IIE" as not used.
Appendix A - IIE Settlement Amount	**- [Not Used] ~~IIE Settlement Amount~~** ~~The payment due a Scheduling Coordinator for positive Instructed Imbalance Energy or the charge assessed on a Scheduling Coordinator for negative Instructed Imbalance Energy, as calculated pursuant to Section 11.5.1.~~	"IIE Settlement Amount" was eliminated from the ISO Tariff as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment. As such, the ISO is proposing to align the ISO Tariff with that change and marking the definition of "IIE Settlement Amount" as "Not Used."

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Appendix A - PIRP Protective Measures	**- [Not Used]** ~~**PIRP Protective Measures**~~ ~~The temporary Settlement treatment delineated in Section 11.12.1 that is provided to Participating Intermittent Resources that qualify to receive such treatment under Section 4.8.1 and that complete their election to receive such treatment no later than thirty (30) days after the effective date of Section 4.8.1.~~	This amendment removes the expired tariff language pertaining to PIRP Protective Measures.
Appendix A - Ramping Energy Deviation	**- Ramping Energy Deviation** The portion of RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy produced or consumed due to deviation from the Standard Ramp because of ramp constraints, Start-Up, or Shut-Down. Ramping Energy Deviation may overlap with Standard Ramping Energy, and both Standard Ramping Energy and Ramping Energy Deviation may overlap with Day-Ahead Scheduled Energy, but not with ~~no~~ any other Real-Time imbalance energy types~~IIE subtype~~. Ramping Energy Deviation may be composed of two parts: a) the part that overlaps with Standard Ramping Energy whenever the DOP crosses the Standard Ramping Energy region; and b) the part that does not overlap with Standard Ramping Energy. The latter part of Ramping Energy Deviation consists only of extra-marginal FMM Instructed Imbalance Energy or RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy contained within the hourly schedule change band and not attributed to Exceptional Dispatch or derates. Ramping Energy Deviation does not apply to Non-Dynamic System Resources (including Resource-Specific System Resources). Ramping Energy Deviation is settled as described in Section 11.5.1~~, and it is included in BCR only for market revenue calculations as provided in Section 11.8.1.4.5~~.	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated from the ISO Tariff as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment. The ISO proposes to align the ISO Tariff with that change.
Appendix A - Residual Imbalance Energy	**- Residual Imbalance Energy** Extra-marginal RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy produced or consumed at the start or end of a Trading Hour outside the hourly schedule-change band and not attributed to	"Instructed Imbalance Energy" was eliminated and replaced with more exacting defined terms. The ISO is proposing to modify this definition to align with that change.

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	Exceptional Dispatch. Residual Imbalance Energy is due to a Dispatch Instruction in the previous Trading Hour or a Dispatch Instruction in the next Trading Hour. Residual Imbalance Energy may overlap only with Day-Ahead Scheduled Energy. Residual Imbalance Energy does not apply to Non-Dynamic System Resources (including Resource-Specific System Resources). Residual Imbalance Energy is settled as described in Section 11.5.5 and it is not included in BCR as described in Section 11.8.4.	
Appendix A - RTD Imbalance Energy	**- RTD Imbalance Energy** The deviation of Supply or Demand from FMM Schedule, positive or negative, as measured by metered Generation, ~~metered Load,~~ or Real-Time Interchange Schedules. RTD Imbalance Energy is composed of RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy and Uninstructed Imbalance Energy, or in the case of metered Load from the Day-Ahead Schedule, as applicable, as Uninstructed Imbalance Energy.	The ISO proposes to clarify the definition of RTD Imbalance Energy in order to be consistent throughout the tariff.
Appendix A - RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy	**- RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy (RTD IIE)** The ~~portion of Imbalance~~ accounted for Energy resulting from the difference between Dispatch Instructions and the Day-Ahead Schedule Energy that has not already been accounted for as FMM ~~Schedules~~ Instructed Imbalance Energy determined pursuant to Section 11.5.1.2.	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated and replaced with more exacting defined terms. This amendment proposes to align this definition with that change.
Appendix A - RTD Optimal Energy	**- RTD Optimal Energy** Any remaining RTD IIE after accounting for all other RTD IIE subtypes. RTD Optimal Energy does not overlap with FMM Optimal Energy Standard Ramping Energy, Ramping Energy Deviation, Residual Imbalance Energy, RTD Minimum Load Energy, RTD Derate Energy, and RTD Exceptional Dispatch Energy, but it may overlap with Day-Ahead Scheduled Energy, and MSS Load Following Energy. RTD Optimal Energy is indexed against the relevant Energy Bid and sliced by service type, depending on the AS capacity allocation on the Energy Bid. RTD Optimal Energy is also divided into	"Optimal Energy" was eliminated and replaced with more exacting defined terms in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment. The ISO is proposing to align this definition with that change.

