

**STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS ON DRAFT MULTI-STAGE GENERATING UNIT
TARIFF LANGUAGE**

NUM	Company	Comments	Related Tariff Section
1	PGE	<p><u>CAISO Proposed Tariff Language</u></p> <p><i>Scheduling Coordinators for Multi-Stage Generating Resources must comply with the certification requirements in Section 8, Appendix K of the CAISO Tariff, and the Business Practice Manuals at the configuration levels and Scheduling Coordinators can only submit Ancillary Services Bids or Submissions to Self-Provide Ancillary Services into the CAISO Markets for the Multi-Stage Generating Resource configurations for which they are certified.</i></p> <p><u>Comments</u></p> <p>The proposed language above is confusing and should be broken into distinct sentences.</p>	8.4.1
2	Dynergy	<p>Each Generating Unit, System Unit, Participating Load or System Resource for which a Scheduling Coordinator wishes to submit a Bid to provide Ancillary Services must comply with the requirements for the specific Ancillary Service as set forth in Appendix K and the Business Practice Manual. <u>Scheduling Coordinators for Multi-Stage Generating Resources must comply with the certification requirements in Section 8, Appendix K of the CAISO Tariff, and the Business Practice Manuals for each Multi-Stage Generation Resource Configuration at the configuration levels and Scheduling Coordinators can only submit Ancillary Services Bids or Submissions to Self-Provide Ancillary Services into the CAISO Markets for the Multi-Stage Generating Resource configurations for which they are certified. In addition, to the extent the CAISO requires specific operating characteristics for Ancillary Services certification, the responsible Scheduling Coordinator must submit to the CAISO such specific operating characteristics for each Configuration at the configuration level.</u> The requirements in Appendix K and the Business Practice Manuals include Ancillary Service control, capability and availability standards. The requirements also involve the following operating characteristics</p>	8.4.1
3	Dynergy	<p>Availability of contracted and Self-Provided Ancillary Services and RUC Capacity shall be verified by the CAISO by unannounced testing of Generating Units, Loads and System Resources, by auditing of response to CAISO Dispatch Instructions, and by analysis of the appropriate Meter Data, or Interchange Schedules. The CAISO may test the capability of any Generating Unit, System Unit, System Resource, external import of a System Resource, Participating Load, or reactive device providing Ancillary Services or RUC Capacity. Participating Generators, owners or operators of Participating Loads, operators of System Units or System Resources, owners or operators of reactive devices and Scheduling Coordinators shall notify the CAISO immediately whenever they become aware that an Ancillary Service or RUC Capacity is not available in</p>	8.9

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		<p>any way. All Participating Generators, owners or operators of <u>Participating</u> Loads, operators of System Units or System Resources and owners or operators of reactive devices shall check, monitor and/or test their system and related equipment routinely to assure availability of the committed Ancillary Services and RUC Capacity. These requirements apply to Ancillary Services whether the Ancillary Services are contracted or self-provided. For a duration specified by the CAISO, the CAISO may suspend the technical eligibility certificate of a Scheduling Coordinator for a Generating Unit, System Unit, Load or System Resource, which repeatedly fails to perform. The CAISO shall develop measures to discourage repeated non-performance on the part of both bidders and self-providers. <u>Further, all of these requirements apply to each Multi-Stage Generating Resource Configuration at the configuration level to Multi-Stage Generating Resources.</u></p>		
4	Dynergy	<p>The CAISO may test the capability of a Generating Unit, System Unit or an external import of a System Resource to provide RUC Capacity by issuing unannounced Dispatch Instructions requiring the Generating Unit or System Unit to come on line and ramp up or, in the case of a System Resource, to affirmatively respond to a Real-Time Interchange Schedule adjustment; all in accordance with the Scheduling Coordinator's Bid. Such tests may not necessarily occur on the hour. The CAISO shall measure the response of the Generating Unit, System Unit or external import of a System Resource to determine compliance with its stated capabilities. <u>For a Multi-Stage Generating Resource the full-range of RUC Capacity is evaluated is the range for at the applicable Configuration.</u></p>	8.9.6	
5	Dynergy	<p>The CAISO will audit the performance of a Generating Unit providing Regulation by monitoring its response to CAISO EMS control or, in the case of an external import of a System Resource providing Regulation, by monitoring the dynamic Interchange response to CAISO EMS control around its Set Point within its rated MW/minute capability over the range of Regulation capacity scheduled for the current Settlement Period. <u>For a Multi-Stage Generating Resource the range of Regulation capacity is evaluated is the range for at the applicable configuration.</u></p>	8.9.9	
6	Dynergy	<p>The CAISO will audit the performance of a Generating Unit or external import of a System Resource providing Spinning Reserve by auditing its response to Dispatch Instructions and by analysis of Meter Data associated with the Generating Unit. Such audits may not necessarily occur on the hour. A Generating Unit providing Spinning Reserve shall be evaluated on its ability to respond to a Dispatch Instruction, move at the MW/minute capability stated in its Bid, reach the amount of Spinning Reserve capacity scheduled for the current Settlement Period within ten (10) minutes of issue of the Dispatch Instruction by the CAISO, and respond to system frequency deviations outside the allowed frequency deadband. An external import of a System Resource providing Spinning Reserve shall be evaluated on its ability to respond to a Dispatch Instruction, move at the MW/minute capability stated in its Bid, reach the amount of Spinning Reserve capacity scheduled for the</p>	8.9.10	

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		current Settlement Period within ten (10) minutes of issue of the Dispatch Instruction by the CAISO. <u>For a Multi-Stage Generating Resource the range of Spinning Reserve capacity is-evaluated is the range forat the applicable Ceonfiguration.</u>		
7	Dynergy	The CAISO will audit the performance of a Generating Unit, Load, or System Resource providing Non-Spinning Reserve by auditing its response to Dispatch Instructions, and by analysis of Meter Data associated with the resource. Such audits may not necessarily occur on the hour. A Generating Unit providing Non-Spinning Reserve shall be evaluated on its ability to respond to a Dispatch Instruction, move in accordance with the time delay and MW/minute capability stated in its Bid, and reach the amount of Non-Spinning Reserve capacity under the control of the CAISO scheduled for the current Settlement Period within ten (10) minutes of issue of the Dispatch Instruction by the CAISO. An external import of a System Resource providing Non-Spinning Reserve shall be evaluated on its ability to respond to a Dispatch Instruction, move in accordance with the time delay and MW/minute capability stated in its Bid, and reach the amount of Non-Spinning Reserve capacity scheduled for the current Settlement Period within ten (10) minutes of issue of the Dispatch Instruction by the CAISO. A Load providing Non-Spinning Reserve from Curtailable Demand shall be evaluated on its ability to respond to a Dispatch Instruction, move in accordance with the time delay and MW/minute capability stated in its Bid, and reach the amount of Non-Spinning Reserve capacity scheduled for the current Settlement Period within ten (10) minutes of issue of the Dispatch Instruction by the CAISO. <u>For a Multi-Stage Generating Resource the range of Non-Spinning Reserve capacity is-evaluated is the range forat the applicable Ceonfiguration.</u>	8.9.11	
8	Dynergy	The CAISO will audit the performance of a Generating Unit, Participating Load, or System Resource providing RUC Capacity by auditing its response to Dispatch Instructions, and by analysis of Meter Data associated with the resource. Such audits may not necessarily occur on the hour. A Generating Unit providing RUC Capacity shall be evaluated on its ability to respond to a Dispatch Instruction, start within the designated time delay, move at the MW/minute capability stated in its Bid, reach the amount of RUC Capacity scheduled for the Settlement Period concerned and sustain operation at this level for a sufficient time to assure availability over the specified period. An external import of a System Resource providing RUC Capacity shall be evaluated on its ability to respond to a Dispatch Instruction, start within the designated time delay, move at the MW/minute capability stated in its Bid, reach the amount of RUC Capacity scheduled for the Settlement Period concerned and sustain operation at this level for a sufficient time to assure availability over the specified period. <u>For a Multi-Stage Generating Resource, the full-range of RUC Capacity is-evaluated is the range forat the applicable Ceonfiguration.</u>	8.9.14	
9	Dynergy	The CAISO shall test the Spinning Reserve capability of a Generating Unit, System Unit or System Resource by issuing unannounced Dispatch Instructions requiring the	8.10.2	

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		Generating Unit, System Unit or System Resource to ramp up to its ten (10) minute capability. The CAISO shall measure the response of the Generating Unit, System Unit or System Resource to determine compliance with requirements. Such tests may not necessarily occur on the hour. The Scheduling Coordinator for the Generating Unit, System Unit or System Resource shall be paid pursuant to Section 11.5.6. <u>For a Multi-Stage Generating Resource the full range of Spinning Reserve capacity is evaluated is the range for the applicable Configuration.</u>	
10	Dynegy	The CAISO may test the Non-Spinning Reserve capability of a Generating Unit, Load, System Unit or System Resource by issuing unannounced Dispatch Instructions requiring the Generating Unit, Load, System Unit or System Resource to come on line and ramp up or to reduce Demand to its ten (10) minute capability. The CAISO shall measure the response of the Generating Unit, System Unit, System Resource or Load to determine compliance with requirements. The Scheduling Coordinator for the Generating Unit, System Unit, Load or System Resource shall be paid pursuant to Section 11.5.6. <u>For a Multi-Stage Generating Resource the full-range of Non-Spinning Reserve capacity is evaluated is the range for the applicable Configuration.</u>	8.10.3
11	Dynegy	The CAISO shall calculate the Real-Time ability of each Generating Unit, Participating Load, System Unit or System Resource to deliver Energy from Ancillary Services capacity or Self-Provided Ancillary Services capacity for each Settlement Interval based on its maximum operating capability, actual telemetered output, and Operational Ramp Rate as described in Section 30.10. <u>For the Multi-Stage Generating Resource the Configuration-specific maximum operating capability and the Operational Ramp Rate are used considered at the applicable configuration level.</u> System Resources that are awarded Ancillary Services capacity in the Day-Ahead Market are required to electronically tag (E-Tag as prescribed by the WECC) the Ancillary Services capacity. If the amounts of Ancillary Services capacity in an electronic tag differ from the amounts of Ancillary Services capacity for the System Resource, the Undispatchable Capacity will equal the amount of the difference, and will be settled in accordance with the provisions of Section 11.10.9.1.	8.10.8.1
12	Dynegy	If the CAISO determines that a Scheduling Coordinator has supplied Uninstructed Imbalance Energy to the CAISO during a Settlement Interval from the capacity of a Generating Unit, Participating Load, System Unit or System Resource that is obligated to supply Spinning Reserve or Non-Spinning Reserve to the CAISO, payments to the Scheduling Coordinator for the Ancillary Service capacity used to supply Uninstructed Imbalance Energy shall be eliminated to the extent of the deficiency, in accordance with the provisions of Section 11.10.9.2. <u>For Multi-Stage Generating Resources the determination offer which payments will be rescinded shall consider the at the resource level with the maximum operating capability for the applicable Configuration level.</u>	8.10.8.2

