




# Flexible Resource Adequacy Criteria and Must-Offer Obligation – Phase 2

Karl Meeusen

Market Design and Regulatory Policy Lead

Working Group Meeting


July 22, 2015



# FRACMOO 2 Working Group Meeting Agenda – 7/22/15

Time	Topic	Presenter
10:00 – 10:10	Introduction	Kim Perez
10:10 – 11:00	Overview and problem statement	Karl Meeusen
11:00 – 11:30	Upward and downward system operational constraints	
11:30 – 12:00	15-minute intertie resources and flexible RA	
12:00 – 1:00	Lunch	
1:00 – 2:00	Inflexible and flexible capacity showings	
2:00 – 2:45	Inflexible capacity RA “allowances”	
2:45 – 3:00	Break	
3:00 – 3:20	Secondary assessment of one-hour ramping capabilities	
3:20 – 3:50	Adjust market rules and/or penalty parameters for day-ahead and real-time bidding and self-scheduling	
3:50 – 4:00	Next Steps	

# ISO Policy Initiative Stakeholder Process



# FRACMOO2 scope and stakeholder process

- **Scope**
  - Defining the flexible capacity requirements and developing any additional flexible capacity needs
  - Provision of flexible capacity by inertie resources, including Effective Flexible Capacity calculation
  - Flexible capacity from storage resources not using the NGR model
  - Flexible capacity impacts of uncontracted/merchant VERs, for which no LSE has associated flexible capacity requirements
- **Working group process**
  - Three working group meetings
  - The first meeting: July 22, 2015
  - Concludes by end of September 2015
- **Stakeholder process**
  - Straw Proposal issued: October 2015
  - Straw Proposal will
    - Start the regular ISO stakeholder process for FRACMOO2; and
    - provide the CPUC with a proposal to consider in the RA proceeding
- **Board of Governors: Q2, 2016**

# Defining Flexible Capacity Requirements and Developing Additional Flexible Capacity Needs

Karl Meeusen

# Problem Statements

- Flexible RA requirements need to include provisions to address potential over-generation conditions
  - Primary focus – managing the PMin burden and the interplay between quantities of inflexible capacity and ramping capability provided by RA resources, particularly in non-summer months
  - Secondary focus – addressing challenges caused by large amounts of self-scheduling
- Hourly ramping needs are increasing and additional flexible RA showing validations are needed to ensure they can be addressed
- Modifications should ensure system, local, and flexible capacity needs are addressed

# Objectives of FRACMOO2 Stakeholder initiative

- Minimize complexity of system and flexible RA showings and requirements
- Develop RA rules to ensure the ISO is able to address
  - Gross load plus required reserves
  - Net load and ramp rates
  - Potential over-generation through responsible forward planning
- Provide LSEs and LRAs opportunity to find least cost means of addressing RA needs
- Develop a secondary test to ensure sufficient hourly ramping capability


# The ISO is considering several changes to the existing RA construct to achieve the objectives of FRACMOO2

1. Account for system upward and downward operational constraints
2. Allow 15-minute inertia resources to provide flexible RA
3. Split RA showings into separate inflexible and flexible capacity showings
4. Inflexible capacity RA “allowances”
5. Conduct secondary assessment of one-hour ramping capabilities
6. Adjust market rules and/or penalty parameters for day-ahead and real-time bidding and self-scheduling

## Overview of the problem statement


# Original estimate of net-load as more renewables are integrated into the grid

## Typical Spring Day




# The ISO has identified a growing need for downward flexible capacity to address over-generation

## ISO's Net-Load vs. Average 5-Minute Energy Prices April 12, 2014




# Imports need to be considered as part of the over-generation solution

April 12, 2014 real time market




# Minimum net-loads will continue to decrease over time



# Over-generation is more than just an economic issue, it is also reliability issue


- Basic impacts
  - Impacts system frequency
  - Increases ACE
- Severe impacts
  - Lack of upward and downward dispatchability
    - Inability to commit resources in timely manner to meet evening ramps without exacerbating over generation
  - Grid facility overloads and potential generator damage
    - could result in extended periods of generating unit unavailability, including unavailability to fulfill IFM awards
  - Risk of non-compliance with NERC's Control Performance Standard 1 (CPS1) and NERC Standard BAL-001-1, ACE, DCS, and frequency response