Section	Proposed Revisions	Reason for Change
	RTD Overlapping Optimal Energy and RTD Non-Overlapping Optimal Energy. Any RTD Optimal Energy slice below or above the Energy Bid has no associated Energy Bid price, and it is not included in BCR as described in Section 11.5.1.1.	
Appendix A - Settlement Interval Penalty Location Real-Time LMP	**- [Not Used]** ~~**Settlement Interval Penalty Location Real-Time LMP**~~ ~~The optimal Instructed Imbalance Energy weighted average of the individual Dispatch Interval Real-Time LMPs for the resources in a UDP Aggregation established pursuant to Appendix R.~~	"Instructed Imbalance Energy" was eliminated and replaced with more exacting defined terms in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment. The ISO is aligning this definition with that change.
Appendix A - Standard Ramping Energy	**- Standard Ramping Energy** RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy produced or consumed in the first two and the last two Dispatch Intervals due to hourly schedule changes. Standard Ramping Energy is a schedule deviation along a linear symmetric twenty (20)-minute ramp (Standard Ramp) across hourly boundaries. Standard Ramping Energy is always present when there is an hourly schedule change, including resource Start-Ups and Shut-Downs. Standard Ramping Energy does not apply to Non-Dynamic System Resources (including Resource-Specific System Resources) and is not subject to Settlement as described in Section 11.5.1.	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated and replaced with more exacting defined terms in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment. The ISO is aligning this definition with that change.
Appendix A - Uninstructed Imbalance Energy (UIE)	**- Uninstructed Imbalance Energy (UIE)** The portion of RTD Imbalance Energy that is not RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy.	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and replaced with more exacting terms. The ISO proposes to align this definition with that change.
Appendix F, Schedule 1 Part A, 1	1. The rate for the Market Services Charge will be calculated by dividing the annual GMC revenue requirement allocated to this service category by the forecast annual gross absolute value of MW per hour of Ancillary Services capacity awarded in the Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets, MWh of Energy cleared in the Day-Ahead market, Virtual Demand Award, Virtual Supply Award, and FMM Instructed	"Instructed Imbalance Energy" and "Exceptional Dispatch Energy" were eliminated as a defined terms in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment and replaced with more exacting terms. The ISO is proposing to align this tariff appendix with that change.

Section	Proposed Revisions	Reason for Change
	Imbalance Energy and RTD Instructed Imbalance Energy, less the forecast annual gross absolute value of such Energy as may be excluded for a load following MSS pursuant to an MSS agreement, Standard Ramping Energy, Regulation Energy, Ramping Energy Deviation, Residual Imbalance Energy, Exceptional Dispatch Energy and Operational Adjustments for the Day-Ahead and Real-Time.	
Appendix F Schedule 3 Section 10.1(a) and (c)	**10. Disbursement of Regional Access Charge Revenues.** **10.1** Regional Access Charge revenues shall be calculated for disbursement to each Participating TO and Approved Project Sponsor on a monthly basis as follows: (a) the amount determined in accordance with Section 26.1.2 of the CAISO Tariff ("Billed RAC").~~;~~ * * * * (c) if the total Billed RAC in subsection (a) received by the CAISO less the total dollar amounts calculated in ~~in~~ subsection (b)(i) and subsection (b)(ii) is different from zero, the CAISO shall allocate the positive or negative difference among those Participating TOs that are subject to the calculations in subsection (b)(i) based on the ratio of each Participating TO's Regional Transmission Revenue Requirement to the sum of all of those Participating TOs' Regional Transmission Revenue Requirements that are subject to the calculations in subsection (b)(i). This monthly distribution amount is the "RAC Revenue Adjustment."~~;~~	This amendment corrects a typographical error by deleting the duplicative word “in.” and corrects punctuation.
Appendix F Schedule 6	**Schedule 6** **CPM SCHEDULES FOR CPM DESIGNATIONS UNDER SECTION 43A** **Monthly CPM Capacity Payment** The monthly CPM Capacity Payment shall be calculated ~~by multiplying the monthly shaping factor of 1/12 by the annual effective fixed CPM Capacity price per kW-year~~ in accordance with Section 43A.7.1~~, unless the Scheduling~~	This amendment corrects an ISO Tariff Section cross-reference and deletes methodology related to the ISO’s Capacity Procurement Mechanism tariff amendment.