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13	SCE	No-pay determination should be at the configuration (not resource) level.	8.10.8.3	
14	Dynegy	For each Settlement Interval in which a Generating Unit, Participating Load, System Unit or System Resource fails to supply Energy from Spinning Reserve or Non-Spinning Reserve capacity in accordance with a Dispatch Instruction, or supplies only a portion of the Energy specified in the Dispatch Instruction, the capacity payment will be reduced to the extent of the deficiency, in accordance with the provisions of Section 11.10.9.3. <u>For a Multi-Stage Generating Resource this determination is made at the resource level. [What is the "resource level"? And is that last sentence even needed?]</u>	8.10.8.3	
15	Dynegy	<u>Participating Generators for Multi-Stage Generating Resources shall comply with provide the Outage reporting requirements in Section 9 by resource and for each Configuration, as applicable. In addition, to the extent that the responsible Scheduling Coordinator modifies the registered Multi-Stage Generating Resource's characteristics as provided in Section 27.8.3, the Participating Generator for the Multi-Stage Generating Resource shall modify any information or reports previously submitted pursuant to this Section 9 to account for any registered status and characteristic changes as soon as possible after receiving notice from the CAISO accepting the registered status or characteristics changes and no later than two (2) days prior to the date on which the Section 27.8.3 changes are expected to be in effect.</u>	9.7	
16	PGE	Tariff Section 11.8 CAISO's proposed language often includes the phrase "the CAISO will evaluate". The CAISO should identify the relevant tariff section that explains its evaluation methodology when using this phrase. For example, Section 11.8.3.1.1 (a) states: <i>"An actual Start-Up is detected between two consecutive Settlement Intervals when the relevant metered Energy in the applicable Settlement Intervals increases from below the Minimum Load Energy and reaches or exceeds the relevant Minimum Load Energy. The Minimum Load Energy is the product of the relevant Minimum Load and the duration of the Settlement Interval. The CAISO will evaluate the Minimum Load Energy for Multi-Stage Generating Resources based on the CAISO-committed configuration."</i> This language in bold is unclear. The CAISO should identify the relevant tariff section that explains the how the CAISO will evaluate Minimum Load Energy for MSG Resources.	11.8	
17	Dynegy <u>For Multi-Stage Generating Resources, the Minimum Run Time and Minimum Down Time will be evaluated at both the Configuration and resource level to determine whether an extension of the IFM Self-Commitment Period applies. [again, what is the "resource level"?</u>	11.8.1.1	Ap

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		<u><i>How does it differ from the most expansive Configuration level? If the CAISO retains this term, it should be defined.</i></u>		
18	SCE	Both these section contain the statement “For Multi-Stage Generating Resources, the Minimum Run Time and Minimum Down Time will be evaluated at both the configuration and resource level to determine whether an extension of the IFM Self-Commitment Period applies”. Please clarify if the Min Run and Min Down time is associated with the configuration level only? If so, is evaluation of MRT and MDT at the resource level correct?	11.8.1.1 and 11.8.1.2	Ap
19	Dynergy	<p><u>11.8.1.3 Multi-Stage Generating Resource Start-Up, Minimum Load, or Transition Costs</u></p> <p><u>For the settlement of the Multi-Stage Generating Resource Start-Up Cost, Minimum Load Cost, and Transition Cost in the IFM, RUC, and RTM, the CAISO will select the applicable Start-Up Cost, Minimum Load Cost, and Transition Cost based on the following rules.</u></p> <p><u>(1) In any given Settlement Interval, the CAISO will first apply the following rules to determine the applicable Start-Up Cost, Minimum Load Cost, and Transition Cost for the Multi-Stage Generating Resources:</u></p> <p><u><i>[Does the CAISO need to define the word “commit”? Does it simply mean “to start-up”? Or does it mean “to start-up and specify a certain operating level and/or Configuration”? Or perhaps just “to direct to operate in a particular configuration”? Perhaps this term should be defined...]</i></u></p> <p><u>(a) If the CAISO commits the Multi-Stage Generating Resource in the IFM and/or RUC in different Ceonfigurations than it commits the Multi-Stage Generating Resource in the RTM, then the Multi-Stage Generating Resource’s Start-Up Cost, Minimum Load Cost, and Transition Cost will be settled based on the RTM Start-Up Cost, Minimum Load Cost, and Transition Cost from the Real-Time Market committed Ceonfiguration as described in Section 11.8.4.1. [??]</u></p> <p><u>(d) If the Multi-Stage Generating Resource is self-committed in IFM or RUC in the same Ceonfiguration as the ISO commits the Multi-Stage Generating Resource in RTM, then the Multi-Stage Generating Resource’s Start-Up Cost, Minimum Load Cost, and Transition Cost will be settled based on the RTM Start-Up Cost, Minimum Load Cost, and Transition Cost for the Ceonfiguration committed in the Real-Time Market as described in Section 11.8.4.1.</u></p> <p><u>(2) In any given Settlement Interval, after the rules specified in Section 1 have been executed, the ISO will apply the following rules to determine whether the IFM or RUC Start-Up Cost, Minimum Load Cost, and Transition Cost apply for Multi-Stage Generating Resources:</u></p> <p><u>(a) If the CAISO commits the Multi-Stage Generating Resource in the IFM in a different Ceonfiguration than it commits the Multi-Stage Generating</u></p>	11.8.1.2	Ap

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		<p><u>Resource in RUC, then the Multi-Stage Generating Resource's Start-Up Cost, Minimum Load Cost, and Transition Cost will be settled based on the RUC Start-Up Cost, Minimum Load Cost, and Transition Cost from the RUC-committed Configuration as described in Section 11.8.3.1.</u></p> <p><u>(b) If the CAISO commits the Multi-Stage Generating Resource in the IFM in a Configuration other than the Multi-Stage Generating Resource is self-committed in RUC, then the Multi-Stage Generating Resource's Start-Up Cost, Minimum Load Cost, and Transition Cost will be settled based on the IFM Costs of the Configuration committed in the IFM, as described in Section 11.8.2.1</u></p> <p><u>(c) If the CAISO commits the Multi-Stage Generating Resource in the IFM in the same Configuration the CAISO commits the Multi-Stage Generating Resource in RUC, then Multi-Stage Generating Resource's Bid Costs will be based on the IFM Start-Up Cost, Minimum Load Cost, and Transition Cost for the configuration committed in the IFM as described in Section 11.8.2.1.</u></p> <p><u>(d) If the Multi-Stage Generating Resource is self-committed in IFM in the same Configuration as the ISO commits the Multi-Stage Generating Resource in RUC, then the Multi-Stage Generating Resource's Start-Up Cost, Minimum Load Cost, and Transition Cost will be based on the RUC Start-Up Cost, Minimum Load Cost, and Transition Cost for the Configuration committed in the RUC, as described in Section 11.8.3.1.</u></p>		
20	SCE	<p>Would the ISO provide comment on SCE's interpretation of this section, which is that MSGs are settled at the CAISO committed configuration if there was both a CAISO and a self-commitment in the same interval? Also, settlement is at RTM>RUC>IFM committed configuration in order of precedence in those situations when the CAISO has more than one commitment, with different configurations, in the same interval. This makes sense since it uses the "final" configuration that CAISO commits.</p>	11.8.1.3	Ap
21	PGE	<p><u>CAISO Proposed Tariff Language</u></p> <p><i>"If the CAISO commits the Multi-Stage Generating Resource in the IFM and RUC in the same configuration the ISO commits the Multi-Stage Generating Resource in RTM, then the Multi-Stage Generating Resource's Start-Up Cost, Minimum Load Cost, and Transition Cost will be settled based on the IFM or RUC Start-Up Cost, Minimum Load Cost, and Transition Cost for the configuration committed in the IFM or RUC, described in Sections 11.8.2.1 and 11.8.3.1, and further determined pursuant to part (2) below."</i></p> <p><u>Comments</u></p> <p>This tariff section is not consistent with MSG Business Rule (BRQ114) which states:</p>	11.8.1.3 (c)	Ap