# Average hourly hydro production for high, low and average hydro years --- April




# RPS Curtailment in 2024 – 40% RPS Scenario


40% RPS in 2024



# Ramping process of March 24, 2024 - Trajectory scenario



# Ramping process of March 24, 2024 - Trajectory scenario no curtailment sensitivity case



# Current tools the ISO has to address over-generation

- Tariff section 7.8 and Operating Procedure 2390
  - Identifies common causes of over-generation (i.e. Self-scheduled resources, initial and terminal conditions, IFM vs CFCD, virtual bids, test energy)
  - Includes a process starting with DAM and proceeding through RTM and recovery
  - Requires ISO operators to issue market notices, call adjacent BAAs, request decremental bids, curtail self-schedules, shut down resources if needed, turn on pumping load (if possible)

# The ISO has a priority process to address over-generation



- IFM from highest priority (last to be adjusted) to lowest priority (first to be adjusted), is as follows
  - a) Reliability Must Run (RMR) Generation pre-dispatch reduction;
  - b) Day-Ahead TOR Self-Schedules reduction;
  - c) Day-Ahead ETC and Converted Rights Self-Schedules reduction;
  - d) Internal Transmission Constraint relaxation for the IFM;
  - e) Other Self-Schedules of CAISO Demand reduction, exports explicitly identified in a Resource Adequacy Plan to be served by Resource Adequacy Capacity explicitly identified and linked in a Supply Plan to the exports, and Self-Schedules of exports at Scheduling Points explicitly sourced by non-Resource Adequacy Capacity;
  - f) Self-Schedules of exports at Scheduling Points not explicitly sourced by non-Resource Adequacy Capacity;
  - g) Day-Ahead Regulatory Must-Run Generation and Regulatory Must-Take Generation reduction;
  - h) Other Self-Schedules of Supply reduction

## Existing tools will be insufficient to address more frequent and larger over-generation



- Does not adequately address over-generation caused by inflexibility of Pmin burden
- Frequency and magnitude of over-generation caused by Pmin burden is likely to increase
  - Mitigated in 2015 due to low hydro production
- Current tools treat self-scheduling of RA and non-RA capacity identically
  - May curtail flexible RA capacity needed for ramps
- Increase in smaller distributed resources make manual curtailment more challenging and less reliable

# Greatest potential for over generation is not well aligned with RA requirements



- NQC set at peak
- State environmental policy objectives encourage high levels of VER production
- Max output for many VERs occurs outside of peak
- Some amount of inflexible capacity may be beneficial



# Flexibility needs must account for both operational realities and state environmental policy



# Flexibility needs must account for both operational realities and state environmental policy (cont.)



## It is reasonable to include downward flexible capacity needs in the RA program

- FERC and CPUC recognize RA should include operational attributes and that there is a need to value ramping capabilities in forward procurement
- The reasons for including downward flexible capacity in the RA program are similar to those for upward flexible capacity
  - Inflexible resources will not incur the full cost of their inflexibility due to bid floors
  - Without sufficient downward flexible capacity, the ISO would still experience downward ramping constraints
    - Would have to resort to out-of-market solutions to maintain reliability



## Accounting for upward and downward resource operational constraints

## Upward flexibility may not always equate to downward flexibility when it comes to resource PMin

- Current EFC allows Pmin to count as flexible capacity if start-up time is less than 90 minutes
- Flexible capacity for over-generation can be limited by cycle times
- EFC calculations must account operational attributes that can contribute to potential over-generation
  - Minimum operating level
  - Minimum run times
  - Minimum down times
- Due to ramping and commitment needs interplay with over generation, some portion of the flexible capacity resources may need to have start-up times between 30 and 60 minutes

## EFC calculation should account for the downward inflexibility of resources' PMin

- Pmin can count as flexible if
  - Start-up time is less than 90 minutes
  - Minimum run time is less than 4 hours
  - Minimum down-time is less than 4 hours
- If Pmin of a resource fails any of these tests, it is inflexible capacity
- Number of starts per day is less than two
  - This may only limit the category of flexible capacity not the quantity

# Under proposed rules EFC may be reduced for minimum run-time and min down-time: Example

## Existing EFC rules

- NQC: 100 MW
- Pmin: 40 MW
- Start-up: 60 Min
- Avg Ramp Rate: 60MW/Min
  
- EFC = 100 MW

## Proposed EFC rules


- NQC: 100 MW
- Pmin: 40 MW
- Start-up: 60 Min
- Avg Ramp Rate: 60MW/Min
- Min Run Time: 6 hours
- Min Down Time: 4 hours
  
