

Exhibit No.: \_\_\_\_\_

Commissioner: Peevy

Administrative Law Judges: Walwyn, Halligan and Allen

Witness: Mary Jo Thomas

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF  
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

Order Instituting Rulemaking to Establish  
Policies and Cost Recovery Mechanisms for  
Generation Procurement and Renewable  
Resource Development

R.01-10-024

**OPENING TESTIMONY OF MARY JO THOMAS REGARDING THE LONG-TERM  
PROCUREMENT PLANS OF THE INVESTOR OWNED UTILITIES ON BEHALF OF  
THE CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR**

**Submitted by the California Independent System Operator**

June 23, 2003

Jeanne M. Solé, Regulatory Counsel  
Charles F. Robinson, Vice President and General Counsel  
California Independent System Operator  
151 Blue Ravine Road  
Folsom California 95630  
Telephone: (916) 351-4400  
Facsimile: (916) 608-7296

1 **BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF**  
2 **THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

3 Order Instituting Rulemaking to Establish  
4 Policies and Cost Recovery Mechanisms for  
5 Generation Procurement and Renewable  
Resource Development

R.01-10-024

6 **OPENING TESTIMONY OF MARY JO THOMAS REGARDING THE LONG-TERM**  
7 **PROCUREMENT PLANS OF THE INVESTOR OWNED UTILITIES ON BEHALF OF**  
8 **THE CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR**

9 **Submitted by the California Independent System Operator**

10 My name is Mary Jo Thomas, Operations Engineer in the Loads and Resources Group of the  
11 Operations, Engineering, and Maintenance Division of the California Independent System Operator  
12 Corporation (CA ISO). My duties on behalf of the CA ISO and my qualifications are submitted as an  
13 attachment to this testimony. I am submitting this testimony on behalf of the CA ISO.

14 The purpose of my testimony is to:

- 15 1) Set forth the CA ISO's recommendations and comments regarding whether the Investor  
16 Owned Utilities' (IOUs or utilities) long term plans have demonstrated that the utilities  
17 will be able to meet their forecasted load, and regarding the information that is required  
18 to undertake a reasonable assessment of this question. I describe some of the difficulties  
19 the CA ISO encountered assessing the utility long-term procurement plans. To avoid  
20 these problems in the future, the CA ISO strongly believes that it is important going  
21 forward to establish standard formats and assumptions for the preparation of utility long-  
22 term procurement plans. It may be helpful to allow parties to attempt to agree upon such  
23 standard formats and assumptions through working groups or workshops sponsored by  
24 the CPUC.
- 25 2) Set forth the CA ISO's recommendations and comments regarding the role of energy  
26 efficiency and demand response in meeting the utility resource adequacy obligations.
- 27 3) Set forth the CA ISO's recommendations and comments regarding the need to avoid  
28 exacerbating over-generation problems.

1 **I. THE ADEQUACY OF THE IOU PROCUREMENT PLANS AND**  
2 **RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A STANDARD FORMAT FOR SUBSEQUENT PLANS.**

3 **A. CA ISO COMMENTS ON THE ADEQUACY OF THE IOU PROCUREMENT PLANS.**

4 Based on the CA ISO's review of the long-term and short-term procurement plans submitted by  
5 the utilities, the CA ISO is of the opinion that the CPUC would not be able to develop a conclusion on  
6 whether the IOUs will be able to meet their forecasted load over the next five to twenty years because  
7 the information provided in the plans is not adequate to evaluate the IOU's ability to obtain resources to  
8 meet the forecasted Peak Capacity.

