

WESTERN ENERGY MARKETS

Regional Issues Forum

June 16, 2026

1:00 p.m. – 4:30 p.m. (Mountain Time)



Agenda

1:00 p.m. – 1:05 p.m.	Welcome, Opening Remarks & Announcements
1:05 p.m. – 2:35 p.m.	DAME and EDAM Implementation and Go-Live
2:35 p.m. – 2:45 p.m.	Break
2:45 p.m. – 4:15 p.m.	Intertie Bidding
4:15 p.m. – 4:25 p.m.	EDAM Resource Adequacy Update
4:25 p.m. – 4:30 p.m.	Closing remarks and wrap up
4:30 p.m.	Reception

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DAME and EDAM Implementation and Go-Live


Kalia Savage, WEIM Entities sector liaison (Moderator)

Khaled Abdul-Rahman, Vice President, Chief Information and Technology Officer, CAISO

Jon Rumble, Principal Manager, Market Design & Resource Integration, Southern California Edison

Cathleen Colbert, Senior Director, Western Markets Policy, Vistra Corporation

Kerstin Rock, Senior Director, Western Market Policy & Analytics, PacifiCorp



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Break

2:35 p.m. – 2:45 p.m. (Mountain Time)



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Intertie Bidding

Kavya Niranjana, Public Interest sector liaison (Moderator)

Jon Rumble, CAISO PTO sector liaison (Moderator)

Carrie Bentley, CEO of Gridwell Consulting, representing WPTF

Johannes Pfeifenberger, Principal, The Brattle Group

Matt Veghte, Director of Real Time Operations, Pattern Energy

Daniel Koppes, Director of Main Grid Operations, PacifiCorp




BEYOND THE BORDER INTERTIE BIDDING, TECHNICAL HARMONIZATION, AND THE FUTURE OF WESTERN MARKETS

Kavya Niranjana, Senior Markets & Tx Policy Manager, Renewable Northwest
Jonathan Rumble, Principal Manager, Southern California Edison

REGIONAL ISSUES FORUM - ALBUQUERQUE, NM


June 16, 2026



THE CORE CONTEXT — WHAT IS INTERTIE BIDDING?

Intertie bidding is the mechanism controlling power flow between regional balancing areas. As day-ahead markets expand, the West faces a fundamental shift: from **Physical Sovereignty** to **Financial Stewardship**.





WHY THIS CONVERSATION IS URGENT

We're redesigning the market while it's operating. Three forces are driving immediate action.

THE LAUNCH REALITY

EDAM internalizes historical external borders into optimized Transfer System Resources (TSRs), eliminating legacy seam boundaries.

THE RELIABILITY LEGACY


The August 2020 heatwave exposed thousands of MW of speculative imports that failed to deliver. Strict Resource Sufficiency Evaluations (RSE) now require physical proof before economic bids clear.

THE TECHNICAL PIVOT

A temporary stay on GAP-Tie modeling and shift back to SP-Tie protects bilateral contract hedgeability during transition.

WHO DOES THIS IMPACT? THE STAKES ARE REAL

Every stakeholder on this stage has something material at risk – and something to gain.



TRANSMISSION OWNERS

Managing lost wheeling revenues, local hedge displacement, and internal network uplifts

INDEPENDENT

Seeking non-discriminatory access – no longer trapped behind legacy contract "gated communities" or uncoordinated seams

REGULATORS &

Balancing public policy attributes – like green power tracking – with the strict physics of the grid

WHERE SHOULD THIS CONVERSATION GO?

Resolving intertie issues is not political horse-trading. It is an exercise in **technical and economic harmonization** – aligning market rules with the physical laws of the Western Interconnection.



DEFINE EQUITY

Craft Congestion Revenue Allocation (CRA) schemas that keep local ratepayers whole while unlocking regional efficiency




TECHNICAL HARMONIZATION

Shift focus from political negotiation toward objective seams coordination grounded in grid physics



BUILD FOR SCALE

Design market rules ready for 3,000-MW regional super-highways – not 500-MW extension cords of the past



THE QUESTION BEFORE THIS

Are our current intertie market structures designed to manage the 500-megawatt extension cords of our past – or are we ready for the 3,000-megawatt regional super-highways of our future?