- EFC = 60 MW

15-minute inertia resources to provide Flexible RA capacity

## 15-minute intertie resources may provide valuable upward and downward flexible capacity

- The ISO expects greater variability over time:
  - Five minute
  - Fifteen minute
  - Hourly
  - Three hours
- 15 minute imports, if economically bid, can help address many of these needs
- Economically bidding intertie resources can help the ISO more readily address over-generation conditions

# There is currently very little intertie capacity economically bidding into the real-time market



Source: Q1 2015 Report on Market Issues and Performance

Available at [http://www.aiso.com/Documents/DMM\\_Q1\\_2015\\_Report\\_Final.pdf](http://www.aiso.com/Documents/DMM_Q1_2015_Report_Final.pdf)

## The ISO must develop rules to allow intertie resources to provide flexible capacity

- All LSEs using intertie resources to provide flexible RA must also demonstrate sufficient import capacity
  - i.e. must reserve capacity through ISO's MIC allocation process
- All resource specific system resources will have the same EFC rules as internal resources
  - i.e. – average ramp rates, Pmin, start-up times, etc.
- ISO must develop EFC counting rules for resources that do not have all necessary parameters in Masterfile
  - i.e. Non-resource specific system


## A limit on flexible capacity from 15-minute inertie resources may be needed

- Non-resource specific resources do not have PMin and minimum run time, making them well suited to provide flexible capacity
- The ISO is still assessing the magnitude of real-time flexibility that must be addressed between 15 minute and 5 minute dispatched



## Determining Flexible Capacity Requirements: Inflexible vs. flexible capacity

# The current flexible capacity requirements



# Evaluation of the existing flexible capacity product


## Pros

- Simple from a procurement standpoint
- Worked in the existing RA construct
- Requires economic bidding from flexible capacity resource
- Easily modified

## Cons


- Does not address over-generation needs caused by  $P_{min}$
- Overlap between system and flexible RA creates confusion with respect to offer obligations
- Does not consider the impact of non-RA resources

# The ISO is considering a new methodology to calculate flexible and inflexible capacity needs consistent with operational and environmental objectives



- Applied only in months when over-generation is a concern
- Develop forecasted load and net load curves
- Identify minimum forecasted net load in a month
- Identify forecasted monthly maximum gross load in a month
- Determine forecasted planning reserve margins


# Need to establish how much inflexible capacity is operationally feasible



- Inflexible capacity set at minimum forecasted net load plus forecasted VER output at peak
- Flexible capacity requirement would be from forecasted minimum net load to forecasted maximum net load plus PRM
  - Capacity providing reserves should already be dispatchable, by definition

# An example of how inflexible and flexible capacity requirements could be determined

- Two day month



# The must-offer obligations for flexible and local capacity resources need not change

- Inflexible capacity determined by minimum net load plus VER output at peak
  - Must-offer obligation = Self-schedule or economic bid
- Flexible capacity determined by maximum net load minus minimum net load plus planning reserve margin
  - Must-offer obligation = Economic bid
- Local capacity requirements remain unchanged
  - Must-offer obligation and availability requirements remain unchanged
- Balance between inflexible and flexible RA requirements can be adjusted through “inflexible capacity allowances”

# Simplify RA showings and offer obligations

- Maximum inflexible requirements only apply in non-summer months
  - PMin burden is of greatest concern in non-summer months
  - System and flexible capacity split would still occur for summer months, but flexible capacity requirements calculations would not change from current rules
- System RA sufficiency could be assessed by
  - Adding NQC of system RA capacity plus EFC of flexible RA units
  - Assessing NQC only and validating flexible RA requirements separately
- Local RA assessments could continue to be done on resource NQC values
  - Applies even regardless of how flexible and inflexible adequacy are measured

## Flexible RA duration requirement needs to be reassessed

- ISO is assessing if the flexible capacity product should continue to be assessed over 3 or 4 hours
- This assessment is examining accuracy of day-peak and shape of gross load
  - 3 hours may work if
    - Day ahead peak forecast is accurate in terms of timing and quantity, and
    - Gross load is “peakier” than it was when RA was originally designed
- The ISO is not contemplating a shorter duration RA at this time




## “Inflexible capacity allowances” and adjustments to inflexible capacity

# Inflexible capacity allowances would allow LSEs to meet inflexible capacity constraints at least cost

- Large quantities of inflexible capacity increase the probability of over-generation
- There is currently a significant amount of inflexible capacity existing in the ISO
  - Inflexible QF
  - Nuclear
  - Run-of-river hydro
  - Self scheduled resources
- Inflexible capacity allowances are a means of increasing allowable inflexible capacity at the lowest cost
  - Allowances do to not help address gross load and are not RA capacity
  - Value should reflect incremental benefit of downward flexibility (i.e. same as incentive to lower  $P_{min}$  of a resource)