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		The transition cost and minimum load cost will be evaluated following the order of RTM -> RUC -> IFM. If a transition cost or minimum load cost has been determined by that market, the eligibility for the subsequent market will not be considered.		
22	SCE	For purposes of determining the IFM Unrecovered Bid Cost Uplift Payments as determined in Section 11.8.5, and the purposes of allocating Net IFM Bid Cost Uplift as described in Section 11.8.6.4 the CAISO shall calculate the IFM Bid Cost Shortfall or the IFM Bid Cost Surplus as the algebraic difference between the IFM Bid Cost and the IFM Market Revenues for each Settlement Interval. The IFM Bid Costs shall be calculated pursuant to Section 11.8.2.1 and the IFM Market Revenues shall be calculated pursuant to Section 11.8.2.2. The Energy subject to IFM Bid Cost Recovery is the actual Energy awarded in the IFM. delivered in the Real-Time that is within the Day-Ahead Schedule for each eligible resource.	11.8.2	Ap
23	SCE	This section addresses long start units that start before the IFM commitment period within the same trading day. SCE believes that the tariff also needs to address those units that must start on prior days to meet the IFM commitment timeline.	11.8.2.1.1 (g)	Ap
24	SCE	Need clarification on determination of ML costs for settlement intervals that contain two dispatch intervals with two different configurations.	11.8.2.1.2 and 11.8.4.1.2	Ap
25	SCE	For any Settlement Interval, the IFM Energy Bid Cost for Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resources, except Participating Loads, shall be the integral of the relevant Energy Bid submitted to the IFM, if any, from the higher of the registered Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource's Minimum Load and the Day-Ahead Total Self-Schedule up to the relevant MWh scheduled in the Day-Ahead Schedule, divided by the number of Settlement Intervals in a Trading Hour. The IFM Energy Bid Cost for Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resources, except Participating Loads, for any Settlement Interval is set to zero for any portion of the Day-Ahead Schedule that is not delivered from the otherwise Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource that has metered Generation below its Day-Ahead Schedule; any portion of the Day-Ahead Schedule that is actually delivered remains eligible for IFM Energy Bid Cost Recovery. The CAISO will evaluate the IFM Energy Bid Cost for a Multi-Stage Generating Resource at the resource level.	11.8.2.15	Ap
26	Dynegy	For any Settlement Interval, the IFM Energy Bid Cost for Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resources, except Participating Loads, shall be the integral of the relevant Energy Bid submitted to the IFM, if any, from the higher of the registered Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource's Minimum Load and the Day-Ahead Total Self-Schedule up to the relevant MWh scheduled in the Day-Ahead Schedule, divided by the number of Settlement Intervals in a Trading Hour. The IFM Energy Bid Cost for Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resources, except Participating Loads, for any Settlement Interval is set to zero for any portion of the Day-Ahead Schedule that is not delivered from the otherwise Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource	11.8.2.1.5	Ap

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		that has metered Generation below its Day-Ahead Schedule; any portion of the Day-Ahead Schedule that is actually delivered remains eligible for IFM Energy Bid Cost Recovery. <u>The CAISO will evaluate the IFM Energy Bid Cost for a Multi-Stage Generating Resource at the resource level</u>		
27	Dynegy	For any Settlement Interval, the IFM AS Bid Cost shall be the product of the IFM AS Award from each accepted IFM AS Bid and the relevant AS Bid Price, divided by the number of Settlement Intervals in a Trading Hour. <u>The CAISO will evaluate and calculate IFM Ancillary Services Bid Cost for a Multi-Stage Generating Resource at the resource level.</u>	11.8.2.1.6	Ap
28	SCE	Does a MSG unit still qualify for transition costs when part of the configuration is running on self schedule?	11.8.2.1.7	Ap
29	Dynegy	<u>For each Settlement Interval, the IFM Transition Costs shall be based on the Configuration to which the Multi-Stage Generating Resource is transitioning and is allocated to the CAISO Commitment Period of that Configuration.</u>	11.8.2.1.7	Ap
30	SCE	With regards to “cost is at resource level,” please clarify how the bid cost level is calculated at the resource level when bids and awards are at the configuration level.	11.8.2.1.5, 11.8.2.1.6, 11.8.4.1.5 and 11.8.4.1.6	Ap
31	SCE	Are transition costs guaranteed? Are there any checks (like the ones found in the SUC section) that an MSG can fail and not receive Transition Cost recovery? What if the unit doesn't transition?	11.8.2.1.4 and 11.8.4.1.7	Ap
32	SCE	Revenues calculations need to be at the configuration (not the resource) level.	11.8.2.2, 11.8.3.2 and 11.8.4.2.1	Ap
33	Dynegy	For any Settlement Interval in a CAISO IFM Commitment Period the IFM Market Revenue for a Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource is the algebraic sum of: (1) the product of the delivered MWh, in the relevant Day-Ahead Schedule in that Trading Hour where for Pumped-Storage Hydro Units and Participating Load operating in the pumping mode or serving Load, the MWh is negative, and the relevant IFM LMP, divided by the number of Settlement Intervals in a Trading Hour; and (2) the product of the IFM AS Award from each accepted IFM AS Bid and the relevant Resource-Specific ASMP, divided by the number of Settlement Intervals in a Trading Hour. <u>In the case of a Multi-Stage Generating Resource, the CAISO will calculate the market revenue at the resource level.</u> For any Settlement Interval in a IFM Self-Commitment Period the IFM Market Revenue for a Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource is the algebraic sum of: (1) the product of the delivered MWh above the greater of Minimum Load and Self-Scheduled Energy, in the relevant Day-Ahead Schedule in that Trading Hour and the relevant IFM LMP, divided by the number of Settlement Intervals in a Trading Hour; and (2) the product of the IFM AS Award from each accepted IFM AS Bid and the relevant Resource-Specific ASMP, divided by the number of Settlement Intervals in a Trading Hour.	11.8.2.2	Ap

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34	SCE	<p>For any Settlement Interval in a CAISO IFM Commitment Period the IFM Market Revenue for a Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource is the algebraic sum of: (1) the product of the awarded delivered-MWh, in the relevant Day-Ahead Schedule in that Trading Hour where for Pumped-Storage Hydro Units and Participating Load operating in the pumping mode or serving Load, the MWh is negative, and the relevant IFM LMP, divided by the number of Settlement Intervals in a Trading Hour; and (2) the product of the IFM AS Award from each accepted IFM AS Bid and the relevant Resource-Specific ASMP, divided by the number of Settlement Intervals in a Trading Hour. In the case of a Multi-Stage Generating Resource, the CAISO will calculate the market revenue at the resource level. For any Settlement Interval in a IFM Self-Commitment Period the IFM Market Revenue for a Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource is the algebraic sum of: (1) the product of the delivered-awarded MWh above the greater of Minimum Load and Self-Scheduled Energy, in the relevant Day-Ahead Schedule in that Trading Hour and the relevant IFM LMP, divided by the number of Settlement Intervals in a Trading Hour; and (2) the product of the IFM AS Award from each accepted IFM AS Bid and the relevant Resource-Specific ASMP, divided by the number of Settlement Intervals in a Trading Hour.</p>	11.8.2.2	Ap
35	PGE	<p><u>CAISO Proposed Tariff Language</u></p> <p><i>“If the CAISO commits the Multi-Stage Generating Resource in the IFM in the same configuration the CAISO commits the Multi-Stage Generating Resource in RUC, then Multi-Stage Generating Resource’s Bid Costs will be based on the IFM Start-Up Cost, Minimum Load Cost, and Transition Cost for the configuration committed in the IFM as described in Section 11.8.2.1.”</i></p> <p><u>Comments</u></p> <p>This tariff section is not consistent with MSG Business Rule (BRQ114) which states:</p> <p>The transition cost and minimum load cost will be evaluated following the order of RTM -> RUC -> IFM. If a transition cost or minimum load cost has been determined by that market, the eligibility for the subsequent market will not be considered.</p>	11.8.2.3 (2c)	Ap
36	SCE	<p>For purposes of determining the RTM Unrecovered Bid Cost Uplift Payments as determined in Section 11.8.5, and for the purposes of allocation of Net RTM Bid Cost Uplift as described in Section 11.8.6.6 the CAISO shall calculate the RTM Bid Cost Shortfall or the RTM Bid Cost Surplus as the algebraic difference between the RTM Bid Cost and the RTM Market Revenues for each Settlement Interval. The RTM Bid Costs shall be calculated pursuant to Section 11.8.4.1 and the RTM Market Revenues shall be calculated pursuant to Section 11.8.4.2. <u>The Energy subject to RTM Bid Cost</u></p>		Ap

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		Recovery is the actual Energy delivered in the Real-Time associated with Instructed Imbalance Energy described in Section 11.5.1, excluding Standard Ramping Energy, Residual Imbalance Energy, Exceptional Dispatch Energy, Derate Energy, Ramping Energy Deviation, Regulation Energy and MSS Load Following Energy.		
37	Dynegy	(f)The RUC Start-Up Cost for a RUC Commitment Period is qualified if an actual Start-Up occurs within that RUC Commitment Period. <u>An actual Start-Up is detected between two consecutive Settlement Intervals when the relevant metered Energy in the applicable Settlement Intervals increases from below the Minimum Load Energy and reaches or exceeds the relevant Minimum Load Energy. [No tolerance band?]</u> The Minimum Load Energy is the product of the relevant Minimum Load and the duration of the Settlement Interval. The CAISO will evaluate the Minimum Load Energy for Multi-Stage Generating Resources based on the CAISO-committed Configuration.	11.8.3.1.1 (f)	Ap
38	Dynegy	For any Settlement Interval, the RUC Market Revenue for a Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource is the RUC Availability Payment as specified in Section 11.2.2.1 divided by the number of Settlement Intervals in a Trading Hour. If the RUC Availability Bid Cost of a BCR Eligible Resource is reduced to zero (0) in a Settlement Interval because of Uninstructed Deviation as stated in Section 11.8.3.1.3, then the RUC Market Revenue for that resource for that Settlement Interval shall also be set to zero (0) since the resource is subject to rescission of RUC Availability Payments as specified in Section 31.5.7. <u>The CAISO will evaluate the RUC Market Revenues for Multi-Stage Generating Resources based on the Multi-Stage Generating Resource resource level.</u>	11.8.3.2	Ap
39	Dynegy	For any Settlement Interval, the RTM Energy Bid Cost for the Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource except Participating Loads shall be computed as the sum of the products of each Instructed Imbalance Energy (IIE) portion, except Standard Ramping Energy, Residual Imbalance Energy, Exceptional Dispatch Energy, Derate Energy, MSS Load Following Energy, Ramping Energy Deviation and Regulating Energy, with the relevant Energy Bid prices, if any, for each Dispatch Interval in the Settlement Interval. The RTM Energy Bid Cost for a Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource except Participating Loads for a Settlement Interval is set to zero for any undelivered Real-Time Instructed Imbalance Energy by the Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource. Any Uninstructed Imbalance Energy in excess of Instructed Imbalance Energy is also not eligible for Bid Cost Recovery. <u>For a Multi-Stage Generating Resource the CAISO will evaluate the RTM Energy Bid Cost based on the Multi-Stage Generating Resource resource level.</u>	11.8.4.1.5	Ap
40	SCE	For any Settlement Interval, the <u>CAISO shall compute two</u> RTM Energy Bid Cost for the Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource except Participating Loads. <u>The first</u> shall be computed as the sum of the products of each	11.8.4.1.5	Ap