Section	Proposed Revisions	Reason for Change
	~~Coordinator for the CPM Capacity resource has agreed to another price that has been determined in accordance with Section 43.7.2~~.	
Appendix L Section L.2 (Formula)	**Appendix L Method To Assess Available Transfer Capability** * * * * **L.2 ATC Algorithm** * * * * ATC Calculation For Imports: ATC = TTC - CBM - TRM - AS from Imports- Net Energy Flow - Hourly Unused TR Capacity. ATC Calculation For Exports: ATC = TTC - CBM - TRM - Net Energy Flow - Hourly Unused TR Capacity. ~~ATC Calculation For Internal Paths 15 and 26:~~ ~~ATC = TTC - CBM - TRM - Net Energy Flow~~	The ISO is proposing to remove the formula from Appendix L because it is an anachronism.
Appendix L Section L.2 (Chart)	**Appendix L Method To Assess Available Transfer Capability** * * * * **L.2 ATC Algorithm** * * * * Hourly Total Transfer Capability of a specified Transmission Interface, per path direction, with consideration given to known Transmission Constraints and operating limitations.	"Constraints" was eliminated as a defined term from the ISO Tariff in the Tariff Clarifications filing in 2010 and was replaced with "Transmission Constraints" as a defined term. The ISO is proposing to align this Appendix L with that change.
Appendix L Section L.7	**L.7 Traditional Planning Methodology to Protect Against Violating Operating Limits** After performing Contingency analysis studies, the CAISO next develops the transfer capability and develops procedures, Nomograms, RMR Generation requirements, or other Transmission Constraints to ensure that transfer capabilities respect operating limits.	"Constraints" was eliminated as a defined term from the ISO Tariff in the Tariff Clarifications filing in 2010 and was replaced with "Transmission Constraints" as a defined term. The ISO is proposing to align this Appendix L with that change.

Section	Proposed Revisions	Reason for Change
Appendix M Section 1.5.4	**1.5 OPERATING AND SCHEDULING REQUIREMENTS** * * * * **1.5.4** The CAISO will procure (or allow for self-provision of) Operating Reserves and/or Regulation for Loads served by imports from Dynamic System Resources, or as otherwise agreed to by the CAISO and the Host Balancing Authority.	This amendment is to conform the Dynamic Scheduling Protocol to be consistent with NERC/WECC standards.
Appendix M 1.7.1	**1.7 COMPLIANCE, LOSSES, AND FINANCIAL SETTLEMENTS** **1.7.1** Energy delivered in association with Dynamic System Resources will be subject to all provisions of the CAISO's ~~I~~imbalance ~~E~~energy markets~~, including Uninstructed Deviation Penalties (UDP)~~ (just as is the case with CAISO intra- Balancing Authority Area Generating Units of Participating Generators).	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment. The ISO proposes to align this appendix with that change.
Appendix M, 1.7.3	**1.7 COMPLIANCE, LOSSES, AND FINANCIAL SETTLEMENTS** * * * * * * **1.7.3** All Day-Ahead Market and RTM submitted Dynamic Schedules shall be subject to CAISO Congestion Management and as such may not exceed their transmission reservations in Real-Time (with the exception of intra-hour Dispatch Instructions of the Energy associated with accepted Ancillary Services Bids or Dispatch Instructions for ~~I~~imbalance ~~E~~energy).	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment. The ISO proposes to align this appendix with that change.
Appendix M, 1.7.6	**1.7.6** ~~A predetermined, mutually agreed, and achievable "PMax-like" fixed MW value will be established for every Dynamic System Resource to be used as the basis for the UDP calculation.~~ Responsible Scheduling Coordinators will be able to report de-rates affecting the Dynamic System Resource ~~via~~ through the CAISO's ~~SLIC O~~Outage ~~reporting~~ management system.	"SLIC" was eliminated as a defined term from the ISO tariff in the Minimum Load Costs After Re-Rate tariff amendment, and the ISO proposes to align the tariff with that change.