The physics don't care about state lines. The data on our OASIS portals doesn't negotiate. What we build here will define Western energy markets for a generation.

EQUITY

CRA mechanisms that protect ratepayers

HARMONY

Seams coordination over political deals

SCALE

Rules built for tomorrow's grid



Intertie Bidding

June 2026

Carrie Bentley – Gridwell Consulting

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About WPTF

- Western Power Trading Forum is a non-profit, trade forum dedicated to competitive markets and transparency throughout the western interconnection



Internal and External Market Seams

- Market seams exist within the EDAM market and between EDAM and other organized markets
 - The implementation of EDAM, continued expansion of WEIM, and formation of other markets in the west create added complexity to transacting
- Market seams create inefficiencies and barriers to participation and ability to seamlessly move energy within and between markets efficiently
 - Fragmented market structures risk reducing overall market benefits
- The lack of a formal policy process to identify and address seams limits the ability to proactively identify and resolve issues



WPTF Proposal in CAISO Annual Policy Roadmap

- Establish an ongoing policy initiative focused on identifying and resolving seams issues
- Propose considering a phased approach
 - Address seams between EDAM, WEIM, and bilateral markets in an initial track
 - Expand to include EDAM interactions with Markets+
- Addressing market seams issues can provide several benefits
 - Improves market efficiency and reliability through targeted enhancements and helps facilitate more efficient transactions
 - Supports long-term success of EDAM



Market Perspective

- Purpose of the energy market is to ensure least-cost dispatch by relying on resource bids that reflect marginal and opportunity costs
- The market optimization uses those bids to select the most efficient mix of resources to reliably meet demand while accounting for transmission constraints and losses
- The primary function of the day-ahead market is to commit and schedule resources on a least-cost basis to meet expected demand, particularly for long-start resources that cannot be efficiently committed in real time, while establishing forward prices and positions ahead of real-time balancing
- Practically speaking, long-start resource commitments are largely fixed after the day-ahead market, while energy schedules and congestion outcomes remain forecasts of real-time conditions



Intertie Bidding on CAISO Border

- Justification for removing CAISO BA to EDAM BA intertie bidding is solely that it will improve power flow modeling
- Improvements in congestion modeling in the day-ahead market increase the precision of where constraints are identified, but do not improve outcomes, unless (1) the market retains the ability to economically adjust dispatch and (2) modeling improvements are more reflective of real-time market congestion
- Thus, the market does not benefit from more accurate power flow modeling in the day-ahead market when the changes are coupled with incentives or requirements for resources to self-schedule or if real-time congestion is significantly different than predicted day-ahead congestion
 - As the day-ahead market is largely a financial market, more accurate power flow modeling alone does not deliver better outcomes
- WPTF supports economic bidding at CAISO to EDAM interties



Intertie Bidding at EDAM Borders

- Allowing economic bids on intertie aligned with purpose of market to ensure least-cost dispatch of available resources (increases the pool)
- Concern with economic bidding on interties seems to be primarily modeling accuracy and reliability of imports
- WPTF supports evaluating:
 - Trade off between modeling accuracy and improved market efficiency
 - Reliability of economic imports and impact on EDAM footprint
 - Consequences of a fragmented market without intertie bidding



More Questions?

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Intertie Bidding:

Market seams, Opportunities, Challenges, and
Experience from other RTOs/ISOs

PRESENTED BY

Johannes Pfeifenberger

PRESENTED AT

WESTERN ENERGY MARKETS



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Five Sources of Inefficiencies Created by Market Seams


Seams between RTOs will generally be more efficient than seams between non-market regions that rely entirely on bilateral trades!