9 The information that is included in the IOU procurement plans is inadequate in several key ways  
10 as follows:

- 11 1) The Long-Term Procurement Plans for Southern California Edison (SCE) and Pacific  
12 Gas and Electric (PG&E) did not provide an analysis that evaluates the magnitude of  
13 resource capacity that would be available to serve load during peak periods. The  
14 Procurement Plans provided an analysis of the IOUs' ability to meet the energy  
15 requirements, however, they do not demonstrate that the capacity to serve the peak load is  
16 available during system peaks without having to shed load. For example, a customer may  
17 require 50 MW for 1 hour of the day and 10 MW for 10 different hours of the day, five  
18 days a week for a total of 3,000 MWh during a four week month; or a customer may  
19 require 10 MW for 15 hours of the day, five days a week and still use 3,000 MWh during  
20 that month. In the first example, the utility would require 5 times the amount of capacity  
21 in the one hour of the day that the customer requires 50 MWs, than it would require at  
22 any time in the second example. If the utility based its purchase plans solely on energy  
23 there is a possibility that the utility could under purchase capacity, and load would need  
24 to be shed for the one hour when the customer's capacity requirement is higher. The CA  
25 ISO recommends that the CPUC require subsequent procurement plans to include an  
26 evaluation of the utilities' ability to provide the requisite level of capacity to meet the  
27 utilities' aggregate peak that is non-coincidental to the CA ISO peak demand.  
28

- 1           2)     There is not a standard methodology used by the three IOUs for developing a load  
2                 forecast. The CA ISO recommends that a standard methodology be used to develop a  
3                 load forecast for the utilities such that the reserve requirements and future investment  
4                 requirements can be appropriately assessed and allocated to each utility. In addition, the  
5                 IOUs' plans should include enough capacity to meet the target reserve level as discussed  
6                 in the testimony of Phil Pettingill. The CA ISO is required to maintain the level of  
7                 operating reserves in real time as set forth by the Western Electricity Coordinating  
8                 Council (WECC) Minimum Operating Reserve Criteria (MORC). To the extent that the  
9                 IOUs do not procure enough capacity to cover the Operating Reserve Requirements, and  
10                to the extent that such reserves are not available to be acquired by the CA ISO in the  
11                Day-Ahead, Hour-Ahead, or Real-time periods, the CA ISO would be required to direct  
12                utilities to shed load in order to maintain a reliable grid. The CA ISO strongly urges that  
13                such an outcome be avoided through prudent Long and Short Term Planning.
- 14           3)     The utility plans do not demonstrate whether the levels of capacity to be procured can be  
15                 delivered to the utilities' loads during the times that the monthly peak demands occur.  
16                 (This is a deliverability issue that is addressed further in the testimony of Mr. Robert  
17                 Sparks.)
- 18           4)     It is not clear that the utility plans have considered risks associated with buyouts of  
19                 Qualifying Facility (QF) generation and retirements of old generation in the CA ISO  
20                 Control Area. There is approximately 2,300 MW of thermal generation operating in  
21                 California that is over 40 years old that have not notified the CA ISO that they will retire,  
22                 whereas the owners others thermal generators built in this era have.
- 23           5)     It is not possible to determine from the plans whether and how the IOUs have qualified  
24                 the capacity that can be expected to be available from each resource. First, it is not clear  
25                 whether the IOUs' reported capacities are based on nameplate capacity or net dependable  
26                 capacity. Net dependable capacity is defined as the power level that a generating unit can  
27                 sustain, on average, measured at or compensated to the point of delivery to the electric  
28

1 grid by both telemetry and CA ISO revenue metering systems if there are no equipment,  
2 operating or regulatory restrictions. It is mathematically equal to gross dependable  
3 capacity minus any capacity utilized for the unit's auxiliary load, on-site load if  
4 applicable, and step-up transformer and project transmission losses. If the Generating  
5 Unit provides Ancillary Services, the net dependable capacity must be tested and certified  
6 by the CA ISO. Next, it is not clear whether the capacity reported has been discounted  
7 for outages, environmental limitations, transmission limitations, etc.

8 Because this last point is particularly important, the CA ISO offers the following thoughts for  
9 qualifying the capacity that can be expected to be available for different types of resources. These could  
10 be discussed further and refined in workshops to develop a common reporting format. These  
11 recommendations provide general methodologies for determining the deliverable capacity that should be  
12 assumed to be available during peak times for a number of different types of resources.