Section	Proposed Revisions	Reason for Change
Appendix M Section 2.5.3	**2.5 OPERATING AND SCHEDULING REQUIREMENTS** * * * * **2.5.3** The Balancing Authority receiving the Dynamic Schedule of the export of Energy from the CAISO Balancing Authority Area is responsible for Operating Reserves and/or Regulation for Loads served by such exports of Energy, unless otherwise the CAISO assumes this responsibility as reflected in the Dynamic Scheduling Host Balancing Authority Operating Agreement.	This amendment is to conform the Dynamic Scheduling Protocol to be consistent with NERC/WECC standards.
Appendix M, 2.6.1	**2.6 COMPLIANCE, LOSSES, AND FINANCIAL SETTLEMENTS** **2.6.1** Energy delivered in association with a Dynamic Schedule of an export of Energy from a Generating Unit will be subject to all provisions of the CAISO's ~~I~~imbalance ~~E~~energy markets~~, including Uninstructed Deviation Penalties (UDP)~~ (just as is the case with CAISO intra-Balancing Authority Area Generating Units of Participating Generators).	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment. The ISO proposes to align this appendix with that change.
Appendix M, 2.6.2	All Day-Ahead Market and RTM submitted Dynamic Schedules shall be subject to CAISO Congestion Management and as such may not exceed their transmission reservations in Real-Time (with the exception of intra-hour Dispatch Instructions for ~~I~~imbalance ~~E~~energy issued by the CAISO and responses to the dynamic signal from the Balancing Authority receiving the Dynamic Schedule of the export of Energy).	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment. The ISO proposes to align this appendix with that change.
Appendix Q Section 2.2.5(a)	**2.2.5 Information Requirements ~~F~~for Participating Intermittent Resource Export Fee** In order for the CAISO to administer, implement and calculate the Participating Intermittent Resource Export Fee, each Participating Intermittent Resource jointly with, and through, its Scheduling Coordinator must provide the CAISO with the following information and documents under the schedule and conditions set forth in this section. The CAISO will maintain the confidentiality of all information	This amendment removes the expired tariff language pertaining to PIRP Protective Measures. This amendment also proposes to correct a typographical error.

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	and documents received under this section in accordance with CAISO Tariff Section 20 et seq. (a) A certification, in the form set forth in a Business Practice Manual, signed by an officer of the Participating Intermittent Resource and its Scheduling Coordinator, identifying ~~(1) the PIR Export Percentage under Section 5.3.2 of this EIRP for resources that have elected PIRP Protective Measures, if any, and basis thereof, and (2)~~ each contract to sell Energy or capacity from the Participating Intermittent Resource, including for each such contract, the counterparty, start and end dates, delivery point(s), quantity in MW, other temporal terms, i.e., seasonal or hourly limitations. The certification must be updated by resubmission to the CAISO (1) upon a request to modify the composition of the Participating Intermittent Resource under Section 2.4.2 of this EIRP; or (2) within ten (10) calendar days of final execution of a new contract or any change in counterparty, start and end dates, delivery point(s), quantity in MW, or other temporal terms, as described above, for any prior certified contract. All other contractual changes will not trigger the obligation for recertification. (b) Copies of all contracts, including changes, identified in the above-referenced certification; however, price information may be redacted from the contracts provided.	
Appendix Q Section 3.1.1.2	**3.1.1 Wind Generation Meteorological Station Requirements** * * * * **3.1.1.2** Each wind Eligible Intermittent Resource shall locate its meteorological station(s) on the windward side of the wind farm. Each wind Eligible Intermittent Resource must install one meteorological station at the average hub height of the wind turbines. ~~The second meteorological station, if any, may be co-located on the primary meteorological station and installed approximately 30 meters below the average hub~~	The ISO is proposing to modify the reference to having the second meteorological station 30 meters below the second station because not every wind turbine is 30 meters tall and this would be inapplicable to some wind turbines.