Nevertheless, significant seams-related inefficiencies exist between RTO markets:

1. **Interregional transmission planning** is generally ineffective (mostly pursued by merchant developers)
2. **Generator interconnection** delays and cost uncertainty created by affected system impact studies (and effectiveness coordination through means such as the SPP-MISO JTIQ, reducing costs by 50%)
3. **Loop flow management** through market-to-market coordinated flowgates (with shares of firm flow entitlements) under the existing JOAs is necessary (but still plagued by design inefficiencies)
4. **Inefficient trading** across contract-path market seams
 - **Intertie bidding** to improve energy trading (particularly in day-ahead)
 - **Intertie optimization** for real-time optimization (after all bilateral trading is closed)
5. **Resource adequacy** value of interties (often not considered in RTO's resource adequacy evaluations) and barriers to capacity trades (often created by RTOs' restrictive capacity import requirements and incompatible resource accreditations)



Interregional planning is needed to fill in gaps between EHV systems




**Let's not forget:
the WECC is not
an island!**

- Bridging the seam to ERCOT and the Eastern Interconnection offers some of the highest-value transmission expansion opportunities in North America
- Merchant developers have been taking the lead so far

Sources and Notes:
The Brattle Group, S&P Global Market Intelligence.
SPP 765kV overlay includes anticipated ITP 2026 solutions.
Compare to ["765kV Super Highway"](#) proposed by AEP in 2006.

North American RTOs/ISOs and their intertwined seams



Intertwined seams of US regional grid operators create complex operational, market, and planning challenges

- **Challenge first arose in late 1990s/early 2000 when MISO was formed and some midwestern utilities (such as ComEd and AEP) chose to join PJM**
 - To address inefficiencies, FERC required MISO and PJM to “depancake” their seam and address planning and congestion management challenges
- **Entergy joining MISO in 2013 (to create MISO-South) created additional seams challenges**
 - MISO loop flows over SPP and TVA highlighted the limitations of seams-management tools developed by MISO and PJM

WECC can take advantage of experience gained in the East!

Indications of seams-related inefficiencies

[NREL's 2024 Interregional Transmission Barriers Report](#) documents and analyzes seams-related inefficiencies

- Uneconomic Flows: Frequently power flows from higher-price areas to lower-price areas.
- High Price Differentials: Significant spreads in power prices between regions when transmission is not constrained indicates opportunities to reduce customer costs
- Underutilized Transmission Capacity: in combination with persistent price differences, means that transmission assets are not being used efficiently to bring lower-priced power to higher-priced regions.
- Lack of Transparency on Inefficiencies: lack of transparency in interchange transactions is an obstacle to identifying inefficiencies—and opaqueness is more likely to occur in areas without regional organized markets (e.g., lack of market monitoring)

Seams-related inefficiencies also relate to loop flows imposed by one region's market-dispatch on its neighboring regions, causing both reliability concerns and congestion management challenges

Intertie Bidding: A tool to improve bilateral trading efficiency

The experience with **intertie bidding** at CAISO and eastern RTO seams shows that it would likely be an effective tool to increase the efficiency of bilateral trades at both EDAM and Markets+ seams

- **Intertie bidding**: Imports and exports clear contingent on bid price (and available transmission rights), which reduces the likelihood of inefficient (unprofitable) transactions
- **Effective in day-ahead market** where prices and price differences can be anticipated reasonably well
 - Price differences between eastern markets change sign only 3-4 times a day
 - Trades across market-to-market seams in the east are about 90% efficient (earning profits)
 - Remaining inefficiencies often related to loop flow and associated congestion management challenges
 - Has not led to real-time reliability challenges that operators could not address
- Intertie bidding is **not efficient in real-time** where prices are too volatile for bilateral trades
 - Real-time price differences between eastern markets change 50-60 times a day (2-3 times each hour)
 - 45-50% of all real-time transactions flow the wrong way (from high to low prices), creating over \$500 million annual losses (e.g., NLR paper: [Interregional ... Savings and Opportunities for Increased Value, 2014-2023](#), April 2025)
 - Coordinated transaction scheduling (CTS), through which RTOs forecast real-time prices to facilitate bilateral transactions close to real time, is not working (see [Intertie Optimization](#), April 2025 and [FAQs](#))

The West is better positioned to avoid seams trading inefficiencies


Trading between eastern market is limited to transactions over a single interface (contract path) between them

- Issue: single interface between all of MISO and PJM
- Reason: Eastern markets are single, consolidated Balancing Areas
- Example: An export of MISO generation from MN to PJM is scheduled and priced the same as generation from LA to PJM
- Causes significant “interface pricing” inefficiencies, poor use of interface capability, and loop flow management challenges

Continuation of Western BAAs and trading points will allow for more granular bilateral trades and intertie bidding

- Trading (and bidding) on multiple interties will be more efficient
 - Avoid defining a single market-wide interface!
- Existing contract path ATCs, shared flowgates, and transmission rights in WECC facilitates better pricing (even if less than perfect) and more efficient loop flow management

Western BAAs and Possible Market Participation



Intertie Optimization: Efficiently Utilize Transmission Between Markets

The experience in the Eastern U.S. shows that “Intertie Optimization” will be necessary to reduce seam-related trading inefficiencies in real-time markets!