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		<p>Instructed Imbalance Energy (IIE) portion, except Standard Ramping Energy, Residual Imbalance Energy, Exceptional Dispatch Energy, Derate Energy, MSS Load Following Energy, Ramping Energy Deviation, Real-Time Minimum Load Energy, and Regulating Energy, with the relevant Energy Bid prices, if any, for each Dispatch Interval in the Settlement Interval. The second shall be computed as the sum of the products of each delivered energy portion less the corresponding IFM Energy award, except Standard Ramping Energy, Residual Imbalance Energy, Exceptional Dispatch Energy, Derate Energy, MSS Load Following Energy, Ramping Energy Deviation, Real-Time Minimum Load Energy, and Regulating Energy, with the relevant Energy Bid prices, if any, for each Dispatch Interval in the Settlement Interval. For the first RTM Energy Bid Cost the relevant Energy Bid price equals the corresponding IFM Energy Bid price if the Instructed Imbalance Energy (IIE) portion is negative, else, it equals the RTM Energy Bid price. For the second RTM Energy Bid Cost the relevant Energy Bid price equals the corresponding IFM Energy Bid Price if the delivered Energy is less than the corresponding IFM Energy award, else it equals the RTM Energy Bid price. RTM Revenue is also computed using both Instructed Imbalance Energy and the actual Energy delivered. The RTM Energy Bid Cost eligible for Bid Cost Recovery is the amount that when netted against the corresponding RTM Revenue amount, excluding revenue from Minimum Load Energy, produces the largest surplus or smallest shortfall. The RTM Energy Bid Cost for a Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource except Participating Loads for a Settlement Interval is set to zero for any undelivered Real-Time Instructed Imbalance Energy by the Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource. Any Uninstructed Imbalance Energy in excess of Instructed Imbalance Energy is also not eligible for Bid Cost Recovery. For a Multi-Stage Generating Resource the CAISO will evaluate the RTM Energy Bid Cost based on the Multi-Stage Generating Resource resource level.</p>		
41	Dynergy	<p>For each Settlement Interval, the Real-Time Market AS Bid Cost shall be the product of the average Real-Time Market AS Award from each accepted AS Bid submitted in the Settlement Interval for the Real-Time Market, reduced by any relevant tier-1 No Pay capacity in that Settlement Interval (but not below zero), with the relevant AS Bid price. The average Real-Time Market AS Award for a given AS in a Settlement Interval is the sum of the 15-minute Real-Time Market AS Awards in that Settlement Interval, each divided by the number of 15-minute Commitment Intervals in a Trading Hour and prorated to the duration of the Settlement Interval (10/15 if the Real-Time Market AS Award spans the entire Settlement Interval, or 5/15 if the Real-Time Market AS Award spans half the Settlement Interval). For a Multi-Stage Generating Resource the CAISO will evaluate the RTM AS Bid Cost based on the Multi-Stage Generating Resource resource level.</p>	11.8.4.1.6	
42	Dynergy	<p>For each Settlement Interval in a CAISO Real-Time Market Commitment Period, the RTM Market Revenue for a Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource is the algebraic sum of the following elements listed below in this Section. For Multi-Stage Generating Resources the</p>	11.8.4.2.1	Ap

NUM	Company	Comments	Related Tariff Section	
		<u>RTM Market Revenue calculations will be made at the resource level.</u>		
43	SCE	<p>For each Settlement Interval in a CAISO Real-Time Market Commitment Period, the RTM Market Revenue for a Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resource is the algebraic sum of the elements listed below in this Section. For Multi-Stage Generating Resources the RTM Market Revenue calculations will be made at the resource level.</p> <p>(a) The <u>CAISO shall calculate two Energy revenue amounts. The first shall equal the</u> sum of the products of the Instructed Imbalance Energy (including Energy from Minimum Load of Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resources committed in RUC where for Pumped-Storage Hydro Units and Participating Load operating in the pumping mode or serving Load, the MWh is negative), except Standard Ramping Energy, Residual Imbalance Energy, Exceptional Dispatch Energy, Derate Energy, MSS Load following Energy, Ramping Energy Deviation and Regulation Energy, with the relevant Real-Time Market LMP, for each Dispatch Interval in the Settlement Interval; <u>the second shall equal the sum of the products of the delivered Energy less IFM Energy awards (including Energy from Minimum Load of Bid Cost Recovery Eligible Resources committed in RUC where for Pumped-Storage Hydro Units and Participating Load operating in the pumping mode or serving Load, the MWh is negative), except Standard Ramping Energy, Residual Imbalance Energy, Exceptional Dispatch Energy, Derate Energy, MSS Load following Energy, Ramping Energy Deviation and Regulation Energy, with the relevant Real-Time Market LMP, for each Dispatch Interval in the Settlement Interval. The RTM Energy revenue eligible for Bid Cost Recovery is the amount that when netted against the corresponding RTM Bid Cost amount, excluding revenue from Minimum Load Energy, produces the largest surplus or smallest shortfall.</u></p>	11.8.4.2.1	Ap
44	Dynergy	<p><u>Scheduling Coordinators must comply with the registration and qualification process described in this Section 27.8.1, in order to effectuate any of the changes described in Section 27.8.3. No less than sixteen (16) days prior to the date that a Scheduling Coordinator seeks to have the resource participate in the CAISO Markets under the new settings or configuration details, the Scheduling Coordinator must complete and submit to the CAISO the registration form and the resource data template provided by the CAISO for registration and qualification purposes. After the submission of a request for change in status [what is a “change in status”? Does it mean a non-MSG resource becoming an MSG resource? If so, can we say that instead? “Status” is a very broad word.] or Ceonfiguration definitions by a Scheduling Coordinator, the CAISO will coordinate with the responsible Scheduling Coordinator to validate that the resource qualifies for the requested status and that all the requisite information has been successfully provided to the CAISO. The resource will be successfully registered and qualified for the</u></p>	27.8.1	Ap

NUM	Company	Comments	Related Tariff Section	
		<p><u>requested status and configuration definitions on the date that the CAISO sends the notification to the responsible Scheduling Coordinator that the resource has been successfully qualified. After the date on which the CAISO has provided this notice, any changes to the items listed in Section 27.8.3 will be subject to the requirements in Section 27.8.1 and 27.9.3. If the CAISO determines that the resource’s operating and technical characteristics have changed since the time that the CAISO issued the notice of qualification to the responsible Scheduling Coordinator, the CAISO may request that the Scheduling Coordinator provide additional information necessary to support their registered status and if appropriate may require that the resource be registered and qualified more consistent with the resource’s operating and technical characteristics. [What happens in the event that the CAISO and the SC cannot agree as to whether a resource qualifies for a certain “status”?] Such changes in status or Configuration details would be subject to the registration and qualification requirements in this Section 27.8. Scheduling Coordinators may register the number of Multi-Stage Generating Resource Configurations as are reasonably appropriate for the resource based on the technical and operating characteristics of the resource, which may not, however, exceed a total of ten configurations and cannot be fewer than two configurations. The information requirements specified in Section 27.8.2 will apply.</u></p>		
45	PGE	<p><u>CAISO Proposed Tariff Language</u></p> <p><i>“After the submission of a request for change in status or configuration definitions by a Scheduling Coordinator, the CAISO will coordinate with the responsible Scheduling Coordinator to validate that the resource qualifies for the requested status and that all the requisite information has been successfully provided to the CAISO (...).”</i></p> <p><u>Comments</u></p> <p>The CAISO should clarify its timeline for validating a resource’s status with the responsible Scheduling Coordinator.</p>	27.8.1	Ap
46	Dynergy	<p><u>As part of the registration process described in Section 27.8.1, the Scheduling Coordinators for Generating Units or Dynamic Resource-Specific System Resources that seek to qualify as Multi-Stage Generating Resources must submit to the CAISO a transition matrix, which contains the cost and operating constraints associated with feasible transitions between Configurations. The responsible Scheduling Coordinator shall submit for each Configuration a single segment Operational Ramp Rate, and, as applicable, an Operating Reserves ramp rate and Regulating Reserves ramp rate. The Scheduling Coordinator must establish the default Configuration and its associated start-up path that apply to Multi-Stage Generating Resources that are subject to Resource Adequacy must-offer obligations. The Scheduling Coordinator may submit changes to this</u></p>	27.8.2	