- 13 a) Thermal capacity should be reported as the maximum net dependable capacity that can be  
14 delivered to the grid (less auxiliary station service, and load netted behind the meter) and  
15 then de-rated for scheduled and forced outages, and environmental limitations.
- 16 b) The capacity reported as contract capacity for thermal generation for which the utilities  
17 do not have knowledge of the traditional outage schedules, should be based on the  
18 historical metered contribution levels at the time that daily peak demands occurred.  
19 Solar generation should be treated in the same way. Note that the maximum scheduled  
20 outage for the month should be used given that the peak demand could occur at any time  
21 during the month.
- 22 c) Run-of-river hydro capacity should be based on the metered historical contribution levels  
23 at time of daily peak demands. Low hydro year conditions should be used for purposes  
24 of determining the adequacy of Long-Term Procurement Plans.
- 25 d) Pond storage, and pumped storage hydro capacity should be based on the maximum level  
26 the generator is able to deliver to the grid based on the ability of the reservoir to release  
27 water during times of daily peak while applying limitations for known scheduled  
28

1 generation outages. Low hydro year conditions should be used for purposes of  
2 determining the adequacy of the Long-Term Procurement Plans.

- 3 e) Historical metered capacity levels contributed from pond storage, or pumped storage  
4 hydro generators during daily peak demands should be used when the utilities do not  
5 have knowledge of the traditional outage rates or the level of capacity the generator is  
6 able to deliver to the grid based on reservoir levels.
- 7 f) Wind capacity is an important resource to serve load in the CA ISO Control Area. Wind  
8 generation, on occasion, provided over 1,300 MW of environmentally clean capacity.  
9 However, historical operating levels of wind generation during summer peak conditions  
10 are very low because the wind is generally stagnant on the hottest summer days. For this  
11 reason, to accurately reflect the capacity that can be expected from wind resources, the  
12 contribution of wind generation during peak days should be based on the dependable  
13 capacity levels that have historically been available during the daily peaks of the specific  
14 season being assessed.
- 15 g) New Generation can be classified as Large Merchant, Municipal, and Utility-owned  
16 Generation, Peaker Plants, Renewable Generation, Distributed Generation, and Self-  
17 Generation. These types of generation all have different risk factors that should be  
18 considered when including them in future procurement plans. Large generation typically  
19 takes three years to develop and transition to commercial status. Peaker Plants,  
20 Renewable Generation, Distributed Generation, and Self Generation can be developed in  
21 considerably less time. However, each of these types of generators have their own  
22 associated risk. Peaker Plants historically have been canceled as fast as they are planned.  
23 Distributed Generation is assumed to have the same issues as the Peaker Plants with the  
24 exception that less emphasis has to be placed on transmission capacity. Self Generation  
25 is dependent on the financial benefit to the end-use customer given current gas rates,  
26 environmental regulations and other permitting issues, the current financial status of the  
27 corporation, and other economic trends. These risks should be considered in the plans  
28

and furthermore, generation that relies on the Transmission System should be included in the CA ISO Transmission Expansion Plan in order to assess any potential transmission constraints that could be placed on the system as a result of the new generation.

h) There are two different types of energy efficiency programs, (1) projects that directly reduce demand, for example programs that result in the installation of more efficient equipment such as more efficient lights or motors and (2) programs that require a discretionary management decision to obtain savings. The CA ISO notes that programs that require a discretionary management decision to achieve savings may have less sustainable savings than other energy efficiency programs. As is discussed in section II of my testimony, it is important that savings for all energy efficiency programs listed in utility long-term procurement plans be based on adequate empirical evidence and projected savings associated with the two types of projects should be treated differently when evaluating the risk and the level of sustainable reduction over time. It is not apparent from the long-term procurement plans whether the IOUs have considered erosion of project savings.

i) The level of capacity reported for contracted capacity should equal the level of capacity that can be delivered pursuant to the contracts, given any transmission limitations affecting delivery during the daily peak. For example the level of capacity reported for contracts for power from generators located on the border of Mexico and in the Southwest should reflect any transmission limitations that would reduce the ability to transport the power into the CA ISO Control Area during the daily peak.