- NYISO, ISO-NE, and Potomac Economics have called for intertie optimization in 2010-2011 to address seam-related inefficiencies
- Only “coordinated transaction scheduling”(CTS) has been implemented between ISO-NE, NYISO, PJM, and MISO. Yet, a decade later, market monitors continue to document seams-related inefficiencies, noting that CTS has not been effective, recommending intertie optimization
- The Western energy imbalance markets and European “market coupling” experiences have shown that optimizing interties between BAAs offers substantial benefits—reducing costs, improving reliability and renewable integration
- For the seams between SPP, MISO, and PJM we estimated that, without intertie optimization, approximately 20-30% of the total transmission value (\$50-60 million per 1000 MW of intertie capacity) is lost across because bilateral trades cannot respond quickly enough to frequently-changing real-time prices
- Intertie optimization is needed in WECC to partially restore benefits of reduced WEIM footprint

See: [Intertie Optimization Report and FAQs](#), IEEE PES [Intertie Optimization](#) slides.



Conclusion: Significant opportunities exist to address market seams

While an improvement relative to bilateral markets, the experience with seams mitigation efforts by the eastern regional markets has highlighted significant inefficiencies remain related to the intertwined seams between regions

These inefficiencies can and should be addressed:

1. Interregional planning requires new approaches and federal/state involvement
2. Coordinated inter-regional generator interconnection processes can reduce costs and interconnection delays
3. Neighboring regions need to improve managing the operational, congestion, and market impacts of the loop flows they impose on each other
4. **Trading inefficiencies across market seams can be addressed through intertie bidding and intertie optimization**
5. The resource-adequacy and resilience benefit of (even uncommitted, non-firm) interregional transmission needs to be recognized in installed capacity requirements and transmission planning

Some of these challenges can be addressed more easily in the WECC



Thank You!
Comments and Questions?

(Additional Slides)

About the Speaker



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[\(webbio and publications\)](#)

Johannes (Hannes) Pfeifenberger, a Principal at The Brattle Group, is an economist with a background in electrical engineering and over twenty-five years of experience in wholesale power market design, renewable energy, electricity storage, and transmission. He also is a Visiting Scholar at MIT’s Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR), a former Senior Fellow at Boston University’s Institute of Sustainable Energy (BU-ISE), a IEEE Senior Member, and currently serves as an advisor to research initiatives by the U.S. Department of Energy, the National Labs, and the Energy Systems Integration Group (ESIG).

Hannes specializes in wholesale power markets and transmission. He has analyzed transmission needs, transmission benefits and costs, transmission cost allocations, and renewable generation interconnection challenges for independent system operators, transmission companies, generation developers, public power companies, industry groups, and regulatory agencies across North America. He has worked on transmission matters in SPP, MISO, PJM, New York, New England, ERCOT, CAISO, WECC, and Canada and has analyzed offshore-wind transmission challenges in New York, New England, and New Jersey.

He received an M.A. in Economics and Finance from Brandeis University’s International Business School and an M.S. and B.S. (“Diplom Ingenieur”) in Power Engineering and Energy Economics from the University of Technology in Vienna, Austria.

The need for inertia optimization

[The Need for Inertia Optimization](#), prepared for ACORE, Advanced Power Alliance, Grid United, Invenery, MAREC, and NRDC, October 2023

[Inertia Optimization FAQs and Implementation Principles](#), February 2024

[Inertia Optimization: Efficient Use of Interregional Transmission \(Update\)](#), presented to OPSI, April 12, 2024

[Market Benefits and Seams: Options and Implications](#), presented to CREPC-WIRAB, April 24, 2024.