NUM	Company	Comments	Related Tariff Section	
		<u>information consistent with Sections 27.8.3 and 27.8.4. All registered Ceonfigurations for Multi-Stage Generating Resources must be operable on-line Ceonfigurations.</u>		
47	SCE	Why does the CAISO feel it is necessary to restrict changes in the status and configurations of MSG units to once every 60 days? SCE has experienced situations in the past where strict time limits in the tariff have prevented the CAISO from changing erroneous data. If the CAISO insists on maintaining such a limit in the tariff, SCE requests that language be added to allow CAISO to waive the limit under special circumstances. However, such a waiver is a second choice to eliminating the language altogether.	27.8.3	
48	Dynergy	<p><u>Scheduling Coordinators must submit requests for changes to the status and Ceonfiguration definitions listed below to the CAISO consistent with the process and timing requirements discussed in Section 27.8.1. [Are the following items what the CAISO intended to be “definitions”? They might be “requirements” but they do not seem to be “definitions”.]</u></p> <p><u>(1) Register a Generating Unit or Dynamic Resource-Specific System Resource as a Multi-Stage Generating Resource.</u></p> <p><u>(2) Unregister a Generating Unit or Dynamic Resource-Specific System Resource as a Multi-Stage Generating Resource.</u></p> <p><u>(3) Change the registered Ceonfigurations for a Multi-Stage Generating Resource, which includes the (a) addition of new Ceonfigurations; (b) removal of an existing Ceonfiguration; (c) a material change to the definition of a registered configuration, which includes (i) a change in the physical units supporting the Ceonfiguration, and (ii) designation of the default Resource Adequacy Ceonfiguration with the associated default start-up path; or (d) changes of “from” and “to” configurations within their transition matrix.</u></p> <p><u>Scheduling Coordinators may not modify any of the above settings [are the above definitions, settings or requirements?] or Ceonfigurations for sixty (60) days after any of these settings or Ceonfiguration details have taken effect. When transitioning to implement these changes across the midnight hour, for any Real-Time Market run in which the changes specified in this Section 27.8.3 are to take effect within the Time Horizon of any of the Real-Time Market runs, the CAISO will Dispatch, Award, or commit [the fact that “Dispatch” and “Award” are defined terms strongly suggests that “Commit” should be a defined term, too] resources consistent with either the prior or new status and definitions, as appropriate, and required by any Real-Time conditions regardless of the resource’s state scheduled in the immediately preceding Day-Ahead Market. Changes to Multi-State Generating Resource characteristics will take effect at midnight or at the earliest time after midnight the resource is operating in the affected Configuration.</u></p>	27.8.3	
	Dynergy	<u>(g) For Multi-Stage Generating Resources that receive a Day-Ahead Schedule, are committed in RUC, or receive an Ancillary Services Award, the</u>	30.5.1 (g –m)	

NUM	Company	Comments	Related Tariff Section
		<p><u>Scheduling Coordinator must submit an Energy Bid, which may consist of a Self-Schedule, in the Real-Time Market for the same Trading Hour or Trading Hours for either the same Configuration scheduled or awarded in the Integrated Forward Market or committed in RUC. [What happens if one Configuration is specified in IFM and a different Configuration is specified in RUC? Wouldn't the RUC Configuration control?] In addition, the Scheduling Coordinator for such Multi-Stage Generating Resources may also submit Bids into the Real-Time Market for two other Configurations provided that the transitions within the three Configurations bid into the Real-Time Market are feasible and the transition from the Configuration for from the previous Trading Hour are also feasible.</u></p> <p><u>(h) For the Trading Hours that Multi-Stage Generating Resources do not have a CAISO commitment from a prior market they can bid-in up to three Configurations can be bid into the RTM.</u></p> <p><u>(i) The Scheduling Coordinator cannot bid in a Configuration to the CAISO Markets into which the Multi-Stage Generating Resource cannot transition due to lack of Bids for the specific resource in other Configurations that are required for the requisite transition. .</u></p> <p><u>(j) In order for Multi-Stage Generating Resource to meet any Resource Adequacy must-offer obligations, the responsible Scheduling Coordinator must submit either as an Economic Bid or Self-Schedule for at least one Configuration that is capable of fulfilling that Resource Adequacy obligation into the Day-Ahead Market and Real-Time Market that is capable of fulfilling that Resource Adequacy obligation</u></p> <p><u>(k) For any given Trading Hour, a Scheduling Coordinator may submit Self-Schedules and/or Submissions to Self-Provide Ancillary Services in only one Multi-Stage Generating Resource-registered Configuration. If in any given Trading Hour the Multi-Stage Generating Resource was awarded Regulation or Operating Reserves in the IFM, any Self-Schedules or Submissions to Self-Provide Ancillary Services the Scheduling Coordinator submits for that Multi-Stage Generating Resource in the RTM must be for the same Configuration for which Regulation or Operating Reserve is awarded in the IFM for that Multi-Stage Generating Resource in that given Trading Hour.</u></p> <p><u>(l) If a Multi-Stage Generating Resource has received a binding RUC Start-Up Instruction as provided in Section 31, any Self-Schedule or Submission to Self-Provide Ancillary Services in the RTM must be in the same Configuration committed in RUC.</u></p> <p><u>(m) If in any given Trading Hour the Multi-Stage Generating Resource is scheduled for Energy in the IFM, any Self-Schedules the Scheduling Coordinator submits for that Multi-Stage Generating Resource in the RTM must be for the same Configuration for which Energy is scheduled in IFM for that Multi-Stage Generating Resource in that given Trading Hour.</u></p>	

NUM	Company	Comments	Related Tariff Section
49	SCE	These sections describe the rules around self-scheduling. These rules seem unnecessary and overly restrictive compared to the flexibility allowed for non-MSG resources. Could the CAISO please describe why these rules are necessary?	30.5.1 (k, l, m) and 30.5.2.1
50	Dynegy	In addition to the resource-specific Bid requirements of this Section, all Supply Bids must contain the following components: Scheduling Coordinator ID Code; Resource ID <u>and Multi-Stage Generating Resource Ceonfiguration ID [does each Configuration have an ID?] as applicable</u> ; Resource Location; PNode or Aggregated Pricing Node as applicable; Energy Bid Curve; Self-Schedule component; Ancillary Services Bid; RUC Availability Bid; the Market to which the Bid applies; Trading Day to which the Bid applies; Priority Type (if any). Supply Bids offered in the CAISO Markets must be monotonically increasing. Energy Bids in the RTM must also contain a Bid for Ancillary Services to the extent the resource is certified and capable of providing Ancillary Service in the RTM up to the registered certified capacity for that Ancillary Service less any Day-Ahead Ancillary Services Awards. <u>Scheduling Coordinators must submit the applicable Supply Bid components, including Self-Schedules, at the registered Ceonfiguration level. [Could an MSGR have unregistered Configurations? If not, do we have to refer to registered Configurations?]</u>	30.5.2.1
51	Dynegy	The CAISO conducts Bid validation in three steps <u>as described below. For a Multi-Stage Generating Resource the validation described herein is done for each at the Ceonfiguration level for which Bids are submitted.:</u>	30.7.3.1
52	Dynegy	<u>If a Scheduling Coordinator does not submit a Bid in the Day-Ahead Market or RTM for a Multi-Stage Generating Resource with a Resource Adequacy must-offer obligation at a Ceonfiguration that can meet an Resource Adequacy must-offer obligation, the ISO will create a Generated Bid for the default Resource Adequacy configuration. If the resource cannot be start-up in the default Resource Adequacy Ceonfiguration-is not capable of start up the CAISO will create a Generated Bid for every Ceonfiguration in the registered Default Resource Adequacy Path. If the Scheduling Coordinator submits a Bid for the Multi-Stage Generating Resource, the CAISO will create this Generated Bid for the registered Ceonfigurations before the Market Close, and if it does not submit such a Bid the CAISO will create this Generated Bid after the Market Close. Any Generated Bid created by the CAISO for the default Resource Adequacy configuration will be in addition to the Ceonfigurations bid into the Real-Time Market by the responsible Scheduling Coordinator. If the Scheduling Coordinator submits a Bid in the Day-Ahead or RTM for a Ceonfiguration that is not the default Resource Adequacy Ceonfiguration-of the MSG and that does not provide the full amount of the resource's RA capacity-only partly meets the resource's Resource Adequacy requirements, the CAISO will create a Generated Bid for the full Resource Adequacy capacity. Before the market closes, if a Scheduling Coordinator submits a Bid in the Day-Ahead or RTM for the default</u>	30.7.3.5

NUM	Company	Comments	Related Tariff Section
		<p><u>Resource Adequacy Configuration of an Multi-Stage Generating Resource that only meets part of the resource's Resource Adequacy must-offer obligation, the CAISO will extend the last segment of the Energy Bid curve in the submitted Bid for the Multi-Stage Generating Resource up to the Multi-Stage Generating Resource's Resource Adequacy must-offer obligation. After the market closes, to the extent that no Bid is submitted into the Real-Time Market for a Multi-Stage Generating Resource scheduled in the Integrated Forward Market as required in Section 30.5 the CAISO will create a Self-Schedule equal to the Day-Ahead Schedule for that resource for the Configuration scheduled in the IFM equal to the Day-Ahead Schedule for that resource. To the extent a Multi-Stage Generating Resource is awarded Operating Reserves in the Day-Ahead Market and no Economic Energy Bids are submitted for that resource in the Real-Time Market, the CAISO will insert a Proxy Energy Bid in the Configuration that was awarded in the Day-Ahead Market to cover the awarded Operating Reserves.. To the extent that an Multi-Stage Generating Resource's RUC Schedule is greater than its the Day-Ahead Schedule, if the Scheduling Coordinator does not submit an Energy Bid in the RTM to cover the difference, then the CAISO will either creates an Energy Bid in the configuration committed in RUC, or extends the Energy Bid that they did submit if there is one before the Market Close. After the Market Close, the CAISO will create a Generated Bid if there is no Energy Bid submitted for the resource for this difference. The CAISO will validate that the combination of the Day-Ahead Ancillary Services Awards and Submissions to Self-Provide Ancillary Services are feasible with respect to the physical operating characteristics of the Multi-Stage Generating Resource. The CAISO will reject Ancillary Services Bids or Submissions to Self-Provide Ancillary Services for Configurations that are not certified to provide Ancillary Services. For any given Multi-Stage Generating Resource, for any given CAISO Market and Trading Hour if the Bids for one Configuration's Bid fails the bid validation process, all other Bids for all other Configurations are also invalidated. <i>[Will the CAISO provide information to the SC so it is quickly and plainly evident which Bids triggered the rejection?]</i></u></p>	
53	Dynergy	<p>For a Generating Unit or a Resource-Specific System Resource, the submitted Start-Up Time expressed in minutes (min) as a function of down time expressed in minutes (min) must be a staircase function with up to three (3) segments defined by a set of 1 to 4 down time and Start-Up Time pairs. The Start-Up Time is the time required to start the resource if it is offline longer than the corresponding down time. <u>The ISO models Start-Up Times for Multi-Stage Generating Resource for each at the Configuration level and Multi-Stage Generating Resource transition times are validated based on the Multi-Stage Generating Resource transition matrix submitted as provided in Section 27.8.</u> The last segment will represent the time to start the unit from a cold start and will extend to infinity. The submitted Start-Up Time function shall be validated as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) The first down time must be zero (0) min. (b) The down time entries must match exactly (in 	30.7.8