# Allowable inflexible capacity can be increased by providing allowances



- Allowances for inflexible capacity for:
  - Dispatchable Load
  - Dispatchable Wind and solar
  - Storage load
  - Exports
- All allowances must be bid into the ISO markets
  - Event based triggers will not count towards the credits
- Note for energy storage:
  - Discharge would be RA
  - Charging would be an allowance

# An example of how an LSE's inflexible capacity allowance could be validated in RA showings

## RA showing\* (without an allowance)

- Total requirement = 1000 MW
- Max inflexible RA: 400 MW
- Min flexible RA: 600 MW
- Showing
  - Max inflexible RA: 400 MW
  - Min flexible RA: 600 MW
- Total capacity shown: 1000 MW
- Outcome: Accepted, Adequate

## RA showing\* (with an allowance)

- Total requirement = 1000 MW
- Max inflexible RA: 400 MW
- Min flexible RA: 600 MW
- Showing
  - Inflexible RA: 450 MW
  - Flex RA: 550 MW
  - Inflexible capacity allowance: 50 MW
- Total capacity shown: 1050 MW
- Outcome: Accepted, Adequate

\* Assumes the ISO validates showings of flexible and in flexible using a summation method

# An example of how an LSE's inflexible capacity allowance could be validated in RA showings(cont.)

## Incorrect RA showing\* (without an allowance)

- Total requirement = 1000 MW
- Max inflexible RA: 400 MW
- Min flexible RA: 600 MW
- Showing
  - Max inflexible RA: 450 MW
  - Min flexible RA: 550 MW
- Total capacity shown: 1000 MW
- Outcome: **Rejected**



\* Assumes the ISO validates showings of flexible and inflexible using a summation method

## Incorrect RA showing\* (with an allowance)

- Total requirement = 1000 MW
- Max inflexible RA: 400 MW
- Min flexible RA: 600 MW
- Showing
  - Max inflexible RA: 450 MW
  - Min flexible RA: 550 MW
- Total capacity shown: 1000 MW
- Outcome: Accepted, **Deficient**

# Allowance values for wind and solar resources must be based on output during low net load times


- Inflexible capacity allowances based on NQC under-value the potential benefits of flexible VERs
- ISO must assess expected output of VERs during low net load periods to determine flexible capacity credit



## Assessing the ability to meet steep one hour ramps

# The ISO has identified a growing need for upward ramping speed

2024 One Hour to Three Hour Net-Load Ramp Ratio



## The ramp rate of a subset of flexible capacity must have high ramp rates


- Allows the ISO to adjust for deviations from day-ahead forecast to adjust for forecast error
  - i.e. cloud cover causes evening ramp to start earlier than expected
- Ensures adequate ramp speed during steepest hourly ramp periods
- Allows ISO to cover 5 minute variability

## One hour ramps are increasing and require additional tools to assess adequacy

- Using flexible capacity showings the ISO will assess the ability to meet maximum one hour ramps
- Most balance complexity and accuracy
  - Production simulation (complex and more accurate)
  - Summing only the fastest resources (simple but not accurate)
- ISO proposes to use a simple, but conservative approach
  - Assess the ramping capabilities of the mid-range ramping resources (i.e. not fastest, but not slowest)
- If deficient, the ISO could issue backstop procurement
  - Cost allocation would need to be determined

## Non-RA resources and potential contributions to over-generation

# Self-scheduled non-RA capacity may cause over-generation or cause flexible capacity to be uneconomic



- Non-RA resources could self schedule, limiting access to flexible RA resources

## The ISO has considered several options to address self-scheduled non-RA capacity

- Option 1 – Prohibit self-scheduling non-RA resources in the day-ahead and real-time markets
- Option 2 – Day-ahead awards for non-RA capacity that do not rebid into real-time markets are automatically rebid by the ISO at:
  - Day-ahead bid,
  - DEB, or
  - Zero
- Option 3 – Non-RA capacity would have a lower penalty price parameter in scheduling rule
  - i.e. non-RA resources would be the first resources curtailed
- The final solution may apply one or more of these options

# Next Steps

- Comments on working group proposal
  - Due August 5, 2015
  - Submit comments to [InitiativeComments@caiso.com](mailto:InitiativeComments@caiso.com)