[Inertia Optimization: Achieving Efficient Use of Interregional Transmission](#), IEEE PES, Energy Policy Forum, April 16, 2025.

RTO market seams

[RTO Market Seams: Impacts on Operations, Planning, and Pricing](#), Wisconsin Public Utility Institute, April 16, 2026.

The Need for Inertia Optimization

Reducing Customer Costs, Improving Grid Resilience, and Encouraging Interregional Transmission

PREPARED BY

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John Gonzalez

Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP

Norman C. Bay
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PREPARED FOR

ACORE

Advanced Power Alliance
Grid United
Invenery
MAREC Action
NRDC

OCTOBER 2023



Intertie Optimization: Avoids the inefficiencies of CTS

Coordinated Transaction Scheduling (CTS)

- 75+min prescheduled 15-min transactions, based on forecasts, which often results in uneconomic trades
- Based on CTS bids by traders, who need to reserve transmission (at a cost)
- Transmission charges reduce CTS efficiency
- If transmission charges are eliminated, traders capture value of transactions (free rides)
- Experience:
 - Low transaction volume due to costs and risk of inefficient trades;
 - Has not been able to improve inefficient use of interregional transmission

Intertie Optimization

- Optimized in real time every 5 min, greatly reducing the frequency of uneconomic trades
- Optimized by RTOs using transmission that remains available after bilateral markets have closed
- Hurdle-free optimization increases market efficiency
- Value of transactions shared by RTOs (i.e., their transmission owners and, ultimately, customers)
- Experience:
 - High transaction volume with substantial benefits to participating BAAs (e.g., Western EIM)
 - Can greatly reduce inefficient use of interregional transmission (e.g., European “market coupling”)

Bottom Line: CTS is not working – not for Traders, not for RTOs, not for TOs, and not for Customers

See IEEE PES [Intertie Optimization](#), April 2025 and [Frequently Asked Questions](#)

Intertie Optimization: Implementation options

How would RTOs/ISOs determine and schedule optimal intertie transactions?

The RTOs would use their existing market optimization SCED engines to optimize intertie schedules subject to available intertie capabilities after all bilateral transactions are closed

- As the PJM IMM explains, this would: “include an optimized, but limited, joint dispatch approach that uses supply curves and treats seams between balancing authorities as constraints, similar to other constraints within an LMP market” ([2023 SOM Report](#) at 478)


1. Contract-path option: treat the contract path across the interface like a single line with a generator (representing the neighboring region) dispatched through SCED.

- The neighboring region would provide generation supply curve (incremental/decremental cost of importing more or less) for RT intervals
- Simplest, will increase efficiency, but not optimally use full physical transmission



2. Flow-based option: represent interface physically with limiting flow gates

- The neighboring region provides binding flow gates and marginal generators with shift factors on these flow gates (ISO-NE’s [2014 IEEE “Marginal Equivalent” proposal](#))
- Will use full physical capability (ISO-NE simulations achieve 99% of full optimization)



3. Combined SCED option: used full, multi-regional SCED (similar to Western imbalance markets)

- Assures full optimization but likely impractical for existing market-based regions


Clarity in the face of complexity

The Power of Economics™



Independent power production and transmission customer

Matt Veghte, Director



Pattern Portfolio



Projects and Facilities

	WIND	SOLAR	STORAGE	T-LINE	H2
OPERATIONAL					
DEVELOPMENT					

Corporate Offices

- Headquarters
- Office


Moving Power Where It's Needed

Transmission customer transactions in


- Public Service of New Mexico
- Salt River Project
- Arizona Public Service
- Tucson Electric
- Western Area Power Administration

Transmission customer rights

- Long term firm (15+ year terms)
- Short term firm and non-firm
- Distinct OATT



Optimized Market Entry



Commercial focus

- Managing many large, variable, resources
- Major hubs
 - Palo Verde
 - Four Corners
 - Pinal Central
- Innovative structures (Subscriber Participating Transmission Owner)

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Nothing in this presentation constitutes legal advice.