NUM	Company	Comments	Related Tariff Section	
		<p>number, sequence, and value) the corresponding down time breakpoints of the maximum Start-Up Time function, as registered in the Master File for the relevant resource.</p> <p>(c) The Start-Up Time for each segment must not exceed the Start-Up Time of the corresponding segment of the maximum Start-Up Time function, as registered in the Master File for the relevant resource.</p> <p>(d) The Start-Up Time function must be strictly monotonically increasing, i.e., the Start-Up Time must increase as down time increases.</p> <p>For Participating Load, a single Shut-Down time in minutes is the time required for the resource to Shut-Down after receiving a Dispatch Instruction. <u>For a Multi-Stage Generating Resource resources transition time is the time required for the resource to transition from one Ceonfiguration to another.</u></p>		
54	Dynergy	<p>For Participating Loads, a single Shut-Down Cost in dollars (\$) is the cost incurred to Shut-Down the resource after receiving a Dispatch Instruction. The submitted Shut-Down Cost must not be negative. <u>For Multi-Stage Generating Resources the Start-Up Costs must be provided for each by Ceonfigurations into which the resource can be started.</u></p>	30.7.9	
55	SCE	<p>This language is a bit unclear. SCE believes the CAISO is trying to say that the decision to mitigate will be done on a configuration by configuration level but the actual bid mitigation will occur across all configurations. SCE suggest the CAISO add some clarity to the section to either confirm our interpretation or make an alternative meaning evident.</p>	31.2.2.2	
56	Dynergy	<p>If the dispatch level produced through the ACR is greater than the dispatch level produced through CCR, then the resource is subject to Local Market Power Mitigation, in which case the entire portion of the unit's Energy Bid Curve that is above the CCR dispatch level will be mitigated to the lower of the Default Energy Bid as specified in Section 39, or the DAM Bid, but no lower than the unit's highest Bid price that cleared the CCR. <u>In the case of Multi-Stage Generating Resource, the CAISO will perform any applicable Local Market Power Mitigation on a Ceonfiguration-by-Ceonfiguration basis and will flag individual Ceonfigurations' Bids for mitigation. To the extent a Multi-Stage Generating Resource's MWhs cleared in the All Constraints Run is greater than the MWhs cleared in the Competitive Constraints Run, the CAISO will evaluate for purposes of mitigation all Energy Bids for all configurations that are submitted based on the relevant Default Energy Bids for the applicable configuration . The CAISO will calculate the Default Energy Bids for Multi-Stage Generating Resources by configuration.</u> When the ACR dispatch level is higher than the CCR level, the market Bid at and below the CCR dispatch level will be retained in the IFM. If the dispatch level produced through the ACR is not greater than the dispatch level produced through the CCR, the unit's original, unmitigated DAM Bid will be retained in its entirety. <u>Does the CAISO use "MWhs cleared" as a synonym for "the operating level to which the resource is dispatched" outside of using it</u></p>	31.2.2.2	

NUM	Company	Comments	Related Tariff Section
		<u>for MSGRs?!</u>	
57	Dynergy	<p>After the MPM-RRD and prior to RUC, the CAISO shall perform the IFM. The IFM (1) performs Unit Commitment and Congestion Management (2) clears mitigated or unmitigated Bids cleared in the MPM-RRD as well as Bids that were not cleared in the MPM-RRD process against bid-in Demand, taking into account transmission limits and honoring technical and inter-temporal operating Constraints, such as Minimum Run Times (3) and procures Ancillary Services to meet one hundred percent (100%) of the CAISO Forecast of CAISO Demand requirements. The IFM utilizes a set of integrated programs that: (1) determine Day-Ahead Schedules and AS Awards, and related LMPs and ASMPs; and (2) optimally commits resources that are bid in to the DAM. The IFM utilizes a SCUC algorithm that optimizes Start-Up Costs, Minimum Load Costs, <u>Transition Costs</u>, and Energy Bids along with any Bids for Ancillary Services as well as Self-Schedules submitted by Scheduling Coordinators. <u>The IFM selects the optimal Configuration from optimizes-up to ten Ceonfigurations of each Multi-Stage Generating Resource as a mutually exclusive resources.</u> The IFM also provides for the optimal management of Use-Limited Resources. The ELS Resources committed through the ELC Process conducted two days before the day the IFM process is conducted for the next Trading Day as described in Section 31.7 are binding.</p>	31.3
58	SCE	<p>CAISO proposes to not award any AS for resources which are in transition the same interval (hour in IFM, 15 min in RTUC). This seems overly restrictive since many instances will arise where the transition takes place in less than 10 minutes. Preventing a resource from selling AS for an entire interval based off a sub-10 minute transition will unnecessarily limit the AS available to the market.</p>	31.3.1.2 and 34.2
59	Dynergy	<p>As provided in Section 30.7.6.2 the CAISO shall co-optimize the Energy and Ancillary Services Bids in clearing the IFM. To the extent that capacity subject to an Ancillary Services Bid submitted in the Day-Ahead Market is not associated with an Energy Bid, there is no co-optimization, and therefore, no opportunity cost associated with that resource for that Bid for the purposes of calculating the Ancillary Services Marginal Price as specified in Section 27.1.2.2. When the capacity associated with the Energy Bid overlaps with the quantity submitted in the Ancillary Services Bid, then the Energy Bid will be used to determine the opportunity cost, if any, in the co-optimization to the extent of the overlap. Therefore, the capacity that will be considered when co-optimizing the procurement of Energy and Ancillary Services from Bids in the IFM will consider capacity up to the total capacity of the resource as reflected in the Ancillary Services Bid as derated through SLIC, if at all. In the case of Regulation, the capacity that will be considered is the lower of the capacity of the resource offered in the Ancillary Services Bid or the upper Regulation limit of the highest Regulating Range as contained in the Master File. <u>For any Trading Hour in which the Multi-Stage Generating Resource is transitioning from one Configuration to another Confirugation.in a transition period, the IFM will not</u></p>	31.3.1.2

NUM	Company	Comments	Related Tariff Section
		<p><u>award Ancillary Services and any Self-Provided Ancillary Services will be disqualified. Any Ancillary Services Awards in the IFM to Multi-Stage Generating Resources will carry through to the Real-Time Market in the same Configuration that the Multi-Stage Generating Resource is awarded [committed? Need to be consistent.] in the IFM.</u></p>	
60	Dynergy	<p>The CAISO shall perform the RUC process after the IFM. In the event that the IFM did not commit sufficient resources to meet the CAISO Forecast of CAISO Demand and account for other factors such as Demand Forecast error, as described in the Business Practice Manuals, the RUC shall commit additional resources and identify additional RUC Capacity to ensure sufficient on-line resources to meet Demand for each hour of the next Trading Day. RUC Capacity is selected by a SCUC optimization that uses the same Base Market Model used in the IFM adjusted as described in Section 27.5.1 and 27.5.6 to help ensure the deliverability of Energy from the RUC Capacity. <u>In the case of Multi-Stage Generating Resources, the RUC will optimize Transition Costs in addition to optimizing the Start-Up and Minimum Load Costs. [Does the CAISO mean it will optimize Transition Costs separately or optimize SU ML and TC as a whole?]</u></p>	31.5
61	Dynergy	<p>Scheduling Coordinators may only submit RUC Availability Bids for capacity (above the Minimum Load) for which they are also submitting an Energy Bid to participate in the IFM. The RUC Availability Bid for the Resource Adequacy Capacity submitted by a Scheduling Coordinator must be \$0/MW per hour for the entire Resource Adequacy Capacity. If the Scheduling Coordinator fails to submit a \$0/MW per hour for Resource Adequacy Capacity, the CAISO will insert the \$0/MW per hour for the full amount of Resource Adequacy Capacity for a given resource <u>reduced by any upward Ancillary Services awards. For MSGs, for resources that fail to submit a \$0/MW per hour for their Resource Adequacy Capacity, the CAISO will insert the \$0/MW per hour for the resource's Resource Adequacy Capacity at the Configuration level up to the minimum of the Resource Adequacy Capacity or the PMax of the Configuration.</u> Scheduling Coordinators may submit non-zero RUC Availability Bids for the portion of a resource's capacity that is not Resource Adequacy Capacity.</p>	31.5.1.2
62	PGE	<p><u>CAISO Proposed Tariff Language</u></p> <p><i>"All resources that are eligible for RUC participation as described in Section 31.5.1.1 with RUC Bids that are unconstrained due to Ramp Rates or other temporal constraints, including Multi-Stage Generating Resource transitions, are eligible to set the RUC Price."</i></p> <p><u>Comments</u></p> <p>There is no proposed language regarding Forbidden Operating Regions"(FORs); since FORs are not considered marginal when in transition, we would like the CAISO to clarify if FOR units can or cannot set the</p>	31.5.1.4