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	~~height.~~ Hub height is the distance from the ground to the center of the turbine axis. If a second meteorological station is required, then it may be so co-located with the primary station, then the second station shall be installed below the primary station. The approximate distance separating the primary station and secondary station shall be an average of one rotator blade length. Where placement of the meteorological station(s) in accordance with this Eligible Intermittent Resource Protocol would reduce production or violate a local, state, or federal statute, regulation or ordinance, the CAISO, in coordination with any applicable forecast service provider, will coordinate with the Eligible Intermittent Resource to identify an acceptable placement of the meteorological station.	
Appendix Q Section 3.1.3	**3.1.3 Designated Turbines** For any wind eligible Intermittent Resource, designated turbines are required to improve forecast accuracy within a wind park. The CAISO shall identify a designated turbine, from which the Eligible Intermittent Resource shall provide nacelle wind speed and wind direction ~~generation in MWs~~ every four seconds. Wind EIRs with a PGA or NS PGA that are operating or have final regulatory approvals to construct as of [[the effective date of this change]] that have wind turbines without nacelle anemometers need not comply with the requirements of this section for Designated Turbines. However, when the Wind EIR repowers or replaces a portion of its existing wind turbines, then the Wind EIR must become compliant with the requirements of this section for Designated Turbines.	The ISO has historically received wind speed and wind direction, rather than wind speed and generation. This requirement is a misprint from what the ISO and participants have been conducting themselves since before this requirement was in the ISO Tariff. When this language was moved from the Business Practice Manual to the ISO Tariff it already included this error. As part of the process of moving this language from the Business Practice Manual to the ISO Tariff, the ISO inadvertently did not move the nacelle anemometer exemption to the ISO Tariff, potentially creating a discrepancy between the ISO Tariff and the Business Practice Manual. This change clarifies that such units remain covered by the pre-Order No. 764 legacy treatment which respect to this limited issue.
Appendix Q Section 5.3 (deletion of whole section)	**5.3 [Not Used]~~Participating Intermittent Resource Export Fee~~** ~~The rules specified in this Section 5.3 and its subsection applies only to Participating Intermittent Resources that have~~	This amendment removes the expired tariff language pertaining to PIRP Protective Measures.

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	~~elected PIRP Protective Measures and do not apply to resources that have not elected for such measures.~~ ~~**5.3.1 Exemptions**~~ ~~After November 1, 2006, Participating Intermittent Resources shall be subject to the Participating Intermittent Resource Export Fee, as set forth in Schedule 4 of Appendix F, for Energy generated, except to the extent the Participating Intermittent Resource is exempt under one or more of the following conditions:~~ ~~The owner of a Participating Intermittent Resource, as of November 1, 2006, utilizes the Energy generated from the Participating Intermittent Resource to meet its own Native Load outside the CAISO Balancing Authority Area. Should any Participating Intermittent Resource subject to this exemption increase its PMax set forth in the CAISO's Master File by modification under Section 2.4.2 of this EIRP, the exemption will not apply to the added capacity unless exempt under another subsection of this Section 5.3.1.~~ ~~If the Participating Intermittent Resource subject to this exemption changes ownership, the Participating Intermittent Resource Export Fee will apply, except where the prior exempt owner demonstrates that the entire output of the Participating Intermittent Resource continues to be delivered to the exempt owner under a power purchase agreement for the purpose of serving the prior exempt owner's Native Load. The exemption will then continue only for the period of the power purchase agreement as provided in accordance with Section 2.2.5 of this EIRP and cannot exceed the MW quantity originally exempted.~~ ~~A Participating Intermittent Resource demonstrates in its certification under Section 2.2.5(a) of this EIRP an export contract with a starting term prior to November 1, 2006. An export contract is any power purchase agreement to sell Energy to any entity other than a Load Serving Entity with an~~	

