




Day-Ahead Market Enhancements discussion

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
Market Surveillance Committee Meeting
General Session
March 13, 2020

Co-optimization of bid-in demand and system forecast will result in the efficient procurement of energy and capacity products

Forecast > Cleared Demand



Forecast < Cleared Demand




3-generator examples to help explain Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs)

	Generator 1 (G1)		Generator 2 (G2)		Generator 3 (G3)
PMIN	0 MW	PMIN	0 MW	PMIN	0 MW
PMAX	100 MW	PMAX	100 MW	PMAX	100 MW
Ramp Rate	2 MW/min	Ramp Rate	2 MW/min	Ramp Rate	2 MW/min
Energy Bid	\$20/MWh	Energy Bid	\$25/MWh	Energy Bid	\$30/MWh
RCU Bid	\$5/MW	RCU Bid	\$10/MW	RCU Bid	\$2/MW
RCD Bid	\$5/MW	RCD Bid	\$10/MW	RCD Bid	\$2/MW


Scenario A: Sequential process leads to less efficient scheduling with non-zero bids

Load bids 225MW @ \$24, Forecast = 225MW



Scenario B: Co-optimization of reliability capacity leads to more efficient scheduling with non-zero bids

Load bids 225MW @ \$24, Forecast = 225MW




Co-optimization of EN and REN result in efficient pricing and scheduling of reliability capacity

- Co-optimization of EN and REN considers the avoided RCU (or RCD) cost when scheduling physical supply, which can lead to more efficient unit commitment than a sequential process
- Under this design, the entire REN schedule needs to be settled for physical resources to be paid consistent with their bids

REN co-optimization results in different scheduling and pricing implications depending on whether supply or load sets the market price


- Scenarios 1 and 3 illustrate price and scheduling impacts when supply sets the price
- Scenarios 2 and 4 illustrate price and scheduling impacts when load sets the price

Scenario 1: Load bids 125MW @ \$50, Forecast = 155MW




Load pays \$23/MWh and allocated \$2/MWh for energy schedule

Scenario 2: Load bids 125MW @ \$21, Forecast = 155MW



Load pays \$21/MWh and allocated \$2/MWh for energy schedule

Scenario 3: Load bids 125MW @ \$50, Forecast = 75MW



Load pays \$30/MWh and allocated -\$5/MWh for energy schedule

Scenario 4: Load bids 125MW @ \$21, Forecast = 75MW

LMP \$21 \$-1



EN LMP reflects marginal value of energy to load.
REN LMP reflects lost marginal value to load of REN power balance constraint.

0 MW 0 MW 0 MW 0 MW
EN REN EN REN

Energy Bid	\$20/MWh	Energy Bid	\$25/MWh	Energy Bid	\$30/MWh
RCU Bid	\$5/MW	RCU Bid	\$10/MW	RCU Bid	\$2/MW
RCD Bid	\$5/MW	RCD Bid	\$10/MW	RCD Bid	\$2/MW
EN Settlement	\$1,575	EN Settlement	\$0	EN Settlement	\$0
REN Settlement	\$-75	REN Settlement	\$0	REN Settlement	\$0

Load pays \$21/MWh and allocated \$-1/MWh for energy schedule

Do the REN co-optimization benefits outweigh the impacts that can occur when load sets the price?

- In comparison to a sequential approach, the co-optimization introduces scheduling and price efficiencies
- However, there are potential adverse impacts when load sets the price
 - In Scenario 2, load is exposed to a REN cost that they can't avoid
 - In Scenario 4, load is prevented from procuring its desired day-ahead energy position
 - In Scenario B, load is forced to procure more energy than its desired day-ahead energy position

Additional topic for consideration:

- Are there risks to having physical and virtual supply settled at different LMPs at the same node? Or is it appropriate to price them differently?
 - Cost allocation can be used to charge virtuals when they are “wrong”
 - When they are “right” they arguably have the same capacity value as physical supply or load