NUM	Company	Comments	Related Tariff Section	
		RUC Price.		
63	SCE	It seems the CAISO might have been overzealous in adding the term "Transition Costs" everywhere that Startup and Minimum Load existed in the tariff. When a resource has already been committed in IFM but is transitioned to another configuration in RUC it would make sense to consider the Transition Costs. Additionally, the new configuration will have a different minimum load cost. It seems like RUC should consider the difference in minimum load costs as well. Will RUC transition to "lower" configurations?	31.5.5	
64	Dynegy	The CAISO shall calculate the Real-Time ability of each Generating Unit, Participating Load, System Unit or System Resource to deliver Energy from or capacity committed in RUC for each Settlement Interval based on its maximum operating capability, actual telemetered output, and Operational Ramp Rate as described in Section 30.10, <u>which for a Multi-Stage Generating Resource is evaluated for eachat the configuration level.</u> If the Undispatchable Capacity is capacity committed in RUC and is from a Generating Unit, System Unit or System Resource that is a Resource Adequacy Resource, there is no payment obligation to the CAISO for the Undispatchable Capacity. The CAISO will report the instance of non-compliance by the Resource Adequacy Resource to the appropriate Local Regulatory Authority.	31.5.7.1	
65	Dynegy	For each Settlement Interval in which a Generating Unit, Participating Load, System Unit or System Resource fails to supply Energy from capacity committed in RUC in accordance with a Dispatch Instruction, or supplies only a portion of the Energy specified in the Dispatch Instruction, the RUC Availability Payment will be reduced to the extent of the deficiency, in accordance with the provisions of Section 11.2.2.2.2, <u>which for a Multi-Stage Generating Resource is evaluated at the resource level.</u>	31.5.7.2	
66	SCE	RUC no-pay at the configuration (not resource) level.	31.5.7.2	
67	Dynegy	The Real-Time Unit Commitment (RTUC) process uses SCUC and is run every fifteen (15) minutes to: (1) make commitment decisions for Fast Start and Short Start resources having Start-Up Times within the Time Horizon of the RTUC process, and (2) procure required additional Ancillary Services and calculate ASMP used for settling procured Ancillary Service capacity for the next fifteen-minute Real-Time Ancillary Service interval. <u>In any fifteen minute RTUC interval that a Multi-Stage Generating Resource is transitioning between Configurations in transition, the CAISO: (1) will not award any incremental Ancillary Services; (2) will disqualify any Day-Ahead Ancillary Services Awards; (3) will disqualify Day-Ahead qualified Submissions to Self-Provide Ancillary Services Award, and (4) will disqualify Submissions to Self-Provide Ancillary Services in RTM. In addition, the RTUC will not transition Multi-Stage Generating Resources with transition times longer than the RTUC Time Horizon. [How long is that? Where in the tariff it is specified?] A Transition Instruction is considered binding in a given RTUC run if the Transition Time of the resource is such that there would not be sufficient time for a subsequent RTUC run to transition</u>	34.2	

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		<p><u>the resource, otherwise the Transition Instruction is considered advisory. [How will the SC know if the Transition Instruction is binding or mandatory?]</u> <u>For Multi-Stage Generating Resources the RTUC will issue the binding Transition Instruction separately from the binding Start-Up or Shut Down instructions.</u> The RTUC can also be run with the Contingency Flag activated, in which case the RTUC can commit Contingency Only Operating Reserves. If RTUC is run without the Contingency Flag activated, it cannot commit Contingency Only Operating Reserves. RTUC is run four times an hour, at the following times for the following Time Horizons: (1) at approximately 7.5 minutes prior to the next Trading Hour, in conjunction with the HASP run, for T-45 minutes to T+60 minutes; (2) at approximately 7.5 minutes into the current hour for T-30 minutes to T+60 minutes; (3) at approximately 22.5 minutes into the current hour for T-15 minutes to T+60 minutes; and (4) at approximately 37.5 minutes into the current hour for T to T+60 minutes where T is the beginning of the next Trade Hour. The HASP, described in Section 33, is a special RTUC run that is performed at approximately 7.5 minutes before each hour and has the additional responsibility of: (1) pre-dispatching Energy and awarding Ancillary Services for hourly dispatched System Resources for the Trading Hour that begins 67.5 minutes later, and (2) performing the necessary MPM-RRD for that Trading Hour. <u>In the RTUC if a Multi-Stage Generating Resource Configuration committed in the IFM or RUC that is later impacted by the resource's derate or outages, the CAISO will re-optimize [what will be re-optimized?] taking into consideration the impacts of the derate or outage on the available Configurations.</u></p>		
68	PGE	<p><u>CAISO Proposed Tariff Language</u></p> <p><i>In any fifteen minute RTUC interval that a Multi-Stage Generating Resource is in transition, the CAISO: (1) will not award any incremental Ancillary Services; (2) will disqualify any Day-Ahead Ancillary Services Awards; (3) will disqualify Day-Ahead qualified Submissions to Self-Provide Ancillary Services Award, and (4) will disqualify Submissions to Self-Provide Ancillary Services in RTM (...)."</i></p> <p><u>Comments</u></p> <p>The tariff language above is not supported by current Business Rules. Will revisions to Business Rules be provided?</p>	34.2	
69	Dynergy	<p>RTUC produces binding and advisory Start-Up and Shut-Down Dispatch Instructions for Fast Start and Short Start resources that have Start-Up Times that would allow the resource to be committed prior to the end of the relevant Time Horizon of the RTUC run. A Start-Up Dispatch Instruction is considered binding <u>in any given RTUC run if the Start-Up Time of the resource is such that there would not be sufficient time for a subsequent RTUC run to could not achieve the target start time as determined in the current RTUC run in a subsequent RTUC run as a result of the Start-Up Time of the</u></p>	34.2.1	

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		<p>resource. A Start-Up Instruction is considered advisory if it is not binding, such that the resource could achieve its target Start-Up Time as determined in the current RTUC run in a subsequent RTUC run based on its Start-Up Time. A Shut-Down Instruction is considered binding if the resource could achieve the target Shut-Down Time as determined in the current RTUC in a subsequent RTUC run. A Shut-Down Dispatch Instruction is considered advisory if the resource Shut-Down Instruction is not binding such that the resource could achieve its target Shut-Down time as determined in the current RTUC run in a subsequent RTUC run. A binding Dispatch Instruction that results in a change in Commitment Status will be issued, in accordance with Section 6.3, after review and acceptance of the Start-Up Instruction by the CAISO Operator. An advisory Dispatch Instruction changing the Commitment Status of a resource may be modified by the CAISO Operator to a binding Dispatch Instruction and communicated in accordance with Section 6.3 after review and acceptance by the CAISO Operator. Only binding and not advisory Dispatch Instructions will be issued by the CAISO. <u>For Multi-Stage Generating Resources the CAISO will also issue binding Transition Instructions when the Multi-Stage Generating Resource must change from one Configuration to another. A Transition Instruction is considered binding in any given RTUC run if the Transition Time of that transition for that resource is such that there would not be sufficient time for a subsequent RTUC run to transition the resource. [Again – will the SC know whether the instruction is binding or advisory?]</u></p>	
70	Dynergy	<p>At the top of each Trading Hour, immediately after the RTUC run is completed, the CAISO performs an approximately five (5) hour Short-Term Unit Commitment (STUC) run using SCUC and the CAISO Forecast of CAISO Demand to commit Medium Start Units and Short Start Units with Start-Up Times greater than the Time Horizon covered by the RTUC. The Time Horizon for the STUC optimization run will extend three hours beyond the Trading Hour for which the RTUC optimization was run, and will replicate the Bids used in that Trading Hour for these additional hours. The CAISO revises these replicated Bids each time the hourly STUC is run, to utilize the most recently submitted Bids. A Start-Up Instruction produced by STUC is considered binding if the resource could not achieve the target Start-Up Time as determined in the current STUC run in a subsequent RTUC or STUC run as a result of the Start-Up Time of the resource. A Start-Up Instruction produced by STUC is considered advisory if it is not binding, such that the resource could achieve its target start time as determined in the current RTUC run in a subsequent STUC or RTUC run based on its Start-Up Time. A binding Dispatch Instruction produced by STUC that results in a change in Commitment Status will be issued, in accordance with Section 6.3, after review and acceptance of the Start-Up Instruction by the CAISO Operator. The STUC will only decommit a resource to the extent that resource’s physical characteristics allow it to be cycled in the same Time Horizon for which it was decommitted. STUC does not produce prices for Settlement. <u>In the STUC, if a Multi-Stage Generating Resource Configuration committed in the IFM or RUC</u></p>	34.4

NUM	Company	Comments	Related Tariff Section	
		<u>that is later impacted by the resource's derate or outage, the CAISO will re-optimize [again, re-optimize what?] taking into consideration the impacts of the derate or outage on the available configurations.</u>		
	Dynegy	<p>(5) The Dispatch Instructions of a resource for a subsequent Dispatch Interval shall take as a point of reference the actual output obtained from either the State Estimator solution or the last valid telemetry measurement and the resource's operational ramping capability. <u>For Multi-Stage Generating Resource the point of reference is further evaluated for each at the configuration level and is also based on the Transition Matrix; [How does the Transition Matrix influence the point of reference? Should "point of reference" be a defined term?]</u></p> <p><u>(12) Through Transition Instructions the CAISO may instruct resources to Transition from one Configuration to another over the Time Horizon for the RTM based on submitted Bids, Transition Costs and Minimum Load Costs, as appropriate for Multi-Stage Generating Resource for the Configurations involved in the transition, consistent with the Multi-Stage Generating Resource Transition Matrix and operating characteristics of these configurations. The RTM optimization may factor in limitations on daily maximum number of transitions between configuration as defined in the Transition Matrix and their Minimum Up Time and Minimum Down Time as defined for each at the Configuration level.</u></p>	34.5 (5)	
71	SCE	Language reads "The RTM optimization <u>may</u> factor in limitations on daily maximum number of transitions between configurations as defined in the transition matrix and their Minimum Up Time and Minimum Down Time as defined at the configuration level." Should the term "may" read "will".	34.5 (12)	
72	PGE	<p><u>CAISO Proposed Tariff Language</u></p> <p>The CAISO has not proposed language for this section of the Tariff.</p> <p><u>Comments</u></p> <p>This section was not included in the proposed MSG Tariff language; proposed tariff language should be added to reflect MSG Business Rule (BRQ105) which discusses the inclusion of Transition Costs for MSG units that are Exceptionally Dispatched.</p>	34.9	
73	Dynegy	e) Minimum Run Time and Down Time. The SCED shall not start up off-line resources before their Minimum Down Time expires and shall not shut down on-line resources before their Minimum Run Time expires. <u>For Multi-Stage Generating Resources this shall be enforced/observed both at the resource and configuration level.</u>	34.15.1 (e)	
74	Dynegy	<u>(c) For Multi-Stage Generating Resources, after</u>	34.15.2 (c)	