Intertie Bidding



Summary of the PAC and CAISO tariffs

- CAISO tariff defers to the Entity to set up the capability of allowing economic intertie bidding if they so desire
- PAC tariff states that only self-schedules are allowed
- PAC tariff also reiterates that the CAISO tariff states it is at the EDAM Entity's discretion whether or not to set up economic intertie bidding

Intertie bidding issues


- Grid Operations will maintain reliability, no matter the cost
- Lack of transmission with only PAC and CAISO in EDAM
- Impact on Reliability during heavy loading/resource scarcity
 - Puts further reliance on market model accuracy to support PAC East/West BAA ties
- PacifiCorp's investment in standing up EDAM Entity functionality, tariff changes, and internal processes would be supporting activities outside of PacifiCorp

WESTERN ENERGY MARKETS

EDAM Resource Adequacy Update

Lindsey Schlekeway, Chair, WEIM Entity sector liaison (Moderator)

John Mayhew, Project Manager, Regional Markets, Public Service Company of New Mexico



WEIM/EDAM Resource Adequacy Update

June 16, 2026

Agenda

History – Origins, coalition formation, and stakeholders

Milestones – Key accomplishments and status

Future Endeavors – Next steps and how to get involved

History: Origins and Background

Following a 2025 study on load and resource diversity, a coalition of EDAM and EDAM-leaning BAAs began developing the Program Overview

- RA Sponsors

- PGE, PacifiCorp, NV Energy, PNM, BANC, LADWP, Turlock Irrigation District, Imperial Irrigation District

- RA Working Group

- RA Sponsors, Idaho Power, Seattle City Light, Black Hills Energy, LSEs within EDAM BAA or EDAM leaning BAA.

- *CAISO serving in a technical advisor capacity*

History: Foundational Principles

1. Establish a common, transparent capacity counting standard with incentives for adherence.
2. Ensure participants procure adequate, deliverable capacity for local and system needs.
3. Support efficient EDAM operations by clarifying forward obligations, performance expectations, and RA-to-day-ahead scheduling relationships.
4. Avoid infringing on other regional RA programs.
5. Leverage EDAM/WEIM transmission connectivity to enable capacity savings for participants.
6. Minimize administrative burden and costs without sacrificing reliability.
7. Maintain voluntary participation.
8. Ensure non-discriminatory, comparable treatment across participants.
9. Align incentives, penalties, and backstop mechanisms with cost causation and commercial feasibility.

Milestones

- BOSR Letter – **March 7, 2026**
- RIF Presentation – **March 16, 2026**
- RA Program Overview Document Published – **April 27, 2026**
- EDAM RA Workshops
 - 1) Program Overview – **April 28, 2026**
 - 2) RA Primer, Foundational Principles, and Governance – **May 7, 2026**
 - ✓ Design Document: Governance
 - 3) Modeling, Metrics, and Resource Qualification – **May 19, 2026**
 - ✓ Design Document: RA Modeling, Metrics, and Resource Qualifications
 - 4) Contracts, Compliance, and Load Forecasting – **May 21, 2026**
 - ✓ Design Document: Compliance, Load Forecasting, and Transmission
 - 5) Transmission, Compliance, Reporting, and Transparency – **May 26, 2026**

How to Participate

- All documentation, workshop slides, recordings, and Design Documents are available on the ROWE website:
<https://rowesternenergy.org/regional-resource-adequacy/>
- Stakeholder Comment Document available for feedback on all documents and workshops. ***Initial comments due Wednesday, June 17, 2026***
- Workshop #6: Thursday, June 25, 2026, 9:00–11:00 AM PT (link available)
- Questions, participation, or comments:
resourceadequacy@rowesternenergy.org

Future Schedule - Tentative

Balance of 2026

- Additional stakeholder workshops **July - September 2026.**
 - ❖ Second round of stakeholder comments due **October 2026.**
- Based on comments, publish the Initial Draft Proposal **November 2026.**
- Workshop to walk through the Initial Draft Proposal **November 2026.**
 - ❖ Comment period open from **November - December 2026.**

2027

- Deliver Proposal to ROWE end of **Q1 2027.**

Goal: Collaboratively build a proposal with broad stakeholder support that meets the needs of all impacted entities.



Questions

?

WESTERN ENERGY MARKETS

Closing Remarks & Future RIF Meetings

October 5, 2026

Sacramento, California



WESTERN ENERGY MARKETS

Regional Issues Forum

Adjourned