## **II. THE ROLE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND DEMAND RESPONSE PROGRAMS.**

This section sets forth the CA ISO's recommendations and comments regarding the role of energy efficiency and demand response in meeting the utility resource adequacy obligations. The three IOUs propose in their long-term procurement plans to use energy efficiency and demand response programs very aggressively in order to meet the resource needs of their loads in the next five to twenty year period. In addition, PG&E in its long term resource plan states "[f]inally, it is critical that the

1 Commission work with the ISO and other stakeholders to quickly determine whether and to what extent  
2 demand response programs will contribute to meeting reserve requirements. The Commission has  
3 adopted and PG&E has embraced aggressive standards for new demand response programs. However,  
4 if these programs do not count toward PG&E's reserve requirements, PG&E would be required to  
5 purchase capacity in an amount equal to the program. . . . If the ISO will not recognize demand response  
6 programs as satisfying reserve requirements, the programs will need to be adjusted to satisfy the ISO  
7 requirement." PG&E's Long-Term Procurement Plan at 1-18. This section of my testimony sets forth  
8 the CA ISO's thoughts in light of the utilities' proposals and responds to the request by PG&E for some  
9 clarity about the resources that will count towards satisfying reserve requirements.

10 I should clarify upfront that the CA ISO is supportive of the addition of all types of resources  
11 within California, including generation, transmission, demand-response and energy efficiency.  
12 Moreover, the CA ISO particularly welcomes the addition of effective demand response programs  
13 within California since such programs are one of several key structural elements that should be added to  
14 the California electricity market in order to prevent the exercise of market power by suppliers.

15 A. THE NEED FOR EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT PROJECTIONS OF SAVINGS.

16 While the CA ISO is supportive of energy efficiency and demand response programs, the CA  
17 ISO is also concerned about ensuring that there will be adequate resources to meet utility customer  
18 loads. Accordingly, the CA ISO is concerned that the impact of energy efficiency and demand response  
19 on customer loads be estimated accurately and based on empirical evidence.

20 The CA ISO is not an expert in the area of energy efficiency and demand response. However,  
21 the CA ISO notes that the utilities propose to rely very aggressively on energy efficiency and demand  
22 response to meet the resource needs of their customers in the next five to twenty years. The CA ISO  
23 understands that relying on aggressive energy efficiency and demand response is consistent with the  
24 direction given to the utilities by the CPUC in D.02-10-062 at 27-28. Nonetheless, the CA ISO is  
25 concerned about the utilities making overly optimistic assumptions about the savings from energy  
26 efficiency and demand response programs and an insufficiency of resources if the goals are not  
27 achieved. The CA ISO notes that sizable reductions in load are forecast from demand-response  
28

1 programs that have little track record in California. Moreover, the utilities are proposing to engage in  
2 energy efficiency investments at levels substantially higher than those that have been successfully  
3 implemented in the last several years.

4 To address these concerns, the CA ISO offers two recommendations:

- 5 1) The CA ISO considers that the CPUC should require some form of empirical information  
6 to support the utility projections about the impact of energy efficiency and demand  
7 response programs on load. For example, where it is available, historical information  
8 regarding the impact of such programs should be provided. The CA ISO does not have  
9 the expertise to assess whether the utilities' projections are sound. Nonetheless, the CA  
10 ISO urges the CPUC to solicit input from entities with this expertise such as the  
11 California Energy Commission and persons within the Energy Division and Office of  
12 Ratepayer Advocates and undertake, with the assistance of these entities, a thorough  
13 review of the utilities' projections to verify that there is adequate information to support  
14 them.
- 15 2) It will be important to undertake periodic reviews of the projections of savings and  
16 demand reductions to ensure that they are modified appropriately as experience with  
17 implementation is gained. This will be particularly important as to innovative programs,  
18 for which there is little or no historic information. As is discussed in the testimony of  
19 Mr. Phil Pettingill, periodic updating of the long-term procurement plans is important in  
20 any event. The results from the evaluation of energy efficiency and demand response  
21 programs should be incorporated into these periodic reviews so that load projections  
22 remain as accurate as possible based on the latest and best available information.

