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Your Link to Power

# Identifying Local Market Power Using Residual Demand

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# Overview

- Objective
- Review of residual demand
- Discussion topics
  - Characteristics of the residual demand approach
  - Application in the ISO market

# Objective

- Residual demand approach was discussed as an alternative in the local market power mitigation process at the March MSC meeting.
- Objectives of this presentation are to
  - Provide background on the residual demand approach
  - Engage MSC in discussion of methodology characteristics
  - Highlight implementation factors for consideration
  - Receive feedback from stakeholders

# Residual demand

- *Residual demand function*
  - Quantity that consumers are willing to and able to purchase at any given price from *a specific supplier* considering the supply of all other market participants.
    - No transmission constraints: demand function minus the aggregate supply function of all firms besides the one under consideration.
    - With transmission constraints: the ability to purchase is constrained by the transmission network.
- *Identifies where and when a generator can influence price.*


# Transmission-constrained residual demand

- *Transmission-constrained residual demand function*
  - Implicit function
  - Models transmission constraints exactly in the same way they are modeled in the market optimization
  - Considers all transmission constraints jointly
- Conceptually tracing it out:
  - solve the market optimization with the generator under consideration self scheduling  $q$  MW, and denote the cleared price by  $p$  \$/MWh, then  $(p,q)$  is a point on the residual demand curve
  - Repeat the process for various  $q$ , and connect the resulting  $(p,q)$  points

# Identify market power using residual demand


- *What does residual demand tell us?*
  - *How the market price changes if a firm withholds its output capacity*
  - *Directly characterizes the ability to alter market price*
  - *Used in assessing if a supplier has market power*
- *Scenarios*
  - Scenario 1: generator facing perfectly elastic demand
  - Scenario 2: generator facing very elastic demand
  - Scenario 3: generator facing less elastic demand
  - Scenario 4: pivotal supplier

# Market power and residual demand scenario 1 & 2



- Perfectly elastic residual demand curve.
- Supplier cannot alter market price, and thus has no ability to exercise market power.
- Withholding will cause profit to decrease compared to competitive bidding (marginal cost).


Scenario 1: a supplier facing perfectly elastic residual demand



- Very elastic residual demand curve.
- Generator has market power - can profitably alter market price by withholding some capacity.
- Ability to alter price is small – requires larger reduction in quantity offered to move price a small amount


Scenario 2: a supplier facing very elastic residual demand

# Market power and residual demand scenario 3 & 4



- Relatively inelastic residual demand curve
- Can profitably alter market price by withholding.
- Strong ability to exercise market power - small changes in quantity (withholding) result in large changes in price.

Scenario 3: a supplier facing less elastic residual demand



- Pivotal supplier – insufficient supply to meet demand without transmission constraints violation if the generator withholds its full capacity.
- May withhold larger quantity and receive very high price on smaller quantity sold.

Scenario 4: a pivotal' supplier's residual demand

# Discussion of general methodological issues

- How are transmission constraints incorporated into the calculation of residual demand?
- How are portfolios of resources owned by supplier at different locations in the system treated?
- For the purpose of market power detection, is it necessary to “trace out” the residual demand curve for each supplier or there are alternative simplified ways?
  - Computational time vs. accuracy?
- How does residual demand distinguish between local market power and system market power?
- How does residual demand account for multi-supplier market power?

# Discussion of potential application in ISO market

- Is this approach best suited as a primary trigger for mitigation, supplemental to existing approach or *ex post* analysis?
- Is this approach something that could be implemented in mitigation process in near-term (May 2012) or is this a longer-term option?
- Would this approach be run on-line with the market software or off-line and provide input to the mitigation process in the market?
  - On-line: More accurate bids, system, and network information, but likely to have computation time and performance concerns.
  - Off-line: Could cover more scenarios but with less current information.
- What triggers mitigation?
  - Elasticity of demand at specific points(s)  $< x\%$ ?
  - Elasticity of demand combined with estimated marginal cost ? (e.g. would it be profitable to exercise market power given estimated marginal cost of supplier?)
- If mitigation is triggered, which resources will be mitigated?