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	~~obligation under law or franchise to serve Demand within the CAISO Balancing Authority Area.~~ ~~The exemption will apply to any extension of the current export contract through an evergreen or other existing extension provision. The exemption terminates upon termination of the export contract. Should any Participating Intermittent Resource subject to this exemption increase its PMax set forth in the CAISO's Master File by modification under Section 2.4.2 of this EIRP, the exemption will apply only to Energy generated up to the contract quantity, unless the Participating Intermittent Resource demonstrates a basis for exemption under subsection (c) for the expanded capacity.~~ ~~A Participating Intermittent Resource demonstrates in its certification under Section 2.2.5(a) of this EIRP a contract to sell Energy to a Load Serving Entity with Native Load within the CAISO Balancing Authority Area. Energy service providers with contractual obligations with customers within the CAISO Balancing Authority Area would be deemed a Load Serving Entity with an obligation to serve Native Load within the CAISO Balancing Authority Area.~~ ~~The exemption will apply to any extension of the current contract through an evergreen or other existing extension provision. The exemption terminates upon termination of the contract. Should any Participating Intermittent Resource subject to this exemption increase its PMax set forth in the CAISO's Master File by modification under Section 2.4.2 of this EIRP, the exemption will continue to apply only to Energy generated up to the contract quantity unless the Participating Intermittent Resource demonstrates a basis for exemption under this subsection (c) for the expanded capacity.~~ ~~**5.3.2 Participating Intermittent Resource Export Percentage**~~ ~~Based on the information required in Section 2.2.5 of this~~	

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	~~EIRP and application of the exemptions to the Participating Intermittent Resource Export Fee in Section 5.3.1 of this EIRP, the CAISO will determine a PIR Export Percentage for each Participating Intermittent Resource that will be calculated as the ratio of the Participating Intermittent Resource's PMax in the CAISO Master File minus the MW, subject to an exemption under Section 5.3.1 of this EIRP on a MW basis to the Participating Intermittent Resource's PMax in the CAISO Master File. For example, a Participating Intermittent Resource with a PMax of 100 MW and a contract with a CAISO Balancing Authority Area Load Serving Entity for 40 MW would have a PIR Export Percentage of (100-40)/100 = 60%. A Participating Intermittent Resource with a PIR Export Percentage greater than zero (0) will be deemed an Exporting Participating Intermittent Resource. The CAISO will notify the Participating Intermittent Resource and its Scheduling Coordinator of the facility's PIR Export Percentage. Any dispute regarding the CAISO's determination of the PIR Export Percentage shall be subject to the dispute resolution procedures under Section 13 of the CAISO Tariff.~~ **~~5.3.3 Monthly Application of Participating Intermittent Resource Export Fee~~** ~~Each month the CAISO will charge Exporting Participating Intermittent Resources the Participating Intermittent Resource Export Fee, as set forth in Schedule 4 of Appendix F.~~ **~~5.3.4 Allocation of Credit for Participating Intermittent Resource Export Fees Received~~** ~~Payments received by the CAISO from application of the Participating Intermittent Resource Export Fee in accordance with this Section 5.3 shall be allocated as a credit on a quarterly basis to Scheduling Coordinators with Net Negative Uninstructed Deviations in proportion to the to the amount of~~	

Section	Proposed Revisions	Reason for Change
	~~Net Negative Uninstructed Deviations that each Scheduling Coordinator was assessed for Participating Intermittent Resources Settlement charges for the applicable CAISO Charge Code during the prior quarter.~~ ~~**5.3.5 Recording of Exemptions and Notice of Termination**~~ ~~The CAISO will record any exemption period ending date, if applicable, for each Participating Intermittent Resource. At the conclusion of the exemption period, the CAISO will notify the Scheduling Coordinator for the Participating Intermittent Resource that the facility is no longer exempt from the Participating Intermittent Resource Export Fee.~~ ~~**5.3.6 Annual Confirmation**~~ ~~On December 31 of each calendar year, each Participating Intermittent Resource shall confirm in the form set forth in a Business Practice Manual, signed by an officer of the Participating Intermittent Resource, that the operations of the Participating Intermittent Resource are consistent with any certification(s) provided to the CAISO under Section 2.2.5 of this EIRP.~~ ~~**5.3.7 Audit Rights**~~ ~~In addition to the rights set forth in CAISO Tariff Section 4.6.9, the CAISO shall have the right to contact any counterparty to a contract relied upon under Section 5.3.1 of this EIRP for purposes of determining compliance with this EIRP.~~	
Appendix Q Section 7 (Last sentence)	**7 PROGRAM MONITORING** * * * * * The CAISO will monitor the impact of rules for Participating Intermittent Resources on FMM or RTD Imbalance Energy and Regulation costs to the CAISO.	"Imbalance Energy" was eliminated as a defined term in the Order No. 764 tariff amendment. The ISO proposes to align this appendix with that change.