#### 23 B. USE OF DEMAND-BASED PROGRAMS AS RESERVES.

24 The testimony of Mr. Phil Pettingill regarding the provision of reserves for direct access  
25 customers, community aggregators, and distributed and self-generation customers notes that it is  
26 important to distinguish between the provision of operating reserves in real-time, and the provision of  
27 planning reserves and/or resource adequacy. Moreover, Mr. Pettingill's testimony describes how  
28

1 demand response can count towards meeting a utility's monthly reliability obligation.

2 Energy efficiency and demand response programs can provide benefit to the CA ISO in three  
3 ways: (1) they can reduce planning load forecasts, (2) they can be used to meet a portion of the MORC  
4 requirements, (3) they can be bid into the CA ISO Supplemental Energy market.

5 As explained above, energy efficiency and demand response programs can reduce planning load  
6 forecasts. To the extent that there is empirical information to support assumptions about the impact of  
7 energy efficiency and demand response programs on load, these programs can legitimately be used by  
8 the utilities to reduce their planning reserves and/or resource adequacy requirement by reducing their  
9 load forecast.

10 Demand response programs can also be used to meet a portion of the operating reserve  
11 requirements. The CA ISO already has a program, the Participating Load program, which permits load-  
12 based programs to provide operating reserves to the CA ISO in the form of non-spinning and  
13 replacement reserves. Some of the requirements for Participating Loads are set forth in the CA ISO  
14 Tariff section 2.5. In addition, the CA ISO has developed technical requirements for participation in the  
15 Participating Load programs, which are currently under review. As soon as the revision of the technical  
16 requirements is completed, the CA ISO would be happy to make the requirements available to the  
17 CPUC and the parties in this proceeding.

18 It is important to note that the requirements in the Participating Load program are designed to  
19 assure that the resources that participate in the program comport with WECC requirements for operating  
20 reserves. Thus, for example, to participate in the CA ISO's Ancillary Service markets, the mechanism  
21 by which the CA ISO assures that adequate operating reserves are available within the CA ISO Control  
22 Area, Participating Loads must be able to comply with CA ISO directions within ten minutes and must  
23 have adequate interval meters and telemetry that allows the CA ISO to monitor the status of the resource  
24 and verify in real time that CA ISO directions with regards to the resource are complied with.

25 It is also important to understand that at this time, the CA ISO does not believe that demand-  
26 response or other load-based programs can meet the WECC requirements for spinning reserves. This is  
27 because spinning reserve, as defined in MORC, is unloaded generation that is synchronized and ready to  
28

1 serve additional demand and is frequency responsive. Demand-based programs can provide non-  
2 spinning reserves because MORC provides that a control area's requirements for non-spinning reserves  
3 can be met by use of the following:

- 4 • Interruptible load,
- 5 • Interruptible exports,
- 6 • On-demand rights from other entities or control areas,
- 7 • Spinning Reserve in excess of the requirement, and
- 8 • Off-line generation which qualifies as non-spinning reserve.

9 The demand response programs can also be bid into the Supplemental Energy market. Such  
10 programs must also meet the requirements of the CA ISO's Participating Load program. The  
11 Supplemental Energy market offers a mechanism for price responsive load to bid into the CA ISO  
12 markets at a price it is willing to receive for interrupting voluntarily. Demand response programs that  
13 qualify to provide Supplemental Energy to the CA ISO could be used by the utilities to meet the  
14 monthly reliability obligation proposed in Mr. Pettingill's testimony.

### 15 **III. OVERGENERATION AND DISPATCHABILITY.**

16 This section of my testimony explains the concerns of the CA ISO regarding the potential to  
17 exacerbate over-generation problems and the advantages of dispatchability. The CA ISO believes that  
18 the utilities' portfolios of resources, and long-term contracts for power should be designed to minimize  
19 the potential to exacerbate over-generation problems and to provide adequate operating flexibility.

