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    • Participating intermittent resource program initiative
      The PIRP Initiative focuses upon understanding the cost drivers for wind generation resources and if improving the forecast accuracy can significantly reduce cost impacts. It also includes development of a tariff filing to address the appropriate charges associated with the export of energy from Participating Intermittent Resources Program resources.
    • Pay for performance regulation
    • Payment acceleration project
      The California ISO (the ISO) recognizes that the current payment calendar takes too long between trade date and market clearing and presents undue credit risk to market participation. This increased risk may hinder resource availability from out-of-state resources, challenge credit management and expose market participants to additional risk in the event of defaults or bankruptcies. The ISO plans to implement payment acceleration approximately 6 months after the Settlements and Market Clearing System go live. Payment acceleration would provide market clearing on an average of 30 days. Payment acceleration also opens the possibility of other significant settlement improvements, such as providing participants an increased dispute window, and implementing a sunset provision.
    • Payment default allocation
    • Peak reliability coordinator funding
    • Penalty allocation procedure tariff amendment
      The ISO is proposing draft tariff language on the process it intends to follow when seeking authority from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to allocate the cost of any monetary penalties that regulatory bodies impose. The proposed procedure follows FERC’s guidance in its Order Providing Guidance on Recovery of Reliability Penalty Costs by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators.
    • Pool of bids in the integrated forward market
      This initiative modified a current market rule which limits the pool of bids considered in the Integrated Forward Market (IFM) to resources that are dispatched in the Local Market Power Mitigation procedures run prior to the IFM (ISO Tariff Section 31.2). The ISO is considering three options on this market rule: 1) maintain the rule but continue to monitor market impacts under different market conditions; 2) modify tariff/BPM to give ISO operators the option of relaxing the rule if it is significantly impacting IFM results; or 3) modify tariff to require consideration of all bids in IFM.
    • Post emergency bid cost recovery filing review
    • Post five-day process price corrections
      Since the start of the new California ISO market design on April 1, 2009, there have been isolated instances in which market prices were corrected outside of the five-day Price Correction Time Horizon. The ISO has not previously published the criteria used to evaluate whether a price correction is warranted after the expiration of the Price Correction Time Horizon. Through this initiative, the ISO will work with stakeholders to determine the circumstances under which post five-day price corrections may be made.
    • Price corrections for invalid congestion
      In January 2013, a software defect in the real-time market application did not accurately reflect certain intervals of prices for congestion observed in the Birds Landing area. The ISO will analyze the market impact to determine if good cause exists to seek regulatory relief from FERC to waive Section 35.3 of the ISO Tariff, extending implementation of price corrections beyond the standard five-day window.
    • Price inconsistency caused by intertie constraints
      Upon the start of convergence bidding, the ISO began enforcing two separate constraints at each intertie scheduling point within the integrated forward market, pursuant to ISO tariff section 31.8. The constraints prevent virtual bids from causing net interchange schedule violations of intertie scheduling limits. Enforcing the separate constraints has resulted in a difference between export pricing and the resources’ bid price. As a result, export schedules are sometimes subject to prices above submitted bid prices. Through this stakeholder initiative, the ISO will evaluate the existing market rule and consider any changes to address adverse outcomes resulting from the current design.
    • Price inconsistency market enhancements
      The ISO is seeking long-term solutions to address price inconsistencies occasionally produced in the ISO market when market solutions result in prices that do not cover the awarded bid prices. These inconsistencies can expose market participants to uneconomical awards and uncertain risks. Through this initiative we seek to: 1) develop enhancements that would reduce or eliminate root causes of price inconsistencies or 2) implement settlement mechanisms to make resources whole to their bid prices.
    • Pricing enhancements
    • Proposal to eliminate operational review tariff provision