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		<u>RTUC issues a Transition Instruction: (1) for non-overlapping Ceonfigurations [what is a “non-overlapping Configuration as opposed to an “overlapping Configuration”? Can this be set forth in a definition of “Configuration”?], the RTD moves the Dispatch Operating Point of the resource immediately from the boundary of the “from” Ceonfiguration to the boundary of the “to” Ceonfiguration, as defined in the Master File or as modified via SLIC, of a Multi-Stage Generating Resource; and (2) for over-lapping Ceonfigurations, RTD moves the Dispatch Operating Point of the resource within the overlapping operating range of the Ceonfiguration until the transition is complete.</u>	
75	SCE	What is the reason behind limited the DEB option for 90 days after status changes? This seems unnecessary.	39.7.1
76	Dynegy	Default Energy Bids shall be calculated by the CAISO, for the on-peak hours and off-peak hours for both the DAM and RTMs, pursuant to one of the methodologies described in this Section. The Scheduling Coordinator for each Generating Unit owner or Participating Load must rank order the following options of calculating the Default Energy Bid starting with its preferred method. The Scheduling Coordinator must provide the data necessary for determining the Variable Costs unless the Negotiated Rate Option precedes the Variable Cost option in the rank order, in which case the Scheduling Coordinator must have a negotiated rate established with the Independent Entity charged with calculating the Default Energy Bid. If no rank order is specified for a Generating Unit or Participating Load, then the default rank order of (1) Variable Cost Option, (2) Negotiated Rate Option, (3) LMP Option will be applied. <u>For the first ninety (90) days after changes to resource status and Ceonfigurations as specified in Section 27.8.3, including the first ninety (90) days after the effective date of Section 27.8.3, the Default Energy Bid option for the resource is limited to the Negotiated Rate Option or the Variable Cost Option. [This warrants further explanation and justification.]</u>	39.7.1
77	PGE	<u>Comments</u> Appendix A does not include a definition of RUC Transition cost.	Appendix A - Definitions
78	Dynegy	For a Multi-Stage Generating Resource, a particular combination of generating components that are operated together, which have a distinct set of operating characteristics (e.g., maximum and minimum energy output, ramp rate, and heat rate function). <i>[I know this needs work but this seems like too important a concept not to expressly define.] An over-lapping Configuration is one in which.... A non-overlapping Configuration is one in which....</i>	Appendix A – Definitions - Configuration
79	SCE	The transition plan mentions that market simulation will take place two months before go-live and that 75 days prior to go-live Scheduling Coordinators will have to commence the MSG registration process. It is likely that	Appendix AA – Transition Plan

NUM	Company	Comments	Related Tariff Section
		<p>market simulation will enhance the CAISO and market participant understanding of the MSG enhancement. This newfound understanding may result in a need to register additional resources, unregister resources, and/or change the characteristics of registered resources. How does the CAISO plan to deal with these inevitable situations?</p> <p>Also in the transition plan is the notion that certain aspects of an MSG cannot be changed during the first 60 days after go-live. What is the purpose of this limitation? One unchangeable value is the default RA configuration and its associated startup path. Since RA values change on a monthly basis (sometimes more than once a month) it is unreasonable to prevent this designation from changing when the basis for making the designation can change. SCE recommends the CAISO remove the constraint or at least reconcile the discrepancy with other tariff provisions.</p> <p>Note: The last paragraph of the transition plan refers to creating Outages at the configuration level 48 hours before go-live. This will require the CAISO to make the Outage reporting mechanisms available to the market with sufficient time to meet the 48-hour deadline. SCE suggests CAISO make the Outage report mechanism available 168 hours before go-live.</p>	
80	Dynergy	<p><u>This Appendix AA describes the registration and qualification requirements for Generating Units and Dynamic Resource-Specific System Resources that intend to qualify and participate in the CAISO Markets as Multi-Stage Generating Resources as of the first day on which the Multi-Stage Generating Resource CAISO Tariff provisions are effective.</u></p> <p><u>During the market simulation activities scheduled two months prior to effective date of the CAISO Tariff provisions enabling the implementation of MSG functionality, Scheduling Coordinators will be permitted to register and participate in market simulation either with or without the use of the Multi-Stage Generating Resource functionality. However, no later than seventy-five days prior to the effective date of the CAISO Tariff provisions enabling the Multi-Stage Generating Resource functionality, Scheduling Coordinators that intend to register and qualify Generating Units or Dynamic Resource-Specific System Resources as Multi-Stage Generating Resources as of the effective date of the CAISO Tariff provisions for the Multi-Stage Generating Resource functionality shall commence the registration process for the resources by submitting to the CAISO the completed MSG registration form and the resource data template for Generating Unit or Dynamic Resource Specific System Resource, which the CAISO provides as part of the registration process. [Are these posted on the web site?] After such submission the CAISO will coordinate with the responsible Scheduling Coordinator to validate that the resource qualifies as a Multi-Stage Generating Resource, and that all the requisite information has been successfully provided to the CAISO. Successful completion of the registration process will occur upon the CAISO's notification to the responsible Scheduling Coordinator that the resource has been successfully qualified as an MSG. [Can SCs be assured that the CAISO will provide notice before</u></p>	Appendix AA – Transition Plan

NUM	Company	Comments	Related Tariff Section
		<p><u>the effective date or, if the information is not complete, that the CAISO will provide a reasonable cure period that would not delay registration?</u> Once the CAISO has provided such notice, the resource will be registered and qualified to participate as an MSG as of the effective date of the CAISO Tariff provisions enabling the implementation of the MSG functionality. Scheduling Coordinators may register the number of Multi-Stage Generating Resource Ceonfigurations as are reasonably appropriate for the unit based on the operating characteristics of the unit, which may not, however, exceed a total of ten Ceonfigurations and cannot be fewer than two Ceonfigurations. <u>[Is it possible that there could be some dispute between the CAISO and the SC as to the number of Configurations that may be registered? How would such a dispute be resolved?]</u> The resource will be successfully registered and qualified for the requested status and Ceonfiguration definitions on the date that the CAISO sends the notification to the responsible Scheduling Coordinator that the resource has been successfully qualified. If the CAISO determines that the resources operating and technical characteristics have changed since the time that the CAISO the notice of qualification to the responsible Scheduling Coordinator, the CAISO may request that the Scheduling Coordinator provide additional information necessary to support their registered status and if appropriate may require that the resource be registered and qualified more consistent with the resource's operating and technical characteristics.</p> <p><u>As part of the registration process, the Scheduling Coordinators must submit to the CAISO a Ttransition Mmatrix, which contains the cost and operating constraints associated with feasible transitions between Ceonfigurations. The responsible Scheduling Coordinator shall submit for each Ceonfiguration a single segment Operational Ramp Rate, and as applicable an Operating Reserves ramp rate and Regulating Reserves ramp rate. The Scheduling Coordinator must establish as part of the RDT in the registration the default Ceonfiguration and its associated start-up path that apply to Multi-Stage Generating Resources that are subject to Resource Adequacy must-offer obligations-as part of the RDT in the registration. The Ceonfigurations and operational characteristics submitted to and accepted by the CAISO during this pre-registration process will be in effect for the first sixty days after the effective date of the Multi-Stage Generating Resources CAISO Tariff provisions. Sixty days after the effective date of the Multi-Stage Generating Resources, the following modeling conversions will be possible as further described in the CAISO Tariff:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <u>(1) Register a Generating Unit or Dynamic Resource-Specific System Resource as a Multi-Stage Generating Resource.</u> <u>(2) Unregister a Generating Unit or Dynamic Resource-Specific System Resource as a Multi-Stage Generating Resource.</u> <u>(3) Change the registered Ceonfigurations for a Multi-Stage Generating Resource, which includes the (a) addition of new Ceonfigurations; (b) removal of an existing Ceonfiguration; (c) a material change to the</u> 	

NUM	Company	Comments	Related Tariff Section
		<p><u>definition of a registered Ceonfiguration, which includes (i) a change in the physical units supporting the Ceonfiguration, and (ii) designation of default Resource Adequacy Ceonfiguration with associated default start-up path; or (d) changes of “from” and “to” Ceonfigurations within their transition matrix.</u></p> <p><u>When transitioning to implement these changes across the midnight hour, for any Real-Time Market run in which the changes specified in this Section 27.8.3 is to take effect within the Time Horizon of any of the Real-Time Market runs, the CAISO will Dispatch, Award, or commit resources consistent with either the prior or new status and definitions, as appropriate and required by any Real-Time conditions regardless of the resource’s state scheduled in the immediately preceding Day-Ahead Market. [see comments on 27.8.1].</u></p>	
81	SCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Would the ISO please confirm whether changes to the Tariff will cause MSG units to be settled differently in the Real-Time Market than non-MSG units? ○ Would the ISO please clarify how it will treat situations whereby an MSG Resource receives feasible schedules in IFM that become infeasible dispatches in Real-Time? 	General Questions/ Comments
82	Dynergy	<p>To help market participants understand this tariff language, the CAISO should define several key terms: “commit”, “configuration”, “resource level”, “status”, “start-up path”, “register”, “default Resource Adequacy Configuration”, “Configuration indicators” “in transition”,</p> <p>In regards to moving between the different operating configurations - perhaps there is a need to distinguish between “commit” and “transition”.?</p>	General Questions/ Comments