20 The CA ISO raised similar concerns to the CPUC in the April 1, 2003 testimony of Mr. Kevin  
21 Graves in this docket regarding implementation of the renewables portfolio standard in this docket. As  
22 Mr. Graves stressed during his cross-examination, the CA ISO's concerns about over-generation  
23 problems are not limited to renewables. Rather, it is important that the entire portfolio of a utilities'  
24 resources be designed to minimize over-generation problems, and that the collection of long-term power  
25 contracts entered into by the utilities afford the utilities and the CA ISO adequate flexibility and  
26 dispatchability to address system problems such as over-generation. To ensure an adequate record in  
27 this phase of the proceeding, this testimony describes the issue and repeats much of the information that  
28

1 was set forth in Mr. Graves' testimony.

2 Over-generation occurs when supply (i.e. generation and imports) exceeds demand (loads and  
3 exports), and the ability of system operators to back down generation to balance the system is  
4 constrained. These conditions generally occur during off-peak hours during the spring and early  
5 summer seasons. Some examples of generators that system operators may have difficulties backing  
6 down in over-generation conditions include: 1) must-take generators (e.g. nuclear plants and qualifying  
7 facilities that have take or pay contracts with the utilities) that the CA ISO does not have authority to re-  
8 dispatch to reduce output; 2) generators that are already operating at minimum load and that are likely to  
9 be needed within a time frame (i.e. to meet the next day's peak load) that does not permit a generating  
10 unit to shut down and restart; and 3) hydroelectric generators that are operating at minimum levels based  
11 on current hydro conditions (i.e. high runoff) and the only way to reduce output is to spill water. Over-  
12 generation conditions generally occur during light load periods (off-peak hours) during the spring and  
13 early summer seasons.

14 Section 2.3.4 of the CA ISO tariff addresses over-generation and sets out a number of sequential  
15 steps that can be taken by the CA ISO to address over-generation circumstances. Ultimately, the CA  
16 ISO can instruct scheduling coordinators to reduce their generation or import schedules on a pro rata  
17 basis, or in more extreme circumstances, the CA ISO can issue mandatory dispatch instructions directing  
18 reductions from particular generating units and/or external imports.

19 Even though the CA ISO tariff addresses over-generation, the CA ISO considers that the CPUC  
20 should strive to minimize over-generation in this docket. First, over-generation circumstances can  
21 create operational difficulties. If over-generation circumstances exist due to the characteristics of the  
22 generating units that remain on line there may be physical limitations on the ability of the CA ISO to  
23 manage an over-generation situation. For example, there are physical limitations on the ability of  
24 nuclear units to be turned on and off. Second, there are financial consequences to over-generation. For  
25 example, if the CA ISO orders units subject to take-or-pay contracts to reduce their output to address  
26 over-generation circumstances, utilities may nonetheless be required to pay for the output.

27 To avoid exacerbating over-generation problems, the utility long-term procurement plans should  
28

1 strive to have the expected output shape of the portfolio of resources procured by the utilities match the  
2 load shape of the utilities' customers. In addition, there should be adequate flexibility in a reasonable  
3 proportion of the resources available to the utilities to ensure that there are not too many resources  
4 required to be on-line when there is inadequate load available to absorb the output. Particular attention  
5 should be taken to consider the impact of resources that are non-dispatchable either because of their  
6 particular characteristics, and/or because of contractual arrangements.

7 In addition, the CPUC should afford the IOUs adequate contracting flexibility to ensure that they  
8 can negotiate contracts that do not bind them into accepting and/or paying for resources that will  
9 exacerbate over-generation conditions. Moreover, the CA ISO favors providing for dispatchability in  
10 standard utility contracts and provisions that would allow the CA ISO to work with the utilities to direct  
11 generators to alter their schedules as needed to address conditions on the grid such as over-generation.

12 Further, the CPUC could include a requirement that generators that qualify as Participating  
13 Generators under the CA ISO tariff sign a Participating Generator Agreement with the CA ISO, and  
14 hence agree to abide by the CA ISO tariff. This would ensure that the CA ISO would be able to order  
15 reductions in the output from these generators if necessary to address over-generation circumstances.  
16 Further, the CPUC could limit the number of resources subject to "as available" or "take-or-pay" terms  
17 and conditions, particularly with regards to resources that are expected to operate during off-peak time  
18 periods.